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Abstract 
 
Ukraine is home to one of the world‘s fastest growing HIV epidemic and has 
received significant amounts of foreign aid to help it tackle the crisis. This study is 
an enquiry into the implementation of the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria (GFATM) programmes in Ukraine, during the second decade of this 
country‘s post-Soviet economic and political transition. The discussion is positioned 
within a broader debate on aid effectiveness. By looking at the GFATM as an aid 
institution whose establishment was purported to improve the aid delivery process, 
the thesis offers a critical insight on the GFATM aid delivery model in the context of 
Ukraine. 
The thesis investigates the conduct and practice of INGO and national NGOs in their 
role as Principal Recipients of GFATM grants targeting HIV prevention in Ukraine. 
Based on ethnographical enquiry conducted in three oblasts in Ukraine, and in capital 
Kyiv, the thesis aims to understand how NGOs have implemented HIV prevention 
services in context of state-owned health care system and to determine the perceived 
effects of the GF programmes on the ground. The thesis situates analysis of NGOs 
into a broader socio-political context of post-Soviet Ukraine and questions their role 
as central actors in delivering essential HIV programmes in parallel with or instead 
of the state, as well as the consequences for sustainability of such programmes. 
Using the particular experience in Ukraine, the thesis shows the influence of global 
funding institutions on relationships between state and civil society and altering of 
civil society‘s roles in aid programmes. The thesis includes a comprehensive 
literature analysis about the Global Fund and other donor programmes working in 
Ukraine in the area of HIV/AIDS.  
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List of terms and abbreviations
1
 
Activities - services the intervention provides to accomplish its objectives. Activities 
can be delivered through outreach, materials distribution, counselling sessions, 
workshops,etc. 
Affected Communities, or Communities – communities of people living with or 
affected by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria. 
AIDS - Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome  
AP- Associated Press  
ART - Antiretroviral therapy or treatment  
ARV - Antiretroviral drug  
Bilateral Donor– the term used to describe a developed-country government (or its 
specialised agency) that provides official development assistance. 
CCM - Country Coordinating Mechanism. A country-level partnership that includes 
representatives from government, multilateral and bilateral development partners, 
nongovernmental and faith-based organizations, affected communities, academic 
institutions and the private sector. 
Coverage - The percentage of persons reached by activities/services. 
CSO - civil society organisation. Associations of citizens (outside their families, 
friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and 
ideologies.  
DFID - Department for International Development (United Kingdom)  
Disbursement – a periodic payment of grant funds to a Principal Recipient. 
Donor– government, private business, foundation, or individual that makes 
contributions to the Global Fund. 
DOTS - Directly Observed Treatment Short-Course (for tuberculosis)  
EU – the European Union 
Evaluation – a systematic collection of information about the activities, 
characteristics, and outcomes of programmes to make judgments about the 
programme, improve programme effectiveness, and/or inform decisions about future 
programming. 
                                                          
1
Based on definitions provided by ICASO (n.d.), and some other sources 
vi 
 
Framework Document – the founding document of the Global Fund, developed by 
the Transitional Working Group that worked to design the Global Fund in late 2000. 
The document codifies the organization‘s purpose, principles, scope and key 
processes. 
FYE - Five-Year Evaluation of the Global Fund  
FSU – Former Soviet Union countries – usually refers to all former Soviet republics 
minus the Baltic states, and includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan 
GFATM - the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
GF – same as above 
GAVI - Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization   
GNP+ - Global Network of People Living with HIV 
Grant/grant agreement – a written agreement between the Global Fund and a PR that 
outlines the terms and conditions of Global Fund financing and the targets to be 
achieved. In most cases, the initial term lasts for two years (Phase 1), which can be 
extended for up to a further three years if the Board decides to commit additional 
resources for Phase 2. 
HIV - Human immunodeficiency virus  
HR – Harm reduction 
HSS - Health systems strengthening  
ICASO – International Council of AIDS Service Organisations  
IEG - Independent Evaluation Group (at the World Bank)  
Intervention - a specific set of activities implemented by a project or providers and 
can be focused at various levels such as the individual, small or large group, 
community or societal levels. 
INGO – International nongovernmental organisation 
IOM – International Organisation of Migration 
LFA – the Local Fund Agent of the GF.A local, independent body contracted by the 
Global Fund to provide oversight of a PR on behalf of the GF.  
MAP – Multi-country AIDS Program (World Bank)  
MARPs – Most-at-Risk-Populations 
vii 
 
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals  
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation  
MOH – the Ministry of Health 
MOU – Memorandum of understanding  
Multilateral Organization– an institution that brings together multiple countries 
working in concert on a given issue, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or 
WHO. 
NAC - National AIDS Council – a multi-sectoral body of AIDS governance in 
Ukraine 
National Strategy (or Plan) – document outlining country-specific priorities, goals 
and approaches for improving health and/or fighting AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria. 
A national strategy is typically developed by the national government (usually led by 
the Ministry of health or the national AIDS coordinating authority) but often 
involves other stakeholders.  
NFM – The New Funding Model. A new model by which the GF distributes its 
funding that replaced the previous rounds-based system. 
NGO - Nongovernmental organization  
Oblast – the name of an administrative territory in Ukraine, similar to province 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OIG – Office of the Inspector General of the GF 
PBF – Performance-based funding model of the GF: the allocation of resources 
based on the demonstration of performance. 
PEPFAR - President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (USA)  
Portfolio – the collection of grants financed by the GF. 
PLHIV - People Living with HIV 
PLWHA – People Living with HIV/AIDS 
PR (Principal Recipient) – the entity legally responsible for implementation and 
management of a grant, as set out in a grant agreement between the entity and the 
GF. PR receives disbursements from the GF, and either uses this money to 
implement programmatic activities directly and/or passes the funding on to Sub-
recipients for them to use to implement.  
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Programme – generally refers to an overarching national or sub-national systematic 
response to the epidemic and includes a number of projects and interventions. A 
programme is usually time-bound. 
Proposal – a written document that serves as the basis of an application for a GF 
grant and specifies, among other things, the beneficiaries, objectives, and activities to 
be supported by the funding requested.  
„Quick‟ tests – a form of HIV screening which uses a finger blood specimen and 
produces a result in a few minutes. May also be called ‗rapid‘ or ‗express‘ test. 
Replenishment – the forum in which, on a periodic basis (every two to three years), 
donors gather voluntarily to discuss the GF‘s progress and to voluntarily make multi-
year pledges to the organization. 
Rounds  - the GF funding cycles, usually lasting for five years. A round consists of 
Phase 1 (first two years) after which the programme gets evaluated by the GF and a 
request for Phase 2 funding is made, approved at the condition that ‗verifiable 
results‘ were achieved. Country may receive several grants, and round cycles often 
overlap. The rounds-based system is now being replaced by a New Funding Model 
(NFM). 
SR - Sub-Recipient – an organization that receives GF funding through a PR to carry 
out activities that are part of a grant agreement.  
Stop TB – Stop Tuberculosis Partnership (a global partnership program)  
TB - Tuberculosis  
UNAIDS - Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS  
UNICEF - United Nations Children‘s Fund  
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
UNODC – United Nations Office of Drug Control 
USSR – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
USAID - United States Agency for International Development  
WHO - World Health Organization 
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CHAPTER 1. DILEMMAS OF AID. THE GLOBAL HEALTH TRANSIT: 
FROM SHARED VALUES TO DISEASE-CENTRED PARTNERSHIPS. 
THE RATIONALE FOR STUDYING THE GLOBAL FUND. 
 
 
Introduction 
This study is an enquiry into the implementation of the Global Fund against 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
2
 programmes in Ukraine, during the 
second decade of this country‘s post-Soviet economic and political transition. 
GFATM is an aid institution – ―the main multilateral funder in global health‖ 
(GFATM, n.d.) that provides aid to countries to fight their HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria epidemics.  
The main argument of the thesis is that the core models promoted by GF, 
such as service delivery by NGOs, performance-based funding, and governance by a 
country coordinating mechanism were used opportunistically by Principal Recipients 
in Ukraine in delivering HIV services parallel with or instead of the state, which had 
a profound impact on sustainability of HIV prevention, on relationships between 
state and civil society and on governance of the GF programmes. The thesis draws on 
the author‘s 15 years of extensive experience with HIV/AIDS programme 
implementation, as well as with aid programmes in post-Soviet NGO sector in 
Ukraine, Russia and other FSU states. The author‘s background was important in 
choosing a research approach, which was determined as an ethnographic enquiry. 
The advantage of ethnography, taking into account the author‘s familiarity and 
experience with aid organisations, was seen, following Hammersley (1985,p. 152) in 
enabling the researcher to treat the ―familiar social settings‖ to be studied ―as 
anthropologically strange‖ in which the task for the researcher was ―to document the 
culture – the perspective and practices – of the people in these settings‖. 
Chapter 1 sets a general thematic background for the present study, whose 
subject positions it within the framework of the aid effectiveness debate. It discusses 
                                                          
2
 Throughout this thesis, the terms ―Global Fund‖, ―GF‖ and ―GFATM‖ are used interchangeably. 
2 
 
the evolution of global health institutions, describes the establishment of the GF and 
its framework principles and core models. 
Chapter 2 describes the country context of Ukraine in regard to its post-Soviet 
transformations, health systems, HIV epidemic and the entry of the GF. 
Chapter 3 addresses the methodological framework for the present research, 
reviews the key literature, document sources and other data used in writing the thesis. 
Chapter 4 summarises findings on the specificity of NGO implementation in 
the context of state HIV health care, including referral and linkage to services; target 
setting; and the perceived roles and relations of PR NGOs with other NGOs in 
Ukraine.  
Chapter 5 offers insight into the conduct of NGOs delivering HIV prevention 
services, and describes monitoring and reporting systems and practices used by PRs.  
Chapter 6 discusses the governance of GF programmes embodied in the 
Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) as perceived by study participants. 
Chapter 7 further develops the discussion and outlines the key arguments that 
this research made.  
The Conclusion outlines the implications of the aftermath of the GF 
programmes for future of HIV prevention services if the GF exits from Ukraine.    
 
1.1 The aid debate and its ramifications 
 
… years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is just 
one major area of the world in which central planning is 
still seen as a way to achieve prosperity – countries that 
receive foreign aid. 
Planners versus searchers in foreign aid (Easterly 2006) 
 
This thesis is positioned within the broad topic of aid effectiveness, which 
inspired me to undertake this study. The section below will present some of the key 
events and arguments of the aid effectiveness debate. Establishing the ramifications 
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of the aid debate was important to situate the later discussion on the GF and to enable 
conceptualising about what was happening to the GF aid delivery model in Ukraine.  
Development aid and its effectiveness have not always been subjects of 
debate. In the post-World War II (WWII) institutional environment, it seemed easy 
to make the case for development aid. Developed countries could help non-
developed countries at a negligible cost if they allocated a very small percentage of 
their GDPs to this task. Several decades after WWII, the idyllic picture of foreign aid 
―started to pale‖ (Prokopijevic 2006, p. 3), as strong criticisms began to be voiced by 
scholars and policy makers alike. These criticisms initiated the foreign aid debate. 
Although a comprehensive review of the ―massive outpouring of studies on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid‖ (Hansen and Tarp 2000, p.375) is not feasible here, I 
shall present those characteristics of the debate, most relevant to my research below. 
 In the early 1970s, Peter Bauer, a development economist, and ―a persistent 
and articulate critic of foreign aid‖ (Shleifer 2009, p. 379), formulated his position on 
aid that he saw as not only failing to speed up, but actually hurting economic 
development. Bauer defined foreign aid as ―a transfer of resources from the taxpayer 
of a donor country to the government of a recipient country‖ (Bauer 1975, p. 396).  
Williamson (2009) described the environment in which aid agencies operate 
as hindering their ability to succeed. Comparing the aid delivery business to Soviet-
style central planning, with its huge bureaucracy, she suggests that aid delivery 
problems stem from such issues as negligible feedback from beneficiaries, hard to 
observe impacts, and the low probability of bureaucratic effort. Prokopijevich (2006, 
p.19) lambasts aid agencies‘ monitoring and evaluation systems by comparing them 
to Communist centralized planning that ―never conceded that their five year-plans 
had failed‖ and referring to monitoring as ―mass deception through reporting and 
evaluation‖. Another prominent critic, William Easterly says aid bureaucracies 
organize themselves ―as a cartel of good intentions, suppressing critical feedback and 
learning from the past, suppressing competitive pressure to deliver results, and 
suppressing identification of the best channel of resources for different objectives ‖ 
(Easterly 2003, p. 34). Other authors similarly critique the ‗aid fiasco‘ (Moyo 2009; 
Lal 1996). Studies highlighting how foreign aid fails and giving possible 
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explanations as to why, were produced by Svensson (2000), Knack (2001), 
Williamson (2009) and others. 
The above criticisms charge that aid enlarges government bureaucracies in 
donor countries and perpetuates bad governments in beneficiary countries, thereby 
enriching elites. In these researchers‘ eyes, aid programs should be dramatically 
reformed, substantially curtailed, or eliminated altogether (Radelet 2006). 
Supporters counter that these arguments are overstated. After the publication 
of Bauer‘s Dissent on Development, staunch criticism of his approach was given by 
Nicholas Stern who called the book ―not a valuable contribution to the study of 
development‖ (Stern 1974, p. 209). Stern gave the following case for aid: people in 
rich countries are much richer than people in the poor ones, and therefore foreign aid 
is their moral obligation (Shleifer 2009). Hansen and Tarp (2000, p. 376) noted the 
lack of a ―strong analytical framework ... to compare and evaluate the causal 
relationships‖ in aid effectiveness studies.  
One of the key advocates of aid effectiveness is Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia 
University professor and director of The Earth Institute. Sachs supports the broad 
goal of foreign aid as embodied in the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), of which he is believed to be the main author (Prokopijevic 2006). 
He was appointed a Special Adviser on MDGs by former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, and continues in the post under current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. 
The MDGs were criticised for not creating any positive incentives for any actors, and 
for promising results that are beyond the actors‘ control to achieve (Easterly 2006). 
Nevertheless, in his 2005 book The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our 
Time, Sachs asserted that poverty can be eliminated globally by the year 2025 
through carefully planned development aid and called for a doubling of worldwide 
aid flows which he viewed as a moral obligation of rich countries that will send forth 
‗mighty currents of hope‘ (Sachs 2005). First known in Western development circles 
for his role in the 1990s as an architect of the neo-liberal
3
 ―transition from 
communism to capitalism‖ (Nee, 2010) in Eastern Europe, Sachs and the garvardskie 
                                                          
3
 ‗Neo-liberalism represents a set of ideas that emerged from the mid to late 1970s, and are famously 
associated with the economic policies introduced by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan 
in the U.S. (Jones et al 2005) Neo-liberalism advocates support for great economic liberalization, 
privatization, free trade, open markets, deregulation, and cuts in government spending. 
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malchiki (‗Harvard boys‘) with whom he worked on the U.S.-funded aid programme 
he managed
4
 are associated by many in the region with the pauperization of 
populations in Russia and Ukraine. 
The arguments presented above have been standing at the core of the foreign 
aid debate over the last 40 years.  
 1.1.1 Aid should be effective: the emergence of the Paris Declaration 
In the analyses of aid effectiveness, the motivations and incentives faced by 
all involved are often overlooked or assumed to be benevolent. In many cases, it is 
presumed that these individuals put aside their own interests and act in the best 
interest of the developing countries.
5
 Williamson attributes this position to Jeffrey 
Sachs. She further suggests that this line of reasoning assumes that donor countries 
or aid agencies are unbiased in their initial decision to donate to a specific country 
(Williamson 2009). Furthermore, it presumes that recipient governments allocate 
foreign aid in an effective manner in order to accomplish the required tasks. 
However, these assumptions are often called into question. As Svennson (2000) has 
argued, the decision-making process surrounding aid disbursement is burdened with 
different stakeholders, special interests, and ‗rent-seeking‘. 
 Over the past ten years, the international community has increasingly focused 
on ways to better coordinate development aid. This culminated in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, ―a first attempt to tackle international policy 
coordination problems in the field of development aid‖ (Severino and Ray 2010, p. 
19). Adopted in March 2005 by more than 100 countries and organisations, the Paris 
                                                          
4
 Headed by Sachs, USAID-funded project of the Harvard Institute for International Development 
promoted ‗shock therapy‘ and a voucher privatization programme in Russia and later in Ukraine that 
resulted in a rapid transfer of state-owned assets to few private hands  - ―the Great Grab‖ (Wedel 
2001, p. 138). For most ex-Soviet citizens, it meant a complete economic disenfranchising, and for 
some, extreme poverty. Intended to spread the fruits of the free market, voucher privatization, 
advocated by Sachs and advisors, was ―a de facto fraud‖ (Millar 1996) that helped to create a system 
of ―tycoon capitalism‖ in Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states. 
5
 The use of terms such as ‗developing countries,‘ the ‗Third World‘ in this thesis is for convenience 
sake only since it represents a language used by international aid organizations, including the Global 
Fund, and does not imply that all countries are following similar development or that others have 
reached a higher or final stage of development.   
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Declaration set commitments and measurable targets to which both donors and 
recipients agreed. Five central pillars of making aid effective were articulated: 
 ownership (countries should exercise leadership in setting their own 
development priorities)  
 alignment (donors to base their support on countries‘ national development 
strategies, institutions, and procedures)  
 harmonisation (donors using common, simplified, and more transparent 
arrangements and procedures, and better dividing labour) 
 managing for results (measuring results against targets) 
 mutual accountability (evaluating effectiveness based on these results). (Paris 
Declaration 2005) 
 
 The Paris Declaration was viewed as a key instrument for increasing aid 
coordination. The signatories of the Paris Declaration pledged to work toward 
indicators to harmonize, align, and more efficiently manage aid efforts (Schneider 
and Garrett 2009). Another important framework for aid coordination was the Accra 
Agenda for Action (AAA) -- signed in 2008 at the 3rd High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness. AAA built on the commitments of the Paris Declaration and set out 
four further key aid principles: 1) conditionality, 2) country systems, 3) 
predictability, and 4) untying aid.  
The results to date for the Paris Declaration are mixed (Schneider and Garrett 
2009). Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the key forum on donor aid 
information sharing, was set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development‘s (OECD) to produce annual reports on official development assistance 
(ODA)(OECD, n.d.). However, because the only enforcement mechanism for 
assuring achievement of the harmonization and alignment targets is ―moral suasion‖, 
reports produced by OECD offer ―few real rays of hope‖ (Schneider and Garrett 
2009, p. 10) in terms of donors‘ accountability. 
1.1.2 No-coordination? 
In November 2011, the Fourth High Level Forum held in Busan, Korea, 
following some of the Paris Declaration monitoring surveys, indicated that neither 
7 
 
the U.S. – a major world donor – nor other donors came close to meeting the targets 
on harmonization or many other aspects of aid effectiveness they had set for 
themselves (Lawson 2013). 
Santiso and Frot (2010) noted that the increase in the number of actors on the 
aid stage had shaped the way aid was disbursed, and argued that a growing aid 
fragmentation was drawing on administrative and human resources of the recipient 
countries, while carrying little money. As an example, Santiso and Frot noted that in 
2007, sectors in some recipient countries attracted more than 2,000 simultaneous aid 
projects, of which the most fragmented was the social sector. Djankov et al. (2009) 
found that the presence of multiple donors in a given country rendered aid less 
effective. Knack (2001) found that higher levels of aid erode the quality of 
governance. 
Not all working in foreign aid are concerned about the growing number of 
donors in recipient countries and even view no-coordination as beneficial. Lawson 
(2013) contends that the wide variety of independent donors is valuable for 
demonstrating pluralism in action and reflecting the decentralization of authority that 
many development plans promote. Others argue that having a range of active donors 
leads to more ideas, competition, and innovation (Santiso and Frot,2010). 
 
1.1.3 The adjustment of aid institutions to the „language of failure‟ 
The ‗language of failure‘ did not go unnoticed. As the criticisms of aid 
delivery began to accumulate from the 1970s on, the aid community did not 
disregard this evidence of failure. Neither did it conclude that foreign aid was a bad 
idea, as noted by Shleifer (2009). Rather, he suggests, the conceptual framework for 
foreign aid has adjusted to the failure, developing three rationales to explain for the 
lack of consistent results: 
(1) The first answer to the failure of aid was to spend more, not less. 
Proponents of this strategy claimed that insufficient spending was the reason why aid 
was not generating the anticipated benefits.  
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(2) The focus of foreign aid goals shifted from assisting the economic growth 
to poverty alleviation. Aid should become a massive welfare program for the 
developing world, which offered the distinct advantage of lower accountability for 
the donors.  
(3) Finally, efforts to lobby support for continuing and increasing aid 
spending shifted away from attempts to prove aid effectiveness. Instead, aid 
advocates began courting the sympathy of Western taxpayers and the political 
establishment, making public relations increasingly the cornerstone of foreign aid 
(Shleifer 2009). 
In this regard, one of the trends in aid delivery is to blame the recipient for its 
failure. Because in most countries, the recipients are national governments, they get 
blamed for being lazy, inactive, disinterested, corrupt, and lacking the appropriate 
institutions or understanding of the aid objectives. The ‗blame the government‘ 
narrative is particularly used when aid implementers are non-governmental: if results 
are successful, it is usually to their credit, if they are not, it‘s because of a ‗bad 
government‘. Although the ‗bad government‘ description ―frequently fits into the 
situation‖ (Prokopijevic 2006, p.17), it is ultimately the donors‘ own choice whether 
or not to enter the target country with aid. If not enough information was considered, 
including on the risks of implementing in a particular country, that should be their 
failure rather than that of the recipient. Prokopijevic attributes the prevailing view of 
donors as ‗good‘ and recipients as being ‗at fault‘ to the international media, and 
notes that all important decisions and instruments [in regard to information 
dissemination] are in the hands of donors. 
A potential remedy to address presumed deficits of ‗bad government‘ in aid 
delivery was suggested in Paul Collier‘s book The Bottom Billion (2007), a ―long-
sought middle way between the critics and the cheerleaders of foreign aid‖ (Easterly 
2007, p. 1475). As an alternative aid delivery model, Collier suggests ―Independent 
Service Authorities‖ (ISAs) - organisations, independent from the government, that 
co-opt civil society to manage aid and public money and incorporate the scrutiny of 
public opinion and NGOs to determine how to maximize output from the expenditure 
of this money. Having himself acknowledged later that donor support for NGOs was 
9 
 
not ―backed by adequate evaluation of their performance: they are, in effect, 
unaccountable,‖ Collier and colleagues admitted that this model needed to be 
―tailored to the distinctive needs of fragile states‖ (Bold, Collier and Zeitlin 2009, 
p.2). Although widely acclaimed, Collier‘s book has also been criticised for its lack 
of historical and contextual analysis of states ‗at the bottom billion‘, and for failing to 
show ―the complicity of Western powers in the trap of the ‗curse of resources‘‖ 
(Hoebink 2008, p. 735), while the use of military intervention to reduce conflict and 
guarantee democracy was deemed as the most controversial proposal in Collier‘s 
book by Segal (2008) and others.  
 
1.2 The case of aid to the former Soviet bloc 
It may seem easy to make the case for foreign aid in the post-Communist 
world. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe resulted in promised Western 
aid in the billions of dollars. The peoples of the countries that liberated themselves 
from the Communist regimes in 1989 in East and Central Europe, and in 1991 in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) needed help in building their economies, political 
systems, and societies to quickly join the family of world nations and continue living 
happily ever after. Despite the fact that pro-democracy movements emerged earlier 
in Eastern Europe than in the FSU, the political momentum for change was ripe in all 
parts of that world. Local populations believed that political change was necessary, 
and people wanted to live in established, democratically-run states with well-
functioning economies. In terms of their political importance, and their proclaimed 
goals, Western aid programmes were much welcomed in all post-Communist 
countries. But in channelling the aid the donors encountered complex systems of 
patronage and social relations (Bruno 1998; Wedel 2001). Several key features 
distinguished the delivery of aid in the FSU states. 
 The shift from an aid giver to aid taker  
 The Soviet Union was a great source of aid (Carothers 1999b). Aid 
programmes sponsored by the USSR were common in parts of Africa, the Middle 
East, Asia, and Latin America. The sudden status of post-communist states in the 
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1990s as recipients of Western aid was a profound reversal of their self-image as aid 
givers. There was no institutional background/infrastructure for absorbing the large 
influx of aid. While this shift was mainly ideological, FSU countries‘ prior ability to 
deliver aid, including at the UN level, surely meant that they were able to determine 
their own goals and priorities. However, there is no evidence that Western donors 
ever attempted to utilise their expertise. 
 Strategic approaches to aid delivery 
Carothers (1999b) distinguished two important approaches to aid delivery to 
civil society organizations in post-communist countries. The first viewed aid delivery 
as a continuation of the ideological battles of the Cold War, and promoted 
anticommunist groups and anticommunist agendas, as well as was excluding anyone 
with a politically tainted past. This approach seemed more appropriate in Eastern 
Europe, where power transitioned from the old communist elites to newly emerged 
democrats. Carothers noted that the anticommunist agenda could not be promoted 
effectively in the FSU region where none of the new political elites were completely 
disengaged from the communist connection and therefore ―true change became more 
difficult because the legacies of communism tended to be more entrenched the 
farther east the donors went‖ (Wedel 2001, p. 206). With the principal objective of 
Western organisations to ensure that communism could not return to the FSU region, 
aid agencies dedicated themselves to ―demolishing the state structures of the Soviet 
era‖ as quickly as possible and without viable alternatives (ibid., p. 173). Particularly 
in Ukraine, ‗democracy promotion‘ and support for NGOs bypassing the state was a 
consistent feature of aid programmes, as discussed in Chapter 2. Among the 
criticisms of the ‗democracy promotion‘ model was that, by promoting a very 
specific and idealized notion of democracy, arising mainly from the Western 
perspective, it tended to support a one-size-fits-all approach, paid little attention to 
local contexts, and frequently treated ―the symptoms rather than the causes of 
democratic deficits‖ (Carothers 1999b, p. 101).  
The second feature of aid agencies in the FSU lay in adhering to their ‗Third 
World‘ experience: ―Although in theory, donors recognized the distinctiveness of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the point of reference for many aid providers was their 
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Third World experience‖ (Wedel 2001, p.38-39). This meant the transposition of 
entire bureaucratic structures, strategies, systems, and, in many cases, the actual 
personnel of traditional foreign aid programmes, to a completely new post-
communist landscape. The essence of this approach is described by Carothers 
(1999b) as ‗the external project‘ method, a traditional aid approach in which an 
external organisation runs all aspects of implementation work, uses external 
consultants to assess the needs of the recipient country and designs the projects to 
meet those needs. In the FSU, the ‗external project‘ approach became the 
predominant form of aid delivery. It tended to restrict funding to fairly narrow 
groups, typically ―intellectual elites concentrated in capital cities‖ (Hann 1998, p. 
xiii). As I argue in Chapter 2, this often led to sidelining bona fide grass roots 
organisations and implanting ‗transnational advocates‘ – international NGOs with 
pre-set external agendas. In regard to the Global Fund, whose programmes in 
Ukraine were managed by an international NGO (INGO) and its linking 
organisations, the new and multiple relationships appeared in health services, HIV 
prevention organisation and within civil society. The need to identify and analyse the 
outcomes of these programmes prompted the development of my research. 
An important aspect of the project mentality is the planned character of aid 
delivery – ‗central planning mentality‘ - in which ―the answer to the tragedies of 
poverty is a large bureaucratic apparatus to dictate quantities of different 
development goods and services‖ (Easterly 2006, p. 1). The terminology of 
‗planning‘ was a ―conventional wisdom in the development community‖ (Friedman 
and Sowell 2005, p.443). Western donors seemed unaware of the ironies involved in 
delivering aid using ‗central planning‘ methods in FSU countries that were originally 
based on central planning. In doing this, they were to ―follow in Communism‘s 
footsteps‖ (Wedel 2001, p. 165) and encounter old Soviet-era legacies and work 
practices that, in particular, appeared in the way GF programmes were run on the 
ground, discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5 that analyse the GF programme 
delivery by NGOs in Ukraine. 
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1.3 The rationale for studying the Global Fund  
The establishment of the GF can be viewed both as a response to aid critics 
and a reflection of its backers‘ belief that a new approach was needed, one that could 
operate more effectively than existing bilateral and multilateral aid mechanisms 
(Wigell 2008). Among the criticisms of foreign aid that the establishment of the GF 
was intended to change were: 
 Aid programs are inefficient, with large bureaucracies imposing high 
administrative costs on recipients (Easterly 2003).   
 Aid is misallocated.  Too much aid is directed toward countries that either are 
not the poorest or do not have policies conducive to using aid effectively 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000; Collier and Dollar 2002).  
 Donors do not sufficiently involve recipients in program design, and earmark 
significant funds for their own priorities, leading to a lack of local ownership 
of aid programs.    
 Donor activities are not well coordinated or harmonised, with multiple donors 
financing similar projects with differing design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation systems, which leads to duplication, and less effective aid.  
 Donors do not adapt their approach to differing circumstances on the ground 
in recipient countries, relying on a one-size-fits-all approach for all recipients, 
regardless of the quality of their governance and commitment to strong 
development policies (Radelet 2004). 
 Donors do not build institutional capacity in recipient countries, and instead 
often bypass local institutions and try to substitute for them, which 
undermines institutional capacity and retards development.  
 Incentives are badly skewed. Donors focus on providing inputs rather than on 
achieving specified development outcomes and their staffs are rewarded 
accordingly. 
 Monitoring and evaluation systems are deeply flawed. Baseline data are 
rarely recorded and indicators for progress are badly chosen, so there is little 
systematic information about what works and what does not. 
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The G8 Genoa Summit Communiqué in 2001 that confirmed the establishment of 
the GF, outlined specifically how a new Fund would work differently:  
The Fund will promote an integrated approach emphasising prevention in a 
continuum of treatment and care… operate according to principles of proven 
scientific and medical effectiveness, rapid resource transfer, low transaction 
costs, and light governance with a strong focus on outcomes… the existence 
of the Fund will promote improved co-ordination among donors and provide 
further incentives for private sector research and development…The 
engagement of developing countries in the purpose and operation of the Fund 
will be crucial to ensure ownership and commitment to results. Local 
partners, including NGOs, and international agencies, will be instrumental in 
the successful operation of the Fund.(G8 Genoa 2001) [emphasis added] 
The research presented herein may be viewed as an extension into the studies 
about aid delivery and its effectiveness, using the particular experience of the Global 
Fund programmes in Ukraine. It sought to examine how the GF aid delivery model, 
as a new promised form of aid delivery, manifested itself on the ground in Ukraine.  
 
1.3.1 Dilemmas of studying aid programmes: the need for a „critical space‟.  
At the beginning of this chapter, a number of factors that led to a questioning 
of the effectiveness of aid have been discussed. Studying concrete effects of aid 
programmes, however, presents a researcher with several dilemmas.  
The first, ‗external‘ dilemma, appears in international context, in which 
donors, being powerful decision makers, exert significant influence on aid research, 
its design, scope and methods. As Habicht et al (1999, p.16) noted, variability of 
standards of certainty required by decision makers in judging the effectiveness of 
[aid] interventions poses ―a major barrier to rational public policy‖. Among the 
issues of concern associated with donor-led evaluations are: different ways how 
donor agreements may guide evaluation into certain (and rigid) criteria, a perceived 
neutrality of donor-led evaluations, and power inequalities arising in the context of 
research that may result in a lack of voice for all those engaged in aid delivery. An 
example of how research into aid implementation became a challenge for the 
researchers, is presented in a text Box 1 below, as described by Walt et al. (2008, 
p.311): 
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Box 1. Applying health policy analysis in a fast moving policy environment 
Brugha et al. (2002, 2004) have conducted a number of studies on global 
health initiatives such as the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Designed to gather and report the views of national-level 
stakeholders at very early stages in their implementation, the studies were sensitive. 
For the Global Fund, in particular, the research was perceived as premature, enabling 
country stakeholders to articulate criticisms, which it feared would have a deleterious 
effect on the need to raise significantly greater funds globally. The Global Fund 
Secretariat in Geneva requested that the scope of the study be widened to report its 
perspective, which was beyond the capacity and resources available to the 
researchers. In both studies, under pressure from funding agencies, the researchers 
reported findings within 9 months. The researchers resisted pressure from the Global 
Fund Secretariat to report interim findings to the Fund in late 2003, in advance of 
reporting back to country stakeholders. 
The policy environment was very fluid, and the researchers found they were 
tracking a moving target — one where the Global Fund itself was responding to 
difficulties, changing guidelines, and proving to be a ‗learning organization‘. Despite 
what the researchers viewed as rapid feedback of findings, given the need for rigour, 
the study funders and the Global Fund responded that the findings only confirmed 
what they had already learned through their own channels; and that these findings 
were being superseded by events.  
The dynamic nature of the policy environment made data collection and 
analysis difficult, and created sensitivities between the global initiatives, research 
funders and the researchers. One lesson was that maintaining a balance between 
independence and engagement with the entity being studied is difficult but key; 
building trust is essential if findings are to be taken on board.    
 
The second, ‗internal‘ dilemma, appears at the country level. While the 
context of aid delivery is widely and grossly different in different countries, as 
Riddell (2009) points out, there is usually little attempt to find out whether most aid 
works or not in particular countries or settings. This task is far from easy. With 
various vested interest groups operating in countries around the aid programmes, 
often not easily recognisable by an outside observer, the aid research may also be 
guided or distorted by powerful in-country stakeholders. 
Because of an often partisan nature of the aid discourse, creating a research 
environment for conducting an independent study of aid is a task far from easy. To 
look into donor-funded activities and study the aid delivery processes, the need is 
crucial to create a research environment that would allow including a broader scope 
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of views to be reflected, including those that may not necessarily be positive 
accounts. 
In this regard, I felt an acute need to set a ‗critical space‘ that could allow for 
more critical voices to be heard in order to capture more fully the voices of all with a 
stake in the aid delivery process and to construct a broader and more representative 
picture of how the aid delivery works on the ground. Creating a ‗critical space‘ for 
my research was necessary in order to question, following Easterly and Williamson, 
whether the aid agencies [in this case, the GF] performed the way they say they 
should – the question was named by the latter authors as ―the key one in the aid 
effectiveness debate‖ (Easterly and Williamson, n.d., p. 6). The methodology and a 
chosen research approach are described in more detail in Chapter 3.  
The need for a ‗critical space‘ was also apparent given the typical GF and its 
Principal Recipients‘ narratives about Ukraine as a ―success story‖ of HIV/AIDS 
programmes (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012, p. 10). This narrative was 
persisting despite the history of being the first ever country whose grant was 
suspended by the GF, and applied to the ‗after-suspension‘ context to describe the 
GF programme implementation by an INGO/NGOs. The ‗success‘ narrative in 
Ukraine has been utilized by PRs to assert the GF principle of civil society 
engagement in aid delivery (an example of a GF-funded ‗success story‘ publication 
is provided in Appendix F), while the ‗blame the government‘ and ‗weak and corrupt 
government‘ rhetoric has been applied to Ukraine‘s state and its health services. As 
Prokopijevich (2006) suggested, the latter rhetoric is usually utilised by donors in 
cases of aid failure.  
The narrative juxtaposing state and non-governmental programmes referring 
to the Government of Ukraine as weak, corrupt, and ineffective, in contrast to ‗well-
established INGOs‘, remained a characteristic feature of GF communications, as well 
as of the other donors. For example, in 2008, the head of the UNAIDS mission 
presenting results of its evaluation to stakeholders in Kyiv, said: 
The Global Fund grant programmes clearly specify targets, and how 
prevention programmes will be implemented and monitored. The workplans 
for the GF programmes represent a clearer and more useful framework for the 
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national prevention programme than does the national AIDS programme of 
the Government (UNAIDS, 2008).  
Zhukova (2013) defined the GF discourse in Ukraine as ―transnational 
biopolitics‖ and argued that juxtaposition to the state aimed to create ―the image of 
an international goodness in saving lives in a post-Soviet region as opposed to the 
image of the impotent post-Soviet state which put those lives at risk, not being able 
to protect them in the face of the epidemic‖ (Zhukova 2013, p. 249). 
1.3.2 Research question and aims of the research 
To enable a critical prism to look closer at the GF programmes delivery on 
the ground in Ukraine, the preferred research approach for my study was chosen to 
be an ethnographic enquiry.  
This research addresses the following key Research Question: 
How have the programmes funded by the Global Fund promoted its service delivery 
and governance models, and what was their impact on HIV prevention policies, 
services and governance systems in Ukraine? 
Aims of the research 
This inquiry critically examines the Global Fund aid delivery model and its 
effects on the delivery of HIV prevention services in Ukraine during Rounds 1 and 6 
of GF grants (2003-2012) as they were perceived ‗on the ground‘ by aid delivery 
participants. 
These two Rounds were chosen for the following reasons: 
 Round 1 suspension to Ukraine was the first suspension in the GF history and 
received a great deal of international attention
6
. Despite this, there has been 
no significant research into the aftermath of the suspension and the grant 
transfer to an international NGO. 
 Rounds 1 and 6 (R1-R6) covered the period when GF funding to Ukraine and 
the EECA region was at its highest. During this time, important interventions 
and policies were practiced. 
                                                          
6
 More details on how the GF suspended Ukraine‘s Round 1 grant in 2004 are provided in Chapter 2. 
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Guided by the research aim, the current study fulfilled the following objectives: 
 Critically reviewed the evidence available, using the delivery of HIV 
prevention services as an example, on how the GF performance-based model 
manifested itself in target setting and monitoring practices, referrals between 
NGO-run settings and state health care, and in other aspects of GF-funded 
HIV services. 
 Analysed the roles and relationships that appeared between Principal 
Recipient NGO(s) and other state and non-state stakeholders when they acted 
as GF implementers; 
 Analysed how the GF country governance model - the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) – manifested itself in Ukraine through country-run 
processes and structures. 
In Conclusion, the research makes recommendations to improve the effectiveness of 
HIV prevention in Ukraine. 
1.4 Global health policies and governance before the Global Fund.  
The section below offers insights of the debate on the Global Fund by 
presenting an overview of the development in international health policy institutions 
over time. Taking the 1948 creation of the World Health Organization (WHO) as a 
point of departure, I shall present an overview of international health policy 
institutions, describing the political context of each period, in which the dominant 
actors, key publications and events are identified, that preceded the establishment of 
the GF. 
1.4.1 Post WWII: the „shared values‟ era in global health 
The end of WWII brought about a tremendous rise of global governance 
institutions, including, primarily, the United Nations (UN). As the Allies were 
winning the war against Nazi Germany, the UN Conference on International 
Organization was convened in April 1945 in San Francisco. It resulted in the creation 
of the UN Charter (Moore and Pubantz 2006), which was ratified by most nations by 
October 1945.  
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Savedoff (2012) distinguishes two paradigms for international cooperation: 
‗global government‘ and ‗mixed coalition‘. He describes a global government 
paradigm as a form of cooperation that models its organisations, procedures, and 
actions on the typical form of a modern nation-state. The logic of such an approach is 
to use the authority and legitimacy of government to establish rules and actions that 
are binding for member states. The UN system was an institution created under this 
paradigm, along with such later organizations as the European Union (EU). The 
global government paradigm presupposes fixed membership of nation-states for a 
wide range of activities to be carried out by international institutions. The result is a 
set of laws and institutions that are binding for all members and are exercised by 
signing international conventions and declarations with their subsequent ratification 
by member countries. 
A ‗mixed-coalition‘ paradigm represents a more fluid approach than that of 
global government. It assembles interested parties — which may include nation-
states, private foundations, for-profit firms, and civil society groups — around 
specific initiatives that may or may not result in the establishment of formal 
organizations. This approach works opportunistically — members take action that 
ultimately, they hope, will demonstrate success and gain broader international 
adherence. An example of a mixed coalition initiative is the Global Fund against 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Savedoff 2012).   
In the second part of the 20
th
 century, Savedoff (2012) argues, the ‗global 
government‘ paradigm prevailed in international relations. He attributes this to the 
fact that, despite ideological divisions separating the Soviet bloc from the Western 
countries, the idea of the social-welfare state was more widely shared. Harvey (2005) 
defined the role of the welfare state as focusing on full employment, economic 
growth, and the welfare of its citizens, where the state power should be freely 
deployed, and, if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes 
to achieve these ends. In the post-WWII era, the rise of global health institutions 
reflected the era of shared values on social welfare. 
1.4.2 The rise and eclipse of the WHO 
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The World Health Organization (WHO) was among the new institutions for 
global governance with a long history of advocating for equity in health (Ewig 2010) 
and most of the foundations of modern international health policy were established 
during this era of shared values on health care. But, in the divided Cold War world, 
health care often became ―the vehicle for a political and ideological battle‖ (WHO 
2008). 
The WHO was ―a hybrid institution‖ with diplomatic and political structures, 
whose governance structure was problematic from the start (Savedoff 2012, p. 6). 
First, in 1948, the US delayed ratification of the WHO constitution. Despite a general 
agreement about WHO‘s role in improving health care for the poor, shared by the 
USSR, Scandinavian nations and several other European states, the US vehemently 
opposed WHO‘s alleged involvement in what was referred to as ―socialist‘ 
medicine‖ (Siddiqi 1995, p. 102). A compromise was found that allowed the US to 
ratify the WHO constitution, which included limiting the WHO‘s role in social care 
issues to fact-finding, analysis and collaboration with other agencies (Siddiqi 1995). 
The US Congress ratified the WHO constitution with reservations that it would not 
commit the US to enact any specific legislative program (American Journal of 
International Law 1950). The issue of accessible health care has remained 
problematic in the US until the present day
7
. 
In 1949, the WHO suffered a blow when the Soviet Union withdrew its 
membership on the grounds that ―the direction the organization has taken did not 
correspond to the tasks which were set in 1946 at the inaugural conference‖(Siddiqi 
1995, p. 103). The move was followed by other socialist member states who 
complained about WHO not contributing enough in vaccines, antibiotics, drugs and 
research to countries that suffered under German occupation, and also that WHO was 
falling under American domination. Andrey Gromyko, the Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister at the time, called the WHO ‗useless‘ (Siddiqi 1995).  
                                                          
7
 In 1993, the attempt to reform the US health-care was made by a Democratic U.S. President Bill 
Clinton who introduced a ‗Health Security Act‘, a comprehensive plan to provide universal health 
care for all Americans. The plan faced fierce opposition from conservatives and the powerful health 
insurance industry, as well as competing vested interests within the Democratic Party, and was not 
successful. Political battles resumed over current U.S. President Obama‘s Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, including an infamous U.S. Government shutdown in October 2013 aimed at 
blocking Obamacare from being funded (Galston 2013). 
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Stalin‘s death in 1953 signified the end of the USSR‘s isolationist foreign 
policy and the country‘s return to the international arena. The USSR returned to full 
WHO membership in 1957. Numerous new, post-colonial member states also joined, 
serving to dilute the influence of the Western countries (Siddiqi 1995), while the 
Soviet Union viewed the WHO as ―a platform from which to demonstrate the 
superiority of Soviet socialist medicine‖ (Osakwe 1972, p. 125), and it was also 
training cadres for new post-colonial states by educating many African students in 
Soviet medical institutes.  
Around this time, the US President Dwight Eisenhower formulated the need 
to provide funding for international health in his Special Message to the U.S. 
Congress: 
For half of mankind, disease and disability are a normal condition of life. 
This incalculable burden not only causes poverty and distress, and impedes 
economic development, but provides a fertile field for the spread of 
communism.(Eisenhower 1955) 
 
As the collective voting power of Second and Third World countries was 
increasing, disparities grew between voting strength and the financial contributions 
of WHO member states. The emergence of the Geneva Group (states that paid a 
majority of contributions) and the Group of 77 (representing interests of developing 
countries) marked the divide 
(Savedoff 2012), while globally, the 
emergence of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) – a major attempt 
―to thwart the Cold War‖ (Subedi 
1996, p. 169) - symbolized a new, 
‗Southern‘ vision of world order.  
A major effort to consolidate 
international health policy was made 
at the landmark Alma Ata Health 
Conference in 1978 (see logo). 
Convened by the WHO and the 
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United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), and hosted by the USSR, the Alma Ata 
conference drew representatives from 134 countries, 67 international organisations, 
and many NGOs and resulted in the adoption of the Alma Ata Declaration of Health. 
Section One of the Declaration defined ―health as a state of complete physical, 
mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, a 
fundamental human right and that the attainment of the highest possible level of 
health is a most important world-wide social goal‖(WHO 1978). Section Three of the 
Declaration emphasised the role of the state in providing adequate health and social 
measures, and enunciated the ―Health for All by the Year 2000‖ call for the 
attainment by all peoples of the world of primary health care ―based on practical, 
scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and technology made 
universally accessible‖ (Gillam 2008, p.536).  
Soon after the endorsement of the Alma Ata Declaration, the Primary Health 
Care (PHC) model came under attack from politicians and aid experts in developed 
countries who could accept neither the core PHC principle that communities in 
developing countries would be responsible for planning and implementing their own 
healthcare services (Hall and Taylor 2003), nor the PHC model, considered too broad 
and idealistic to be implemented widely. An article published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine in 1979 - entitled: ―Selective primary health care: an interim 
strategy for disease control in developing countries‖ (Walsh and Warren 1979) – 
suggested the costs of PHC approach were too high. The proposed approach was 
instead to fight against a limited number of diseases by concentrating on specific 
interventions that, according to the authors, would be most cost-efficient: 
vaccinations, promoting longer breast feeding, anti-malaria activities and oral 
rehydration. This approach prioritised rapid results over long-term objectives, based 
upon technical criteria and side-lining the notions of participatory decision-making 
and community-based approaches to health (Van Olmen et al. 2012). It represented 
the start of a movement, called Selective PHC, in a direction argued to be exactly 
opposite to the Alma Ata Declaration (Italian Global Health Watch 2008).  
International funders were also becoming wary of funding comprehensive, 
broad-based programmes. Having vertical, definable, and time-limited programmes 
22 
 
that could be changed every few years, suited both donor agencies and donor 
governments (Hall and Taylor 2003). Newell (1988), Green (1999) and others 
warned about a threat of Selective PHC and called the attempts to alter it ―a counter-
revolution‖ and ―a form of health feudalism that is destructive rather than an 
alternative, attractive to professionals, financing agencies and governments that are 
seeking results in the short term‖(Newell 1988, p.903). 
The WHO 2000 ‘World Health Report, Health Systems: Improving 
Performance‘ put the failure of PHC to achieve its goal down to inadequate funding 
and insufficient training and equipment for health workers (Hall and Taylor 2003), 
while the 2008 ‗World Health Report - Primary Health Care (Now More Than Ever)‘ 
issued on the 30
th
 anniversary of Alma-Ata Conference (WHO 2008) was seen as an 
attempt to ―resurrect PHC‖ (Takemi and Reich 2009). 
Political and corporate interests continued to influence WHO‘s later years. 
After the election of Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima as WHO Director-General in 1988, USA 
froze its contributions as it disputed numerous WHO initiatives such as the 
promotion of the International Code on Breast Milk Substitutes, and the launching of 
the Essential Drugs Program, fiercely opposed by the pharmaceutical industry 
(Italian Global Health Watch 2008). With WHO budget reduced, programs began to 
be financed ad hoc through extra-budgetary funds provided by various donors and by 
the early 1990s such funds represented 54% of the entire budget of the WHO (Italian 
Global Health Watch 2008). The growing prominence of extra-budgetary funds 
raised concern that “few richer member states and powerful external individual 
donors and alliances may direct WHO about where the organization's efforts and 
funds should be spent, by supporting specific programmes and not others, by making 
ad hoc decisions, rather than developing strategic policies over the longer 
term‖(Missoni 2008, p.6).   
Between 1948 and 1998, the WHO moved from being the unquestioned 
leader of international health to being an organization in crisis (Brown et al. 2006). 
The prestige of the WHO got a boost in 1998 after the election of the former Prime 
Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland as the WHO Director General. Her 
1998-2005 tenure, although marked by initiatives such as the Framework Convention 
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on Tobacco Control, in general reflected the adoption of a policy approach similar to 
that promoted by the World Bank and was followed by more proliferation of 
activities financed by extra-budgetary mechanisms which soon greatly outnumbered 
those funded by the WHO regular budget (Italian Global Health Watch 2008). Some 
of those activities became to be known as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
Defined as ―a collaborative relationship which transcends national boundaries 
and brings together at least three parties, among them a corporation (and/or industry 
association) and an intergovernmental organization, so as to achieve a shared health-
creating goal on the basis of a mutually agreed division of labour‖ (Buse and Walt 
2000, p. 550), PPPs later were also referred to as Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) 
(Walker 2009). Missoni (2008) attributes to Brundtland‘s tenure at the WHO the 
promotion of ‗partnerships and other interactions with the corporate sector‘ – among 
those she had strongly supported was the Global Alliance on Vaccines and 
Immunizations (GAVI), and the GF. Although Missoni concludes that at the end of 
Brundtland's mandate, WHO's international credibility had been restored, others 
(Brown et al 2006; Hawkes 2011; Savedoff 2012) argued that in its later years, with 
the extra-budgetary funding by Western donors earmarked for specific programmes, 
WHO‘s agenda was distorted, and it was eclipsed by PPPs – its own creation:  
Despite its past accomplishments, WHO fits increasingly uneasily into a 
world with a growing number of international players who seem fleeter of 
foot and deeper of pocket. Set up as an agency to provide advice to 
governments at a time when government health departments were the prime 
movers in health policy and delivery, it seems passé beside such upstarts as 
the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance, 
and private philanthropies (Hawkes, 2011). 
PPPs as a trend in vertical programming, received much criticism (Levine 
2006; Garrett 2007) as causing more problems than they solve: ―... priority should go 
toward activities that are part of the global public goods agenda, including setting 
norms and building knowledge within public health, and away from operational tasks 
and advocacy for the specific ―cause of the day‖ diseases‖ (Levine 2006, p.1016). 
Being vertically structured, they may create ―stand alone programmes‖ when being 
put on the ground in countries (Drew 2005c, p.13). PPPs were put in question for 
focusing ―on particularistic issues‖ and lacking ―the permanent authority, ongoing 
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financial commitments, and the continuity needed to address major global problems 
over the long term‖ (Forman and Segaar 2006, p. 208). Some have questioned the 
legitimacy of global PPPs (Missoni, 2008). 
1.4.3 The emergence of neo-liberalist agenda: a „New Age‟ in global health 
The rise of neo-liberalism following the 1970s decline of the welfare state 
(Coburn 2000) manifested in the conservative anti-government-bureaucracy backlash 
of the 1980s, ―epitomized by Reagan and Thatcher and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989‖ (Savedoff 2012, p. 5), while the USSR‘s dissolution in 1991 put the end to the 
―politics of public health as a by-product of the Cold War‖ (Osakwe 1972, p. 118). 
These events fundamentally affected the global health architecture and paved a way 
for the emergence of new and powerful players.  
In 1993, the World Bank, one of the pillars of neo-liberalist policies, released 
a famous ‗Investment in Health‘ world development report (The World Bank, 1993) 
that asserted a failure of the then-existing various health systems and proposed a new 
approach for finance and organisation of healthcare. Among the measures it 
suggested were: 
 Cost-effectiveness as the main tool for choosing among possible health 
interventions;  
 Governments were advised to decide their countries‘ health priorities and 
resource allocation policies according to cost-effectiveness and disability-
adjusted life years (DALY)
8
. Less cost-effective services such as tertiary care, 
heart surgery, treatment of highly fatal cancers, etc. should not be for paid by 
government; 
 Only a minimum package of essential services should be paid for by the 
government; 
 Governments should privatise healthcare services, by selling the public goods 
and services, and buying services from the private sector;  
                                                          
8
In 1990, Harvard University developed the concept of Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY), which 
was launched by the World Bank and WHO as a measure for the burden of disease.  
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 Government financing of public health and essential clinical services would leave 
the coverage of remaining clinical services to private finance, mediated through 
insurance (The World Bank 1993). 
The World Bank report reflected a major change in the nature of healthcare 
service delivery in resource-poor countries and made little mention of the term 
‗Primary Health Care‘. Instead, it considered the delivery of healthcare services in 
terms of the economic benefit that improved health could presumably deliver, and 
saw health improvement mainly in terms of improvement of human capital for 
development, rather than as a consequence and fruit of development. The Bank 
approach became known as ‗Health Sector Reform‘. It heralded an emphasis on 
using the private sector to deliver healthcare services while reducing or removing the 
role of state services. User fees, cost recovery, private health insurance, and public–
private partnerships became the ‗buzz words‘ for healthcare. In the next 20 years, 
these measures became to be implemented worldwide (Civaner n.d.).  
With the World Bank‘s entry as a major player in health policy, the WHO 
began to lose its international leadership capacity (Ewig 2010) and was soon 
displaced as ―the most influential actor in health‖ (Van Olmen et al. 2012, p.774). 
Numerous studies have critiqued the ‗global blueprint‘ for health policy 
advocated by the World Bank (Whithead et al. 2001). The focus of the critique was, 
for instance, on the ‗cost-effectiveness approach‘, which was believed to obscure the 
complex, social nature of illness and resulted in a number of problems, including 
reduced access to health services, cost inflation, and resource misallocation 
(Homedes and Ugalde 2006; Janes et al 2006; Waitzkin et al 2007).  
Whitehead et al (2001, p.833) have indicated that attempts to undermine 
public services posed ―threats to equity in the well-established social-welfare 
systems of Europe and Canada‖. For fragile middle- and low-income countries, the 
introduction of user fees for public services, and the growth of out-of-pocket 
expenses for private services represented a ―poverty trap‖.  
At the end of the 1990, the critique came ‗from within‘ the World Bank, 
when its former chief economist Joseph Stiglitz articulated his view of neo-liberal 
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policies as theoretically and historically inaccurate, and lacking transparency (Stiglitz 
1998). Stiglitz‘s critique may have paved the way for some loosening of the World 
Bank‘s position on the role of state regulation, which coincided with the rise of the 
UN‘s new human development paradigm. The key to the new paradigm was the 
Human Development Index (HDI) that included, in addition to GDP, the average 
measure of life expectancy, literacy and educational attainment (Ewig 2010). 
Ultimately, however, global health policy remained predominantly neo-liberalist, 
including the way health reforms were implemented in post-communist countries. 
 
1.4.4 The global AIDS response architecture before the GF  
Figure 1.1 Chronology of the global AIDS response (Merson et al 2008, p.482) 
 
The first attempt at institutionalizing the global AIDS response was a launch 
by WHO in 1987 of its Control Programme on AIDS (CPA) ―to direct and 
coordinate the global response to the pandemic‖ (Merson et al 2008, p. 480). The 
CPA‘s first director was Jonathan Mann. Renamed in 1988 as the Global Programme 
on AIDS (GPA), it became the largest programme in WHO‘s history. Mann‘s 
leadership received much credit for having raised global awareness of the AIDS 
pandemic and for his courage to demand a human rights-based response to the 
pandemic (Fee and Parry, 2008), by recognizing and reaching out to activist and 
community groups and networks of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). 
Despite its achievements, GPA was unable to muster the political will required to 
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mount the necessary response in affected and donor countries, in part because of its 
inability to engage nations‘ leaders in the sensitive policies linked to HIV 
transmission (Merson et al. 2008).  
Serious tensions existed among UN agencies and HIV/AIDS experts 
regarding the priority that should be given to different approaches to HIV prevention. 
Some felt that HIV/AIDS should be tackled primarily as a public health problem 
with an emphasis on shorter term, behavioural interventions such as condom 
promotion and social marketing, sex education of youth in and out of school, 
voluntary HIV testing and counselling, and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs). Others believed that the pandemic could best be controlled with a longer-
term development approach that addressed structural determinants that increase 
vulnerability to HIV infection, such as gender, human rights, poverty and community 
development. The diverging views on how best to combat HIV impeded the ability 
of UN agencies and bilateral donors to harmonize their efforts at the country level, 
and polarized the HIV/AIDS community (Merson et al. 2008). In 1990, Mann 
resigned over tensions with WHO‘s Director-General Nakajima (CGD 2009). An 
external review led to the decision to close the GPA in 1996 and replace it with a 
new agency to coordinate the work of the UN on AIDS - the UN Special Programme 
on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), fully established in 1997.  
The push for the new programme came from the donors who hoped that a 
slimmer and more efficient UNAIDS, with emphasis on coordination rather than 
direct financial support to countries, would require less funding than the GPA 
(Merson et al. 2008). The role for the newly created UNAIDS was to: 
.. achieve and promote global consensus on policy and programmatic 
approaches; strengthen the capacity of the UN system to monitor trends and 
lessons learned and to ensure that appropriate and effective policies and 
strategies are put into operation at country-level; strengthen the capacity of 
governments to draw up comprehensive national strategies, and to coordinate 
and implement effective HIV/AIDS activities at country level; promote 
broad-based political and social mobilization to prevent and control 
HIV/AIDS within countries, ensuring that national responses involve a wide 
range of sectors and institutions; and advocate greater political commitment 
in responding to HIV/AIDS epidemics at global and country levels, including 
the mobilization and allocation of adequate resources for HIV/AIDS. (WHA 
1993) 
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Initially co-sponsored by seven agencies
9
, UNAIDS was led since its 
inception until 2008 by its founding Executive Director, Dr. Peter Piot, with whom 
the program has become closely identified (CGD 2009)
10
. The organisation‘s first 
years were challenging. Unlike the co-sponsoring agencies, each with a specific 
mandate, the UNAIDS, despite the broadly set goals, did not have a mandate to 
coordinate the work of the UN and ―to reach beyond the organization to all sectors to 
forge a global agenda on HIV and AIDS‖ (CGD 2009, p. 5). 
As a mechanism for in-country coordination, UNAIDS introduced UN Theme 
Groups on HIV/AIDS – ―the main vehicles through which agencies in the [UN] 
system coordinate their activities at the country level‖ (UNAIDS 2005, p. 15). UN 
Theme Groups often had difficulties getting started, because of lack of collaboration 
between UN co-sponsors and other donors
11
. Gradually, donor governments 
diminished their contributions, which led to a decrease in UNAIDS staffing and 
programmes at the country level (Merson et al. 2008).  
While it is generally acknowledged that UNAIDS, in its umbrella function, 
played an important role in harmonizing AIDS policies across agencies and made an 
important contribution to fighting the pandemic, however, after a release of UNAIDS 
five year review (UNAIDS 2002), there were still questions remaining on what it 
was meant to be: a sum of all UN activities on HIV/AIDS or of the parts of its 
cosponsors? Or a Geneva-based Secretariat with regional and country outposts under 
the loose rubric of multi-sectoralism and an expanded response? (CGD 2009). And 
while it has played a valuable role in monitoring the epidemic, forecasting future 
needs, and influencing national governments to develop their HIV/AIDS policies, 
much of its success can be attributed to the era in which it was created and the void 
in leadership that needed to be filled. Now that this void has been filled by numerous 
agencies, advocacy groups, and movement toward integration of HIV/AIDS efforts 
into larger health and development goals, many question the role of a standalone 
                                                          
9
UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNDCP, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank. 
10
 Piot stepped down from his post at UNAIDS in December 2008. He is currently the Director and 
Professor of Global Health at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM. n.d.). 
11
 The author observed these challenges first-hand during her work for UNAIDS in Ukraine. 
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agency dedicated to a single disease (Das and Samarasekera 2008; Schneider and 
Garrett 2009), or even ask: do we need UNAIDS? (CGD 2009) 
Parallel to the developments at the UN, in the 1990s, several foundations, 
bilateral donors, and international NGOs launched efforts to tackle HIV/AIDS 
focused specifically on developing countries. Following the tradition of its work in 
population and reproductive health, HIV prevention efforts funded by the US 
government in these years tended to be designed by public-health experts and 
implemented by US-based non-profits funded through the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (Merson et al 2008).  
Towards the end of the 1990s there was no global significant framework in 
place to combat AIDS, and no global treaties or benchmarks to coordinate national 
HIV/AIDS policies. At the national level, ‗first generation‘ government programmes 
began to be established and by the early 1990s almost all developing countries had 
national HIV/AIDS control programmes - frequently criticized for lacking national 
ownership and ineffectiveness (Merson et al 2008). 
On June 25-27, 2001, at the urging of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and 
U.S. ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, a UN General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) entitled ‗Global Crisis - Global Action‘(UN 2001), gathered in 
New York to address the security implications and long-term financing efforts of 
HIV/AIDS, marking the first time in the UN history that a disease had been the focus 
of a General Assembly (Schneider and Garrett 2009). Heads of State and 
Representatives of Governments issued the ‗Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS‘ that set out national targets and global actions to reverse the epidemic 
and committed to submit country progress reports (UNAIDS 2001). The final 
document of the UN Special Session indicated $7-10 billion as the annual amount the 
international community should allocate to tackle the ‗global crisis‘ (Italian Global 
Health Watch 2008). 
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1.5 The Global Fund era beginning 
―..the Global Fund is you.‖ 
Michel Kazatchkine, the ex-Global Fund Executive Director
12
 
1.5.1 The creation of the Global Fund 
The leading donor countries (the Group of Eight – G8), the US government, 
and organisations in the UN system have paved the way to the establishment of the 
Global Fund. The idea of an independent funding mechanism to fight infectious 
disease was first articulated at the 1998 G8 summit in Birmingham, UK (CRS 2005).  
Originally, the list of diseases targeted for the global health fund was broader. 
Initially called the ‗Massive Attack on Diseases of Poverty‘, the initiative to tackle 
malaria, tuberculosis, unsafe pregnancy, AIDS, diarrheal diseases, acute respiratory 
infections and measles, was articulated in the WHO Director-General concept paper 
that also called for increased efforts to eradicate or eliminate Guinea Worm, polio 
and leprosy by 2005, and to make ―monumental improvements in the delivery of 
effective and responsive health care‖ (WHO Director-General's Office 1999). The 
list of diseases continued to evolve: by March 2000, it narrowed to TB, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, unsafe childbirth and vaccine-preventable diseases (WHO Director-
General's Office 2000), and at the G8 Experts‘ Meeting on Global Health Issues on 
April 19–20, 2000, the discussion finally focused on the three major infectious and 
parasitic diseases - HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria - identified as the highest priority 
areas among others through the G8 process (G8 Experts Meeting 2000). 
The momentum for establishing a new fund grew at the G8 summit in Japan, 
resulting in adoption of the ‗G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000,‘ which declared, ‗We 
have widespread agreement on what the priority diseases are… a new strategy to 
harness our commitments..and to define the operations of this new partnership‘ (G8 
Communique Okinawa 2000). 
As noted earlier, criticisms of existing aid programmes prompted the 
establishment of the GF. A large part of the impetus for creating the GF came from 
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donors who no longer wanted to channel money through existing aid programmes 
(Radelet 2004). The impetus for the establishment of the GF also came from a 
growing and ―an increasingly sophisticated and diverse group of community partners 
and researchers‖ and AIDS activists (Merson et al. 2008, p. 484) who engaged in 
treatment activism following the discovery of HAART
13
 in 1996.  
In the US, beginning in 1999, several U.S. Congress Representatives 
introduced various legislative acts to establish a special fund on AIDS, one of which 
passed both the House and Senate and was signed into law in August 2000
14
.  
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was at the core of the international effort 
to create an independent funding vehicle. On April 26, 2001, when addressing a 
summit on HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases in Abuja, Nigeria, he called for 
establishing ―a war chest on AIDS‖ (BBC 2001) and announced he would donate his 
$100,000 Philadelphia Liberty Medal award to it (Schuster 2001). Annan‘s proposal 
attracted considerable attention. On May 11, 2001, Annan and Nigeria‘s President 
Olusegun Obasanjo came to the White House, to hear President George W. Bush 
make a ―founding pledge‖ of $200 million to the Global Fund (CRS 2005). 
The creation of the GF was endorsed by UNGASS in June 2001, and by the 
G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001. At the first meeting of its 18-member 
Board on January 28–29, 2002, GF issued its first call for proposals (Kapp, 2002), 
and in April 2002 awarded a total of US$378 million over two years to 40 
programs to fight the three diseases in 31 countries (GFATM 2002), one of which 
was Ukraine. 
1.5.2 The U.S. influence over the Global Fund 
Since its founding pledge to the Global Fund in 2001 and until the present, 
the U.S. has exerted a strong influence over the GF: U.S. contributions have 
remained higher than of any other country, U.S. officials have served on various GF 
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Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Treatment. 
14
 The Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Fund of 2000, P.L. 106-264, was signed into law on 
August 19, 2000 and called for negotiations between the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, the World 
Bank and others in order to create a ‗World Bank AIDS Trust Fund‘ (Sheehan 2008, p.184). 
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Boards, and the U.S. Congress has steadily raised its appropriations to the Fund. At 
the same time, Congress has passed laws that limit U.S. spending on the Fund
15
.  
Since the GF establishment, the extent of U.S. involvement in the GF is an 
ongoing discussion (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013). Much of this scrutiny comes 
from the fact of the U.S. being the largest single GF contributor (see Figure 1.2): 
Figure 1.2 Cumulative GF Contributions by Donor (2002-May 2013) in USD (CGD 
2013, p.10) 
 
The debate has mainly developed along the following lines: 
(a) whether the U.S. should maintain its GF contributions; and 
(b) as a part of a more general political debate to reduce aid spending. 
Opponents of the GF argue that Congress should forego pledges to the GF in 
the interest of funding U.S. bilateral programmes such as PEPFAR (Truong 
2013). The supporters of spending cuts on foreign aid, among them former 
Representative Ron Paul (R-Texas), argued that the government must prioritise 
                                                          
15
 A condition set through the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde ‗U.S. Global Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008‘ (P.L. 110-293), prohibited U.S. 
contributions from exceeding one-third of all contributions (CRS 2011). The U.S. contribution limit 
meant to encourage greater global support for the Fund (CRS 2011).  
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national security and domestic issues over foreign aid. In his 2012 campaign, 
Republican Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney advocated to change the entire U.S. 
foreign assistance system by offering aid in ‗Prosperity Pacts‘ – ―America will send 
you money only if you drop all existing trade and investment barriers objectionable 
to U.S. companies‖(Garrett 2012).  
Opponents of the aid cuts, such as U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), 
Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, 
argue that ―foreign aid totals less than 1 percent of the federal budget, yet it is a 
crucial investment in our national security‖(Leahy 2011).  
Both levels of political debate underline the special role of the U.S. in the GF 
and explain the scrutiny placed on its operations that are constantly reviewed by 
various U.S. agencies.  
In June 2005, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported 
that the Fund had limited capability to monitor and evaluate grants, which raised 
questions about the accuracy of its reported results (GAO 2005) and indicated that 
the Fund‘s documents had not consistently explained why it provided additional 
funds for grants or why it denied disbursement requests. In its response to the GAO 
report, the U.S. State Department stated: ―The lack of easily and publicly available 
documentation to support decisions on grant performance, disbursements and 
renewals is one of the most troubling deficiencies [of the Fund]‖(GAO 2005, p. 59). 
Members of Congress have advocated for stronger oversight of the GF. At a 
March 2007 hearing held by the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Rep. 
Adam Smith, D-Wash., expressed reservations about the GF oversight capacity: 
The information and accountability that Congress has come to take for 
granted through bilateral programs are not available through the GF, and 
many of the primary recipients of the GF grants are governments with a 
history of corruption and fraud and/or limited capacity to properly manage 
large sums of money in their health sectors. [T]he absence in the GF of a 
robust reporting and monitoring mechanism, at both the primary and sub-
recipient levels, is an open invitation for waste in these countries and a tragic 
loss of opportunity to save lives. The implementation of a system that 
provides accountability and transparency would seem vital to continue the 
expanded support of the GF in the future. (cited in CRS 2008, pp. 12-13) 
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Interestingly, in this statement, the GF is being criticized in comparison to 
traditional aid programmes for lack of accountability in funding ‗corrupt 
governments‘. As noted above, the criticism about how the donors engaged with 
governments pre-GF, was one of the arguments in support of the GF establishment. 
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 2008 report voiced criticisms of 
the GF oversight mechanisms that were deemed ―not strong enough to protect 
against wasteful spending, particularly in countries that have a well-documented 
history of corruption and poor financial management‖(CRS 2008, p.12).  
In an effort to strengthen oversight of the Fund‘s grants, Congress included a 
provision authorizing the Secretary of State to withhold 20% of the U.S. 
contribution
16
 until the GF could demonstrate improved oversight and accountability 
in grant disbursement, while also allowing the Secretary to waive the requirement, if 
she determined that a waiver was important to the national interest (CRS 2011). The 
existence of such provision underlines the importance of the mandate given to the 
Secretary of State in relations with the GF. From 2009 to 2013, this position has been 
held by Hillary Clinton, a ―politically powerful Secretary of State‖(Goldberg 2012) 
who greatly increased the influence of the State Department over the GF affairs.  
A recent report suggested that the role of the U.S. was shifting to ensure ―the 
appropriate balance between U.S. support for multilateral efforts, such as the Global 
Fund, and bilateral programs, which allow for increased control and oversight‖ 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2013).  
In one of her final acts as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton created the 
Office of Global Health Diplomacy (OGHD) as part of the State Department. This 
move suspended a Global Health Initiative, launched by President Obama in 2009 
(CSIS 2013). The OGHD is supposed to lead U.S. international efforts in global 
health and to oversee U.S. engagement with the GF. In February 2013, a report by 
the Global Policy Center entitled ‗Global Health Policy in the Second Obama Term‘, 
questioned whether the new presidential administration was able ―to sustain and 
consolidate its diplomatic outreach for global health‖(Morrison 2013, p. 1). 
                                                          
16
 Reinstated at 10% in 2012 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013) 
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1.6 The Global Fund mission and structures 
1.6.1 The GF guiding principles 
According to the GF Framework Document, the purpose of the Fund is to 
attract, manage and disburse additional resources through a new public-private 
partnership that will make a sustainable and significant contribution to the reduction 
of infections, illness and death, thereby mitigating the impact caused by HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria in countries in need, and contributing to poverty reduction 
as part of the Millennium Development Goals (GFATM 2001).  
The guiding principles of the Global Fund include the following: 
A. The Fund is a financing instrument, not an implementing agency; 
B. The Fund is intended to leverage financing for AIDS, TB and malaria; 
C. The Fund will base its work on programs that reflect national ownership 
and respect country-led formulation and implementation processes;  
D. The Fund will seek to operate in a balanced manner in terms of different 
regions, diseases, and interventions; 
E. The Fund will pursue an integrated and balanced approach covering 
prevention, treatment, and care and support in dealing with the three 
diseases; 
F. The Fund will evaluate proposals through independent review processes 
based on the most appropriate scientific and technical standards that take 
into account local realities and priorities; 
G. The Fund will seek to establish a simplified, rapid, innovative process 
with efficient and effective disbursement mechanisms, minimizing 
transaction costs and operating in a transparent and accountable manner. 
(GFATM 2001, p. 1-2) 
As a ‗War Chest for Fighting HIV/AIDS‘ (Lewis 2005), the GF positioned 
itself as distinct from other donors and intended to combat the global burden of the 
three diseases by delivering aid in new, innovative ways (Glassman 2012). The GF 
36 
 
functions as a financial instrument, rather than an implementing agency (Schneider 
and Garrett, 2009). The focus on funding serves to define it as a form of institutional 
innovation among traditional multilateral institutions (Walker 2011). The GF does 
not have a country representative office and relies on the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism to govern and oversee its programmes. 
A focus on civil society is another key principle of the GF. By making an 
engagement of civil society and those affected by the diseases in service provision as 
a requirement for countries‘ eligibility to receive funding (Rivers 2005), the GF has 
been strongly promoting NGO-centred service delivery. The engagement of civil 
society organizations (CSOs) is predicated on the special nature of GF programmes, 
which view CSOs as having better access to marginalised and vulnerable groups 
such as men who have sex with men, sex workers, people who inject drugs, and 
others (GFATM 2013), in comparison with slow and bureaucratized processes in 
state health care: 
The Global Fund found that, on average, civil society organizations are 
essential, successful and high-performing implementers of Global Fund grants 
and that direct financing to civil society PRs can improve the speed of finance 
and add additional capacity. (GFATM 2007, p.13) 
In the context of country-level public health systems, GF promotion of a 
special role for civil society organisations is viewed as an extension of the neoliberal 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) promoted by the World Bank, which were seen 
to by-pass government in favour of civil society (Walker 2011). 
1.6.2 The GF Board as the constituency based governance model.  
Definitions of the term‗governance‘, given by Stoker (1998), Mayntz (2003), 
Schuppert and Zürn (2008) and other authors, differentiate between an analytical and 
a normative understanding of governance (Lauth 2012). In regard to the policy 
sphere, I have accepted the definition of governance by Christiansen as: 
.. the production of authoritative decisions which are not produced by a single 
hierarchical structure, such as a democratically elected legislative assembly 
and government, but instead arise from the interaction of a plethora of public 
and private, collective and individual actors. (Christiansen et al 2003, p. 6) 
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The GF‘s constituency based governance model is core to the organization‘s 
identity as a public-private partnership. The GF Board stresses that its effective 
functioning ―requires active and informed engagement by all 
constituencies‖(GFATM, n.d.1). 
Figure 1.3. The GF Governance Model puzzle (Guarinieri 2011)
Our Governance Model
• Donors
• Recipients
● Private 
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● NGOs North
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● World Bank
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The Board is the supreme governing body of the GF and exercises the 
following core functions: strategy development, governance oversight, commitment 
of financial resources, assessment of organisational performance, risk management, 
partnership engagement, resource mobilisation and advocacy (GFATM,n.d. 2). 
Analysis and discussion of the GF Board composition and its impact on 
decision-making was provided by Brown (2007), Davinia (2009), Missoni (2008), 
Walker (2011), Spicer (2009) and some others. It is briefly summarised below. 
According to the GF ‗Operating Procedures of the Board and Committees‘ 
(GFATM, 2011b), seats with voting power on the Board of the GF are allocated in 
the by-laws to representatives of donor countries, developing countries, civil  society,  
the  private  sector,  private  foundations,  non-governmental  organisations,  and  the 
communities  living  with  the  diseases. 
As a new institutional form, the GF was challenged to demonstrate 
accountability to its donor countries, to make a case for its legitimacy relative to 
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traditional multilateral organisations in the UN system (Forman and Segaar 2006), 
and to demonstrate effectiveness in terms of using its resources to achieve intended 
health outcomes and impact (Walker 2009). Gaventa (2006) noted that this approach 
is also used by donors to argue that the biases of elitism or a lack of public 
accountability found in traditional institutions, such as those of the state, can be off-
set by investing in a vibrant civil society.  
The Five-Year Global Fund Evaluation has concluded that the GF had an 
inclusive governance structure, involving the private sector (for-profit and non-
profit) in addition to donor and recipient countries (Gerrard and Ooi 2012). When the 
GF was originally constituted as a private foundation in 2001, the 18 voting members 
on its Board were comprised of seven donor country delegations, seven developing 
country delegations and four delegations representing civil society and the private 
sector (Walker 2011). With the growth of GF, donor delegations began to 
predominate on the Board. The GF 24-member Board comprises 20 voting members, 
with one vote each, and four non-voting members. 20 voting members are divided 
into two ‗voting blocs‘: a ‗donor voting bloc‘ with 10 seats representing donor states, 
the private sector and private foundations, and the ‗the implementer voting blocs,‘ 
with 10 seats consisting of developing states and NGOs (Davinia 2009), of them 
seven are representatives of developing states (divided by regions), three seats are 
reserved to NGOs from both developed and developing countries (one seat each) and 
representatives of ‗people living with disease‘.17 
Garrett Brown (2007) has described the governance at several levels of the 
GF and, in particular, examined the practice of multi-sectoral deliberation within the 
Board. His findings suggest that, despite the presumed balance between donor and 
recipient states, the unequal political influence and power between them was present 
on the GF Board, manifested by the fact that the donor states often met prior to GF 
meetings to discuss political strategy and to organise voting caucuses. Brown 
suggested that such ‗voting caucuses‘ would give donors an unfair advantage to push 
through various motions or funding decisions. Remarkably, when several recipient 
countries lobbied the GF donors for extra resources to organise their own pre-Board 
meetings, their request was rejected. The implication of forming and maintaining the 
                                                          
17
 In 2011, the amended Bylaws provided that there were eight representatives from donors (GFATM, 
2011). 
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unfair advantage of a donor caucus, is that the deliberation process between Board 
members effectively becomes a process of interest-based preference maximisation. 
Some of Brown‘s study participants, who were GF Board members, also suggested 
that there were problems with accountability, in terms of there being ‗no consistent 
idea of who the Global Fund is accountable to‘ and that ‗the Global Fund is 
accountable only to donor states‘. It was also observed that within the Board, donor 
states had an effective veto power by alluding taking certain decisions that might 
threaten future funding. The example of this veto power was evidenced by the U.S. 
willingness to withhold funds until certain programs are eliminated or changed to the 
Bush administration‘s liking, for example by continuously pressuring the GF to fund 
abstinence faith-based ABC
18
 programs. Brown argues that by having an effective 
veto power, donor countries were able to colonize the deliberative process by forcing 
the removal of various alternatives from the debate or by using the threat of future 
funding reductions as a means to coerce outcomes (Brown, G. 2007). His study also 
suggested the existence of possible disconnects between the Board representatives 
and their constituents
19
.  
Some INGOs developed strong links to the GF Board. In May 2011, one of 
the trustees of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance
20
, Martin Dinham, was 
appointed Chair to the GF Board. As of January 2013, two other members of the 
Alliance were on the GF Board: Alliance Executive Director Alvaro Bermejo, was 
appointed as a Developed NGO Delegation Board member, and the Alliance's Latin 
America and Caribbean regional representative, Javier Hourcade Belloqc, was one of 
the NGO Representatives of the Communities Living with the Diseases.  
To summarise, the governance structures of the GF (Board) appear multi-
sectoral mainly in rhetoric, with the power balance shifted towards donors and 
prolific Western NGOs.  
 
                                                          
18
ABC- Abstinence, Be Faithful, use Condom. 
19 Brown‘s suggestion was confirmed by author‘s earlier experience in Ukraine, when trying to 
determine who represented the country on the GF Board. The GF web-site listed a name of a MOH 
official as the GF Board member for a number of years. However, there was no knowledge of that 
person making any public statements or conducting meetings in Ukraine in regard to her GF function. 
20
An INGO with headquarters in UK. More information is provided in Chapter 2. 
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1.6.3 Governance at the country level. The GF country ownership model and 
its limitations  
The importance of country ownership was recognized in the Paris Declaration 
that defined it as countries exercising ―effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies‖ and coordinating development actions (OECD, 2005).  
Country ownership is one of the core principles of the GF: ―The Global Fund 
will base its work on programs that reflect national ownership and respect country 
led formulation and implementation processes‖ (GFATM 2001, p. 91). 
Unlike most multilaterals, the GFATM does not have in-country presence or 
representation. Instead, it relies on a model where a Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) develops proposals, Principal Recipients (PRs) receive grants 
and implement programmes and a Local Fund Agent (LFA) contracted by GFATM 
provides in-country monitoring.
21
 
Figure 1.4 The Global Fund implementation model  
 
                                                          
21
The LFA is typically one of the large multinational accounting firms – PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers, KPMG, or others (Taylor, 2011). The LFA role is to assess the financial and operational 
capacity of a PR, and after the proposal is approved, to verify PR reports, progress updates, etc. LFA 
reports to GF Secretariat are not disclosed to CCM or other country stakeholders.    
(GFATM 2003, p. 38) 
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The CCM is the primary mechanism GF relies on to exercise the country 
ownership principle, and an eligibility criterion to receive GF money. GFATM 
guidelines encourage CCMs ―to be broadly representative of all national stakeholders 
in the fight against the three diseases‖ (GFATM 2005, p. 3) by creating a forum that 
includes national and international private actors such as local and international 
NGOs in addition to government (Walker 2011).  
In each GF round,
22
 the CCM develops and publishes a National Strategy for 
the development of a GF country proposal that presents the country‘s understanding 
of its HIV epidemic, national HIV data, existing resources to combat the epidemic, 
the groups of highest risk to HIV transmission, etc. This document serves as a base 
for selecting a PR, who is then responsible for preparing a country proposal that is 
approved by the CCM and sent to the GF. Proposals are reviewed by the GF 
Technical Review Panel (TRP)
23
 and approved by GF Board. 
Analysis of the country ownership principle in global health and its 
realization in the GF systems has been done by Radelet and Caines (2005); Sridhar 
and Batniji (2008), Spicer et al (2009), Walker (2011), Garmaise (2009; 2013), and 
others. This section introduces the key arguments of the debate over the GF country 
ownership, while Chapter 6 on the CCM in Ukraine places these arguments onto the 
country context. 
Walker (2011) argues that the ‗country ownership‘ model of governance that 
the GF has promoted at the country level is a form of input-oriented legitimacy that 
is needed by the GF to justify that it is spending money according to the needs of the 
recipient countries.  
At the same time, as argued by Garmaise (2013), country ownership was 
never supposed to mean that the GF should ―write a blank cheque‖ and from the 
outset, limitations were placed on the application of the country ownership principle. 
One example of such limitations was the GF requirement that countries establish 
                                                          
22
 GF grants are given for five years. There were a total of 10 GF rounds of funding from 2002 to 
2012. In November 2011, Round 11 was suspended. The New Funding Model is currently applied in 
funding grants to countries.  
23
 TRP, an independent group of epidemiologic and public health experts that reviews the country 
proposals and ensures that proposed programs meet standards of scientific and technical rigor. 
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CCMs to make the country submission eligible. The presence of minimum CCM 
requirements has been criticized for allowing the GF Secretariat staff ―to exercise a 
considerable amount of discretion in applying these requirements to the screening of 
proposals‖ (Garmaise 2009).  
The mandate of the CCM is not clear. A UNAIDS study concluded that, 
while 80 percent of countries had ―national AIDS authorities‖ with ―a clear mandate 
to coordinate‖, only 41 percent had ―authority to allocate resources‖ (UNAIDS 2005, 
p. 19). Functionally, they are often not the way governments or countries normally 
manage programmes (Radelet and Caines 2005). The World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) report concludes that CCMs lack both the authority and the 
resources to exercise effective oversight over GF grants, since they are not 
conventional governing bodies. CCMs have small secretariats that are only 
responsible for administration and execution of CCM decisions such as submitting 
proposals to the GF but are not responsible for implementing the GF program in the 
country. Rather, the Geneva-based GF Secretariat contracts directly with the PRs to 
implement the grants (IEG, the World Bank 2012). 
The GF High-Level Panel Report in 2011 notes that while ‗country 
ownership‘ was applied broadly across the GF model, there was no clear 
understanding of the term in practice: 
The Panel has heard the mantra of ‗country ownership‘ invoked to explain 
and justify almost every aspect of the Global Fund‘s business model and 
decision the institution makes. Yet while ‗country ownership‘ is a founding 
principle highlighted in the Framework Document, there does not appear to 
be a shared perception – inside or outside the Global Fund – about what the 
term means in practice. (High-Level Panel2011, p. 9) 
The GF High-Level Panel Report noted that ―constantly reinforced, but hazily 
defined, ideology of ‗country ownership‘ …within the GF Secretariat has bred a 
culture of passivity in grant management. This practice confuses PRs, and leaves the 
grant portfolio vulnerable‖.(High-Level Panel 2011, p.65) 
There are concerns that closer coordination among donors in the GF 
decreases the policy space of developing countries by shifting the balance of power 
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towards the ―consortium of donors acting in unison‖(Murray et al 2007, p.1018), 
while the perceived global unilateralism linked the global health agenda to the U.S. 
national interests (Kickbusch, 2002). The latter author has also suggested that as the 
debate over aid effectiveness continues to influence all the U.S. administrations, 
which have to fight severe domestic battles to justify foreign aid disbursements at the 
U.S. Congress, ―the four Es – economics, effectiveness, efficiency, and evidence – 
become the battle cries for the development community‖ (ibid., p. 134). Translated 
into implementation discourse, the GF model of ‗performance-based funding‘ 
originates from this political battle-field and is aimed to demonstrate to GF donors, 
particularly to the US, that its programmes are effective. 
 
1.6.4 Performance-based funding and its criticism 
The founding principle of the Global Fund — to provide funding to countries 
on the basis of performance — was meant to make it different from other aid 
agencies. In the words of President‘s Bush administration official, as cited in The 
Wall Street Journal, "we envision... a level of substantive accountability – meaning 
results – that's unheard of in international development assistance" (cited in Schoofs 
and Phillips 2002).  The core belief embedded in the creation of the GF was that an 
organization that links funding to measured results and performance can be more 
efficient. To implement this belief, the GF created a system of performance-based 
funding (PBF). The GF funding process is described below. 
Figure 1.5 Performance-based funding and the GF grant life cycle (GFATM 2009) 
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After the country proposal is vetted by TRP, the GF Board approves a 
proposal for a five-year grant, and the GF Secretariat signs a two-year grant 
agreement with the PR. The LFA conducts capacity assessment before the GF signs 
an agreement with a PR. If the results of assessment are satisfactory, the GF instructs 
the World Bank, the trustee of the GF, to disburse the first tranche of funds to the 
PR. The GF disburses subsequent tranches based on performance. After a grant‘s 
first two years - Phase 1- the GF reviews grant performance to determine whether the 
grant should be continued and if the Board approves continued funding, the grant 
enters Phase 2. PRs submit a Progress Update and Disbursement Request (PUDR), 
which consists of a progress report on the grant implementation and a request for 
funds for the next reporting period. The progress report includes information on the 
results of the grant against targets and information on expenditures. The PUDR is 
reviewed by the LFA and submitted to the GF Secretariat. Based on the assessment 
of the PUDR, the Secretariat assigns a performance rating to the grant on the 
following scale: A1 – exceeded expectations; A2 – met expectations; B1 – adequate; 
B2 – inadequate but potential demonstrated; and C – unacceptable (IEG, the World 
Bank 2012, p. 47). The PUDR process has been characterised as ―overly complicated 
and time-consuming‖ (IEG, the World Bank, 2012, p. 51). 
To access performance and overall impact of the agency, the GF has 
developed a four-tiered corporate performance management framework (Figure 1.6). 
Also called a ‗Global Fund evaluation pyramid‘ (in Nahlen and Low-Beer 2007, 
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p.323), this framework is crucial to the GF to demonstrate that it is an effective 
financing instrument, contributing to the fight against the three diseases: 
Figure 1.6 The Global Fund evaluation pyramid 
 
In this scheme, the GF contribution is pictured by a light grey triangle. The 
framework starts from operational performance at the bottom, then moves to 
programmatic results (grants performance measurement), which then leads to 
effectiveness, and ultimately to impact in combating the three diseases at the top. By 
this scheme, the GF accepts full responsibility only for its operational performance at 
the bottom level, while results at the top levels of the framework, such as the impact 
on the diseases, are ―increasingly due to the collective effort of other partners‖ in 
addition to the GF (IEG 2012, p.16). In this scheme it is left unclear how to measure 
the overall contribution from other partners and/or national governments to the 
impact area on top of the pyramid, and where to draw a ‗demarcation line‘ between 
results attributed to GF contributions and other, non-GF contributions, making it 
difficult to distinguish GF-supported interventions. Chapter 5 discusses this scheme 
in the context of Ukraine where the difficulty of identifying GF-attributable HIV 
services presented one of the limitations for my study. 
For each dimension of the performance management framework, the GF 
identified Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The Policy and Strategy Committee of 
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the GF Board
24
 develops and approves the KPIs, with baselines and targets, which 
are periodically updated. In 2011, there were 26 KPIs, 15 of which measured 
operational performance, and a large number of sub-indicators, most of which were 
also output indicators
25
.The list of Top Ten GF performance indicators for 2011 is 
provided in Appendix A. 
Fulfilment of KPIs by PRs is the main condition for continued funding. 
However, there are no specific rules in-country as to which indicators should be 
chosen. Under the country ownership principle, the choice of ―their own performance 
indicators and target goals‖ is left to countries themselves (Glassman et al 2013, p. 
46). The KPIs in each country are selected from the general GF list and agreed by the 
GF Secretariat and PR, and then incorporated into the grant agreement.  
The World Bank IEG analysed the M&E systems of the GF. Describing the 
indicators relating to outcomes and impacts as ―difficult to report‖, it noted that the 
GF performance indicators ―provided little added value for assessing project/grant 
performance, for contributing to periodic summative evaluations, or for enhancing 
policy dialogue‖ (IEG, the World Bank 2012, p. 50).  
The way the particular indicators are chosen, and the way to quantify them, as 
chosen by the recipients, may hold a potential for manipulation. First, performance 
indicators may not always capture all the goals that programs need to pursue. 
Secondly, if recipients are allowed to set their own targets, they may set unambitious 
ones simply to ensure that they can easily fulfil or over-fulfil these. Drew (2005e) 
expressed reservations about target setting associated with PBF. He suggested that 
agreeing targets between PR and GF could result in a ―must achieve 100% mini 
project‖, a ―negotiated agreement of what is needed and feasible within the time 
available‖ as, in his view, GF PBF system allowed for this kind of thinking. The 
outcome may be that the PRs ―that understand how the process works will find it in 
their interest to set low targets to ensure they achieve higher scores in their grant 
performance report‖ (2005e, p.31). [emphasis added] 
                                                          
24
The Committee abolished after the GF 2012 reforms. 
25
The web-link to KPIs at the Global Fund web-site was no longer accessible at the time of writing. 
Secondary data from the Center for Global Development report (CGD, 2013b) were used. 
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Thirdly, if funding decisions are dependent on performance indicators, 
another way to fulfil them is to direct funds toward organisations in higher-capacity 
areas, where results can be achieved more easily, and be easily measured. This may 
deprive the less developed or least accessible areas of money and services. 
Furthermore, in cases of a narrowly composed CCM, with its membership 
representing only a small circle of interested NGOs and government stakeholders, 
the potential exists of them agreeing on pre-determined goals in order to get funding. 
A World Bank IEG report concluded that, while ―the scale at which the 
Global Fund had attempted to implement PBF was unprecedented‖, the focus on 
results remained ―a work in progress‖ and was ―a complex and burdensome system 
… focused more on project inputs and outputs than on development outcomes and 
impacts‖ (IEG, the World Bank 2012, p. 46).  
The Five-Year GF Evaluation noted lack of available standardized 
information for service delivery indicators across the GF grant portfolio (MACRO 
International 2007). Others spoke of a ―superficiality of numbers that the Global 
Fund proudly announces as its ‗results‘‖ (Decosas 2012). Verification and 
measurement were also of concern to the CDG 2013 report that calls the GF to 
―immediately strengthen its verification of PR performance through a more robust 
approach to the measurement of the quantity and – where feasible – quality of health 
services delivered with Global Fund support‖ (Glassman et al 2013, p. 84). The CGD 
report concluded that the GF has not yet realized the full potential of performance-
based funding and lacks ―clear and consistent criteria for allocation‖ (ibid., p.46). 
More discussion of the potential benefits and challenges associated with PBF can be 
found in (Adam and Gunning 2002; Eichler 2006; Kerouedan 2010; Feachem 2011; 
Glassman et al 2013) and others. 
1.6.5 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is the main structure within the GF 
for protecting its operations from fraud and the misuse of funds. The need for an 
independent auditing structure inside the GF was articulated by the U.S. Congress 
resolution that followed from a CRS report (CRS 2005). Established in December 
2005, the OIG operates as an independent unit of the GF, reporting directly to the 
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Board (GFATM, n.d.3). OIG audit teams are multi-disciplinary and combine 
financial auditors, public health experts and procurement specialists (Linnee 2010).  
The OIG structure enjoyed relative obscurity within the GF‘s generally 
frequent and vocal public relations campaigns and press releases. It came up strongly 
in 2008 when John Parsons, a British citizen who previously worked at UNESCO 
and UNICEF and also headed the UK National Audit Office in 1989-1996 (Heilprin 
2012), was appointed as the GF Inspector General. In that year, the OIG released a 
series of reports about previous GF grant suspensions. These reports were critical of 
the internal management systems at the GF Secretariat level, as a result of which ―not 
sufficiently robust systems were built on the ground … and Principal Recipients 
management systems were often faulty‖ (Heilprin 2012). The OIG‘s mandate covers 
audits and investigations of fraud allegations, including those from whistleblowers. 
As noted by AIDSPAN, from 2008 to 2009, the number of investigations stemming 
from whistleblower complaints tripled under Parsons.‖We don't just look at the 
financial inputs; we look at what has actually been achieved,‖ Parsons said, 
explaining that the audits are aimed at giving assurance that the GF grants ―are used 
wisely to save lives‖(Cited in Linnee 2010). 
In his tenure as the GF Inspector General, Parsons was continuously at odds 
with the then GF Executive Director Michel Kazatchkine, which was reported by 
various sources (McNeil 2012; Garrett, 2012). In particular, the focus of criticisms of 
Parsons‘ work was that his reports intended to cover not only the financial 
management, but also looked at programmatic aspects of GF grants and that angered 
some NGOs (Rivers 2012). Parson‘s office was active in conducting investigations, 
and Kazatchkine‘s office acknowledged that if Parson‘s office doubled the amount of 
programs it reviewed, then ―the amount of losses identified may also 
double‖(Heilprin, 2011a). 
In 2009, at the onset of the world economic crisis, UNAIDS warned of the 
impact of the crisis on HIV prevention and treatment programmes suggesting that 
―the HIV and AIDS response has reached a turning point‖ (UNAIDS 2009b, p. 5). 
An even bigger threat to global HIV/AIDS response, however, came from the Global 
Fund itself. 
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1.7 The Global Fund crisis in 2011 
―awful moment in the Fund‘s history‖(Garrett 2012) 
At the 22nd GF Board Meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 13-15 December 2010, 
a document, ‗Secretariat Response to Findings of the OIG and Joint Communication 
on Inspector General Matters‘, was disseminated. It commented on issues of concern 
over the results of OIG audits in several countries: 
The Secretariat and the Inspector General have agreed that it is important that 
cases of fraud, financial abuse and misappropriation are put in their proper 
context. Given the  large  number  of  countries,  and  the  extreme  variations  
in  governance and management  capacity  across  the  GF   portfolio,  the  
Secretariat and the OIG agree that the OIG‟s findings in particular cases 
should not be used to draw general conclusions across all grant-programs or 
about the Global Fund. OIG findings in particular cases should not be 
interpreted as calling into question the basic principles underlying the work of 
the Global Fund, or its general model.(GFATM 2010) [emphasis added] 
On January 23, 2011, the AP released an article that discussed instances of 
corruption discovered by the OIG (Heilprin 2011a). The article focused on 
allegations of corruption and fraud in four countries that received GF grants - Mali, 
Djibouti, Mauritania and Zambia. The article cited findings of the OIG office that up 
to two-thirds of the funds in some of the GF grants reviewed were lost to fraud.  
In response to the AP article, on January 24, 2011, the GF issued a statement 
defending its record and commitment to transparency:  
The Global Fund has zero tolerance for corruption and actively seeks to 
uncover any evidence of misuse of its funds. It deploys some of the most 
rigorous procedures to detect fraud and fight corruption of any organization 
financing development.. The news report that has caused concerns refers to 
well-known incidents that have been reported by the Global Fund and acted 
on last year. (cited in Kaiser Family Foundation 2011) 
Jon Liden, the GF communications director, in an interview with the DevEx 
news service called the controversy surrounding his organisation ―a grave 
misunderstanding‖. When answering a question on whether this was a wake-up call 
for the GF that it needed to tighten its monitoring of how grant money was used, 
Liden answered, ―Not really‖ (Taylor 2011). 
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These statements triggered a wave of criticism from other agencies, which 
felt the Fund was attempting to divert attention from itself. Reactions followed from 
critics and supporters of the GF about corruption in foreign aid in general and the 
Fund‘s response to corruption in particular, including the perspective of the newly 
elected U.S. Congress ―to hold hearings concerning halting aid dispersion to the 
Fund‖(Bate 2011). The media revelations resulted in much closer scrutiny of the 
GF‘s work, and a drop in its funding, prompting Germany, the European 
Commission (EC), and Denmark to withhold $457 million (Euro 315 million) in 
funding (Heilprin 2011b). Sweden, the fund's 11th highest contributor, also 
suspended its annual donation.  
On February 8, 2011, the GF released a statement by the Board Chair and 
Vice-Chair saying that it had instituted several measures ―to reinforce its financial 
safeguards and increase its capacity to prevent and detect fraud and misuse in its 
grants‖ (cited in Salaam-Blyther 2011, p. 8). The GF has also doubled the budget of 
the OIG (Economist 2011) and organised a number of trips for journalists to observe 
GF-supported programs in six different countries (GFATM 2011).  
Later, however, the GF Board considered scaling back investigations and 
releasing less information about them publicly and to donors. The Inspector General 
Parsons publicly opposed these changes since he believed that this ―could be 
interpreted negatively and as a purposeful effort to suppress material information‖. 
Although the GF characterised the media coverage as exaggerated and ―wildly 
inaccurate and misleading‖, similar concerns were expressed in the U.S. Congress 
(Heilprin 2011b). 
Addressing the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator 
Eric Goosby spoke of the need ―to support and strengthen the Fund‘s efforts to root 
out corruption in its grants, supporting a strong and independent Inspector General 
and working to protect both U.S. taxpayers and the people who rely upon the health 
programs financed through the Fund‖(US House of Representatives 2011, p. 7). 
51 
 
On April 5, 2011, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a 
minority report, containing recommendations on how to strengthen the oversight of 
GF grants (US Senate 2011), among them the following:   
 Make U.S. contributions to the GF contingent upon the GF Board‘s adoption 
of reforms laid out by the U.S. Department of State.  
 Have the U.S. Representative to the GF reiterate in the strongest terms to the 
GF Board that the US has no tolerance for fraud and abuse and that the OIG 
needs to acquire adequate resources and personnel to audit and investigate 
programs on the ground.  
 Have the GF take any steps necessary to ensure that LFAs and CCMs are 
capable of managing grants and are properly trained on how to spot and 
mitigate suspected fraudulent activities.  
On March 16, 2011, the GF announced that the former Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt, and the former 
President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, would lead a high-level panel of international 
experts to review and reform GF systems (CRS 2011). The head of the High-Level 
Panel was Gabriel Jaramillo who later became a GF General Manager. 
On September 9, 2011, the High-Level Panel Review was released. It 
acknowledged the GF oversight systems were ‗imperfect‘ and stressed the need for 
Fund to get over the ‗unpleasant‘ period:  
The controversy surrounding the audit and investigative reports released by 
the OIG in the last six months has, in large measure, diverted the attention of 
the Global Fund‘s Board and management. While the Global Fund can never 
tolerate dishonesty, and sub-standard performance is always disappointing, it 
is important to view certain aspects of these reports in their historical context. 
The early years of the Global Fund‘s life were a period during which the 
institution went from a standing start to deploying resources quickly in 
dozens of countries at the same time, in response to an evident worldwide 
emergency. Donors and recipients felt the urgency. Goals and expectations 
were unclear, and oversight mechanisms imperfect. (GFATM 2011a, p. 61) 
[emphasis added] 
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The Panel Review stressed that the GF Board, Secretariat and the OIG should all 
agree to a ‗Turning of the Page,‘ a reconciliation strategy, faithful to the Fund‘s 
founding principles, which would involve the following elements: 
 No amnesty for fraud, but focus oversight on more recent rounds of grants. The 
GF oversight mechanisms should look to the future, focused on Rounds 6 (2007) 
and afterwards.   
 Strengthen the relationship between the Secretariat and the Inspector General. 
 Adopt a new risk-management framework 
 Redefine ‗Country ownership‘ in the context of the Global Fund‘s risk-
management framework (GFATM 2011a). 
Meanwhile, at the May 2011 Board meeting, the OIG presented its vision of what 
was important for the GF, which included: 
 Reconsider the relevance of the GF‘s model. The Fund should reconsider 
whether to remain just a financing institution, reliant upon national 
ownership. If the Board decided to retain that model, the OIG recommended 
identifying other options to mitigate the risks of fraud and financial 
misappropriation.   
 Reevaluating the KPI structure. The OIG asserted that the KPI structure‘s 
emphasis on speed and quantity of disbursements often compromises quality 
and adequate consideration of risks.  
 Establishing minimum acceptable capacity standards to assess PRs and 
develop a system to hold PRs accountable when things go wrong.   
 Enforce the policies and guidelines that have not been implemented at 
country level.   
 Making CCMs more effective in their oversight duties, and ensuring that they 
are without conflicts of interest (OIG 2011, pp. 8-9). 
The OIG suggestions resonate with much of the critique about GF systems and 
policies discussed above. 
The U.S. issued a ‗Call to Action for reform‘, launching a process to improve 
the Fund‘s operations, especially at the country level. This statement was embraced 
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at the GF Board meeting in November 2012, and a Reform Working Group was 
established to push this reform agenda forward as a top priority (US House of 
Representatives 2011). 
At the same meeting on November 15, 2012, the GF Board fired John 
Parsons from his post as Inspector General on the grounds of ―unsatisfactory 
performance‖(GFATM 2012d). This decision was criticized by many organisations. 
The US-based AIDS Healthcare Fund (AHF) called it a ‗hatchet job‘ and a very dark 
day for the GF and accountability in development funding in general. AHF President 
Michael Weinstein said, ―It appears that John Parsons has been fired merely for 
doing his job too well‖ (AHF 2012). The decision to fire Parsons came despite the 
fact that the High-Level Review Panel expressed ―enormous respect for the positive 
impact the OIG's work has had on securing the organization's investments‖ and 
called the OIG ―the only risk-mitigation strategy within the Global Fund that has 
worked as designed‖(High-Level Panel, p.53). 
1.8 Changes in the GF after 2012. The New Funding Model (NFM) 
In November 2011, the GF Board approved a new strategic plan ―to become 
more flexible, iterative and better-informed‖ in order to increase the impact of its 
programmes. As part of that process, the GF introduced the New Funding Model 
(NFM), which replaced the existing rounds-based system. Access to funding in the 
transition phase was by invitation, and special consideration was to be given to 
countries in a position to achieve rapid impact, those at risk of service interruptions, 
and those currently receiving less than they would under the new funding model‘s 
allocation principles (GFATM 2013c). 
An editorial published in The Lancet warned: ―The continued survival of the 
Fund remains at risk. The organisation is still in a period of transition. It needs to 
enter a phase of stabilization‖ (The future of the Global Fund 2012, p. 860). 
In 2012, the GF spoke about ―refocusing resources‖ and suggested that in 
order to achieve the most impact on the epidemic, funding should be concentrated 
―in the countries where the GF and partners can have the greatest impact. These 20 
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countries account for more than 70 percent of the global burden of HIV, TB and 
malaria‖ (GFATM 2012b,  p.11): 
Figure 1.7 The Global Fund 20 ‗High Impact‘ Countries 
 
Despite being presented as a more predictable funding opportunity (GFATM 
2012b), the NFM brings uncertainties as to how it will ensure the GF core principles 
of demand-driven and country-owned responses to the three diseases. While 
UNAIDS described the NFM‘s focus as supporting ―the countries with the most 
serious epidemics and least ability to pay‖ (UNAIDS 2013), Glassman et al. (2013) 
noted that a new regional GF focus would disqualify middle-income countries from 
accessing GF funding at the time when the global disease burden was shifting more 
towards them. 
On January 22, 2013, the GF Executive Director Mark Dybul addressed a 
global health conference in Oslo. He stressed:  
We need to move past the tyranny of averages. We all see country and 
regional average rates of HIV, TB and malaria, but they mask micro-hyper-
epidemics where transmission rates are very high. A micro-hyper epidemic is 
an outbreak of disease that is highly concentrated among a part of the 
population, putting a wider population at risk of infection. By focusing high-
impact interventions where new infections are occurring, countries will get 
the biggest bang for the buck. (GFATM 2013e) [emphasis added] 
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This statement suggests a further narrowing of the scope of GF-supported 
interventions, as well as the GF narrowing its ‗responsibility zone‘. The GF new 
deliberation, manifested clearly through the NFM, makes the question of whether it 
coalesces with the country ownership principle that GF programs ―reflect national 
ownership and respect country-led formulation and implementation processes‖ 
(GFATM 2001), essentially rhetorical.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion of the global governance models 
proposed by Savedoff (2012). At the end of his paper, he concludes that: 
Mixed coalitions have been able to achieve a lot without being able to compel 
uniform action. The tragedy of this limitation, though, is the painful gap 
between what we accomplish and what we could accomplish.. So, mixed 
coalitions are a form of international self-organization that are promising and 
problematic. There is no guarantee that they will form to address the most 
important issues and no guarantee that any particular coalition or team will 
have the resources—financial or in legitimacy—to carry out important 
functions. (Savedoff2012, p. 16) 
The GF continues to evolve at the time of writing. Since most of the data 
collection and literature analysis occurred before the start of GF 2012 reforms, the 
analysis and the discussion presented in this thesis focus on the structures and 
policies that existed at the GF prior to that. While every possible effort has been 
made to present literature updates and new GF-related data as it became available 
closer to the time of completing writing, it was not possible to incorporate all of the 
new information into analysis. However, the author believes that the now historical 
character of many of the described events does not diminish the importance of this 
enquiry, but is a reminder that ―the Global Fund has been and still is very influential 
in shaping major international health policy choices that warrant serious scrutiny 
from the global health community‖ (Italian Global Health Watch 2008, p.47).  
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CHAPTER 2. UKRAINE: HISTORY, POST-SOVIET TRANSITIONS AND 
HIV EPIDEMIC. THE GLOBAL FUND ENTRY TO UKRAINE. 
 
2.1 Country background 
 2.1.1 History of Ukraine: a divided country.   
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe with an area of 603,628 sq. 
km. The capital of Ukraine is Kyiv, with a population over three million. 
Administratively, the country is divided into 24 provinces (oblasts), one autonomous 
republic of Crimea, and two cities with a special status: Kyiv and Sevastopol 
(Ukraine, 2011). After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine has been rapidly 
depopulating: its population fell from 52 million in 1991 to an estimated 
44,573,205 in July 2013 (CIA World Factbook). With one of the lowest birth 
rates in Europe, Ukraine‘s crude death rate is 15.75 deaths per 1,000 
population - second only after South Africa (ibid.). 
Figure 2.1. Map of Ukraine 
 
 
Ukraine was not always known by its present name, although it has a very ancient 
and rich history and a highly developed national identity and culture. Its relative 
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obscurity originates from the fact that Ukraine, for most of its history, was a divided 
nation, and moreover, a stateless one. For centuries, Ukraine was divided among 
countries with different political, religious and social systems.  
The first historically known state on Ukrainian territory was a Slavic state, Kievan 
Rus‘. Centered in Kyiv, it prospered on trade between the Baltic and the 
Mediterranean Seas. The Rus‘ reached its ‗Golden Age‘ in the 10th-11th centuries 
during the reigns of Vladimir the Great and his son Yaroslav the Wise. In 1240, 
weakened by internal feuds, Kyiv was invaded and devastated by Batu (Batyi), the 
grandson of Genghis Khan. Subsequently, the Rus fell in decline and came under the 
influence of Polish-Lithuanian, Mongol and Cossack (Zaporizhya Sich) states, while 
a new entity in the north, the Muscovy, began to gain influence, forming the basis for 
the future Russian Empire (Fennell, 1983). After the 1686 ‗Eternal Peace‘ treaty with 
Poland, Ukraine was divided – pravoberezhna (right-bank) Ukraine, west of the 
Dnieper, went to Poland and livoberezhna (left-bank) Ukraine, east of the Dnieper, 
and Kyiv went to Russia. The formal partitioning of the two regions made the 
Dnieper a frontier zone which it remained for more than a hundred years. By the 
Third Partition of Poland (1795), right-bank Ukraine was also annexed by 
the Russian Empire.  
Halychyna, or Galicija, also known as Western Ukraine, was situated further west 
from right-bank Ukraine on territories now occupied by Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-
Frankivsk oblasts, and developed as a distinct entity. Its population is believed to 
descend from a West Slavic tribe called White Croats that was part of the Great 
Moravia state in Central Europe in the 9
th
 century (Spiesz, 2006). Between 12
th
 and 
16th centuries, control over the area passed from Hungary to the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. In 1772, Halychyna became a province of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire. After the end of WWI and collapse of Austrian and Russian empires, and the 
1917 revolution in Russia, several short-lived independent states emerged across 
Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR after 1921, and Halychyna 
became part of Poland. In 1939, Halychyna became part of the Soviet Union, 
following the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Germany and USSR, and 
was invaded by Germany in 1941. Before the war, Halychyna was a prominent 
center of European Judaism, with an estimated Jewish population of 530,000. At 
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least 520,000 were murdered during the Nazi occupation, before the region was 
liberated by the Red Army in 1944 (Interactive, n.d.). 
Crimea historically was under control of the Crimean Khanate. Later disputed by 
Turkey and Russia, including the 19th century Crimean War, it eventually became 
territory of the Russian Empire. Crimea is home to a significant Muslim minority, the 
Crimean Tartars who constitute 12% of Crimea‘s population (Ukrainian Census 
2001), as well as other nationalities (Greeks, Bulgarians, Krymchaks). Crimea was a 
battleground in several wars, including WWII and the bitter Red Army defense of 
Sevastopol. Crimea was a popular Soviet resort, particularly known for its 
tuberculosis treatment sanatoriums. In 1992, Crimea became turbulent when the 
Crimean Parliament adopted the Act on State Independence of Crimea (Mizrokhi, 
2009). Fearing the spread of separatism in former Soviet republics, Presidents 
Kravchuk of Ukraine and Yeltsin of Russia divided the ex-Soviet Black Sea Fleet 
based in Sevastopol and agreed to autonomy for Crimea under Ukrainian 
jurisdiction.  
2.1.2 Economy: agrarian versus industrial Ukraine. Regionalism 
For centuries, Ukraine was a granary of the Russian Empire (Aslund, 2009), 
and is often called ‗a bread basket of Europe‘ because of its abundant black soils 
(chernozems) that are among the most fertile soils known (Britannica, 
Encyclopaedia). Ukraine suffered severely during Soviet collectivisation of 
agriculture in the 1930s. Five to seven million people are believed to have died in an 
artificially imposed starvation – Holodomor - or Hunger Death (Aslund, 2009), while 
almost 30 million tons of grain were exported in 1932-33 to world markets to finance 
Stalin‘s industrialisation plans (The Ukrainian Museum, 2003).  
After WWII, Ukraine developed into a strategically important region, with a 
strong emphasis on the military-industrial complex and heavy industry, defense-
oriented science and technology development. Its fertile black soils generated more 
than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output (CIA World Factbook, 2012). Ukraine 
was a strong asset of the former USSR. Ukrainian economy was developing along 
the regional divides - heavy and military industry and manufacturing were 
concentrated in Eastern Ukraine, whereas Western Ukraine was more agricultural.  
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After the end of the USSR, Ukraine was initially viewed as a country with 
favourable economic conditions in comparison to the other republics. However, its 
economy remained dependent on energy supplies from Russia, which has been using 
Ukraine‘s dependency as a foreign policy tool (Balmaceda 2008).  
Ukraine cannot be understood without acknowledging its ―regional 
peculiarities and tensions‖ (Aslund 2009, p. 19). Ukraine‘s regions played an 
important role in the formation of the Soviet political elites. Soviet leaders 
Khruschev and Brezhnev as well as many prominent Politburo and military elite 
members - came from Ukraine.   
Ukrainian regionalism is sometimes presented as the outcome of the weak role of 
the country‘s capital, Kyiv, versus more influential regions. Aslund (2009) suggests 
that, unlike many other European countries, Ukraine - in its modern history - was 
never dominated by its capital. Instead, in Soviet times, Dnipropetrovsk – the 
industrial powerbase in Eastern Ukraine – was the leading light – and produced 
Communist leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, and after 
independence in1991, the second President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, as well as 
prime ministers Pavlo Lazarenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. So many political elites, as 
well as prominent Soviet sports, science, and arts figures originated from the city that 
it became common to talk about the ‗Dniepropetrovsk clan‘ (Schmidt-Häuer, 1986), 
exerting influence on the life of the whole USSR. Donetsk, the other industrially 
developed region and a base of coal production, produced President Victor 
Yanukovych as well as the richest man in Ukraine Rinat Akhmetov (Forbes, 2012). 
Together, Donetsk and Dniepropetrovsk oblasts represented the industrial wealth of 
Ukraine and after 1991 became the seats of the wealthiest business empires (Aslund, 
2009). 
Dniepropetrovsk native Volodymyr Shcherbytsky whom Brezhnev appointed as 
the first Secretary of Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) in 1972, was characterized 
as a ‗hard-liner‘ and a ‗Brezhnevite‘ because of his stronghold over the party 
apparatus and loyalty to Moscow. Considered by many as a possible successor to 
Brezhnev as a head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Shcherbytsky 
supported centralisation of the Ukrainian economy and was a harsh opponent of 
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nationalist dissent (Subtelny, 2009). Shcherbytsky remained at his post until 1989, 
long after other Brezhnevites lost power (Aslund, 2009). Few of Gorbachev‘s new 
policies of perestroika, demokratizaciya and glasnost (restructuring, 
democratization and openness) were implemented in Ukraine where they were 
viewed as strange phenomena, shown on TV from Moscow. A popular joke of the 
time was, ‗If you want a break from perestroika, come to Ukraine.‘  
 
2.1.3 Chernobyl, perestroika and the end of the Soviet Union 
On 26 April 1986, the most severe nuclear accident in history occurred at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant, 60 miles north of Kyiv, releasing large amounts of 
radioactive fallout. Handling of the accident by authorities exposed the deeply 
cynical character of the regime - as members of the government commission 
observed the Chernobyl liquidation work from a sealed bunker, fire brigades, 
especially in the first hours of the catastrophe, extinguished radio-active fires without 
any protection gear(Grogan, 1987). As news of the accident spread, authorities held 
the usual May Day parade in Kyiv, despite worries of high levels of radiation, while 
the Ministry of Health (MOH) released reassurances about ‗safety‘. The parade 
included children engaged in dancing and sports activities. The conduct of the May 
Day parade, and a bicycle tournament held in Kyiv the following day, were a 
shocking demonstration of how far the officials could go to conceal information 
about the Chernobyl accident. Under pressure from abroad, Moscow authorities 
released limited information about the accident several days after it happened 
(Rubin, 1987), while the MOH said that ‗a certain amount of radiation is good for 
you.‘  
Chernobyl was the first hard challenge for the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. With popular sentiment 
rising against a stagnating economy, food shortages, and lack of political freedoms, 
the way Chernobyl was handled by authorities was deeply upsetting to people who 
had not been informed about the disaster (Aslund, 2009). The Chernobyl accident 
and clumsy dealing with safety information by Soviet authorities left a strong legacy 
behind and catalyzed anti-Soviet tendencies. As Gorbachev himself acknowledged, 
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―the nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl, even more than my launch of perestroika, was 
perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union‖(Gorbachev, 2006). 
While there was much talk about reform, Gorbachev's policy of perestroika was 
never introduced into practice for the majority of citizens (Magocsi, 1996). About 95 
percent of industry and agriculture was still owned by the Soviet state in 1990. 
Distrust and disillusionment with the regime were growing. A very unpopular war in 
Afghanistan was also costing the Soviet Union dearly. A well-intended and reputedly 
effective anti-alcohol campaign, initiated by Gorbachev (Bhattacharya et al, 2012), 
was perceived negatively by the public. It triggered a massive surge in illegal alcohol 
production and dealt a fatal blow to Gorbachev‘s popularity (Reuters, 2009).  
After an infamous August 1991 coup, a last-ditch effort by party hard-liners to 
maintain the USSR, disintegration processes in the former Soviet republics 
accelerated, led by republican Communist apparatchiks and democracy movements. 
The Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were the first to leave the 
USSR. The process culminated in signing of the Byelovezh Treaty (named after a 
forest reserve in Belarus) by Russia‘s President Boris Yeltsin, Belarusian Supreme 
Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, and Ukraine‘s Supreme Soviet Chairman 
Leonid Kravchuk on December 8, 1991. The document proclaimed the end of the 
Soviet Union as a subject of international law, and agreed to the establishment of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to be composed of the 12 republics that 
still made up the Soviet Union at the time (Pifer, 2011). The sidelined Gorbachev 
was forced to resign on December 25, 1991. 
 
2.1.4 Ramifications for a new Ukraine: from communism to oligarchy  
Ukraine entered the post-Soviet era through a negotiated pact between the 
national communist officials and national democrats (Kuzio, 2000). To most 
members of the former Communist governing apparatus (nomenklatura), Ukraine‘s 
independence emerged as an unanticipated by-product of the collapsed center in 
Moscow. The main stake holders in Ukraine‘s political formation were the former 
nomenklatura and the ‗red directors‘ – former Soviet industry managers who were 
quick to realize that ―the state was the most lucrative feeding ground‖ (Zon 2000, 
p.10), where they could ―best pursue their individual and group interests‖(Narozhna, 
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2002), so they ―moved from being directors of enterprises to owners of enterprises 
they once controlled‖(Shelley, 1998, p.653). In addition to communists and ‗red 
directors‘, the state formation of independent Ukraine has been shaped by a popular 
National-Democratic ‗Rukh‘ Coalition. As none of those three groups were powerful 
enough to rule by themselves, their alliance formed a basis for establishing a political 
system in Ukraine. After consolidation of industrial and financial groups and the 
formation of oligarchy, the initial tri-partite alliance dissolved and its members 
aligned with different oligarchic groups.  
In Ukraine, as in other post-Soviet states, the transition to a market economy 
was ―beneficial only to a privileged few and not accompanied by the establishment 
of the rule of law‖ (Barkowski 2011, p. 2). Earlier research on Ukraine suggested the 
central role of a ‗criminal-political nexus‘ - the alliance of the former party elite, 
members of the law enforcement and security apparatuses, and organized criminals 
who together penetrated the licit and illicit sectors - during privatization (Shelley, 
1998). Some authors (Millar 1996; Wedel 2001 and others) have attributed a 
significant share of the responsibility for creating the conditions that led to the ‗Great 
Grab‘ (Wedel 2001) – a de facto theft of state assets by red directors and oligarchs - 
to US aid programmes led by Jeffrey Sachs and his colleagues at the Harvard 
Institute for International Development, as noted above. 
Political splits began to take shape according to historic regional divides that 
presented two broad foreign policy options. Those who preferred a ‗Slavic choice‘ – 
closer ties with Russia and the other FSU countries – lived predominantly in Eastern 
Ukraine, southern oblasts, and Crimea. The ‗pro-Western‘ or ‗pro-European‘ 
direction was supported by staunch defenders of Ukrainian sovereignty, in particular 
its independence from Russia, who tended to predominate in the center, including 
Kyiv, and Western Ukraine. In modern Ukraine, most political parties‘ programmes 
continue to operate along this dichotomy (O‘Loughlin, N.D.). As one Western 
diplomat noted, ―No one can say what is happening in Ukraine, or where the country 
as a whole is heading because no one can grasp the country as a whole. The different 
areas are totally different‖ (cited in Lieven 1999, p. 79).  
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In particular, Dnipropetrovsk-clan representative Leonid Kuchma‘s tenure as 
president (1994-2005) was problematic. ―Growing paralysis in decision-making in 
the legislature and the rising encroachment of the patrimonial state and the oligarchs, 
has increased the power of vested interests over the State‖(ILO 2001, p. 9). Under 
Kuchma, the vested interests had grown so strong that they were almost invincible. A 
year-long tenure (1996-97) as prime minister of notorious Pavlo Lazarenko from 
Dnipropetrovsk, appointed by Kuchma, became ―the epitome of corruption‖ (Aslund 
2009,p.95)
26
. In other parts of Ukraine, where many industries and collective farms 
were downsized or closed, discontent grew over lack of economic opportunities, 
unemployment, and the wide-spread corruption, associated with Kuchma‘s regime. 
The murder of investigative journalist Georgy Gongadze, whose beheaded 
body was found near Kyiv in 2000, ignited a major political crisis that erupted when 
allegations emerged that Kuchma, and his presidential administration, may have 
ordered the killing (Institute, 2001; Penketh, 2001). Mass rallies followed across 
Ukraine, and anti-Kuchma political forces gained momentum and significant popular 
support. In 2004, Kuchma‘s attempt to secure his power by nominating a Donetsk-
clan representative, Viktor Yanukovych to run for president, was marred by massive 
fraud in the second round of elections, and culminated with the ‗Orange Revolution‘ 
in November 2004. Ukraine‘s regional divides were a visible factor in the ‗Orange 
Revolution‘: 
Figure 2.2 Regional vote distribution in the ‗Orange Revolution‘ (Wikipedia, n.d.) 
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 In 1999, Lazarenko fled abroad and was detained and imprisoned in the US for money laundering. 
He is on Top 10 most corrupt leaders in recent history list, together with Philippines President Marcos 
and Indonesia‘s Suharto (Zaheer, 2011). 
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The victory of ‗pro-Western,‘ allegedly reformist Viktor Yushchenko was 
claimed by voters from Western and central Ukraine, while Eastern Ukraine 
predominantly supported Viktor Yanukovych.     
Despite widely held hopes that the ‗Orange Revolution‘ was Ukraine's 
democratic breakthrough, some cautioned against representing it as the establishment 
of liberal democracy (D'Anieri, 2007). The post-Orange Revolution period and 
Yushchenko presidency (2005-2010) were characterized by great domestic political 
instability (Peterson Institute, 2009), exacerbated by the onset of the world economic 
crisis. Despite their harsh revolutionary rhetoric, Yushchenko and the Orange 
leadership did not succeed in eliminating the rent-seeking oligarchic network 
(Fischer et al, 2008). One of the Orange leaders, Yulia Tymoshenko,
27
 lost 2010 
presidential elections to Viktor Yanukovych and was imprisoned on charges of abuse 
of power.  
 
2.1.5 Ukraine on the „Chessboard‟: „Europe‟s Linchpin‟ and a large aid 
recipient 
After 1991, Ukraine became a recipient of massive foreign aid to support 
democracy, structural adjustment and promoting reform. As noted above, an 
important shift was that from an aid giver – the USSR provided massive aid to 
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A native of Dnipropetrovsk, Tymoshenko became known as the "Gas Princess‘ in the 1990s, when 
as the protégé of former Prime Minister Lazarenko, she headed Unified Energy Systems (UES), the 
company importing Russian gas into Ukraine. Her career in the gas industry is believed to have 
allowed her to amass a fortune (AlJazeera 2011).  
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developing countries in par with the USA (Rivero, 2009) – to a recipient of massive 
foreign aid. Not only there was no institutional background for absorbing aid coming 
in large amounts, but soon it became obvious that different donors were promoting 
different reforms in different states. In Collision and Collusion, Janine Wedel talks 
about how the donors distinguished between different FSU countries: ‗more 
developed‘ states were those with nuclear arms, while ethnically troubled 
Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan, Kazakhstan and Caucasian republics fell into the domain 
of ‗underdeveloped‘ (Wedel 2001, p. 20). Ukraine, as ‗more developed‗, received 
significant initial aid for de-nuclearization and disarmament (Narozhna, 2002). 
Throughout the 1990s, it was the third largest global recipient of US aid (Perlez, 
1996). Borodchuk (2012) described foreign aid strategies in Ukraine as mostly ad 
hoc, based on political momentum. According to a local think tank,Geostrategу, from 
1990 through 2011, Ukraine received $3.336 billion in aid (Rosbalt Ukraina, 2011).  
Aid earmarked for Ukraine was not just for its disarmament. Some in the 
Western political and scholarly establishment adopted the ‗Chessboard‘ concept 
(Brzezinski, 1997) in Ukraine‘s post-independence years, viewing it as ‗Europe‘s 
Linchpin,‘ which should play an important role in the stability of the region and 
whose statehood should be preserved by all costs:  
An independent, democratic, and reform-oriented Ukraine can provide a model 
for Russia‘s development ... and promote stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe... Ukraine needs Western money and diplomatic backing to preserve its 
independence and keep reform on track. A civil war between its Russified east 
and its more Ukrainian west, or its absorption into a new Russian empire, 
would reverberate throughout Europe. (Mroz and Pavliuk, 1996) 
In this externally assigned role, the country is supposed to both counter-
balance Russia and serve as a model for Russia‘s development. Despite the lack of 
consistency and strategic perspective, foreign donors and the international 
community continued to view Ukraine through the ‗Russia prism‘ which caused 
―considerable frustration in Kyiv‖ (Fischer  2008, p. 15). The persistence of Western 
hopes that Ukraine would grow into this role may help explain why, for so many 
years, despite little in the way of meaningful reform, this post-communist country 
was so favored with aid. Some types of programmes were particularly promoted. 
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„Democracy promotion‟: a focus on NGOs 
As time passed after independence, concerns over its ‗democratic regression‘ 
disturbed prior assumptions that Ukraine ―was on a ‗transition‘ path to a consolidated 
democracy‖ (Kuzio 2005, p.167). The West became concerned about a dysfunctional 
state, manifested by its inability to satisfy the basic material needs of the population, 
or to determine a comprehensive reform strategy (Wolowski, 2009). Support for civil 
society looked particularly attractive, ―crucial to the post-communist political 
transformation and a panacea for problems from corruption and lack of 
accountability to service delivery needs‖ (Lopes 2012, p. 1). 
While support to local NGOs was a ―talisman of international development 
organisations‖(Atlani-Duault 2007, p. 14), support for civil society in the post-
communist world was particularly high on aid agencies‘ agenda. Henderson (2003) 
noted a shift in Western countries‘ political agenda after the fall of communism. 
Having initially promoted economic and social development in the post-colonial 
developing world, they moved to directly ‗promoting democracy‘ in post-communist 
states. This shift represented ―a substantial foreign policy experiment‖ in which 
recipient countries were ―laboratories of experimentation‖(Henderson 2003, p. 3). 
The number of NGOs in Ukraine mushroomed after independence and 
liberalisation of political freedoms. At the same time that Robert Putnam was 
observing that in America more people were ―watching TV... and civic society has 
shrunk‖ (Putnam 1995, p. 65), in the early 1990s, public activism was at its height in 
post-Soviet republics
28. The 1992 Law ―On Citizen Associations‖ (E-Law, 1992) 
allowed thousands of citizens groups and initiatives to officially register. By 2011, 
about 50,000 different-sized NGOs and charity organisations were registered in 
Ukraine (Kondratenko, 2012). Official sources list 91,317 registered public 
associations of all forms (Ukrstat, 2013a). Ukraine was said to have ―the freest and 
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 Early public associations grew out of public movements during perestroika and were mostly 
informal grass roots citizen groups, gathered around a particular cause or initiative, locally or nation-
wide. Members included workers, academics, women, students, etc. who worked on a voluntary basis 
and supported organisations through membership fees, personal funds or local fundraising. Hundreds 
of such groups were a base of nascent post-communist civil society. 
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most vibrant civil society among CIS countries‖ where levels of civil society 
development ―approximate the levels of new EU member states‖(UNDP , 2007). 
The political momentum for early post-Soviet civil society was short-lived. 
Just as the new NGOs began to acquire space and prominence, the political arena 
began to fill with ‗transnational advocates‘ (Hrycak, 2007) – international NGOs 
(INGOs) – and their funders. The influx of foreign-funded NGOs to Ukraine and 
other FSU states occurred under the label of ‗democracy building‘ (Carothers, 
1999b). Zhukova (2013, p. 115) called this process a ―promotion of soft imperialism‖ 
aiming at the decentralization of post-Communist states under the umbrella of 
democracy. The effort did not materialise in fruitful results, argue Carothers (1999b), 
Wedel (2001), Sampson (2003), Henderson (2003), Hrycak (2007), Fioramonti and 
Heinrich (2007), Pishchikova (2011), and others. In Ukraine, increasing contact with 
‗transnational advocates‘ led to ―increased competition among similar groups for 
foreign funding‖, with local organisations devoting themselves ―to the causes and 
concerns of foreign donors‖(Hrycak 2007, p. 89), while NGO involvement began to 
be perceived as a job opportunity - ‗office work‘. This resulted in rapid formation of 
‗project society‘ and ‗project elites‘:  
People within and outside organizations compete for money, influence, 
access and knowledge; they distribute these resources among their own 
networks and try to prevent others from obtaining access. The successful 
actors in this competition become the project elites... intimately tied to 
Western ideas and funding, not to mention knowledge of English and the set 
of skills associated with ―project management‖.  This Euro-elite is not only 
paid well ... [they] earn more money than their parents ever did, and more 
than high government officials. In this sense, they form part of a 
new comprador bourgeoisie (Sampson, 2003). 
In FSU region, those were commonly referred to by a derogatory term 
grantoedy or grantozhery (grant-eaters), to describe organizations that know ―how to 
apply for and obtain funds‖, but do not ―bring change‖ (Shapovalova 2010, p.11). 
CSOs
29
 in post-Soviet context are frequently described as ―vertical organisations that 
do not respond to crucial societal concerns‖, ―being more interested in pleasing 
foreign donors, than paying attention to what people need and what they say‖ 
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In this research, the terms ‗CSO – civil society organisation‘ and ‗NGO – non-government 
organisation‘ – are used interchangeably because, although they are distinct notions, in the context of 
Ukraine they usually refer to the same entity. There has been a proliferation of various NGO terms, 
e.g. GONGO – Government organised NGO, and others (Götz 2008). 
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(Fioramonti and Heinrich 2007, p. 25), ―parroting the phrases donors expect in order 
to win grants‖ (Hrycak 2011, p. 261), or ―more firmly rooted in transnational 
networks than in their own societies‖ (Wedel 2001, p. 114). Pishchikova (2011), 
analyzing US aid to NGOs in Ukraine, argued that despite the dominance of the 
‗civil society assistance‘ discourse, the aid effect was often negative as it ―fell short 
of the proclaimed goal of democracy-building, and impeded the development of 
indigenous civil society‖ (Pishchikova 2011, p. 198).  
Transition from citizen initiated CSOs into grantoedy did not just happen 
overnight, but grew out of the post-communist political development. Political 
scientists observed that changes in the powers of Ukraine‘s president facilitated 
development of a culture of ‗Neo-Patrimonialism‘ (Van Zon, 2005), based on a 
‗delegative democracy‘ (Kuzio, 2005), manifested during Kuchma‘s second term 
(2000-2004), as well as after the ‗Orange revolution‘ during Yuschenko‘s presidency 
(2005-2010). The president positioned himself as having directly delegated powers 
from the people who voted for him, which precluded the need for people to be 
represented by civil society institutions. The main feature of neo-patrimonialism is 
―the private appropriation of the public realm‖ when public and private spheres are 
―de jure separated but de facto such separation does not exist‖ (Malygina 2010, p. 
10). This model was characterised by low levels of political participation beyond 
voting. In fragile post-communist political organisms, the combination of neo-
patrimonialism in the domestic political sphere and an influx of INGOs worked to 
sideline bona fide grass roots organizations, and replace them with ―puppet 
organisations that appear to be civic structures‖ (Kondratenko, 2012). 
While Malygina (2010) observes how neo-patrimonialism facilitated the state 
officials‘ use of public resources to acquire wealth, Kondratenko (2012) suggests that 
foreign-funded CSOs were also viewed by bureaucrats as a source of income. ―Not 
uncommon‖ practices of setting up ―artificial social services-oriented CSOs‖ just to 
raise funds from international donors by state officials were noted in Kuts‘ study 
(2001), in which participants reported ―local governments seeking grants from 
donors preferring to establish ‗their own‘ CSOs in the relevant regions‖ (Kuts 2001, 
p. 22). Chapter 4 describes the proliferation of ‗quasi‘ NGOs in GF-funded settings. 
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2.2 Post-1991 transitions: the HIV dimension 
After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine plunged into a deep and painful 
socio-economic transition, characterised by economic crisis, inflation, loss of 
savings, and mass unemployment, exacerbated by the aftermath of Chernobyl. 
During a prolonged 1991-1999 recession, Ukraine lost 60 percent of its GDP and 
suffered five-digit inflation rates while one-third of the population plunged into 
poverty (UNAIDS ASAP, 2009).  
Among the numerous aspects of post-Soviet transitions, several deserve a 
closer look in the context of the present research. 
2.2.1 Trafficking in women. Migration. 
In the 1990s, Ukraine became a ‗supply country‘ and a major source of 
women for international sex markets (Hughes, 2000a). A brief historic outline of 
prostitution in Ukraine is provided in Appendix B. 
During perestroika, despite the famous proclamation about ―no sex in the 
USSR‖30 in the 1980ies, the phenomenon of valyutnye (hard currency) prostitutes 
began to spread, ―glamorized in media by popular films such as Interdevochka” 
(Hughes 2000a, p. 15). Interdevochki (girls working on foreigners) were prolific in 
Intourist hotels in major cities and resorts in Crimea and Caucasus and met with little 
resistance from police.  
With the rapid development of ex-Soviet states as ―the hub and major 
supplier of women‖ (Stone, 1998), Ukraine became one of the largest origin 
countries of Slavic sex slaves after 1991, as well as a transit country for Asian and 
Indian sex workers to Western Europe (Hughes, 2002), earning ―the biggest money 
for criminal groups in Eastern Europe‖ (Hughes 2000a, p. 21). The accounts of the 
numbers of the trafficked women in 1991-1998 varied between 500,000 as suggested 
by IOM (1998), and 400,000 women, suggested by Ukrainian Interior Ministry 
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 During perestroika, a popular ‗Pozner-Donahue‘ TV Bridge (telemost) show connecting US and 
USSR audiences live, was created to show the policies of glasnost. During one such show, dedicated 
to the family life of Soviet women, one woman participant proudly proclaimed: ‗There is no sex in the 
USSR!‘ 
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(Stone, 1998).  Legally, prostitution in Ukraine was criminalised between 2001 and 
2005 (Kerrigan et al, 2013), but later was de-criminalised, while liability for 
pimping, brothel operations and sex trafficking was made more severe. The Criminal 
Code of Ukraine does not define individual prostitution as a crime.  
The existing discourse on prostitution/sex work in Ukraine – including in the 
context of HIV transmission - is ambiguous. It is not informed by the country‘s 
historic contexts; neither is it a product of the women‘s movement. Instead, it is 
externally-driven by donor-supported transnational NGOs. While different views on 
prostitution feature differently in international programmes in Ukraine, the role of 
the Ukrainian women and women‘s NGOs is mostly decorative. Organisations such 
as UNAIDS adopted the definition of sex work as receiving ―money or goods in 
exchange for sexual services, either regularly or occasionally‖ (UNAIDS 2012a, 
p.3), while Coalition against Trafficking in Women, based in Banghok, European 
Women‘s Lobby, a Dutch-based NGO, and others, advocated legalisation of 
prostitution in FSU. USAID, a foreign policy arm of US government, on the 
contrary, was careful not to adopt the stance of ‗promoting prostitution‘, and for 
many years, especially during the Presidency of George Bush Jr., USAID only 
supported ABC-centred HIV prevention. The role of aid in the discourse on sex work 
in FSU was noted by Hughes (2002) who argued that well-funded NGOs in Ukraine 
and Russia represented the funder‘s perspective, not the grassroots voices of people 
at home. Thereby, ―the authentic voices in sending countries have been supplanted 
by the voice of the destination countries‖ (Hughes 2002, p.2). This issue is linked to 
a more global loss of role of post-communist women‘s NGOs, manifested by their 
failure in the 1990s to enter the global women‘s networks and incorporate the post-
communist agenda on women into the key global framework documents including on 
trafficking and reproductive health
31
. Tensions in ‗East-West sisterhood‘ 
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Post-communist women‘s NGOs were unable to change the pre-formed global development 
agendas. During the 4
th
UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, ‗A Voice from a Non-
Region‘ statement was circulated among delegates, advocating for inclusion of women‘s issues of 
post-communist transition into the UN Framework Document, but did not succeed. The document is 
on file with the author. After the 4
th 
Conference, attempts to consolidate Eastern European and FSU 
women‘s networks continued until the early 2000s but were not successful in winning donor support. 
Author‘s own experience with global women‘s movement informed the research. 
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relations
32
are well-documented in works of Einhorn and Yeo (1995), Havelkova 
(1997), Hrycak (2007), C.Kaplan (1997), Sperling (1999), N.Funk (2006), Wedel 
(2001), Pishchikova (2011), and others, while ‗East‘ and ‗South‘ tensions, also 
present at global forums, were not reflected in literature.  
Due to unregulated character of the prostitution in Ukraine, it is organised by 
the criminal networks that may often operate in cooperation with law enforcement 
and government officials (Hughes, 2000a). Symbolically, the first NGO for sex 
workers established in Odessa in 1998 with support from OSI
33
 - a famous „Vyera, 
Nadyezhda, Lyubov‟ (Faith, Hope and Love) - was headed by an acting police female 
officer working in crime prevention unit (UNAIDS 2007b).  
Ukraine is home to a relative hierarchy of sex work which includes a top level 
of elite sex workers who are well paid and protected by security guards, personal 
doctors, and pimps. The middle category organizes in locations near hotels, bars and 
strip clubs as well as private residences. They often work with pimps or mamochki 
(madams) who take a portion of their salary in exchange for protection from police 
and clients. The lowest tier includes women working on the streets as well as those 
on highways, parking areas, train stations and bus stops; this group often includes 
drug and alcohol users as well as homeless women (TAMPEP, 2007). There is an 
ambiguity regarding the numbers of sex workers, and estimates fluctuate between 
60,000 and 90,000 women. These numbers do not correlate with much higher 
numbers of migrants and victims of trafficking, suggested above.  
Recently, inward sex tourism to Ukraine has become a growing trend. There 
were suggestions to regulate sex workers by police during EURO-2012 football 
championship (Schuster et al, 2010).  
In the context of HIV transmission in Ukraine, the externality of the sex work 
discourse, added by a highly criminal and politically volatile environment, distorts 
understanding of the problem and narrows the scope of its application to the donor-
supported programmes. This explains Ukraine‘s failure to develop a sensible policy 
on prostitution which is an important step in ensuring the rights and access of sex 
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 The term ‗East-West sisterhood‘ was used ironically by Roth (2007) to describe the divides between 
East European and Western women activists and scholars over political and cultural issues of post-
communist transition. 
33
 Open Society Institute (OSI) - the fund by George Soros with headquarters in New York.  
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workers to health services. Epidemiologically, sex workers as a group are an 
important factor in Ukraine‘s HIV epidemic. Recent research suggests that Ukraine 
has the highest HIV prevalence among female sex workers in the EECA region 
(Kerrigan et al, 2013). Ukraine does not register HIV infection cases among CSWs 
(commercial sex workers) (UNGASS, 2012, p. 13). ‗Blindness‘ of the official 
statistics – that puts HIV cases among CSWs together with other HIV sexual 
transmission cases - reflects the lack of a clear epidemiological vision of this group 
that impedes the development of an effective national strategy of HIV sexual 
prevention.   
 
Migration   
Throughout history, Ukrainian populations were highly mobile. Despite its 
fertile soils, Ukraine‘s populations often suffered from widespread poverty and 
resorted to earnings from non-agricultural activity, involving short and long-distance 
migration to factories and towns (Gatrell, n.d.). Following intensive labour 
migrations in 18th-19th centuries, populous Ukrainian diasporas developed in many 
parts of the world (Kichorowska-Kebalo, 2011).   
The phenomenon of migration, although changing in scale and in direction, 
has remained a characteristic feature of Ukraine and the country is among the top ten 
in the world in its rate of outward migration, according to IOM. According to the 
data provided by Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, about 5 million Ukrainians work 
abroad, 65% of them are women (Kyzyma, n.d.).  Ukraine is one of the main origin 
countries of exploited labour in Europe (UNHCR, 2012).As to the regions of origin, 
the Western Ukraine (Halychyna) bears a disproportionate share of all Ukrainian 
migrations: 
Figure 2.3. Geographical distribution of Ukrainian labour migrants (IOM, 
2011) 
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There has been no empirical research on HIV prevalence among Ukrainian 
migrants. Research in other countries has shown that, once migrants arrive at their 
destination, HIV risk factors include being separated from regular partners, 
loneliness, and anonymity that inﬂuence their behaviour (ILO, 2005). Some engage 
in risky behaviour as a result of peer pressure, or the need to belong to a group or a 
community. Female migrants are especially vulnerable to abuse, violence, trafficking 
and inequality. 
2.2.2 Weakening of the law enforcement. Drug-related policies and issues. 
The collapse of Soviet law enforcement after the end of the USSR was 
obvious and predictable, given the heavy ideological component of its functioning. 
Dismantling of the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the first head of NKVD
34
, by 
angry crowds in Moscow during the August 1991 putsch (coup) became a media 
symbol of death of the empire. The Soviet collapse of the 1990s saw massive lay-offs 
in police, military, and security services just when the new states needed them most.  
After the end of the USSR, Ukraine was left without the institutional capacity 
to address organized crime (Shelley, 1998). Most of the expertise and the institutions 
to deal with the problem remained in Russia, which inherited the centralized 
institutions of the Soviet state. Shelley suggested the central role of a criminal-
political nexus - the alliance of the former party elite, members of the law 
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 NKVD - Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. 
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enforcement and security apparatuses, and the organized criminals who together 
penetrate the licit and illicit sectors - was the most pernicious element of the crime 
phenomenon in Ukraine. The existence of such a nexus seriously distorts law 
enforcement.  
In the context of post-communist transitions, it has become almost axiomatic 
to speak about the rise of HIV and growing drug use and prostitution by attributing 
their causes to economic crisis and joblessness. Rhodes et al (1999) spoke about 
social and economic ‗risk environments‘ in which HIV spread rapidly. The growth of 
drug use was as much caused by the transition‘s social effects as by an 
unprecedented proliferation of production and distribution of drugs, which could not 
have happened without the weakening – and corruption – of law enforcement. A 
vivid description is given in Laurie Garrett‘s Betrayal of Trust: 
Stopping the Mafia, Gypsy gangs and other narcotraffickers in the region 
would be tough – perhaps impossible, psychiatrist Pavel Bem said. He 
insisted that regardless of what factors were driving the region‘s young adults 
toward drug addiction – the real crisis was how readily, and cheaply, the 
killer products were available. 
Almost without exception, narcotics and amphetamines could be purchased 
easily and openly, even in rural areas of Siberia or the frozen Arctic Circle. 
And sophisticated networks of gangsters and Gypsies, working with 
traditional drug traffickers from Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Asian 
Golden Triangle, were moving across borders behind the once-Iron Curtain. 
‗These new economies are great opportunities for organized crime. And they 
are holding their prices way down at introductory levels‘, said Bem. 
Following universal rules of marketing, drug traffickers were creating 
clienteles in the region by selling everything from raw opium to heroin at 
rock-bottom prices, more than tenfold lower than equivalent drug sales in 
New York City. 
The cheapest high was vint, an extract of ephedrine allergy pills that were 
chemically oxidized to ephedrine, and powerful hallucinogen. In Moscow vint 
sold for three dollars… 
The primary selling point for vint was Lubyanka Square – across the street 
from the headquarters of the Russian police force formerly known as the 
KGB. (Garrett 2000, pp. 213-214) 
After 1991 independence, Ukraine became a conduit for Southwest Asian 
heroin bound for European markets. Porous borders, understaffed and underfunded 
75 
 
counter-narcotics entities, and the rise of organized crime syndicates have enabled 
traffickers to utilize Ukraine as a viable transit point (Layne et al, 2002). Recent 
reports suggest an increasing share of Ukraine in global trafficking and call it ―the 
drugs gateway to Europe‖ (The Ukrainian Week, 2013). 
Drug use in Ukraine has been on the rise since 1991. In general, the drug 
policy of Ukraine was not consistent because it needed to comply with the country‘s 
international obligations and respond to internal crime problems. There is no liability 
for the use of drugs or psychotropic substances under the Ukrainian criminal 
legislation (Viyevskyy et al, 2011). Criminal liability exists for possession of drugs, 
psychotropic substances, or precursors not for sale purpose and in amounts 
exceeding the smallest allowable amount (Criminal Code of Ukraine, Article 309), or 
for the use of drugs in public or by a group of persons (Article 316), as described in 
Viyevskyy et al. (2011). High prices for heroin and cocaine have drawn many drug 
users to domestically cultivated poppy straw. Grown primarily in western and 
northern Ukraine, according to the Ministry of the Interior(Layne et al, 2002), weed 
and home-made opiates (―shirka”) were among the most popular drugs, due to the 
easy access to the raw materials and their profitability. Drug use when home-
made opiates and medications are used together is quite widespread. A recent report 
suggests Ukraine becoming an important heroin consumption market in Eastern 
Europe (UNODC, 2011). The drug scene in Ukraine is changing and was not a 
subject of a detailed analysis in this study. More information can be found in 
Viyevskyy et al (2011), Layne et al (2002),Kaminskaya (2003), Nieburg and Carty 
(2012), WHO (2013). 
Some authors tend to portray the growth of HIV within the domain of 
―political tensions between public health and law enforcement approaches to harm 
reduction and drug treatment‖ (Nieburg and Carty 2012, p.2), reporting punitive 
approach to drug use and violence towards drug users as the major barriers to 
improving access to HIV prevention in Ukraine and other FSU states (Rhodes et al. 
2006; Rhodes et al. 2010; Rechel 2010; Strathdee 2010 et al.). It is sometimes argued 
that the reasons why drug users remain an ‗easy and convenient target‘ were linked 
to existing practices of fulfilling crime statistics - the main criteria to evaluate police 
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performance in Ukraine that provides incentives for more arrest/imprisonment 
(Kucheruk, 2013). The role of external factors in the spread of HIV is also outlined. 
Neighbouring Russia spent billions of rubles on anti-drug and anti-drug trafficking 
policies, but in regard to HIV, was forced to acknowledge at a MDG Conference in 
2011, that it ―cannot resolve this, and the roots… of this problem are linked with the 
need to fight the drug threats coming across the border from Afghanistan.‖ 35 
Prohibitionist Russian drug policies were believed to influence Ukraine. Some 
research suggested that Russian science, which opposed harm reduction including 
OST, continued to influence government officials and healthcare providers in 
Ukraine (Spicer et al, 2011). In April 2012, the Head of the Parliamentary 
Commission on Health, influential Tetyana Bakhteeva indicated during a meeting in 
Kyiv with Lord Fowler, Chair of the UK House of Lords‘ Select Committee on HIV 
and AIDS, that despite the importance of syringe exchanges and substitution 
treatment in tackling HIV, ―the Ukrainian government would not be able to take over 
the responsibility for harm reduction programs or finance them‖ (International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2012a).  
2.3 The health care in Ukraine before and after 1991. HIV/AIDS health care. 
2.3.1 Semashko system and its collapse. Post-1991 health reforms. 
The Soviet Union was a welfare state with free universal health care, free 
education, and most other services provided by the state. The Soviet health system 
delivered comprehensive medical services, including in the most remote areas. 
Known as ‗Semashko system‘36, fully public and highly centralized health care was 
one of the strongest pillars of the Soviet system. An outline of health system in the 
USSR is given in Appendix C.  
The break-up of the Soviet Union led to ―the most astounding collapse in 
public health ever witnessed in peacetime in the industrialised world. For the Euro-
Slavic world it would be the most radical reversal, in the absence of war, since the 
Black Death of the fourteenth century‖ and it became ―one of the most catastrophic 
consequences of the dissolution of the USSR” (Garrett 2000, p.113). [emphasis 
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 Speech of the Foreign Minister of Russia (Lavrov, 2011). 
36
 Nikolai Semashko (1874-1949), People‘s Commissar of Health and later a USSR Academician, 
Lenin‘s advisor on health, is considered a ‗father‘ of Soviet health care system. 
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added] Post-Soviet independent states were torn between preserving at least some 
features of the previous health care system and reforming it.  
After 1991, Ukraine retained entitlement to universal health care. In mid-
1990s, it attempted devolution from a centralized model of decision-making and 
financing of health care to its extreme decentralization and delegation of authority to 
local administrations. The 1997 law "On Local Self-Government in Ukraine" 
devolved significant budgetary authority to oblast and district councils (Gotsadze et 
al, 2010), while leaving health facilities administratively subordinate to MOH. As a 
result, healthcare responsibilities were fragmented among central government and 
regional administrations, which has constrained implementation of health policy 
(Lekhan et al, 2010) and made most health care entitlements, guaranteed by the 
Constitution of Ukraine, essentially rhetoric. The process of health care 
decentralization led to increasing inequalities between ‗wealthy‘ and ‗poor‘ oblasts 
of Ukraine. In regions lacking sustainable income, the health system became a heavy 
burden on local budgets. This was meant to change in 2001, when financing was re-
centralized under MOH, separating service provision from local authorities and 
ensuring that operating budgets were not influenced by local politics (Gotsadze et al, 
2010). The mechanisms introduced allowed some smoothing of territorial 
differences, but the scale of inequalities remained significant (Lekhan et al, 2010). 
The level of health care expenditures (HCE) is uneven between Ukraine‘s regions: 
Figure 2.4. Health care per capita expenditures in 2005, in Ukrainian hryvnas 
(UAH) (Betliy O et al, 2007) 
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High-income regions, such as the city of Kyiv, the Crimea Autonomous 
Republic, and Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk oblasts, are able to provide 
their residents with better-financed health care. The graph also shows that the large 
part of HCE is spent on inpatient care. 
Differences in regional health service capacity have significant implications 
for the HIV care delivery. 
At present, MOH has overall responsibility for the public health care system 
(see Figure 2.5 below). Its official role is confined mainly to setting norms and 
standards of health care and developing policy as well as procuring drugs (Lekhan et 
al, 2004). At the oblast level, the oblast health administration – oblzdrav– is 
responsible for regional health care facilities. At the district level, town and village 
administrations have authority over district health facilities.  
Figure 2.5. Structural organisation of health care in Ukraine (Lekhan et al, 2004) 
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There is a discrepancy over the role of MOH in policy making. While the 
1992 Law of Ukraine on 'Principles of Legislation on Health Care in Ukraine' holds 
the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) responsible for developing the national policy, 
setting standards, allocating budgets, and creating national health care programs 
(Betliy et al, 2007), in practice these issues are determined by MOH.  
In 2011, Ukraine launched another attempt at healthcare reform, to introduce 
new approaches in the healthcare sector, enforce quality standards, and change the 
healthcare funding system by introducing the health services request (MOH, 2012).  
Overall, in most post-communist countries, post-1991 health reform decisions 
were made on the basis of politics rather than evidence. The rush towards reforming 
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health systems was often motivated by a political desire to distance from the 
communist ideology that Semashko system so strongly embodied. Agencies such as 
World Bank have played an important part in post-Soviet health care reforms. 
Foreign experts who had prominent roles in the early days often had little insight into 
local situations (Rechel and McKee, 2009). As was the case in other countries, they 
often concentrated on ‗policy transfer‘ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009) rather than on 
building domestic capacity. 
Ukraine‘s current health system may be characterized as a ‗hybrid‘ of 
Semashko because it ―preserved its fundamental features‖ (Lekhan et al. 2010), with 
many elements of old health care still present. One such element is a system of the 
specialized AIDS centres – a vertically structured health system whose foundations 
were laid in late Soviet Semashko health care. 
2.3.2 Early days of HIV epidemic in the USSR. Soviet response to AIDS 
Due to the closed nature of the Soviet system, the region experienced a slow 
start of HIV/AIDS. The first cases of HIV in the USSR were associated with Soviet 
citizens returning from abroad, as well as unprotected sex with foreigners, primarily 
male students from African countries (Vinokur et al, 2001). The majority of sero-
positive females in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) during the 1980s had multiple 
sexual contacts with foreigners (Kozlov et al, 1993).  
 Although the first official information about AIDS
37
was released in 1987, 
there were earlier direct and indirect signs that the epidemic had entered the USSR. 
Among the indirect signs was the Prikaz (Order) of the MOH of the USSR of 
10.06.1985 (Ministry of Health of the USSR, 1985). While the Order stated that 
cases of AIDS were recorded in the USA and no AIDS cases had been discovered in 
the USSR (Khozhylo, 2008), nevertheless, it decreed the organization of mass 
screenings and opening of specialized diagnostic labs to test for AIDS. Other official 
documents emerged soon afterwards – among them the amended Order of the MOH 
of 09.07.87 that introduced a requirement of mandatory AIDS testing of all foreign 
                                                          
37
 Initially, in Soviet documents, the disease was called sindrom priobretennogo immunodeficita – 
SPID – meaning AIDS syndrome. 
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students already in the USSR, and an entry ban to the Soviet educational 
establishments for AIDS-diagnosed foreign nationals (Ministry of Health of the 
USSR, 1987). Those documents indicated a ―double standard‖ in AIDS statistics 
(Khozhylo 2008, p. 49), and suggested that there were already known cases of AIDS 
in the USSR before 1987. 
 The direct evidence came in a ‗bombshell speech‘ in Paris in 1986 by Dr. 
Victor Zhdanov, head of the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology of the USSR Academy 
of Medical Sciences, at the Second International AIDS Conference (Garrett, 2000, p. 
201). Zhdanov, a top Soviet AIDS expert at the time, a member of the WHO 
Executive Board (Kaplan, 1999), openly defied the Soviet authorities by revealing 
that claims that there was no AIDS in the USSR were untrue, and that small 
outbreaks of the virus were appearing in parts of the USSR, including Moscow 
where the virus had been discovered in 12 out of 10,000 people screened by his unit 
(Nahaylo, 1986). Upon Zhdanov‘s return from Paris, a ‗witch hunt‘ campaign was 
unleashed against him and he was denounced as a ‗CIA spy‘, while several unsigned 
articles appeared in Soviet scientific journals questioning his credibility as a scholar. 
Allegations were to be investigated by a commission headed by Valentin Pokrovsky, 
President of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR (Garrett, 2000). 75-year 
old Zhdanov, having suffered a stroke, was summoned to the commission where he 
fell victim of vicious personal attacks and died shortly afterwards
38
.  
 Initially, Soviet health authorities intended to place HIV and AIDS into the 
sexually transmitted infection (STI) network of the health care system, which seemed 
rational given the predominantly sexual mode of transmission of the first HIV cases 
in the USSR. But eventually, a separate system of AIDS clinics and labs was 
established. 
The Law on AIDS passed in August 1987 focused primarily on punitive 
measures (Belikov, 1987). The law made HIV testing obligatory and criminalized 
transfer of the infection (Medvedev, 1990). Among other measures, it required: 
                                                          
38
 Meanwhile, Pokrovsky‘s son Vadim was appointed the head of a new HIV/AIDS Laboratory and 
Clinical Centre in Moscow (Garrett, 2000).  Now called the Russian Federal AIDS Centre, it is still 
headed by Vadim Pokrovsky at the time of writing. 
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- foreigners living in the USSR for more than three months to undergo an 
HIV test,  
- Soviet citizens returning home after one month or longer abroad to be tested 
for HIV, 
-  physicians to test anyone whom they suspected might be infected, and  
- up to eight years prison terms to those who knowingly infected others.  
The 1987 legislation also called for expulsion of non-Soviet citizens who refused 
to be tested. Williams (1995), Powell (2000), Medvedev (1990) and others criticized 
Soviet anti-HIV legislation for creating a climate of fear between possibly infected 
people and medical authorities. Patients feared being found HIV positive because of 
the discrimination and possible imprisonment for transferring the infection, and 
medical personnel were afraid of being accused of accidentally infecting patients. 
Feshbach described cooperation between those at risk and the medical authorities as 
―impossible‖ (Feshbach 2007, p.29). 
In 1987-88, a computer system for the registration and analysis of all HIV 
testing activities was established, and in the following year a centralized system of 
AIDS Centers and diagnostic laboratories was created. At the beginning of 1989, 
about 17 million people had already been tested. By late 1991, just before it 
disintegrated, the Soviet Union had 1,015 HIV diagnostic laboratories, 110 
prevention centers (of which 80 were in Russia), and 200 special consulting centers 
for anonymous blood testing (Williams, 1995). 
As a result of these institutional choices, however discriminatory, the Soviet 
health system was able to prevent most of the initial outbreaks of HIV/AIDS. The 
early response to AIDS resulted in a network of AIDS centers that were segregated 
from the general health care system. The collapse of the health care system, and 
abandonment of many typical Soviet anti-epidemical measures, intensified the 
multiple dilemmas involved in HIV/AIDS control. 
2.3.3 HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine  
Until 1994, the number of HIV-infected people in Ukraine was low. Between 
1987 and 1994, over 39 million tests were carried out, and only 398 people were 
identified as HIV positive, of whom 215 were foreigners (Barnett and Whiteside 
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1999). The number of reported HIV infections increased extremely rapidly in the 
second half of the 1990s (Harmer 2000). 
Figure 2.6 Newly registered HIV cases among citizens of Ukraine in 1987-
2011 (Ukr. Centre for for Socially Dangerous Disease Control). 
 
Increasing HIV infection rates were masked by a decrease in testing after 
1998 when Ukraine adopted the Law "On Prevention of AIDS and Social Protection 
of People", which made HIV testing voluntary (WHO 2005). Some sources note that, 
while conforming to international standards aiming to protect the human rights of 
PLWHA, the law ―made the collation of data obtained prior to and after 1998 
complicated‖ (British Council 2001, p.17). 
Research suggested the growth of the HIV epidemic was in line with 
Ukraine‘s regional divides:―The increase was initially observed and was particularly 
striking in the regions along the Black Sea‖ (Hamers 2000, p. S5). DeBell and Carter 
(2005) spoke about ‗Ukraine‘s River Dnieper corridor‘ comprising the parts of 
Ukraine with the five highest rates of intravenous drug users Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, 
Kyiv, Mikolaiv, and Zaporizhia, all lying along the Dnieper: 
Figure 2.7 Ukraine's ‗River Dnieper corridor‘ with a high coincidence of drug 
use and HIV rates (reproduced from DeBell and Carter, 2005, p.217) 
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The World Bank also singled out Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, 
Mykolaiyv and Crimea as the most HIV-affected regions in Ukraine (Bank, 2009). 
Gukalova (2006) suggested that HIV rates correlated with the income level of 
population and were higher in oblasts with higher wage level, linking the latter to the 
ability of people to be able to afford a more ‗free life style‘ – i.e. to use drugs, 
purchase sex etc., she also suggested an increased susceptibility to HIV in ‗mono-
towns‘39. In 2008, HIV prevalence in oblasts looked like following:  
                                                          
39 ‗Monotowns‘ or ‗mono-industrial towns‘ in the Soviet Union were urban settlements with an 
economic base dominated by a single industry (Karam, 2011). The closure of an industry would mean 
the whole town population would become unemployed. 
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Figure 2.8 HIV prevalence in the regions of Ukraine in 2008 (Ukr.AIDS Centre) 
 
In 1999-2002, the main mode of HIV transmission was intravenous drug use (IDU): 
 Figure 2.9 HIV/AIDS in Ukraine, by route of transmission: 1999 to 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ukrainian AIDS Centre. 
Around 2007-2008, heterosexual transmission became the main mode of HIV 
transmission:  
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Figure 2.10 The routes of HIV transmission in Ukraine (Perehinets, 2012)
 
As of 11.02.2014, there were 247,101 registered cases of HIV-infection, over 
66,607 registered AIDS cases, and 32,283 AIDS deaths (Ukr.Centre for Disease 
Control). 
Suggestions made by Matic (2006) about ‗a maturing HIV epidemic‘ in 
Eastern Europe, correlate with an alarming increase in AIDS morbidity and 
mortality: 
Figure 2.11 New AIDS cases and AIDS-related deaths per year among 
citizens of Ukraine in 1991-2012,Ukr.Centre for Disease Control 
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Official data on HIV was frequently criticised for inconsistency and 
confusion over HIV screening results (Feshbach and Galvin, 2005), and donor 
organisations use estimated numbers. Estimates obtained through donor-funded 
research have also displayed a wide variability (see Appendix D).  
 
2.3.4 National governance mechanisms on HIV/AIDS 
 Due to the nature of vertical decision-making in Ukraine, at both the national 
and local levels, coordination and collaboration with international donors are often 
left to individual personalities and interests of those involved (Judice et al. 2011). 
Persisting political instability in Ukraine‘s government has led to frequent 
turnaround of ministers of health. Continuous policy upheavals that accompany 
frequent personnel changes has led the MOH to be described as the ―‘rain forest‘ of 
bureaucracy‖(World Bank 2009, p. 16). 
 Ukraine‘s government response to HIV/AIDS began in 1991 when 
Parliament adopted the Law on AIDS Control and Social Protection. Evolution of 
Ukraine‘s national governance on HIV/AIDS may be divided into two periods: 
(a) 1992 to 2000 - a ‗President-centred‘ period, when national governance 
institutions were built up under direct control of the President of Ukraine. 
This period is characterised by a stronger mandate of AIDS state institutions, 
including participation in budgeting and state planning. 
(b) After 2000 until now - ‗MOH/donor-centred.‘ AIDS governance mechanisms 
formed to comply with Ukraine‘s international obligations. Their mandate 
became weaker and unclear, and authority was divided between the MOH 
and multi-sectoral coordinating bodies that included international 
stakeholders. 
 
„President-centred‟ period   
 In 1992, President Leonid Kravchuk established the National Committee 
for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and HIV Infection that included top medical 
experts, executive officials from ministries of interior, health care, education and 
others. The Committee reported directly to the President, had control over AIDS 
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funding, and authority to institute anti-AIDS policy nationally and in oblasts, as well 
as to represent Ukraine abroad. From 1993 to 1998, the Committee was headed by 
Valery Ivasyuk. In 1996, the Committee established oblast AIDS committees 
(National AIDS Committee, 1996) as mechanisms of regional governance. The first 
four AIDS centres were also established in Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and 
Kyiv (Khozhylo, 2008). In 1997, scandal erupted in Ukraine when incidents of HIV 
transmission via donor blood raised concerns over the safety of its blood transfusion 
systems (Gorchinskaya, 1997). Ivasyuk accused a group of top officials for lobbying 
for a ban on importing HIV test systems to Ukraine (Kyiv Post, 2001), and 
promoting domestically-made test systems that, in his opinion, were responsible for 
producing many false results. Despite his protests, the decree signed by Ukraine‘s 
Prime Minister Pustovoitenko on January 19, 1998 (The Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine, 1998) gave a monopoly for procuring test systems to one company - 
Diaprof-Med (The Kyiv Post, 1998). In January 1998, President Kuchma, allegedly 
influenced by vested interest groups, fired Ivasyuk from his post and in May 1998 
disbanded the National AIDS Committee.  
A year after the disbandment of the Committee, the National AIDS 
Coordination Council was formed in 1999 under Vice Prime Minister Volodymyr 
Seminozhenko, with support from UNAIDS and other donors (World Bank, 2009). It 
was replaced by the National Commission on AIDS in November 2000, following 
Ukraine‘s commitment to the UN MDGs (Lekhan et al, 2004). Some functions of the 
disbanded National AIDS Committee transited to the Ukrainian AIDS Centre. 
However, the strong governance mandate was lost. 
 In 2000, Ivasyuk took part in the medical examination related to the murder 
of journalist Georgy Gongadze. After series of threats and accusations of 
embezzlement of state funds (Ukr.Pravda, 2001), he fled to Britain and applied for 
political asylum (Penketh, 2001).  
 
„MOH-centred‟ governance 
From the beginning of the 2000s, national AIDS governance centred around 
the MOH. The mandate was shared between the MOH and the National AIDS 
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Council (NAC), with many governance functions duplicated (Khozhylo, 2008). 
Inside the MOH, the Department of Socially Dangerous Diseases was established in 
1999.Its role and mandate were believed to be weak and ability to make meaningful 
decisions independently in question (World Bank, 2009). The role of NAC, despite 
being headed by the Vice Prime Minister, was mainly recommendatory. In light of 
frequent changes in this position, the Vice Prime Minister had limited direct 
involvement in oversight of the Government‘s response to AIDS. During the GF 
grants, NAC evolved into a Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM).  
The ‗Orange Revolution‘ in 2004 was accompanied ―by concomitant 
improvements in HIV/AIDS programmes‖(Matic 2006, p. 13). In 2006, President 
Yushchenko signed a decree creating a new National HIV/AIDS Committee and put 
the repatriated Ivasyuk in charge, who was also appointed Deputy Minister of 
Health. The Committee struggled for a mandate; it was subordinated to MOH with 
inadequate authority to coordinate across different government agencies (UNAIDS, 
2009). It also was not funded. Yushchenko accused the government, then headed by 
rival Victor Yanukovych, of sabotaging his decree and not putting funding for the 
Committee into the state budget. Yushchenko even threatened not to sign the 2008 
Budget if funding for the AIDS Committee was not included (UNIAN, 2007), 
however, these threats never materialised. With another change of government, 
Ivasyuk lost his post.  
Under a range of changing appointed heads (V.Petrenko, S.Cherenko, 
O.Fedko), the Committee slowly expanded its role and responsibilities. As Ministers 
of Health changed frequently, the Committee held de facto delegated responsibility 
for the national AIDS response. In 2010 it transformed into the State Service on 
Combating HIV-infection/AIDS and Other Socially Hazardous Diseases. Despite 
being called―a high level agency with a wide decision-making authority‖ (MOH, 
2012), State Service continues to be subordinated to MOH and operates within the 
framework of the National AIDS/TB Council. It also performs functions of the 
National Council Secretariat in relations with the GF (MOH 2012, p. 14). A detailed 
discussion of country coordination during the GF R1-R6 grants and research findings 
are presented in Chapter 6. 
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2.3.5 HIV/AIDS health care entitlements. HIV prevention. HIV testing. 
The Law of Ukraine on AIDS commits the Government of Ukraine to 
universal access to HIV treatment and care, with free treatment for all patients with 
HIV/AIDS. To enter ART and other treatment, an infected person needs 
corresponding medical indices and be willing to register (UNDP 2008).  
For individuals with HIV-infection to fully benefit from potent combination 
antiretroviral therapy, they need to know that they are HIV infected, be engaged in 
regular HIV care, and receive and adhere to effective ART (Gardner et al. 2011). The 
2012 WHO strategic HIV testing and counselling programme framework specially 
emphasizes the importance of ensuring linkage between HIV testing and counselling 
programmes and prevention, treatment, care and support services (WHO 2012). The 
HIV care continuum - also known as the HIV treatment cascade - is a model 
describing the delivery of services to PLWHA across the entire continuum of care: 
 
Figure 2.12 A model of HIV treatment cascade (Gardner et al.2011) 
 
 
The HIV care continuum schemes, as well as WHO ART guidelines, have been 
evolving over years globally, and below is a brief overview of their evolution in 
Ukraine.  
Entitlement to ART, including among other indices, the CD4 cell count, has 
varied. At the beginning of the GF programmes in 2003, the ART start threshold 
required a CD4 cell count of 200 cells/mm
3
 (Protocols for treatment of HIV-
infection, MOH of Ukraine) that was linked to low availability and high costs of 
ART. In August 2004, ART provision was launched in six oblasts under the Round 1 
GF program. By 2008, it was gradually scaled up to all oblasts. Ukraine‘s UNGASS 
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report indicated that death on ART (related  to  late  initiation  of  ART)  was  among  
the  main  reasons  to discontinue  ART  during  the  first  12  months  after  initiation  
of  treatment  in  the  2004-2007  cohorts (MOH, 2012). In 2007, according to the 
Base Standard for Implementation (Extension) of ART for PLWHA (MOH 2007), 
the CD4 cell count threshold for the start of ART was lowered to ≥350 cells/mm3, 
leading to increased numbers of eligible patients. The following year 2008, after a 
vocal lobbying campaign by GF implementers, most of the patients on ART, funded 
through GF grant, were passed into state care. For the government, ART costs were 
the lion‘s share of the state AIDS budget. The rate of funding for the national AIDS 
programme and capacity of AIDS centres lag behind the growing number of patients 
in need of treatment. ART coverage of HIV-infected people and their follow up were 
insufficient and the coverage rate fell in 2011 (2010 – 84%, 2011 – 82.3%)(MOH, 
2012). As of 01.01.2012, 83% of patients were getting treatment with support from 
Ukraine‘s state budget and 17% with support from the GF (MOH, 2012).  
HIV prevention in Ukraine: an overview 
National research in Ukraine (Khozhylo, 2008) as well as international 
sources (Merson, 2007) view HIV prevention as a holistic process that includes:  
 primary/negative prevention – preventing individuals presumed as HIV 
negative to contract HIV-infection by various measures;  
 secondary/or positive prevention (PP) – prevention of HIV transmission 
from HIV-positive individuals to uninfected individuals; and, 
 tertiary prevention – also including care – that involves a higher 
adherence by HIV-positive individuals to ART and other treatments, as 
well as social care such as providing food, clothing, and access to free 
services outside of the health care system. 
A holistic view of HIV prevention, as of any other disease prevention, is 
deeply rooted in the legacies of the old Semashko preventive approach to infection 
control. Unlike the USSR, Ukraine has always struggled with funding the various 
prevention approaches that have evolved as the government‘s views on HIV 
prevention changed at different stages of the HIV epidemic.  
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A MOH report described HIV prevention 
as the major priority in the state policy, 
and all the key line ministries are involved 
in the implementation of prevention 
programs (MOH, 2012). Primary 
prevention, under the new policy is based 
on articulated principles of a healthy 
lifestyle and family values. A national 
healthy lifestyle logo (see the picture), principles of the ―Constitution of a Healthy 
Human Being‖ (Ministry of Education, n.d.), and special awareness-raising programs 
were developed. The issue of HIV prevention has been integrated into the work of 
the Ministry of Education and Science to address the issue of quality of HIV 
prevention classes at educational institutions and the level of teachers‘ training and 
qualifications. A special Order was issued by the Ministry to set standards in these 
areas. However, there was no budgetary funding for prevention programmes in 
education.  (MOH, 2012). 
Prevention of „mother-to-child‟ transmission (PMTCT). According to MOH, 
implementation of the National Programme for PMTCT remains the only 
intervention in Ukraine to reach most of the target population with quality services 
(MOH, 2012). The programme is fully funded by the state and is believed to have 
been successful in lowering the MTCT rates (UNDP, 2008): 
Figure 2.13 HIV transmission from mother to child in Ukraine, in % (MOH, 2012) 
 
Focused (positive) prevention (PP) - among high-risk populations is carried out 
under the GF project (MOH, 2012). The coverage of IDUs‘ sexual partners with 
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prevention programs is low. There were changes in the operation of social services 
due to government restructuring reform. The scope and magnitude of prevention 
programs among MSM and those implemented in prisons are insufficient. There is 
no appropriate strategy for screening blood donation or for infection control (MOH, 
2012).  Most PP interventions in the populations most at risk of HIV were supported 
by donor organizations and implemented by civil society and some faith-based 
organizations, largely without control or support from the government (MOH, 2012).  
In its prevention policy, Ukraine accepted international recommendations that 
a correct understanding of HIV epidemic should influence the choice and focus of 
HIV prevention and populations that it targeted. This UNAIDS approach, known as 
―Know Your Epidemic, Know Your Response‖ (UNAIDS, n.d.), ―a rallying cry for 
an intensified focus on HIV prevention‖ as noted by Wilson and Halperin (2008), 
had produced mixed outcomes globally: 
.. [F]or too long, the global HIV-prevention community has pursued 
generalised responses in concentrated epidemics, concentrated approaches in 
generalised epidemics, or hedged their bets and done a bit of everything‖ 
(Wilson and Halperin 2008, p. 423). 
In Ukraine, despite the change in the main mode of transmission in 2007-
2008, the view on its HIV epidemic as concentrated among groups of high-risk, with 
IDU as a dominant mode of HIV transmission, was continuously promoted by 
international donors. During the GF R1-R6 programmes, there was no agreed 
perception of Ukraine‘s HIV epidemic40. Research participants reported that the PRs 
adoption of external view on Ukraine‘s epidemic as concentrated among IDUs 
resulted in the lack of sensitivity of GF-funded prevention interventions to adjust to 
the changing nature of the epidemic. More details are provided in Chapter 5. 
HIV testing  
In Ukraine, testing for antibodies to HIV is considered an important part of 
prevention. Testing practices in Ukraine have undergone four stages (Appendix E). 
                                                          
40
 A number of Ukraine‘s stakeholders reject the notion of its HIV epidemic as concentrated. Some 
publications suggested that in several parts of Ukraine, epidemic was already generalizing (see for 
example UNDP (2000), DeBell and Carter (2005)). Later, the term ‗mixed epidemic‘ has been used by 
UNAIDS representatives and researchers (Alistar et al. 2011) in relation to Ukraine. 
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Ukraine implements the ‗combined voluntary counseling and testing (VCT)41 
model‘ that is administered in state-funded hospitals, STD clinics, narcological and 
TB dispensaries, family planning centres and antenatal clinics (Varban et al, 2012). 
Ukraine has an extensive, tiered HIV laboratory system. Virologic and immunologic 
testing is done at an increasing number of the 27 regional AIDS center laboratories 
as well as at a central HIV reference laboratory. There are also 761 state-funded 
‗Dovira‘ (‗Trust‘) centres in all oblasts (Perehinets, 2012) that conduct express 
testing and counseling and are approximated to residential areas. A considerable 
number of private laboratories also conduct HIV tests. Due to the stigma associated 
with HIV, many people choose to do HIV screening at the private labs, however, no 
data were available on how many private labs conducted how many HIV tests, and 
no reporting model was developed for them (British Council 2001). Express (rapid) 
tests are also administered by HIV-service NGOs (Varban et al, 2012). 
The aim of HIV testing is to determine eligibility of PLWHA to receive ART 
and other entitlements stipulated by law. To receive these entitlements, a person‘s 
HIV status needs to be confirmed through a pidtverdzhuvalny (confirmatory) testing 
for antibodies to HIV ½, and antigen р24 HIV-1 (The Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 
2012) – for which a venous blood is taken for an immune-fluorescence assay (IFA) 
test conducted at the AIDS center laboratory, followed by a waiting period of 
between two weeks and one month. Only after a confirmatory test proves positive, it 
serves as an entitlement to enter the HIV continuum of care. The patient is then put 
on a dispensary list (dispansernyi oblik), which requires registration and submission 
of individual passport data to AIDS centre. 
Two populations are universally tested in Ukraine – blood donors and 
pregnant women who attend ante-natal clinics (ANC), with procurement of their HIV 
test kits provided by the state budget. UNAIDS describes coverage by testing of 
other populations as ―low and inconsistent‖ (UNAIDS 2009, p. 30). Because test kits 
for testing general population are procured by the oblast budgets, in oblasts with 
limited financial capacity
42
, the number of registered HIV cases may significantly 
underestimate prevalence rates (MOH, 2012).  
                                                          
41
 In other sources, the system is referred to as HIV Testing and Counselling (HTC) (Perehinets 2012). 
42
 See the differences in oblasts health budgets presented in Figure 2.1 on p.77. 
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Prison system 
Ukraine has a significant number of prisoners – about 350 per 100,000 
people. The total number of inmates in Ukraine was 145,189 as of February 1, 2013 
(Departament, 2013). In 2005, between 15 and 30 per cent of prisoners in various 
prisons across Ukraine tested HIV positive (AIDSLEX, 2006). The share of HIV 
positive individuals and AIDS-related deaths among the prisoners was rising:  
Figure 2.14 Numbers of officially registered HIV positive individuals, patients 
with AIDS, and AIDS-related deaths among prison population in Ukraine 
(UNODC 2012, p. 24) 
 
After 2010, AIDS has become the leading cause of death among prisoners 
and detainees (see Figure 2.15): 
Figure 2.15 Causes of deaths of individuals in places of confinement
(UNODC, 2012, p. 27) 
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The prison system and its statistics are sometimes difficult to verify as some may be 
‗classified‘ as in Soviet times, besides, it‘s a different jurisdiction within the Ministry 
of Justice, and has a separate health system. The infection rates for HIV and TB in 
prison system as well as available services need to be researched independently. 
Drug clinics (narcological dispensaries) 
The treatment of people with drug problems in Ukraine is carried out at a 
tertiary level by a vertical system of narcological dispensaries. MOH approves the 
list containing types of drug treatment facilities and departments (Ministry of Health 
of Ukraine, 2002). The financing of these institutions/departments is provided by the 
regional budgets and partly at the expense of the out-of-pocket payments by patients. 
Medical procedures associated with treatment of patients with drug dependence are 
to be carried out by a state narcologist (Vievsky, 2011). In addition, treatment of 
people with drug abuse problems may be carried out by private health care 
institutions and private narcologists, with the clients paying for their treatment. 
The narcological service is often seen as an atavism of Soviet health care, 
where it was a sub-discipline of psychiatry, and the state confined drug and alcohol 
addicts to locked facilities for blood purification procedures, aversion therapies and 
the use of labour as therapy (Latypov, 2011). Its legacy of registration requirements 
of patients with drug problems and periodic visits to the narcological center 
(Celentano and Beyrer, 2008) survived the USSR.  
 
2.4 Proliferation of the Global Fund in Ukraine.  
2.4.1 Main funders in HIV/AIDS in Ukraine before GF. Other actors in 
HIV/AIDS 
As Marcus et al (2009) pointed out, donor countries and organizations have to 
a great extent guided the trajectory and implementation of GF programmes at the 
country level. The section below describes the key funders on HIV/AIDS in Ukraine, 
whose earlier proliferation had shaped the GF entry.  
The UN Family 
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Historically, the most prominent donor for HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Ukraine was the United Nations. Ukraine, as a Soviet republic, was a full UN 
member since 1945, when the decision to allow the USSR to have more than one 
vote at the UN
43
 resulted in Ukraine and Belarus obtaining a UN membership 
(Bevans, 1968). Despite being nominal, as its delegation voted unanimously with the 
USSR, the UN membership left an established tradition of Ukraine‘s involvement at 
the UN level. When the UN representative office opened in Kyiv in 1992, the 
country possessed both the experience of international cooperation and a professional 
cadre of diplomats and international development specialists.  
In the mid and late 1990s, HIV-AIDS initiatives clustered around the UN 
office in Ukraine. They included publication of a bulletin for people with HIV, and 
support for initiative groups of PLWHA, which began to form an association 
(UNAIDS 2007). At the end of the 1990s, the UNDP-funded ‗Civil 
society/Government Partnership‘ programme began to develop multi-sector 
partnerships in HIV-AIDS policy at the local level. The UN provided assistance to 
regional governments and civil society organisations to promote their collaboration 
in organising the response to the epidemic at the regional and local level. A UN 
Theme Group on HIV/AIDS emerged in 1999, backed by UNAIDS in Ukraine, 
included UN family organisations, government, representatives of donor projects 
working in HIV-AIDS, mostly USAID-funded, as well as academics and some 
NGOs. UNDP supported other HIV-focused projects – such as ‗Peer-to-Peer 
Education in HIV/AIDS‘ with funding from the Turner Foundation, partnered with a 
national government agency. In those programmes, the role of NGOs was to seek 
better ways to influence national and local budget spending on AIDS and to work 
towards better representing their communities and facilitate their access to state 
services. With small grants to local NGOs to provide services to the homeless, 
addicts, sex workers, and other vulnerable populations, UN engagement at this time 
was marked by a pronounced focus on local and regional governments‘ role in 
creating a supportive environment for collaborative, multi-sectoral involvement of 
non-state sectors of society, formulation of better local policies on HIV/AIDS, and 
influencing regional budgeting. With UN funding provided for activities, the 
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premises and local resources were typically provided by local governments. This was 
supposed to increase the sense of ownership and make local governments perceive 
these programmes as their own.  
As a UN Security Council member in 2000-2001, Ukraine achieved 
prominence by supporting several global initiatives, among them the initiation of a 
UN Special Session on AIDS (UNGASS) that Ukraine announced at the first session 
of its membership in the Security Council (Kuchinsky, n.d.). Ukraine was also one of 
the first UNGASS signatories. On the strength of its active support role to UNGASS, 
reflecting a strong government commitment, in 2001 Ukraine was approached to 
submit a Round 1 application to the Global Fund.  
 
Soros (Vidrodzhennya) Fund 
The other prolific donor to HIV-AIDS programming was George Soros and 
his ‗Open Society Institute‘ (OSI) in New York. OSI played a very active role in 
funding civil society groups in Eastern and Central Europe and in former Soviet 
republics, where 24 of his foundations worked. Aslund (2009) attributed to Soros the 
development of most nongovernmental organisations in Ukraine. Quigley (1997, 
p.109) characterised OSI foundations as being ―biased toward their own versions of 
democracy, partisanship, and active involvement in local politics‖. In Ukraine, Soros 
operates under the name Mizhnarodny Fond Vidrodzhennya (International 
Renaissance Foundation).  
In the mid-1990s, OSI, through its International Harm Reduction 
Development Programme (IHRD), funded pilot projects in several oblasts to work 
with IDUs and until 2003 was ―a key donor‖ for harm reduction in Ukraine: ―It 
focused mainly on advocacy for drug policy reforms and developing an enabling 
environment for effective scale-up of harm reduction‖ (Semigina 2009, p. 22). In 
1996, OSI funded the first harm reduction project in Odessa
44
. In 1997-1998, OSI 
funded NGOs to work with IDUs in Poltava, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Donetsk, Vinnitsa, 
Zhitomir, Sumy, Simferopol and Kharkov (Zabransky et al, 2012). The initial scale 
of operation was limited. Later called ―boutique programming‖, the ―high-quality, 
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small-scale projects‖ that provided services for most-at-risk populations, were 
effective ―at a very localised level‖ but had ―little impact on the national-level 
epidemic‖ (APMG 2009, p. 3).  
The first OSI harm reduction projects had a pilot status. In this study, it is 
assumed that their network in seven oblasts formed an initial ‗proto-network‘ of the 
regional HIV NGOs in Ukraine that later proliferated ―beyond boutique level” in GF 
programmes (APMG, 2009, p.14), while the key staff of the OSI IHRD programme 
moved on to senior management positions with the International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
in UK and its Linking Organisation in Ukraine, a future GF recipient.
45
 These 
projects had an important role to play in future GF proliferation in Ukraine. 
USAID 
In 2002, Ukraine was identified as one of 23 USAID priority HIV/AIDS 
countries globally on the basis of its escalating epidemic and potential for significant 
economic, political, and social impact (USAID, 2003). The implementers of the 
USAID programmes were typically US-based contractors. Among the largest 
recipients were: Futures Group, working though its POLICY project, with a focus on 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS policy, and the Seattle-based Program for 
Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH) that in the 1990s implemented the 
Ukraine Infectious Disease Program (MEDS, 2000) and later focused on tuberculosis 
control.  
In 2000, unusually for USAID, which typically funded US-based contractors, it 
awarded funding to a UK-based International HIV/AIDS Alliance for the 
‗Transatlantic HIV Prevention Initiative‘ that ran for the period of 2000-2004.  
In 2003, USAID introduced ‗HIV/AIDS Strategy for Ukraine for 2003-2007.‘ 
The strategy introduced a prioritetnye regiony (‗high priority‘ regions) policy on 
HIV/AIDS that directed funding to eight of 24 oblasts with the highest HIV rates 
(USAID 2003). These were Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kyiv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, 
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Kherson and Cherkasy oblasts and Crimea Autonomous Republic.
46
 ICASO named 
―the focus on ‗priority‘ oblasts to the detriment of other areas‖ as one of the 
challenges to HIV prevention in Ukraine (ICASO 2007, p. 5). 
Chapter 5 describes how the GF funding followed the established donor pattern 
and was also mainly spent in ‗high priority‘ regions. 
 DFID 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) funded projects in 
Ukraine as part of „Taking Action: The UK Government‘s Strategy for Tackling 
HIV/AIDS in the Developing World‘. DFID‘s level of engagement in Ukraine, 
especially in HIV prevention, was small in comparison with neighbouring Russia, 
where its programming, ―for a range of reasons,‖ was ―quite different from others 
around the world,‖ (DevEx 2008) as noted by DFID Head in Russia and Ukraine 
Simon Bland.
47
 A DFID evaluation by Thomson et al (2007) described the 
organization‘s failures in Russia in the area of harm reduction. A notable example 
was the project in Togliatti, Samara region (1998-2004), which developed an 
effective HIV prevention programme for high-risk groups, but failed to convince the 
local government to continue this controversial approach with its own funds. The 
evaluation concluded that the programme had failed to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of harm reduction on a large scale and ―to influence the Russian 
government to develop similar public programmes‖. As a result, DFID ―failed to 
maintain its leading role in the controversial area of supporting NGOs to scale up 
harm reduction work‖ (Thomson et al 2007, pp. 36-38). 
Reduced DFID involvement in Ukraine may also be explained by the fact that 
by 2003 the country already had received large funding in R1 from the GF. DFID 
funding was mainly committed for consultancies aimed at lowering the risk of HIV 
infection among MSM in Kyiv and Donetsk as well as allocating small grants to in-
country NGOs (GOV.UK, 2006). Under the ‗Taking Action‘ initiative, DFID also 
supported UNAIDS in Ukraine under the ‗Building M&E Capacity‘ rubric. The 
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report on ‗Taking Action‘ noted difficulties in obtaining disaggregated information 
on how DFID funds were spent on HIV in Ukraine (GOV.UK, n.d.). DeBell and 
Carter (2011) suggested the DFID programme had a problematic impact. Allocating 
small grants to in-country NGOs, each of which was externally managed by UK 
universities, charities, and NGOs, established a pattern which was ―to encourage 
competitive bidding between small Ukraine NGOs, poor coordination, and a 
tendency to bypass Ukraine‘s MOH. This kind of support not only failed to sustain 
initiatives but it also failed to confront the fundamental need to strengthen the 
national health system itself‖ (DeBell and Carter 2011, p. 9). Stewart called DFID in 
Ukraine a ―prominent departing donor‖ (Stewart 2009, p.190).   
GTZ 
The German federally owned technical cooperation enterprise GTZ 
(Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), in cooperation with the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), supported projects in Ukraine aimed at promoting 
workplace policies and programmes on HIV/AIDS, funded under GTZs BACKUP 
Initiative (GTZ 2009).The objective of Initiative was to advise governmental and 
civil society partners on how to apply for funding from the GF and to build their 
capacity to do so. Particular attention was paid to gender equality, integration into 
health systems, increased participation of civil society, and capacity development. 
Project ended in 2009. 
Currently called the International Cooperation Enterprise (Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit – GIZ), the agency implements an HIV/AIDS 
advisory services and institutional capacity building project, ‗Consulting on 
HIV/AIDS and Support of the Institutions‘, commissioned by the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and executed by the 
MOH of Ukraine. GIZ is following the ‗Gib AIDS Keine Chance‘ (Don‘t give AIDS 
a chance) campaign to promote HIV prevention. Run since 2008, the campaign 
works to increase knowledge and awareness of HIV/AIDS and improve people‘s 
attitudes to those affected by HIV/AIDS. This applies to the population as a whole, 
but particularly to adolescents and those who work in ports or for service providers. 
The campaign engages high profile sport stars to promote healthy lifestyle messages.  
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The World Bank 
The World Bank‘s US$60 million TB and HIV/AIDS Control Project was 
funded through its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP). Conceived in 1999, in 
close collaboration with the Government (UNAIDS, n.d.), this ambitious programme 
was supposed to reduce TB and HIV/AIDS morbidity and mortality through an 
effective National Strategy for TB and HIV/AIDS Program. The project became 
operational in March 2004, with the MOH and State Penitentiary Department as 
implementing entities (Bank, 2009). The ‗AIDS Control‘ component – to be 
implemented by MOH - was to support the following objectives: (i) to stabilize the 
epidemiological situation in the country; (ii) to reduce risky behaviour among young 
people; and (iii) to reduce the social tension in the society and negative consequences 
of the epidemic. These objectives were ―more reflective of the entire national and 
international efforts‖ at the time of project preparation when the GF – the main 
financier of ARVs in Ukraine was not yet operational (Bank 2009, p. 11). The largest 
part of ‗AIDS Control‘ component was to be directed towards harm reduction 
programmes among IDUs, CSWs, and MSM including training, advocacy, education 
materials, peer education programs, vehicles, syringes, condoms and supplies, as 
well as providing test kits and equipment to improve blood safety and development 
of blood safety guidelines. A public awareness campaign was also included for the 
general population about HIV prevention, to encourage the use of protective 
measures, and reduce stigma. The programme also provided for HIV treatment 
activities, development of treatment protocols, drugs and supplies for the treatment 
of opportunistic infections, training of staff, lab equipment, etc. and for care and 
support for PLWHA sub-component (Bank, 2009). As noted by Semigina (2009), the 
GF and the WB programmes were viewed as complementing each other.  
The Bank project failed to implement. Funding was suspended numerous times 
under different governments and Ministers of Health. Geared strongly at TB control 
and promotion of DOTS, implementation was affected by ―considerable resistance to 
DOTS from the Ukraine‘s TB Institute‖48(Bank, 2009, p. 9). Part of the problem 
stemmed from the Bank‘s own understanding of the TB approaches in Ukraine 
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headed by the influential Academician of Ukrainian Academy of Medical Sciences Yuriy Feschenko.  
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proposed for Bank financing, found to be ―not compliant with international 
standards‖ (Bank, 2009, p. 10). The Bank was keen on Ukraine‘s adopting a TB 
Programme, as ―a crucial transition away from the traditional Soviet approach to TB 
diagnosis, treatment and monitoring‖ (ibid., p.10)49.  
The project finally closed in 2008, with most activities never implemented 
(Bank, 2009). The Bank‘s own project closure report, describing the main 
stakeholders, implementation challenges, as well as the political and institutional 
context that caused the project to fail, informed various stages of this research.  
 
Other actors in HIV/AIDS 
AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) 
This US-based INGO has come to Ukraine later than most others. AHF is 
known for its involvement in many HIV programmes globally. In 2011, it was 
among the harshest critics of the ex-GF Executive Director Michel Kazachkine and 
called for Kazatchkine's resignation in the wake of reports of "waste, fraud, and 
corruption" in order that "reforms may begin in earnest‖ (Reuters, 2011). In contrast 
to other internationals in Ukraine that advocate a focused HIV prevention and harm 
reduction, AHF advocated for expanding ART treatment as prevention. AHF became 
famous for its advocacy activities to expand access to affordable condoms, and free 
HIV testing throughout Ukraine when it worked with state-run Dovira (Trust) 
cabinets. Through its ‗Testing Millions‘ campaign, in 2010 AHF conducted 18,137 
street tests as part of a rapid HIV testing initiative in Ukrainian cities (AHF, n.d.). 
These screenings generated HIV seropositivity rates of 3.84% (Ford et al, 2012) - 
three times higher than officially accepted estimates. As part of its advocacy 
campaign to promote ART treatment, in 2012 AHF wrote a letter to the then GF 
Executive Manager Jaramillo suggesting that the GF should re-programme its Round 
10 funding in Ukraine towards more treatment. The letter noted that access to ART 
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through establishing a special ‗phtisiatry‘ health care system to deal with TB screening, treatment, and 
sanatorium cure, continues to influence the modern-day medical establishment in all FSU states.  
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appeared to be a low priority for the programs supported by the GF in Ukraine
50
 and 
spoke of existing divisions over funding priorities in-country between GF PRs who 
argued that its grants focus on prevention, while government money should be spent 
on treatment: ―The Global Fund‘s efforts to promote prevention should not come at 
the expense of more than 100,000 people who are waiting for treatment. The number 
of people dying of AIDS is growing and the epidemic is spreading‖, the letter said. 
HIV cannot be stopped unless everything is done to test PLWH, provide ARVs to all 
who need them and bring the viral load in HIV positive people to undetectable levels 
- all of those to be done, according to AHF, to follow GF own Board 
recommendations issued in May 2011. Without such re-programming, AHD 
reiterated, ―millions of GF dollars in Ukraine could go to waste‖. The AHF campaign 
did not succeed to alter the GF funding focus in Ukraine. 
 
Clinton Foundation 
Former US President Bill Clinton‘s Foundation worked in Ukraine within a 
framework of the ‗Clinton Global Initiative‘ (CGI). The CGI – ―a unique model to 
unite and guide opportunities of individual persons and organizations in order to 
implement change‖ (Pinchuk Foundation. n.d.2) was financed by Victor Pinchuk, a 
―Ukrainian tycoon, a son-in-law of that former Soviet republic‘s authoritarian 
president‖ [Kuchma] (Baker and Savage, 2008). According to The New York Times, 
Pinchuk has given $1-5 million to Mr. Clinton‘s foundation and agreed to underwrite 
a Clinton initiative to encourage philanthropy in developing economies in Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa (Thomas, 2008). The project would have consisted of a series 
of conferences presided over by Mr.Clinton, as well as other activities. The receipt of 
funding from ―a billionaire who made his money during the controversial 
privatization process of Ukraine‘s steel industry‖ (Thomas, 2008) was not revealed 
by Clinton until December 2008, when under pressure from Obama presidential team 
he disclosed his foundation's donor list – in order to confirm Hillary Clinton‘s 
nomination as Secretary of State (Nasaw, 2008). The new administration was 
concerned that among the donors to the Clinton foundation were some representing 
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conflicts of interest for Mrs Clinton in her role as Secretary of State (Zaleski, 2008). 
The Obama administration in December 2008 signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the Clinton Foundation, which required Mr. Clinton to disclose 
his past donors and any future contributors. The memorandum also required that in 
case of Mrs. Clinton‘s confirmation, the CGI should be incorporated separately, 
could longer hold events outside the US and would refuse any further contributions 
from foreign governments (Baker and Savage, 2008). As a result, the project funded 
by Victor Pinchuk, was discontinued. 
Partnered with Clinton Foundation was another prolific funder in HIV/AIDS 
in Ukraine - ‗ANTI-AIDS‘ (ANTI-SPID) Foundation, founded by Elena Pinchuk, the 
wife of Victor Pinchuk, and a daughter of the ex-President Leonid Kuchma. Queen 
Elisabeth II, the former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan, and Sir Elton John are 
among the dignitaries who have participated in the ANTIAIDS Foundation projects. 
Among the Foundation‘s activities were HIV awareness campaigns in media outlets 
owned by Victor Pinchuk, work in orphanages for HIV-positive children, Sir Elton 
John‘s concerts and others. 
2.4.2 The GF entry to Ukraine. Strong government support 
 As mentioned above, Ukraine‘s active role in initiating the UNGASS 
special session in 2001 positioned the country as a regional leader of the global fight 
against AIDS. Ukraine was approached by donor states to submit a proposal to the 
GF, and its R1 application was approved shortly.  
Ukraine was the first among the post-Soviet states where the GF signed three 
grant agreements of R1 grant in January-March 2003for a period of five years. The 
USD 99.12 million in R1 was seen as significant contribution to Ukraine‘s fight 
against AIDS. Andrij Pidaiev, Minister of Health of Ukraine, said at the signing: 
"We are proud of this and will pursue the policy of true partnership in the response to 
the epidemic in Ukraine" (GFATM 2003a).  
As one report suggested, ―having been a ‗first mover‘ carries a cost‖ (Brusati 
2003, p.5). Ukraine‘s price for its early GF submission turned out to be very high. 
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The original R1 proposal was developed under the aegis of MOH and was 
consolidated from several parts for which separate submissions were encouraged. 
Overall, there is lack of publicly available information on the pre-Round 1 
submission procedures and the first year of the programme. The original proposal at 
the GF web-site (Ukraine Portfolio n.d.), a report on CCM prepared by Brusati 
(2003) and the OIG 2008 review of the suspension of GF grants were used in writing 
this section, as well as Roger Drew (2004-2005) reports.  
The official submission was made by the newly established Country 
Coordinating Mechanism – the Government Commission on Fighting HIV/AIDS 
headed by the Vice Prime-Minister of Ukraine (at the time, Vitaly Seminozhenko). 
This CCM‘s membership was large – a GNP+ report noted it having 45 members, as 
well as the use of ―silent‖ selection criteria in the process of appointing CCM 
members (GNP+ 2003, p. 6).  R1 proposal was submitted at a time when the Global 
Fund had just defined the very concept of the CCM (Brusati, 2003), and before clear 
CCM guidelines had been developed (Drew, 2004). Brusati (2003) noted that even 
after the R1 programme commenced, none of the CCM stakeholders interviewed for 
his study were aware of the existence of the GF‘s CCM Guidelines issued on June 4, 
2003, while the CCM itself proved to be ―an important testing ground for Ukraine‖ 
(Brusati 2003, p. 24). Later studies found programmes approved in the GF Round 1 
were weaker than subsequent ones, since the GF systems were not initially fully in 
place (Radelet and Siddiqi, 2007). 
The three Principal Recipients (PRs) for Ukraine‘s R1 proposal were the 
MOH (responsible for roughly 70% of the grant with the goal to implement 
treatment, care and support of HIV/AIDS patients), UNDP (in charge of 10% of the 
grant focused on HIV prevention programmes), and the Ukrainian Fund against 
HIV/AIDS, a GONGO
51
, (responsible for 20% of the grant focused on 
information/education campaigns [IEC] for the general population). Intended results 
for the MOH component included: antiretroviral therapy and therapy for 
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Ukrainian Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS‘, as a ‗governmental NGO‘ reporting to the Cabinet of Ministers. 
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opportunistic infections for 1,500 PLWHA, the number of infected babies born to 
HIV-positive women reduced by 10 per cent; 50 per cent of pregnant women to be 
treated with ART, to prevent mother-to-child transmission. Intended results for the 
UNDP component included: coverage of IDUs by prevention programs is increased 
to 20 per cent in identified sites, use of sterile syringes is increased to 50 per cent, 
use of condoms by sex workers while providing services is increased to 30 per cent, 
use of condoms by men in uniform is increased to 40 per cent (GFATM 2003a). 
The Ukrainian Fund was responsible for management of the CCM 
Secretariat; and its Chair served as CCM Executive Secretary (Brusati, 2003). The 
OIG 2008 review reports that an assessment of the three PRs by the the Local Fund 
Agent (LFA)
52
found all of them to have limited (i.e. UNDP and MOH) or no 
capacity (The Ukrainian Fund) to implement GF programs. Grants were signed on 
the premise that capacity would be developed during grant implementation. The 
decision to allow the PRs time to build capacity ran ―counter to the GFATM model 
of having time-bound and performance-based grants‖ (OIG 2008, p. 13). The 
prevailing geopolitics of the time led the GF to violate two of its own guiding 
principles in order to enter the second-largest ex-Soviet country: it accepted the 
proposal from CCM that did not meet its own guidelines, and awarded grants to PRs 
without capacity to implement. This was not the last time the GF would not fulfil its 
guidelines in Ukraine. 
Implementation stalled soon after it started in spring 2003 because there was 
no pre-existing capacity to absorb such a massive grant. The MOH, a "rain forest" of 
bureaucracy, had no official mandate, no clear lines of authority to authorise 
spending and other dysfunctional arrangements (World Bank 2009). As a result, GF 
money was not being spent. After nearly 12 months of a 24-month program, the 
recipients had spent less than 4 % of the total amount of the three grants (OIG 2008). 
The OIG sought to understand why the LFA, which was to oversee the in-country 
implementation, had not notified the GF Secretariat about the issues in country. The 
LFA acknowledged knowing about capacity issues in country, but said it had not 
included them in its reports because they had to ―adopt a diplomatic stance in their 
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written opinions‖ and ―had to be mindful of their position in the country‖. This ran 
counter to the declaration of independence that is signed by all LFAs in undertaking 
their work (OIG 2008, p.14). 
Meanwhile, with CCM ―clearly in a state of flux‖ (Brusati 2003, p. 24), a new 
structure emerged - the ‗NGO Secretariat on cooperation with the Global Fund in 
Ukraine‘ (‗NGO Secretariat‘). ‗NGO Secretariat‘ was directly funded by a R1 Sub-
Recipient, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, which provided facilities, 
equipment, and staff salaries and support for an electronic bulletin (Brusati, 2003)
53
. 
Despite being structured as an informal civil society forum, the name ‗NGO 
Secretariat on cooperation with GF in Ukraine,‘ translated into local language, 
suggested that this structure may have been endorsed by the GF or linked to it. While 
the dysfunctional CCM and its Secretariat, the ‗Ukrainian AIDS Fund‘ struggled 
with grant administration and had to rely on state-salaried clerks, well-funded and 
fluent in English ‗NGO Secretariat‘ had many advantages in regard to information 
dissemination, and their electronic bulletin soon became the ―most comprehensive 
source of information about the contents and decisions of all key meetings linked to 
the country-level activities of the Global Fund‖ (Brusati 2003, p.16). A poll that the 
‗NGO Secretariat‘ conducted in May 2003, challenged the MOH as a Principal 
Recipient, stating that ―some of the leading Ukrainian NGOs have been working in 
the area of HIV/AIDS without interruption since the mid-nineties, long before the 
MOH began to deal systematically with the disease‖(ibid., p.17). The questionnaire 
was distributed among organisations from the database of the ‗NGO Secretariat,‘ and 
only ten NGOs responded, suggesting the circle of organisations involved was 
narrow. While the ten respondents were anonymous, as Brusati reported, having been 
chosen through the USAID-funded Alliance database, they most likely included 
regional NGOs - implementers of the ten ‗boutique‘ projects in the 1990s, a ‗proto-
network‘ of regional AIDS NGOs mentioned above. Despite the small number of 
respondents and the disclaimer that the poll did not intend ―to identify the results 
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Secretariat‘ was funded through a USAID project that Alliance implemented at the same time. The 
address of ‗NGO Secretariat‘, listed on the NGO Poll (Brusati 2003, p.55) is the same as the USAID-
funded Alliance office in Kyiv. 
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with the opinion of all HIV/AIDS-servicing NGOs‖, the ‗NGO Secretariat‘ was 
invited by the GF to present the poll results at its Regional Meeting of 12 countries 
of Eastern Europe and Central Asia  (Brusati 2003).  
 2.4.3 Suspension of Round 1. Transfer of the R1 grant to the INGO  
In late January 2004, a GF mission led by its Chief of Operations arrived to 
Ukraine, shortly after the GF Secretariat received a letter from several NGOs, whose 
identity has not been officially disclosed by GF. According to OIG (2008), the 
allegations received were about: 
(1) possible payment of kickbacks to MOH officials from prospective sub-
recipients (SRs), and 
(2) the price of the selected bidder for ARVs being US$3.1 million higher 
than the lowest bidder and that two other lower bidders had been 
disqualified (OIG 2008, p. 13). 
The OIG 2008 review further reports that the GF Secretariat hired forensic 
accountants Ernst and Young (EY) to investigate the allegations. The EY report 
contained recommendations for improving internal controls, but ―did not conclude on 
the existence of irregularities‖ (OIG 2008, p. 13). The GF ordered another review 
from its LFA
54
, which concluded that the winning bidder was a dormant company 
with no known operations and directors based in Cyprus. This second review also did 
not confirm the allegations of irregularities in the letter that sparked the investigation. 
The GF then ordered the MOH to cancel the tender and to appoint UNICEF to 
procure ARV drugs. According to the OIG, the decision to select UNICEF was 
undocumented. UNICEF submitted a bid that was subsequently revised four times, 
resulting in a bid that was about US$ 1 million higher than the bidder selected by the 
MOH. The OIG report, while not disputing the rightness of the bid cancellation, 
nevertheless defined the GF Secretariat decisions as ―being contrary to [the GF] 
principle of having country-led processes because they: (a) contravened procurement 
best practice by intervening in an ongoing procurement process; and (b) contravened 
one of the basic [GF] principles by instructing the MOH to procure from UNICEF‖ 
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(OIG 2008, p.14). The Ukrainian government tried to challenge these moves, but 
events began to escalate quickly.  
Following the January 2004 mission, GF suspended the Ukraine grants citing 
―poor governance by the CCM, poor management by the PRs, lack of clarity of 
internal procedures and slow program implementation‖(OIG 2008, p.15). This was 
the first country grant suspension in GF history. On January 30, 2004, the GF 
Executive Director Richard Feachem, noting that firm action was needed to ensure 
the ambitious targets for treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS in Ukraine could be 
reached, said: ―The primary responsibility of the Global Fund is to achieve results 
and to turn back the HIV/AIDS pandemic. We have taken action with our colleagues 
in Ukraine in order to ensure that our money flows, that the epidemic does not spread 
further, and those who need treatment will receive treatment‖(GFATM, 2004a).  
The suspension carried with it a set of conditions, among them:  
(a) Selection of an organization that would temporarily replace the three PRs 
―until the CCM could address the slow implementation and decide on other PR 
arrangements‖; 
(b) Cancellation of the MOH tender;  
(c) Establishment of a monitoring and advisory unit; and  
(d) Resolution of governance and management issues at the CCM level (OIG, 
2008, p. 16). 
On February 24, 2004, the GF announced the end of the grant suspension and 
the appointment of a temporary principal recipient. The International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance – a UK-headquartered INGO that had been a SR in R1 – was appointed as 
Temporary Grant Steward. A GF press release announcing the appointment 
anticipated that the Fund would allow Ukraine to resume leading project 
management once issues related to ―governance, management, and adherence to 
required business practices are satisfactorily addressed‖(GFATM, 2004b). The OIG 
2008 review noted the GF failed to document its decision making, providing no 
explanation of what alternatives were considered by GFATM to resolve the crisis, 
how the decision was arrived at, and why it was the optimal decision. Another OIG 
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report noted the GF‘s decision to suspend the grant and pass stewardship to an 
international NGO was ―controversial‖ (OIG 2012b, p. 10).  
The GF Secretariat also placed Ukraine on the Additional Safeguards 
(ASG)
55
 list. The OIG concluded that the decision to place Ukraine on the ASG list 
was made by the country team [at GF Secretariat] based on the risks arising from the 
previously discussed weaknesses of the three initial PRs and the CCM. Again, 
however, the OIG noted that the GF had failed to document its decision to place 
Ukraine on the ASG list (OIG, 2008). The decision of placing Ukraine on ASG 
further led to the selection of Alliance as a temporary grant steward. The OIG 2008 
report noted that the [GF] Secretariat‘s justification of its selection was based ―on the 
grounds of a strong track record in HIV program implementation, sound 
management arrangements and a strong presence in Ukraine‖ (ibid., p.17).  However, 
no evidence was advanced that there were no other institutions in Ukraine that could 
satisfy the GF criteria. UNAIDS underlined that ―donor preferences for using well-
established international NGOs rather than local organizations has hindered 
opportunities to strengthen the latter‘s capacity‖ (UNAIDS ASAP 2009, p. 44). 
Although the GF ―took steps to consult stakeholders about the decision to suspend 
the grants and to appoint the Alliance as Grant Steward, these were ultimately the 
Global Fund‘s decisions‖ (Drew and Malkin 2005b, p. 3).  
The swiftness with which the GF arrived at its decisions regarding the R1 
transfer and Grant Steward appointment
56
, accompanied by lack of documentation 
about in-country processes, as noted by OIG, was remarkable for an organization that 
did not have a country presence. The decisions were justified, not based on country 
ownership mechanism, but in a flurry of communications from the GF and 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance about the need to proceed quickly and urgently so 
―that the epidemic does not spread further, and those who need treatment will receive 
treatment‖ (GFATM 2004a). The fact that Alliance initially was made responsible 
for a one-year stewardship contract, brought in a ‗short-termism‘ approach, 
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 The ASG is part of GF risk-management strategy, which is invoked when existing systems cannot 
ensure accountable use of GF financing. The GF Secretariat applies the ASG as required based on the 
facts and circumstances of each particular grant (OIG 2008). 
56
 The decision to appoint the Alliance as Grant Steward was taken «within two to three weeks of the 
decision to suspend the original grants‖ (Drew 2004, p. 20). 
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characterised ―by the need for urgency and meeting challenging deadlines‖, and ―a 
constant tension between following procedures correctly and getting things done on 
time‖ (Drew 2005a, p. 11). The narrative of ‗urgency‘ and ‗emergency‘ would 
become a dominant theme for the whole period of the Alliance as a grant steward, as 
well as in later GF implementation years.  
  
2.4.4 Aftermath of the suspension. Further GF rounds 
The OIG (2008) review noted that while the conditions (a) and (b) of the GF 
suspension were quickly met by withdrawing funds from old PRs and nominating a 
new implementer, the other two conditions, (c) establishment of a monitoring and 
advisory unit, and (d) resolution of the CCM governance and management, aimed at 
ensuring governance of the GF grant during and after the transition, were not met. 
The NAC (CCM) did not survive the grant suspension and was disbanded. A period 
of government walk-out of all multi-sectoral AIDS structures ensued. 
Instead, International HIV/AIDS Alliance began holding ‗Stakeholders 
Meetings‘ in March 2004 that replaced government engagement. These became ‗by 
default‘ the major HIV/AIDS coordination mechanism in Ukraine (Drew 2005c).  
The GF decision to transfer money to an INGO was strongly opposed by the 
government (OIG 2008). ―It undoubtedly affected the Ministry of Health‘s 
willingness to see the Global Fund-supported program as part of the national 
response‖ (Drew 2005c, p.4).  
In March 2004, the GF entered into a one-year contract agreement with 
Alliance under which the R1 funding was transferred to Alliance, which agreed to 
provide stewardship and management services for activities under the three 
suspended grant programs. The new agreement had four components, (i) treatment, 
care and support (57%), (ii) targeted prevention (15%), (iii) IEC (12%), and (iv) 
surveillance and evaluation (3%). The remaining 11% was earmarked for the PR unit 
to manage the grant execution (Bank, 2009). Thus the government priorities reflected 
in the original R1 allocation – 70% to implement treatment, care and support of 
HIV/AIDS patients, 10% focused on HIV prevention programs, and 20% for 
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information/education campaigns [IEC] for the general population - were 
significantly revised by GF and Alliance with no Government involvement. 
The focus of this grant was the provision of ARV therapy for treatment of 
HIV/AIDS (APMG 2009). The programme‘s strategy focused on supporting and 
expanding community-based prevention and care interventions for vulnerable and 
hard to reach communities, and providing up-to-date and tailored information and 
resources. Integral to this approach were linkages between prevention and care and 
support services (Semigina 2009).  
The OIG review (2008) noted the model adopted in Ukraine ran contrary to 
several cardinal GF principles like promoting national ownership and additionality: 
The Global Fund finances national programs through participatory proposal 
development processes, including multiple stakeholders, processes that 
complement existing national and/or regional programs, that support national 
policies and priorities. (GFATM 2001, p.4) 
The OIG suggested that NGO management of GF grant posed several 
challenges: 
(a) being seen as a stand-alone project as opposed to being part of the national 
AIDS program, implying lack of national ownership with minimal government 
commitment and support (also noted by Drew 2005c); and  
(b) Alliance‘s focus on delivering results and meeting targets left ―little time 
for considering …issues like coordination and building a national response‖ (OIG 
2008, p. 19).  
Notably, an important aftermath of the GF grant transfer in Ukraine was an 
increased debate at the GF about how to ensure accountability for its investments. 
The pressure to disburse funds rapidly overwhelmed efforts to scrutinize recipients 
more carefully or manage financial risks more fully. Established in July 2005 at the 
behest of the donors, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has been ―the only 
risk-mitigation strategy within the Global Fund that has worked as designed”(High-
Level Panel 2011, p. 53). [emphasis added] 
According to the Stewardship agreement with the GF, Alliance implemented 
the first phase of R1 programme until 30 September 2005. In May 2005, a R1 
extension proposal was submitted on behalf of Ukraine by a newly formed CCM, the 
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National Council on AIDS. The new Grant Agreement with the GF acknowledged 
that ―the Alliance was nominated by a group of stakeholder representatives and 
endorsed by the Ukrainian National Coordination Council on the Prevention of the 
Spread of HIV/AIDS‖ (GFATM, 2005). The OIG noted the decision to nominate 
Alliance as PR for the new grant was made without a review of its performance, 
under the 2004 stewardship agreement (OIG 2008). 
The next GF round for which Ukraine submitted an application was R6. 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine was again nominated as a PR in R6 by 
Ukraine‘s CCM. The R6 application set ambitious goals that some stakeholders 
believed might be difficult to achieve in practice (Semigina, 2009).  
With the receipt of R6 grant, International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine 
became the largest GF recipient in East and Central Europe. The co-Principal 
Recipient in R6 was the All-Ukrainian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
(Merezha), a Sub-Recipient in R1. Its nomination was not without questions. Being a 
national advocacy organization, known for its criticism of the government, many 
questioned whether Merezha would have the capacity ―to handle such massive 
responsibilities while also continuing to advocate effectively on behalf of people 
living with HIV— and to do so with its customary independence‖ (UNAIDS 2007a, 
p. 7). Sustainability of GF programmes run by two NGOs was also in question:  
The systematic lack of Government involvement and support for programmes 
and activities implemented by NGOs also represents a serious risk to their 
short-term results and long-term sustainability. (UNAIDS 2009, p. 31) 
 
2.5 International NGO as a Principal Recipient: narrow focus and challenges of 
legitimacy 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the core issue in the GF agenda is to engage civil 
society and those affected by the diseases.  
Much of the global discourse on AIDS and NGOs is acknowledged as having 
developed along the lines of a ‗North-South‘ relationship, with the slow recognition 
of the phenomenon in the political science and international relations literature 
(Boone and Batsell, 2001). O‘Manique (2004) and some others have argued that the 
public health response to AIDS in the West was shaped by a ‗neo-liberalism‘s 
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triumph‘, with its view of health as largely a private and individual responsibility. 
Involvement of the medical research establishment and pharmaceutical industry 
determined largely a biomedical approach to policy response to AIDS in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which she called ―the hegemonic biomedical understanding of 
African AIDS‖ (ibid., p. 66). Others, while seeing correlations between Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and the growth of HIV/AIDS epidemics, stopped 
short of drawing a clear causal link (Barnett and Blackwell, 2004).  
Nelson suggested a ‗North–South divide‘ across NGOs, corresponding roughly 
to developed versus less developed countries (Nelson, 2002). Shumate et al (2005,p. 
488) described the 1990s as ―an era of great success for HIV–AIDS INGOs‖, 
manifested in activist issues being recognized by the international community, and 
increased aid funding becoming available. Their study examined partnerships within 
the global HIV–AIDS INGO community (see Figure 2.16): 
Figure 2.16 A myriad of global alliances of HIV–AIDS INGOs (Shumate 2005, 
p.499)
 
Among the activities that INGOs conduct, Shumate et al identified exchange of 
ideas, promotion of member interests, coordination and regulation of member 
activities, education and public awareness, research and information gathering, and 
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humanitarian activities. The authors asserted that INGOs typically work ―within the 
status quo‖ to provide services and to advocate for their members (Shumate et al 
2005, p. 486).  
Risse (2006) discussed the issue of INGO legitimacy in the context of 
governance, noting frequent accusations of INGOs for lacking legitimacy. He 
suggested that the issue was linked to INGOs‘ internal accountability and concluded: 
―if we compare ‗INGOs‘ to democratic states, they certainly lack internal 
accountability‖ (Risse 2006, p. 190). Smith (1997) noted that most transnationally 
operating NGOs were accountable to a rather small group of members and to those 
who fund them, mostly private foundations, and often public agencies.   
In Ukraine after 1991, expectations were high that civil society organizations 
would emerge to deal with HIV:  
The breakdown of the Soviet system has led to a gap in society that is 
normally occupied by ‗civil society‘ and the construction of this will be 
difficult and slow, yet it is crucial in halting and responding to the epidemic. 
In particular people living with HIV are marginalised and excluded. 
Experience elsewhere shows that they have a vital role to play in developing 
policies for intervention and support services. (Barnett and Whiteside 1999, 
p. 216) 
However, the way AIDS NGOs proliferated in Ukraine did not originate from 
a post-communist transition discourse. While their onset was slow in comparison 
with the post-1991 development of other civil society actors, when they emerged as 
the ‗proto-network‘ of AIDS NGOs, they were externally funded, developed mainly 
around external discourses, and advocated narrowly for policies associated with these 
interventions. Zhukova (2013) argues that the direction of funding has been a major 
determinant shaping the NGO sector in HIV/AIDS in Ukraine. She places a 
discussion of HIV/AIDS in context of ―transnational governmentality‖ and defines 
the ―NGOisation of the HIV/AIDS sector in Ukraine as a process involved in 
establishment of the transnational apparatus for discourse production and 
dissemination of expert knowledge on the epidemic‖ (Zhukova 2013, p. 96). 
While in other Eastern European countries, for most NGOs working on HIV 
prevention, the need to secure funding occurred ―on the landscape of political and 
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moral messages regarding HIV and the need to serve their clients‖ (Owczarzak 2009, 
p.422), Ukraine‘s NGO context was profoundly altered by the GF entry. Not only 
there was little domestic discussion about political and moral messages of HIV – but 
the fact that the money was given directly to the INGO by the GF, demonstrated that 
this NGO did not emerge or developed internally in Ukraine, neither was its recipient 
status a result of a wide local initiative or a call for civil society participation.  
The UK-based International HIV/AIDS Alliance began work in Ukraine in 
2000 with USAID funding. The International HIV/AIDS Alliance-Ukraine became a 
separate legal entity in March 2003, after it obtained a local registration from the 
Ministry of Justice with the Secretariat of the International Alliance in the UK as a 
founder. In R1, it operated as a country office (OIG, 2012). In 2009, Alliance in 
Ukraine became an ‗independent Linking Organisation‘ (Alliance, 2010). Through 
its Linking Organisations and country offices, International HIV/AIDS Alliance 
accesses GF funding in more than 30 countries in the world (see Figure 2.17). In the 
FSU, Alliance works only in Ukraine.  
Figure 2.17 Alliance Linking Organisations receiving GF funding (Alliance. n.d)
57
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 The use of colours in this map is merely to distinguish between the continents and sub-continents 
where Alliance or its Linking organisations are implementing the GF-funded programmes: yellow to 
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Soon after R1 funding was confirmed, International HIV/AIDS Alliance in 
Ukraine pronounced itself ―the largest NGO in Ukraine. Its current size stems 
primarily from the appointment, in March 2004, of the UK-based International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance as Principal Recipient of the country‘s Round 1 HIV/AIDS 
grant‖ (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2007, p. 35). An organization positioning 
as the largest national NGO, made this claim merely because it was a subsidiary of a 
foreign NGO and a recipient of GF funds. This mostly self-appointed mandate was 
carried on by this organisation with the continued support from the GF. The GF 
decision to nominate an INGO to implement grant in a country with a developed 
civil society and existing HIV/AIDS governance structures has left many gaps in 
understanding the context of this decision as well as its further impacts on 
governance and country ownership of HIV control in Ukraine. 
Conclusion 
Ukraine‘s country context and its previous Soviet history are important in 
understanding the complexity of the environment in which donor programmes have 
come to deliver aid. Regarding HIV epidemic, the multiplicity of political, economic 
and social factors that contributed to its spread in Ukraine, warn from seeing it 
simply as a preventable and treatable disease, as existing political and criminal 
contexts need to be considered when discussing what interventions to control HIV 
would have had the greatest impact. The prevailing perception of the HIV 
transmission in Ukraine as occurring mostly via injecting illicit drugs had important 
implications for the choice of HIV prevention interventions.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
denote South America, blue to denote Africa, green – for Europe and red – for Asia. In Europe, 
Alliance only works in Ukraine. 
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CHAPTER 3: HOW THE RESEARCH AGENDA WAS FORMED: 
PHILOSOPHICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH. THE CHOICE OF RESEARCH 
APPROACH. DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS.  
 
Introduction 
The chapter begins with the review of the key document sources and other 
data on GF that were used in research. The chapter then continues with the 
discussion about theoretical underpinnings of this research and positions it within a 
wider philosophical and epistemological perspective. The discussion then proceeds 
to outline the positions taken by the author on the ontological issues, epistemological 
and axiological assumptions that underpin qualitative research. By justifying and 
describing the choice of methodological approaches and research tools that were 
applied, it asserts the place of this research within the existing paradigms. The 
chapter concludes by describing data collection in more detail, including the 
researcher‘s reflection of the experiences during field work and research limitations. 
The final part describes the process of data analysis and details its stages.  
 
3.1 Literature review: Available sources of information and data on Global Fund 
i. Search time limits 
For the purpose of keeping information up-to-date, and because of the rapid 
changes in HIV/AIDS policies, epidemiological updates, and amendments to the GF 
policies, the search timeline was established between 2002 (year of the creation of 
the GF when most establishing policies were adopted) and 2012 (the last year of 
implementation of the Round 6 GF grant in Ukraine). Besides, most global AIDS 
policy approaches were amended around 2001-2002 (UNGASS Declaration, etc.) 
which further supports the timeline limitations. Some timeline exceptions were 
made, as new relevant literature and documents emerged in 2013, both 
internationally and in Ukraine. 
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ii. Keywords and selection criteria  
Standard search engines generate up to 300,000,000 hits for ‗Global Health‘ 
and up to 1,300,000 results for ‗Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria‘. The preliminary literature search used the following databases: 
GoogleScholar, PubMed, Scopus, Cochrane Library, EBSCO, as well as links to 
Reports and Publications at the WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, and the GFATM sites. For 
specific, country-related information, specialised databases were consulted including: 
HIV/AIDS Survey Indicators Database, CIA World Factbook, and GF, WHO, 
UNAIDS, UNDP, World Bank country pages. For Ukraine‘s government documents, 
CCM materials and links the web-site of Ministry of Health of Ukraine, and State 
Services on HIV/AIDS website were consulted. Reference lists of the relevant 
literature were also searched. Titles and abstracts were searched for the following 
terms: ‗Aid programmes in former Soviet Union‘, ‗Foreign aid for HIV/AIDS‘, ‗aid 
effectiveness‘, ‗The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria‘, 
‗GFATM‘, ‗HIV/AIDS policy‘, ‗HIV prevention‘, ‗HIV programmes research‘, 
‗HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine‘, ‗NGOs in FSU countries‘, ‗AIDS NGOs‘, ‗HIV 
services‘, as well as combinations of these terms.  
 
iii. Publications review: the place of Global Fund among other global 
health initiatives. Global Fund in Ukraine. 
 
Since its inception, the work of the Global Fund has been subject of 
numerous research and analysis. Publications stem from Principal Recipients annual 
reports, independent evaluations conducted by the experts hired by the GF, to 
scholarly articles and US Congressional reports.  
Literature reviewed included the published primary sources on the topic, 
published between 2002 and 2012 identified through PubMed, Medline, and Google 
Scholar search engines, as well as general, predominately political  science literature 
on post-Soviet studies. In order to inform the exploratory research study, I searched 
for published abstracts and papers related to the HIV epidemic and GF in Ukraine. 
The literature review was intended to identify specific sources on the GF 
implementation in Ukraine. More papers were added to the literature review as they 
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appeared while the research was in progress. A limited list of literature sources on 
GF was done by the author before the start of the PhD research to originate the 
research proposal. This list was further expanded to include the following categories 
of sources: 
1) The official GF web-site served as the primary source of reference for GF policies, 
information on Ukraine‘s grant portfolio, as well as a linking page to GF 
Publications. After 2011, there were problems in accessing GF documents: some 
links were no longer active, or previous information updated by new, including 
alterations of grant amounts and disbursements. Previously saved files were used for 
analysis, where available. Cross-references were made to other sources citing GF 
documents web-pages. 
2) Reports of the GF Office of the Inspector General (OIG). OIG produces regular 
reports of planned or diagnostic audits that measure the effectiveness of GF 
spending. Two reports in particular were used in analyzing implementation in 
Ukraine – the OIG 2008 Report on suspension of GF grants, and the OIG 2012 report 
(a draft version circulated to CCM members, and the final official version were 
available). Other OIG reports and statements were used when writing about GF 
general policies and systems. 
3) U.S. government reports. Among the consistent analysis of the GF, are periodic 
reports of Congressional Research Services (CRS) and Reports of the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to the US Congress. CRS reports dated 
between 2002 and 2010 contained a comprehensive analysis of history and political 
environment of the GF, analysis of GF procedures and structures, funding 
disbursements, and outlined bottlenecks and lessons learned from country 
experiences. GAO 2005 and 2007 reports were used that were commissioned by 
members of Congress before hearings on aid disbursement. They represent well-
documented evidence to assess Global Fund‘s efficiency.  
4) The web-site of the US-based think-tank ‗Center for Global Development‘ (CGD), 
‗HIV/AIDS Monitor‘ reports58 and ‗Global Health‘ blog were periodically reviewed 
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http://international.cgdev.org/initiative/hivaids-monitor 
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for references, as well as publications of their key associated authors such as 
W.Savedoff, S.Radelet, A.Glassman, N.Oomman, and some others.  
5) The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) reports. IEG is charged 
with evaluating the activities of IBRD and IDA (the World Bank), to assess the 
performance of Bank Group policies, programs, projects, and processes 
(accountability) and to learn what works in what context (lessons). The IEG 
evaluations of the GF informed Chapter 1. 
6) The GHIN (Global Health Initiatives Network) database
59
 was a source of GF-
centred publications including their study of GF in Ukraine by Tatyana Semigina. 
7) Web publications of the ‗Aidspan‘ – an NGO with headquarters in Kenya, such as 
GFO - Global Fund Observer - that provides regular updates and analysis on the GF 
Board meeting decisions, OIG reports, as well as author‘s publications with the 
analysis of the GF policies and programmes.  
Specifically in regard to GF in Ukraine, following sources were consulted: 
1) Annual reports, grant manuals and grant documents of two Principal 
Recipients located at the web-sites of International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine 
and the All-Ukrainian Network of PLWHA (Merezha). PR documents in local 
language were also consulted that were circulated during stakeholders and other 
meetings in Ukraine attended by the author. At mid-stage of the research, web-sites 
were updated a number of times and some document links became inactive, however, 
most documents are in downloaded form in the author‘s files.  
2) Synergy Working Group/Roger Drew reports. Under the auspices of 
Synergy, in 2004-2005, at the end of the first year of the Global Fund stewardship 
agreement implemented by International HIV/AIDS Alliance, USAID commissioned 
consultant Roger Drew to conduct a series of evaluations in Ukraine on GF 
implementation. These reports, released during GF Round 1, represent an important 
source of evidence about the GF implementation policies and practices in Ukraine, 
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 The GHIN (Global Health Initiatives Network) database is the outcome of a systematic search for 
research on three HIV/AIDS Global Health Initiatives (GHIs): the Global Fund, the World Bank‘s 
Multi-country AIDS Project (MAP) and the President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): 
http://www.ghinet.org/database.asp 
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describe country context, service delivery practices, and outline implementation 
challenges. This source was of a special importance as it focused on topics that later 
also emerged from the data analysis. Drew reports are referenced across the whole 
thesis and contain important insights into the PR systems and policies in Ukraine.  
3) Country reports generated or commissioned by donor programmes based in 
Ukraine: such as the MEASURE Report funded by USAID in 2011, and others that 
describe the implementation systems and practices of the Alliance in Ukraine.   
4) WHO Ukraine country assessments of various years, including EuroWHO 
‗Health systems in transition‘ reports, were used to write about health care system in 
Ukraine and other sections. 
5) UNAIDS reports: Ukraine‘s country UNGASS reports, evaluation reports 
by UNAIDS – such as 2009External Evaluation of Ukraine‘s National Response on 
HIV/AIDS. Commissioned on behalf of the Ukraine‘s government -that also had a 
focus on GF programmes. Other UNAIDS annual reports on HIV epidemic globally 
and regionally, relevant country reports and web-page publications were consulted.  
6) The 2009 report by Australia-based AIDS Projects Management Group 
(APMG). Commissioned through the GF-funded tender by Alliance, APMG 
conducted an evaluation of prevention services implemented by Alliance as a GF PR 
in terms of their efficiency, quality, cost benefit and sustainability potential. The 
APMG evaluation was believed to be generated for the GF extension of Phase 2 of 
R6 Alliance grant and contained important insights into GF programme delivery ‗on 
the ground‘. 
7) The World Bank 2009 closure report. The report about a failed World 
Bank project that was implemented at the same time as the GF R1 and R6 
programmes, contained important evidence about political and health care context of 
aid programmes in Ukraine, and about specific in-country implementation policies 
and practices. 
8) Documents of the National Council on HIV/AIDS and other socially 
dangerous diseases (CCM) proceedings, including paper documents handed out at 
the CCM meetings that were shared with the author by individual CCM members or 
otherwise made available to the author when attending CCM meetings. The full list 
of Ukraine‘s official sources consulted is included into the reference section. 
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9) Unpublicised documents that were available to the author in-country 
through personal communications, and various other communication means 
including stakeholders listserves, conference presentations, meeting minutes, 
communicated memos, disseminated statements etc. 
More publications relevant to a particular part of my study, are referred to in 
the concrete section where they are cited. Media sources were used in describing the 
GF crisis in 2011. 
 
3.2 Philosophical, epistemological and methodological perspectives of the present 
research 
The section below carries on the discussion about the research theoretical 
underpinnings and positions it within a wider philosophical and epistemological 
perspective. It starts with outlining the major philosophical traditions that guided the 
field of social studies and justifies the choice of the qualitative research as a 
preferred methodological tradition. The discussion then proceeds to outline the 
positions taken by the author on the ontological issues, epistemological and 
axiological assumptions that underpin qualitative research, and establishes the choice 
of ethnographical enquiry as a preferred research approach.  
3.2.1 Key philosophical traditions in social studies and the choice of   
qualitative research for this study  
Science should not be necessarily a mystery nor a 
monopoly of experts and intellectuals. 
Fals-Borda, 1995 
The philosophical approaches to social studies follow two distinct traditions 
of thinking. Historically, positivism, a recurrent theme in the history of Western 
thought, holds to the view that the only authentic knowledge is that which allows 
verification and assumes that the only valid knowledge is scientific. Positivism came 
to replace metaphysics in the history of knowledge, mainly through the works of the 
Enlightenment philosophers, among them Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, 
the latter is attributed with the development of the modern sense of the positivist 
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approach. A philosopher and a sociologist, Comte argued that, much as the physical 
world operates according to gravity and other absolute laws, so also does 
society. Positivism is marked by the final recognition that science provides the only 
valid form of knowledge and that facts are the only possible objects of knowledge; 
philosophy is thus recognised as essentially no different from science. Politics, social 
interactions, and all other forms of human life about which knowledge was possible 
would eventually be drawn into the orbit of science (Kieran, 2007).  
At the turn of the 20th century, social scientists began to challenge the 
justification of utilizing the scientific method of the physical sciences to study social 
and human matters (Onwuegbuzie, 2000). In contrast to Comte's positivistic 
ideology, Wilhelm Dilthey's interpretive/hermeneutical approach to science emerged 
as the first serious challenge to positivism. Dilthey noted that whereas the physical 
sciences dealt with inanimate objects that often exist independently of human beings, 
the social research focused on the processes and products of the human mind 
(Hodges, 1952) and therefore should not be conducted with the methods of the 
physical sciences due to a fundamental difference in subject matter. Max Weber, 
greatly influenced by Dilthey (Bergstraesser, 1947), thought that both research 
paradigms had significant shortcomings: positivism could not attach meaning to a 
social reality, whereas idealism did not entertain the possibility that a social reality 
might be the existing reality. Weber expressed the need to focus social inquiry on the 
meanings and values of acting persons and therefore on their subjective meaning 
complex of action. Weber's solution to Dilthey's problem was to attempt to bring 
together the positivist and interpretivist paradigms (Onwuegbuzie, 2000), however he 
did not succeed in this task as noted by Outhwaite (1987). These two paradigms 
remained polarised beyond WWII. 
The times of social change, civil rights and liberation movements of 1950s 
and 1960s were marked by the emergence of post-positivism (e.g., Hanson, 1958; 
Popper, 1959). Post-positivists asserted that reality is constructed and that research is 
influenced by the values of investigators. Post-positivism gave birth to more radical 
paradigms such as constructivism, interpretivism, and naturalism. Many theorists 
representing these new iconoclastic paradigms began to argue for the superiority and 
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exclusiveness of post-structuralism and post-modernism (Onwuegbuzie, 2000). 
These idealists believed that multiple-constructed realities (i.e., relativism) abound, 
that time- and context-free generalisations are not possible, that inquiry is value-
bound, that it is impossible to distinguish between cause and effects, that logic flows 
from specific to general, and that knower and known are inseparable. 
The tendency to lean toward more interpretive, post-modernist, and critical 
practices research became dominant in social studies in recent years. Qualitative 
research has also been characterised by a growing interest to studying the narrative 
practice. This "narrative turn" is producing a significant literature as researchers 
present sensitising concepts and perspectives that bear especially on narrative 
practice, which centers on the circumstances and communicative actions of 
storytelling. Riessman (1993) and Gubrium and Holstein (2009) provide analytic 
strategies and methodological frameworks for narrative analysis, and Holstein and 
Gubrium (2011) present the variety of approaches in recent comprehensive texts.  
Qualitative rather than quantitative research methods were adopted in this 
research. Numerous strengths of qualitative data have been outlined by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), among them a focus on naturally occurring, ordinary events in 
their natural settings. They further maintain that qualitative data are ―fundamentally 
well suited for locating the meanings people place on the events, processes, and 
structures of their lives, and for connecting these meanings to the social world 
around them‖ (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 10).  
Cresswell (1998) suggests that the rationale for an individual willing to 
engage in qualitative inquiry can be found among: (1) the nature of the research 
question, (2) the need to explore a particular topic, (3) the need to present a detailed 
view on the topic, (4) because it allows the researcher to study individuals in their 
natural settings. He suggests the following definition of qualitative research: 
Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct 
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. 
The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, reports 
detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural 
setting.(Creswell, 1998, p. 15) 
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3.2.2 The worldview/paradigms of research 
Cresswell believes that qualitative researchers approach their studies with a 
certain paradigm or worldview, a basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide their 
inquiry. These assumptions are related to the nature of reality (the ontological issue), 
the relationship of the researcher to that being researched (the epistemological issue), 
the role of values in a study (the axiological issue), and the process of research 
(methodological issue) (Creswell, 1998, p. 74).  
Guba and Lincoln (2005) distinguish five main paradigms of the qualitative 
research, namely:  
 positivism,  
 postpositivism,  
 constructivism,  
 critical theories, and  
 participatory paradigms.  
 
Within these research paradigms, this study follows a constructivism, by 
Guba and Lincoln (2005), or a constructionism, by (Crotty 1998) research paradigm, 
with a symbolic interactionism as its theoretical perspective. George Herbert Mead, 
the father of symbolic interactionism, believed that humans should be understood in 
terms of their behaviors. Mead‘s view of ―a person‖ as ―a personality because he 
belongs to a community, because he takes over the institutions of that community 
into his own conduct‖ (Mead 1934, p. 162) is methodologically significant. It means 
that when the research is done from this perspective, we have to take, to the best 
of our ability, the standpoint of those studied on the situation and articulate the 
viewpoint of the actors we are studying clearly and accurately. To serve the aims of 
the present research, ethnographic enquiry was adopted as a research paradigm.  
Below I summarise the main philosophical assumptions made by me that 
guided this research. 
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The ontological assumptions taken by the author considered the existence of 
multiple research realities: that of the researcher, those of individuals being 
investigated, and those in the reading audience who would be interpreting the study. 
It was believed that this research needed to report these realities and the best way to 
achieve it was by generating extensive quotes, presenting emerging themes that were 
based on the words used by informants themselves, and collecting advance 
documentary evidence for the different perspectives on each theme. The choice of 
qualitative research interviews as a method of data collection for being "attempts to 
understand the world from the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of 
peoples' experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations" 
(Kvale, 1996) suited this purpose well. 
In regard to epistemological assumptions, i.e. those that determine the 
relationship of the researcher to that being researched, the need to minimize the 
―distance‖ or ―objective separateness‖ (Guba and Linkoln 1988, p.94) between the 
researcher and the researched was viewed as a necessary prerequisite for this 
research. It was supposed to enable to generate relevant and diverse data from within 
a variety of settings and from different levels of informants. The author had prior 
work experience in the field of international organisations in Ukraine which were the 
main factors facilitating access to informants. The choice of the ethnographic inquiry 
with its focus on the researcher spending significant time in the field, observing 
interactions between the researched subjects was justified in this regard. 
As to the axiological assumptions i.e. the values that the study supports, those 
were seen as related to the epistemological assumptions that assumed initially the 
close distance between the researcher and the researched. This study was conceived 
from having a critical perspective on the work of international aid organizations in 
the FSU, and throughout the thesis, the ‗critical space‘ was maintained to enable the 
researcher to construct a more holistic and comprehensive picture of the GF aid 
model delivery in Ukraine. Regarding the interpretation of the interviews, it was 
believed that less iteration of the author‘s own position needed to be achieved, and 
for this a balance between the personal beliefs of the author and the opinions 
expressed by the participants, needed to be maintained. This was done through using 
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coding and applying the contextual analysis in interview analysis, in which the 
themes that emerged from participants‘ accounts, formed the framework through 
which the data analysis and discussion were carried out. More explanation of the data 
collection methods is provided further in the present chapter. 
3.2.3 Research design: choosing among the five traditions  
Within qualitative research, John Creswell‘s (1998) outline of five main 
research traditions, namely: biography (originated in historical studies), 
phenomenology (with origin in psychology), grounded theory (originating from 
sociology), ethnography (from anthropology) and case study approach from political 
science, constituted a departure point in choosing a research approach to guide my 
enquiry. 
As noted above, the current aid discourse of the Global Fund and its 
implementers in Ukraine remains partisan, and their narratives typically present 
Ukraine as a ‗success story‘. Meanwhile, many gaps remain as to the effects of the 
GF programme implementation by NGOs, in particular: how the NGO 
implementation affected health services delivery, what were its effects on the HIV 
care continuum, on NGO roles and relations in the ‗Third sector‘ in Ukraine, and in 
other GF-funded settings. The quest to examine how the GF aid delivery model 
worked in Ukraine, coupled with the existence of a ‗pre-charged‘ GF programme 
environment and a politicised country context, described in Chapter 2, called for a 
more holistic and a more encompassing approach that would best position the 
researcher in accessing the data and respondents in country, allow for the least 
compromised position to facilitate access and building trust with participants, in 
order to obtain a solid evidence for the study.    
Two of the abovementioned theoretical approaches were considered for this 
study, namely the case study approach and the ethnographic inquiry approach. 
Following below is argumentation of the relevance of these approaches for this 
study. 
Yin defines the case study research method ―as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
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boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used‖ (Yin 1994, p. 23). He believes the choice of 
the case study method is determined by: 
1) The type of research question: typically to answer questions like ―how‖ or ―why‖; 
2) Extent of control over behavioural events: when investigator has a little/no 
possibility to control the events; 
3) General circumstances of the phenomenon to be studied: contemporary 
phenomenon in a real-life context (Yin, 1994). 
Case studies, in their true essence, explore and investigate contemporary real-
life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events 
or conditions, and their relationships. 
Some characteristics of the phenomenon to be studied (the GF), the country 
of study (Ukraine) and time-line of the Rounds 1 and 6 programme corresponded to 
one of Yin‘s characteristics – i.e. contemporary phenomena in a real-life context – 
which could potentially justify for a choice of a case study research design. Case 
study research design was also considered for its ability to define the research topic 
broadly, to cover several variables and to rely on multiple sources of evidence. 
Important consideration for the case study method included the context being seen as 
a major part of a study. And lastly, case study was considered for being frequently 
used in the studies of programmes. As noted by Parthasarathy, ―case studies of 
specific programs, projects, initiatives, or sites, have become integral to evaluation 
research to analyze the implementation processes and outcomes‖ (Parthasarathy, 
2008). 
3.2.4 Ethnographic enquiry as an enabler for „critical space‟ to study aid 
At the same time, other features of the research phenomenon suggested that 
the object in view was not just a case, but a manifestation of what may also be 
viewed as a distinct ‗culture‘ – the culture of aid giving – encompassing multiple 
networks and inter-relations, and occurring in varying country contexts. Chapter 1 
discussed existing dilemmas in aid research, when donors, being powerful decision 
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makers, exert significant influence on the discourse in aid debate. Because of an 
often partisan nature of this discourse, creating a research environment for 
conducting an independent study of aid is a task far from easy. To look into donor-
funded activities and study the aid delivery processes, the need is crucial to create a 
research environment that would allow including a broader scope of views to be 
reflected, including those that may not necessarily be positive accounts. 
This suggested considering another relevant approach: that of a critical 
ethnographical inquiry. As Creswell (2007) has argued, the critical ethnographer 
examines the culture through the lens of power, privilege, and authority in response 
to an ethical responsibility to address unfairness or injustices and attempts to achieve 
positive social change (Brown & Dobrin, 2004; Hammersley, 1992). The choice of a 
critical methodology positions the researcher to examine social inequities, with a 
goal of creating positive social change. Madison (2005) observed that the criticalist 
moves from ―what is‖ to ―what could be‖ (p. 5) to contribute to emancipatory 
knowledge and the discourses of social justice. 
It is this ability to maintain a ‗critical space‘ that I found so indispensable in 
regard to ethnographic enquiry when I sought to best position myself as a researcher. 
The need to have a method of inquiry that would allow to capture more broadly the 
voices ‗from the ground‘, including critical voices, is paramount in order to have a 
realistic look into the aid delivery process. Establishing a more ‗critical space‘ for 
my research was also necessary in order to question, following Easterly and 
Williamson, whether the GF performed the way it said it would – as it is the ―key 
question in the aid effectiveness debate‖ (Easterly and Williamson, n.d., p. 6). 
In addition, I felt the need not to just draw a picture of one case of aid 
delivery in a particular case country – Ukraine – but to demonstrate how global 
power relations (of the GF with Ukraine) profoundly shaped local relations (of GF 
Principal Recipients with other actors and systems in country). Doing this meant 
observing relations that appeared during the GF aid model delivery, among them that 
of the ‗giver‘ and of the ‗taker‘, as well as reflect on the participants‘ perspectives on 
the aid process. In order to be able to observe and record the interactions, the 
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researcher needed to be positioned as close as possible ―to take the role of others‖ 
(Crotty 1998, p. 83), ―to take the standpoint of those studied‖ (Denzin 1978, p. 99).  
I believed that ethnographic enquiry represented the most appropriate 
approach that would enable me to reflect the voices of actors who otherwise would 
not be included into most of the donor-guided and donor-influenced studies. 
To serve the aims of the present study, ethnographic enquiry was adopted as a 
paradigm of research, because its main purpose was to enable the researcher ―to 
uncover meanings and perceptions on the part of people participating in the research, 
viewing these understandings against the backdrop of the people‘s overall worldview 
or ‗culture‘‖ (Crotty 1998, p. 7). Ethnographic approach was also identified for 
allowing ―to look for patterns, describe local relationships (formal and informal), 
understandings and meanings (tacit and explicit), and try to make sense of a place 
and a case in relation to the entire social setting and all social relationships‖ 
(Parthasarathy, 2008).  
Ethnography also seemed appropriate taking into account the author‘s 
familiarity and experience with aid organisations in Ukraine which might bear some 
inherent biases. In such conditions, the advantage of ethnography was seen, 
following Hammersley (1985,p. 152) in enabling the researcher to treat the ―familiar 
social settings‖ to be studied ―as anthropologically strange‖ in which the task for the 
researcher was ―to document the culture – the perspective and practices – of the 
people in these settings‖.  
Several studies that have provided a useful guidance and facilitated finalising 
the choice of ethnographic enquiry as a primary research approach are reviewed 
below.  
 3.2.4.1 Ethnographic enquiry as a means to describe aid giving culture 
Ethnography, which literally means to ―write (or represent) a culture‖ 60 , 
traces its origins to ancient Greece and a ―father of history‖ Herodotus whose History 
                                                          
60
Ethnography (from Greek ἔθνος ethnos = folk/people and γράφω grapho = to write) the scientific 
description of peoples and cultures with their customs, habits, and mutual differences. (Oxford 
Dictionaries).  
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investigated the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars and included a wealth of 
geographical and ethnographical information. Herodotus explored the Middle East as 
the centre of the world which he believed was torn apart by the tensions between two 
civilisations: Eastern and Western, Persian and Greek (Clair 2003). This division is 
revisited by post-colonial scholars (Ashchroft 1995; Castle 2001), and post-modern 
scholars (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Ethnography has its earliest roots in social 
anthropology, which traditionally focused on small scale communities that were 
thought to share culturally specific beliefs and practices (Savage 2000). Overall, the 
traditionalist view on ethnography as a master discourse of colonisation is outlined 
by Robin Clair (2003) who lays out the four phases of ethnography and takes to task 
the colonial underpinnings of ethnographic practices. Political change, both globally 
and within the academic world, has meant that the ethnographer's authority to 
provide the only, or most legitimate, account was no longer accepted (Ahmed and 
Shore 1995). 
A strong case in favour of making international aid a part of ethnographic 
discourse was made by David Mosse and David Lewis in their volume The Aid 
Effect: Giving and Governing in International Development (2005). They describe 
the expansion of the scope of ethnography from ―its classical concern with ‗the local‘ 
and ‗the other‘ or the impact of global processes on local places, to more 
sophisticated conceptions of local-global relations‖ and outlined ―the fruitfulness of 
an ethnographic approach to aid‖ (Mosse and Lewis 2005, p. 1).[emphasis added] 
Among the questions they pose to describe the challenges ―the global aid 
architecture‖ presents, some are relevant to the aims of this thesis: 
How are relationships (international, state-citizen) reconfigured in the 
contemporary transnational aid domain? Are boundaries between nation-
states, donors and self-governing international financial institutions (such as 
IMF and the World Bank) blurred by the new technical demands of managing 
aid flows? Does the ‗moral resurrection of aid‘ with its emphasis on 
ownership, participation and good governance in fact conceal an era of 
greater intervention by international agencies in the internal affairs of 
developing countries?  (Mosse and Lewis 2005, p. 2) 
Bierschenk (2000) notes that neo-liberal trends to denationalise and 
decentralise aid serve to diversify further sources of power and influence via a 
proliferation of organisations and intermediary networks. The multiplicity of 
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interactions in development gives this field of anthropology a ―privileged empirical 
pathway‖ into social reality, as noted by Mosse and Lewis, since it forces attention to 
the social processes and negotiations of meaning and identity in heterogeneous social 
arenas. Moreover, Mosse and Lewis (2006, p. 1) believe that it is no longer possible 
to isolate interactions in development from those in state apparatus, civil society, or 
wider national or international practices; in their words, ―an anthropology of 
development is inextricably an anthropology of contemporary Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia‖. 
Gille and Ó Riain (2002), speaking of the challenges posed by globalization 
to existing social scientific methods of inquiry, referred to ―global ethnographers‖ 
who, by locating themselves firmly within the time and space of social actors ―living 
the global,‖ can reveal how global processes are collectively and politically 
constructed, demonstrating the variety of ways in which globalisation is grounded in 
the local (Gille and Ó Riain 2002, p. 271). 
 At the same time, as noted by Laëtitia Atlani-Duault, taking an ‗insider‘ 
ethnography is both to carry out a ‗multi-situated ethnography‘ (Marcus 1995), or 
‗global ethnography‘ in which the local and the global are mutually constitutive 
(Burawoy et al 2000), and to participate as fully as possible in the community being 
studied (Bellier and Wilson 2000), the latter implying trying to blend in with the 
group.  
Institutional ethnography approach, an empirical approach to inquiry 
combining theory and method developed by Smith (2005) was also considered in 
relation to this study. Unlike traditional case study research, institutional 
ethnography does not aim to generalize from or compare local phenomena. Although 
the initial point of entry is the examination of local phenomena, the end goal of an 
institutional ethnography research project is to expose how larger power relations 
shape local experience. Slade (2010) suggested that institutional ethnography 
projects can be framed as extended case studies into the mechanics of power. 
Institutional ethnography is an important tool for understanding social organisation 
and developing strategies for activism to effect social change.  
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3.2.4.2 Ethnography to study post-communist transition and aid programmes 
in FSU 
 Chapter 2 described post-Soviet transition and its political, economic and 
social effects. As shown by many authors, the post-Soviet transition has also created, 
exacerbated, and redefined forms of difference and inequality throughout the region, 
and anthropological and epidemiological research on the spread of HIV reveals that 
it is precisely these inequalities that structure the distribution of disease risk and 
burden (e.g., Schoepf 1998; Rhodes et al 1999). Owczarzak highlights the 
importance of ethnographic research in studying HIV vulnerability, for its ability to 
reveal ―the relationship between complex sets of interrelated ―vectors of 
disadvantage‖ (e.g. underemployment, lack of social services, and lack of personal 
safety) and HIV vulnerability‖ (Owczarzak 2009, p. 422). Important in relation to the 
present study was her argument that the trend in HIV prevention research in post-
socialist contexts ignored these inequalities and downplayed historically produced 
social exclusions and marginalization in favor of prevention programs that reify 
culture and focus on information dissemination and choice.  
―Pioneering work on Western aid to Eastern Europe‖, as described by Brown 
(2006, p. 16) was marked by Steven Sampson (1996, 2003), Thomas Carothers 
(1999a, 2004) and Janine Wedel (2001). Sampson described ―the social life of 
projects‖ as a ―specific set of resources, people and practices‖ that flow between 
West/North and East/South and ―ultimately create embedded interests‖. Sampson 
described the formation of new ‗project elites‘ – groups and organizations competing 
for money, influence, access and knowledge (Sampson, 2003) as an outcome of aid 
programmes. Wedel (2001) undertook an ethnographic approach to study aid 
programmes in Eastern Europe ad FSU – to see ―how aid happens – through whom 
and to whom, under what circumstances, and with which goals‖ (Wedel, 2001, p. 6). 
In a later publication, Wedel defines her methodology as ―studying through... 
tracking policy discourses, prescriptions and programs and then linking them to those 
affected by the policies‖ (2005, p. 37). Wedel‘s major contribution to the aid 
research is her account of aid to Poland and Russia, and she describes in detail the 
impact of Western assistance, delivered there over a short period of time by 
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organisations and individuals with little knowledge of the social, cultural and 
political contexts in which they were operating. A special focus is made by her on 
‗transactors‘ – those entrusted with managing the transfer of resources. Later, Sneed 
(2006) acknowledged Wedel‘s work as coming back to fundamentals of development 
research by Robert Chambers who was calling for moving beyond traditional 
hierarchies of knowledge and expertise, implicated in the ‗top-down‘ model of 
development (Chambers 1997). Chambers critique is now more widely accepted as 
implying that international development initiatives often ―import value systems and 
principles into local systems, disrupting social, political and other power structures 
on the ground with the end goal of transforming local culture and social behaviour‖ 
(Sneed 2006, p. 102). In Sneed‘s view, Wedel applied this critical ethnographical 
tradition in analysing Western aid in Eastern Europe and FSU, which had the effect 
of creating a new plutocracy. The work of Thomas Carothers (2004, p. 5), a 
renowned expert of post-communist transitions, advocates strongly for the 
ethnographic approach when he speaks about ―listening as carefully and 
systematically, as possible to what a wide range of people in developing and 
postcommunist countries say about the experience of being on the receiving end of 
democracy promotion policies and programs‖. 
 Alexandra Hrycak (2007) and Martha Kichorowska-Kebalo (2011), both of 
whom focused on Ukraine and dealt with the effects of the US aid programmes on 
women‘s organisations there, have chosen ethnographic enquiry for its ability to 
reflect on post-Soviet transitions and their impact on organisations, institutions and 
self. Kichorowska-Kebalo‘s study of the post-Soviet women‘s movement in Ukraine 
―sought ground in both anthropological and feminist theory as self-consciously 
political as well as intellectual systems of thought‖ (Kichorowska-Kebalo 2011, p. 
vi), while Hrycak called for ―careful ethnographic study‖ to research how 
transnational activists move across borders as ‗a fruitful starting point‘ to analyse the 
relationships ―between global and local forms of women‘s mobilization in 
Ukraine‖(Hrycak 2007, p. 76). 
Another insight into the world of post-Soviet aid was made in a book by 
Laëtitia Atlani-Duault Humanitarian Aid in Post-Soviet Countries: An 
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Anthropological Perspective. The author depicts ―the confrontation that occurred 
between Soviet and Western models when faced with a shared social phenomenon: 
the promotion of a development model‖ (Atlani-Duault 2007, p. ix). With rich 
experience working with a major international agency in the FSU region, Atlani-
Duault defines her research as a ―networked ethnography, from within‖ (ibid., p.5). 
She stresses the importance of bringing into the development discourse not only the 
simplistic vaunting of the knowledge of ―‘the people‘, an idealized entity, 
irretrievably poor and oppressed, which needs to be defended‖(Olivier de Sardan 
2004, p. 729), as populist critical anthropologists would do (an approach that she 
associates with the work of Chambers (1997); or a dismantling of a ‗neo-colonialist‘ 
discourse of development as a ―top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic approach‖ 
(Escobar 1994, p. 44), as deconstructive development anthropologists do, but a ‗third 
approach‘. In her perspective, rather than considering development as an external 
force acting on ‗real ethnological‘ field subjects, Atlani-Duault, following Mosse and 
Lewis (2005), suggests that development workers are themselves valid subjects for 
fieldwork. She further asserts that ―development situations are ‗interfaces‘ not only 
between field actors but also between the institutions they represent and the 
representation systems that influence them‖ (Atlani-Duault 2007, p. 5). 
 In designing this study, I found strong parallels with Atlani-Duault‘s 
perspective of a developmental worker and of ‗development situations‘ suggesting a 
more focused ‗insider‘ ethnography. This position of the researcher within a 
researched subject was very close to the experience I brought with me when I started 
my research at Queen Margaret University, after more than fifteen years of work 
with aid programmes in the FSU region. Although not without an inherent bias, this 
position provides a researcher with a unique lens of looking into the aid practices 
through their own experience, and I considered myself well-positioned in this regard. 
In particular, adopting an ‗insider‘ look proved a valuable approach during data 
analysis, when making inferences from participants‘ responses required a thorough 
understanding of the implementation realities on the ground.  
3.2.4.3 Other theoretical concepts informing this research 
138 
 
This research uses the ethnographic enquiry to better understand the complex 
transnational processes of combating the HIV epidemic, in which individuals, 
organisations, policies, and values constantly interact. It aimed to establish how the 
GF aid model manifested itself in the roles, relations, systems, and practices that 
appeared in the process and at the result of the implementation of the GF Round 1 
and 6 programmes by Principal Recipients NGOs, using the example of HIV 
prevention programmes.  
At the initial stage, this research was also informed by other theoretical 
concepts, such as policy implementation theories, aid evaluation research, health 
policy analysis and post-Soviet studies. The latter one in particular had assisted in 
contextualisation of my research and provided a background for viewing the GF 
programmes within historical, economic, political and social contexts of HIV in post-
Soviet Ukraine. Chapter 2 reflects in detail on the country contexts of Ukraine and its 
HIV epidemic as an outcome of post-1991 transitions, and describes background in 
which aid programmes have developed. This part of the study was informed by 
works of Medvedev (1999), Feschbach and Galvin (2005), Twigg (2007), Rowland 
and Telyukov (1991), DeBell and Carter (2005) and some others.  
The works of Murray Feshbach, the Western world‘s leading expert on Soviet 
and post-Soviet health and demography, provided important accounts of the 
counterproductive USSR policy responses during the early days of the HIV 
epidemic. DeBell and Carter (2005) underlined the importance of understanding the 
context for those doing research in the post-Soviet region.  
The role of the country context is of a particular importance for this study that 
looks into the effects of GF aid for HIV/AIDS control in Ukraine, and views them 
through the prism of the post-Soviet policy environment as ―markedly different from 
that in southern Africa, southeast Asia, and other poor regions where HIV has 
ravaged societies‖ (Twigg 2007, p. 20). While in many parts of the world, the 
effective response to the epidemic was hindered by poorly developed health systems, 
and money for HIV response had to be channelled in absence or with insufficient 
infrastructure and workforce necessary to deliver the services, Ukraine‘s existing 
specialised AIDS health care system begs considering an alternative approach.  
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Within the country context of Ukraine, the following dichotomy is shaping its 
HIV/AIDS response: while its institutional capacity is framed by ―the perverse 
horizontal segmentation‖ that characterized the previous Soviet health care system 
(Twigg 2007, p. 21), the choice of HIV control measures is rooted in external 
recommendations based on the understanding of health service delivery in the 
developing world. This dichotomy helped to contextualise this research and assisted 
in the choice of the theoretical approach.  
There were other relevant issues that affected the choice of theoretical 
approaches: 
 Lack of research base for policy making in Ukraine 
The discipline of social research is developed in Ukraine, with much human and 
institutional expertise is present, however, DeBell and Carter (2005) highlighted 
weak or non-existent links between policy making and social research institutions. 
The unclear link between policy and research in post-independence Ukraine presents 
additional challenges when researching national policy on HIV/AIDS. Lack of 
national research base was noted by participants when they described how target 
setting for HIV prevention was done using external approaches by PRs in R1-R6. 
More details are provided in Chapter 4.  
 
 Donor dictum in HIV/AIDS policy in Ukraine 
The fact that donors practice ―coercive policy transfer‖ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009, 
p.87) by which transnational institutions ―almost dictate the nature of policy change‖, 
is well-established on the example of African countries by Moyo (2009), and in 
analysing the donor aid for privatisation in Russia by Stiglitz (2001), Wedel (2001) 
and others. As Marcus et al (2009) point out, core principal policies from donor 
countries and organizations have guided to a great extent the trajectory and 
implementation of GF programmes at the country level. There is, however, little 
discussion about a ‗coercive policy transfer‘ in regard to aid programmes in health 
care that are implemented in post-communist countries, and in particular in Ukraine.  
Rather, the focus of many donor programmes is on criticising post-Soviet 
state health care, which is blamed virtually for everything in regard to aid delivery, 
140 
 
with some arguments stemming from an old Cold War discourse, and others 
informed by a neo-liberal World Bank paradigm. Despite the fact that the Soviet 
Union has not been in existence for more than twenty years, the legacy of 
‗Semashko‘ health care continues to haunt neo-liberalist aid policy thinking. The 
criticisms are even more ominous because post-Soviet health care, having suffered 
after 1991 ―the most astounding collapse in public health ever witnessed in 
peacetime in the industrialised world‖ (Garrett 2000, p.113), was further weakened 
by neo-liberal market reforms, as discussed in Chapter 2. The critical narrative of 
post-Soviet health care as incapable of health service delivery serves to justify why 
the aid programmes deliberately aim at by-passing the state health system in favour 
of non-state providers and in favour of narrow health focuses.  
As noted above, the ‗blame the government‘ narrative has prevailed during 
the GF programmes delivery in Ukraine. The persistence of this narrative has often 
directed the debate about the impact of GF into a stovepipe of politically motivated 
discussion about post-Soviet health care and its problems. With the focus on 
criticising the government as ultimately responsible for providing health care 
services, the GF own ‗zone of responsibility‘ is obscured, including how GF-funded 
programmes shape the way HIV health services are practised, whom the services are 
reaching and how roles and relationships develop in GF-funded health settings.  
In these circumstances, the role for the researcher is to describe and 
document, and be a reflexive observer who witnesses the aid processes in the 
making, observes how different players interact, and describes their relations. For 
these reasons, the author believes that ethnographic inquiry constitutes the most 
appropriate research approach in the given research context. The fruitfulness of an 
ethnographic approach looks particularly attractive in view of the nature of this 
research, which aims to study the Global Fund globally conceived aid delivery 
model, and roles, relations, policies and practices that appear during the GF 
programme implementation in their local context in Ukraine – i.e. to determine the 
―impact of global processes on local places‖ (Mosse and Lewis 2005).  
Based on the foregoing, the present research is defined as a critical 
ethnographic enquiry into the conduct and practice of INGOs and national NGOs in 
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their role as Principal Recipients of GFATM grants targeting HIV prevention during 
Rounds 1 and 6 programmes in Ukraine (2003-2012). In particular, it looked into the 
GF core models – such as NGO-based delivery of services, performance-based 
funding and ‗country ownership‘ governance manifested through Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) – and studied how they were perceived by 
participants on the ground. All of the above aspects of GF engagement with Ukraine 
are critically analysed to determine how the GF aid delivery model affected its HIV 
prevention policies and services.  
 
3.3 Data collection stages 
This study adopts research methods that are generally common to qualitative 
research, employing a holistic approach to problem-solving, rather than relying on a 
single method for collecting and analysing data, and thus employing a triangulation 
of methods. Within the data, the distinction between secondary and primary data was 
made. Primary data was collected through the 50 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders with experience in GF programmes in Ukraine. 
Secondary sources of data included various published literature sources and country 
documents with specific information on HIV prevention and GF programmes in 
Ukraine, as well as notes made of participant observations at the venues such as 
CCM and stakeholder meetings. The observation notes were used in conjunction 
with emerging themes from the participant interviews and were synthesized in the 
analysis. 
50 interviews were conducted between November 2011 and September 2012 
with purposively selected participants based in Kyiv, and during field visits to three 
oblasts of Ukraine. The interviews were all transcribed into text. 
The document analysis comprised key GF programme documents – annual 
reports of the PRs; minutes of CCM and stakeholder meetings; GF, PR, and 
government press releases; and other available documents on the web-sites of the 
GF, State Service of Ukraine for AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases, the Ukrainian 
Centre for Disease Control and two PRs.  
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Document analysis commenced prior to regional interviews and continued during 
the interview phase and after the end of data collection, as new sources became 
available. Some relevant documents were uncovered during trips to oblasts in the 
process of interviewing, and were also included in the document review. Some 
sources represent unpublicized reports that were obtained by the author during in-
country meetings and through online communications, and are on file with the 
author. PR operational manuals, guidelines, grant competition announcements, as 
well as databases GF SRs were also reviewed on the web-sites of the two PRs or 
obtained during Stakeholder or CCM Meetings in Ukraine attended by the author. 
Both electronic and paper versions of CCM documents were reviewed as they were 
available on the State Services web-site and notes from the selected CCM sessions 
that the author attended in 2010, 2011 and 2012 in Kyiv were also used.  
3.3.1 Designing an interview guide and choosing key interview areas 
Qualitative research interviews are "attempts to understand the world from 
the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples' experiences, to uncover 
their lived world prior to scientific explanations" (Kvale, 1996). In qualitative 
research, open-ended responses to questions provide the researcher with quotations, 
which are the main source of raw data. According to Patton (1987, p.11), quotations 
"reveal the way in which [the respondents] have organized the world, their thoughts 
about what is happening, their experiences, and their basic perceptions…The task… 
is to provide a framework within which people can respond in a way that represents 
accurately and thoroughly their point of view about the program". 
 Patton identified three main types of qualitative interviewing to use in research: 
the informal conversational interview, the interview guide approach, and 
the standardized open-ended interview. Although these types vary in the format and 
structure of questioning, all of them have in common the fact that the participant's 
responses are open-ended and not restricted to choices provided by the interviewer. 
A fourth type of interview, the close-ended, fixed-response interview, falls in the 
realm of quantitative interviewing, and was not considered for this research. A 
limited number of closed questions was nevertheless included into the Interview 
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Guide to obtain views on Ukraine‘s epidemic, effectiveness of GF programmes, and 
to define the respondents status and GF experience. 
The Interview Guide approach was adopted for use in my research for being the 
most widely used format for qualitative interviewing. This approach was seen as 
enabling the interviewer to cover an outline of topics or issues, while allowing for 
some freedom to vary the wording and order of the questions. Another benefit of 
using the interview guide was seen especially in cases of possible ‗deviations‘ from 
the main themes, if the need would arise during an interview to probe for more in-
depth responses. It was also expected that this format of interview will still remain 
fairly conversational and informal as I aimed to establish a good rapport with my 
study participants and gain their confidence. A possible drawback of using the 
interview guide approach was noted by Sewell (1999) who suggested that sticking to 
the outlined topics will prevent other important unanticipated topics from being 
raised by the respondent. The interview guide was believed to be flexible enough to 
enable the balance between covering the main areas and allowing to probe into the 
respondent‘s specialised or contextualised knowledge and explore new issues and 
ideas that might come up, with due discipline and time management exercised by the 
researcher during interviews. 
Face-to-face interviews were the preferred method. Previously distributed 
information sheets (in Appendix G), and a brief introductory session preceded each 
interview during which participants could find out more about the researcher and the 
research and were asked to sign the consent forms.  
The Interview Guide addressed the following main thematic areas: 
(1) Questions to determine respondent‘s status, length of experience and level 
of knowledge about GF programmes. Those included: sector to which a 
respondent belonged, length of GF experience or specialized knowledge, 
type of work involved in connection with GF programmes.  
(2) The main bloc of questions – to be asked of all participants: 
a) Status of Ukraine‘s HIV epidemic 
b) Entities/institutions responsible for HIV prevention 
c) Defining prevention interventions funded by the GF 
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d) Assessment of the Principal Recipients‘ roles in HIV prevention 
e) Assessing the roles and effectiveness of the CCM.  
(3) Bloc of questions on HIV prevention needs and coverage: how they were 
determined, what decision making mechanisms existed, main actors in 
target setting. 
(4) Questions about the influence of the GF programmes in Ukraine: 
(5) Questions about the organisation and documentation of HIV prevention 
services – asked to participants with HIV service delivery experience. 
Central to this segment was the assessment of whether and how often, 
NGOs in the studied regions offered to their clients from vulnerable 
groups HIV prevention services and how clients were categorised and 
counted. 
The full Interview Guide is provided in Appendix H. 
 
3.3.2 Fieldwork organization 
As Suter (2012, p. 350) notes, the sampling plan for gathering text is often 
purposive, meaning that participants are selected to serve a specific purpose (not 
randomly to allow generalisation across a population), and the purpose of the 
sampling plan is ―to maximize the value of data for theory development by gathering 
data rich enough to uncover conceptual relationships‖.  
The need to look deeper into the GF programme implementation strongly 
suggested that because of the perceived complexity of those programmes and their 
inherent focus on specific interventions, the number of people possessing specialised 
knowledge and experience was limited to a certain number of individuals and 
organisations in Ukraine. It was therefore the nature of the research question that 
determined the choice of respondents to be studied. The need for more in-depth 
investigation of the HIV prevention services delivery and the relations that occurred 
in the GF-funded settings required that a portion of participants should have been 
interviewed in oblasts. Regional probe into the GF programmes implementation was 
meant to provide my study with regional dimension and serve to solidify its 
conclusions.The final sampling plan therefore included sampling by participants‘ 
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geographical region, by sector identity and level of experience/involvement with the 
GF programmes.  
 
3.3.3 Geographical location and criteria for their selection 
Given time and resource constraints, the focus of the research was on three 
regions plus the capital city of Kyiv. In sampling geographical territories for the 
research, following factors were considered: 
1) Official epidemiological data of the registered cases of HIV infection at the oblast 
level (from Ukrainian Centre for Disease Control). The map showing HIV 
prevalence in various oblasts of Ukraine is presented in Chapter 2.  
2) The extent to which GF programmes were present in oblasts. Data on 
geographical distribution of GFATM-funded HIV prevention services taken from PR 
annual reports was used to determine this.   
3) Considerations of Ukraine‘s regional differences also played a role; one region 
represented Western Ukraine, one Southern Ukraine and one Eastern Ukraine. 
The choice of oblasts was meant to reflect on the regional balance of Ukraine, 
diffusion of its HIV epidemic, and the perceived depth of penetration by the GFATM 
programmes. It resulted in the following categorisation of regions: 
1) One of the regions that have the highest number of GF-supported projects, 
and high reported HIV prevalence; 
2) One region that has few GF-supported projects and low (for Ukraine) 
reported HIV prevalence rates;  
3) Two large populated regions with high HIV transmission potential that 
can have an impact on national morbidity and mortality, and high number 
of GF projects. 
The following locations were chosen for interviews:  
Region Oblasts included 
Location of sampling 
point/place of conducting 
interviews 
Eastern 
Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia oblasts 
Dnipropetrovsk 
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Western 
Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Rivne, 
Ternopil, Luzk, Zakarpatia(capital 
Uzhgorod) oblasts 
Ivano-Frankivsk 
Southern 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
(capital Symferopol), Kherson, 
Mykolayiv, Odesa 
Mykolayiv 
Central 
Cherkasy, Chernigiv, Kyrovohrad, 
Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, 
Zhytomyr, Kyiv oblast and the city 
of Kyiv 
The capital Kyiv 
 
Figure 3.1 Location of the sampling points  
 
 
3.3.4 Purposeful sampling of respondents 
Appropriate sampling represents one of the strategies to obtain reliable and 
verifiable data. Following Morse et al (2002,p. 18), the appropriate sample consists 
of participants ―who best represent or have knowledge of the research topic‖. In this 
research, purposive sampling was used.  
In Patton‘s view (1990), all types of sampling in qualitative research may be 
encompassed under the broad term of ‗purposeful sampling‘. He writes: ―the logic 
and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study 
in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal 
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about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, thus the term 
purposeful sampling‖ (Patton 1990, p. 169). He describes 15 different strategies for 
purposefully selecting information-rich cases, among them: extreme or deviant case 
sampling; intensity sampling; maximum variation sampling; homogeneous samples; 
typical case sampling; stratiﬁed purposeful sampling; critical case sampling; 
snowball or chain sampling, and some others. Common to all these strategies is 
selecting information-rich cases that are selected purposefully to ﬁt the study. 
Respondents for purposive sampling are selected because of some 
characteristic. Patton (1990), Palys (2008), Sandelowski (1995), Morse (1991) and 
others provide numerous descriptions of cases of purposive sampling. Keeping in 
mind that ‗research participants are not always created equal – one well‐placed 
articulate informant will often advance your research far better than any randomly 
chosen sample of fifty‘ (Palys, 2008, p. 697), for the purpose of this research, I chose 
stakeholder purposive sampling, defined in the words of Palys as:  
Stakeholder Sampling: Particularly useful in the context of evaluation 
research and policy analysis, this strategy involves identifying who the major 
stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or 
administering the program or service being evaluated, and who might 
otherwise be affected by it. (Palys 2008, p. 698) 
The choice of stakeholder sampling was determined by the aims of the 
research and the need to focus on the policy making and policy implementation 
processes. In defining stakeholders, I adopted Pawson‘s (2006) definition, which 
regards stakeholders as key sources for eliciting programme theory and providing 
data on how the programme works.  
A key determinant for inclusion into the research was respondents‘ prior or 
current involvement with GF programme implementation. Respondents were 
primarily national and regional government stakeholders, NGO service providers, 
and state health care service providers. At the oblast level, key informant interviews 
were conducted with local government officials and staff of GF Sub-Recipient 
NGOs. Representatives of international NGOs, bilateral agencies and other donor 
organisations working in Ukraine in the area of HIV/AIDS were also included. At 
the national and international level, independent experts were also included in the 
sample, to include people with expert knowledge of policy making in the HIV/AIDS 
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sphere in Ukraine. Additionally, more individuals with perceived knowledge and/or 
direct experience with the GF programmes that emerged during the interviews in 
oblasts, were invited to participate in interviews. 
The respondents were also categorised into three geographical levels 
according to their location as: sub-national (oblast); national; and international. 
International respondents were located both inside and outside of Ukraine. 
 
3.3.5 Participant recruitment  
Prior to beginning the PhD research, the author has had more than 15 years of 
professional experience in the area of donor programmes in HIV/AIDS in Ukraine, 
as well as in a wider FSU region. The initial pool for recruitment was compiled on 
the basis of professional and personal networks acquired from author‘s professional 
experiences. In search of more participants, more individuals from among the oblast-
based contacts were approached to determine their interest and availability for 
interviews. GF-funded oblast and NGO databases produced by PRs, mainly by 
International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine (Directory 2011), were consulted to 
obtain access to regional stakeholders, initially by e-mail and then by phone. Within 
NGOs, participants included both management and HIV service providers‘ level 
taken from different NGOs. A preliminary pool of contacts was established before 
field trips began. Snowballing techniques were used in oblasts to add further contacts 
to the initial pool. Individual interviews were scheduled upon arrival to the oblast 
according to local availability of respondents. 
At the oblast level, when it was not initially possible to identify and make 
appointments with people only with GF experience, participants were sought from a 
HIV/AIDS sector background, also using snowballing. Because NGO participation in 
HIV services provision was among the key issues to be investigated, composition of 
the sample was purposely skewed to achieve sufficient representation of NGOs 
providing the services to generate sufficiently wide variety of data for analysis. 
To recruit state sector participants, contact was made either through the 
oblast‘s health department with state health care specialists with known engagement 
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or expertise with GF-funded HIV prevention services, or individuals were 
approached directly. At the NGO level, the initial contact was to identify personnel 
with GF programme experience. At the national level, participants reflected a 
balance between different state agencies and levels of state servants including current 
or former CCM members.  
In accordance with the aims of the study and the need to maintain a ‗critical 
space‘, participant recruitment was skewed towards finding informants with a 
specific GF-related knowledge, who may not be typically included in donor-guided 
and PR-guided studies, and to give voice to a broader range of stakeholders on the 
ground. For this reason, because of perceived conflicts of interest, staffs employed at 
both PRs‘ Head offices in Kyiv, were excluded from the pool, and were not asked to 
identify the study participants, or to assist in the sampling of regions. The GF Sub-
Recipients (SRs) in all three oblasts and nationally were recruited for interviews as 
informants possessing specific on-the-ground knowledge and experience. 
 
3.4 Research limitations. Ethical and other issues considered before interviewing 
An evaluation of the entire scope of GF programmes in Ukraine is outside the 
purview of this study. For my research, I interviewed respondents based in three out 
of the 24 oblasts of Ukraine, as well as in the capital Kyiv. The vast territory of 
Ukraine and the existing differences between the regions as to the perceived impact 
of the GF programmes preclude extrapolating data from several regions to the whole 
country. Rather, by analysing the roles, policies, relations and practices under the GF 
programmes in the three oblasts, I seek to raise more interest in the topic in the hope 
of generating a systemic look into the whole impact of GF-funded interventions on 
Ukraine‘s national HIV/AIDS response.  
The midway point of the research coincided with the 2011-2012 reforms at the 
GF; after which many of the previously existing policies and documents were 
updated, and some were no longer available online. This complicated analysis of 
some documents as I consequently needed to find more secondary references to 
them.   
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Further limitations to this research lay in the lack of clearly identifiable HIV 
prevention services funded by GF, lack of services standards and the constantly 
evolving definitions of ‗service package‘ and ‗client‘ of services during the R1 and 
R6 implementation.  
As Patton noted, the personal, conversational nature of interview situations 
highlights many of the basic ethical issues of any research method (Patton, 1990). 
Among these issues are: confidentiality, the need for informed consent, risk 
assessment, interviewer mental health issues, and some others. 
1) Confidentiality –Asking people about their work and its impact on policy or the 
epidemic can make some people uncomfortable. They may feel they are viewed as 
beneficiaries receiving income from these programmes, or may not want to give 
negative comments because they feel this may harm the general perception of their 
work, or even their country. Because respondents may be sharing information that 
they can perceive as sensitive and having negative implications in their personal and 
professional lives if they are identified as sources, it is important to honestly assess 
and communicate to them how much confidentiality they can expect. The researcher 
also needs to consider how the confidentiality of individuals will be preserved when 
the data are analysed and reported. Related issues include who, in addition to the 
researcher, will have access to the data. 
2) Informed consent - Most studies, for instance program evaluations, are covered by 
some kind of human subjects review process. This will usually require that 
respondents sign an informed consent form agreeing to participate, after being 
informed of potential risks and/or benefits. In pre-interview communication, 
participants were assured that every effort would be made to store data safely, and 
that the author would not collect any personal or other information that might 
indirectly link a respondent with a particular response.   
3) Risk assessment - It is important to consider all potential risks and include them in 
the informed consent process. Even though "just talking" may seem inherently 
harmless, people who participate in open-ended interviews may experience 
psychological stress, or pressure by peers or staff who believe that the participant 
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may say unflattering things about them or their organisation to the interviewer. To 
mitigate the risk of potential peer pressure, every effort was made to space out the 
meetings and locations and make independent arrangements with each study 
participant. For the same reason, it was decided not to have focus group discussions, 
in order to generate more candid responses and avoid stakeholders in the same 
location being aware of what others were saying. This meant planning for additional 
time during each regional trip. In terms of personal risks, there were no political 
upheavals or unrest at the time of the interviews (2011-2012). 
4) Mental health of the interviewer - Interviewing can be an intense interpersonal 
experience. In the same way as participants may experience psychological stress 
from disclosing sensitive information or talking about unpleasant situations, 
interviewers may be overwhelmed by the sensitive nature of what they see or hear, 
especially in the field, when they are away from home and family. Although the 
author did not personally experience any psychological harm during the interviews, 
there was general fatigue after intense personal interactions. The author mitigated 
psychological problems preventatively by allowing extra time when on location for 
physical activities such as exercise and taking strolls, to the place of interviews and 
back to the hotel, visiting churches and local markets. This was a pleasant, stress-
relieving experience, also enabling the author to observe economic and social life 
and various human interactions, which was useful to gain insights into the local 
context of life in the studied regions.  
 Despite the ethical issues identified above that were associated with this 
study, there were potential benefits of the research believed to outweigh potential 
harms because: 
 Even though some participants may feel sensitive about being asked about 
some aspects of their professional activities, their responses may contain 
important information relevant to the subject of research that has not been 
provided before. In some cases, respondents reported or appeared to 
experience a degree of relief in discussing issues freely in a safe environment. 
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 The GF is a global tool for combating HIV/AIDS, providing funding in many 
cases when local resources are insufficient. Qualitative research draws from 
participants‘ experiences directly and thus may be a better instrument to 
identify challenges and allow people with a more critical outlook to share 
their views.  
 
3.5    Field work 
 As noted by Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 55-56), ―data collection is 
inescapably a selective process‖ in which ―you cannot and do not ‗get it all‘ even 
though you might think you can‖. Selectivity was practiced at all stages of data 
collection, and included a careful selection of study participants.  
3.5.1 Conducting the interviews 
Following a sampling plan, a core group of contacts was identified in Kyiv 
and three regions suggested for visits. Contact was made with the initial core group 
by e-mail, while still in Edinburgh. After the clearance from the Ethics Panel was 
received, pilot interviews were conducted in Kyiv in October 2011. The pilot phase 
generated a few corrections to the Interview Guide, and after consultations with a 
supervisory team, I proceeded to the first regional trip. 
Field trips and Kyiv-based interviews were conducted between October 2011 
and September 2012. A total of 52 individuals were invited to participate in the 
study, and 50 consented. The interview process included the following: 
 In advance of the interview, I sent by an e-mail, or post, the information sheet 
(Appendix G) and let the potential respondent know more about the research. 
If a participant was identified during the field visit, information sheet was 
given at the meeting and time provided for the participant to read it.  
 At the meeting, in addition to information sheet, I presented some personal 
and background information, and explained why the opinion of the 
respondent was needed and how important it was to obtain the data for 
research purposes. Information about collection of data, storage, anonymity 
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and confidentiality was explained at this stage. Any questions on the side of 
the respondent were asked at this point.  
 Then the interviewee was asked whether he/she would like to continue, and if 
yes, if he/she would like to sign a consent form. Decision on whether to 
participate in the interview immediately or at a later date, was made at this 
point. Written informed consent forms were collected of all 50 participants, 
currently on file with the author.  
 The interview would then commence. When necessary, breaks were made. 
All 50 respondents had knowledge or experience of GF work in Ukraine 
and/or internationally and represented a diverse background. Ten were CCM 
members at the time of interviewing or within the five preceding years, and eight 
were members of regional coordinating councils (see below the distribution of 
respondents by their self-identification): 
 
 
Overwhelming majority of the participants had five or more years of 
experience with GF programmes (see Fig. 3.3): 
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Number of respondents in each category
* CCM membership was reported in addition to the main 
respondent category, therefore, the total number of 
respondents is above 50
4
10
36
Number of 
respondents
Figure 3.3 Length of experience with GF programmes
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Most participants had experience in both GF R1 and R6: 
 
Interviews with 27 regional respondents were conducted by researcher in 
either Russian or Ukrainian, based on the participant‘s choice. The 23 national and 
international interviewees spoke in Ukrainian, Russian or English.  
Interviews took place wherever it was convenient for the interviewee and 
private enough to preserve confidentiality. Eleven interviews were conducted in 
health care facilities, including oblast AIDS centres, drug clinics, sexually 
transmitted infections clinics, other regional health institutions. Interviews with five 
government officials were conducted in government buildings. Another eleven 
interviews were held with heads of regional NGOs at offices of regional NGOs or 
needle exchange program facilities. The remaining thirty interviews were conducted 
in places convenient for the participants. Two interviews with international 
participants were conducted by Skype. Participants were receiving no reward, per 
diem, or other financial compensation. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes and two 
hours, with the average interview duration of 65 minutes. 
Total of 27 interviews were conducted in oblasts, with the following 
distribution across the regions: 
- 10 interviews were conducted in Ivano-Frankivsk,  
- 9 interviews conducted in Mykolayiv, and  
- 8 interviews conducted in Dniepropetrovsk. 
 3.5.2 Recording and transcription 
Most of the interviews were conducted in Russian or Ukrainian, while several 
others were done in English. It was decided to transcribe interviews in the original 
6
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Figure 3.4 Participants' experience in the GF Rounds  
In both Rounds Round 6 Round 1
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languages as they were conducted. The author is fully fluent in all the languages used 
in the interviews. One of the reasons to keep the original languages was the need to 
stay closer to the original meanings and original text, and generate the initial codes, 
as they were implied in the original meaning by the participant, before categorising 
them into themes. The author is aware of communication difficulties in Ukraine 
arising from translation. Some previous foreign researchers conducting interviews in 
Ukraine noted that simultaneous translation during the interview was ―creating a 
potential for communication difficulties‖ (APMG 2009, p. 13), even if using 
professional translators knowledgeable in the subject matter. Keeping interviews in 
the original was also viewed as an additional layer of preserving confidentiality and 
anonymity of the informants. 
This research uses transcripts of recorded interviews as text data. 
Transcribing started in January 2012. All interviews were transcribed in full, except 
for repetitions, and irrelevant personal narratives. With most interviews transcribed 
before summer 2012, final transcription ended in December 2012. 
3.5.3 Safeguarding the data 
In order to ensure confidentiality and safeguard identifying information, 
participants‘ name, age, and demographic information were not reported in the 
findings.  
Self-identification was used to allow participants to categorise themselves for 
the study. Only general work-related categories were offered to differentiate between 
various stakeholders, and with not much detail to allow identifying their positions or 
organisation/s. Regional or sector identities are not disclosed in quotations in the text 
of the thesis.  
Given the nature of some of the respondent‘s roles, every effort was made to 
fully anonymise their responses from others working in the field. For example, with 
the government stakeholders, the total number of government stakeholders 
interviewed in all sub-regions could be revealed, without providing the list of 
government departments or organisations to which they belong in a particular sub-
region. This ensured the anonymity of individual subjects interviewed without losing 
the general characteristics necessary to distinguish them for research purposes. 
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The same principle applied to NGO staff/service providers. This thesis does not 
supply the list of NGOs whose staff were interviewed, and reports their responses by 
numbers only. This ensures their anonymity and that their names cannot be linked to 
the name of their NGOs that operate in the region sampled. 
All identifying information present in consent forms was kept separate from 
the audio recordings and transcriptions and no tracing identity is possible based on 
the data stored by the author. Numerical codes were assigned to each transcript and 
in the thesis participants are quoted by these numbers only.  
Regarding the technical side of data collection and storage, all due 
precautions outlined in the Ethical Panel approval, were followed. Each interview 
was recorded, and an audio file stored only on the researcher‘s personal, password-
protected laptop. This computer was not connected to any computer network. Backup 
was on a external device (floppy drive), that is also password protected. 
All files, field notes, analytical memos, and other study materials have been 
stored in a safe, locked location at researcher‘s home, and will remain within such 
restraints for the time period outlined in Ethical Panel recommendations and ethics 
regulations. After this time, all paper and digital materials will be destroyed. 
 
3.6 Data analysis 
3.6.1 Following Creswell‟s data analysis stages 
All the transcribed data was in textual form, which suggested a choice of 
analytical tools for analysis. As Dey (1993, p. 6) notes, qualitative researchers ―learn 
by doing‖. Qualitative analysis is ―mainly to help us learn‖ (Miles and Huberman 
1994, p.10). While qualitative research may require reliance on three ―I‘s‖ – ―insight, 
intuition, and impression‖ (Dey 1995, p. 78), Creswell (2007) suggests that the data 
analysis goes by a spiral: 
Figure 3.5 Cresswell‘s ―Spiral of analysis‖  
157 
 
 
According to Creswell‘s spiral, the analysis begins with the gathering of data, 
and moves into data management – organization of files and records, writing memos, 
and reading data, then reflecting, then on to describing, classifying, and interpreting, 
categorizing, and comparing, and finally, representing and visualizing the data. 
What Cresswell‘s spiral represents visually, Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 11-
12) define verbally by outlining three major stages of data analysis: 
1. Data reduction (simplifying complex data by, for example, extracting 
recurring themes via coding);  
2. Data display (e.g., matrices, charts, graphs, etc.) 
3. Drawing conclusions and verifying them as a means of testing the validity of 
findings.  
The research followed these three stages of data analysis. 
3.6.2 Coding. Categories. Content analysis 
Coding, also called indexing, is used to organising the data and reducing it to 
manageable proportions. The SAGE Encyclopaedia defines coding in qualitative 
research as ―the process of generating ideas and concepts from raw data such as 
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interview transcripts, field notes, archival materials, reports, newspaper articles, and 
art‖ (Given 2008, p. 85). 
Coding is at a basic level, any way of categorizing and sorting data for the 
purposes of analysis. Coding involves the breaking down of research data into units 
which are then grouped according to their characteristics. A researcher applies 
meaning to raw data by assigning key words or phrases to sub-units of data. These 
key words then act as signposts to themes within the data. The process of coding is 
well-described in a number of qualitative methods manuals, including Dey(1993); 
Lofland and Lofland (1995); Miles and Huberman (1994).  
In doing coding, a researcher is aware of its perceived subjectivity. It requires 
a researcher to walk around in the life of the participant and to try to interpret what is 
being said in a way that is congruent with what the participant means (Robertson, 
2008). It is important to maintain as much ‗trust-worthiness‘ as possible. The 
researcher needs to keep an open mind and avoid pre-conceptions, interpreting the 
data, while remaining true to what the participant said and how they said it. 
The steps of data coding outlined by (Corbin and Strauss 1990) have appeal 
to those researchers and research funders who desire scientific rigour. If research 
reports contain accounts of indexing and coding schemes with illustrative examples 
for each code, some readers may be more willing to believe that a logical and 
systematic approach to analysis has been taken.  
However, Coffey et al. (1996) expressed doubts about the narrow, 
reductionist character of analytic strategy that is imposed when coding is used as a 
first step to theory generation. Their concerns are heightened if analysis is conducted 
with computer-assisted qualitative data analysis as this encourages standardised, 
mechanistic procedures that fragment and de-contextualise data into discrete 
sections.  
Similarly, Krippendorf (2013) wrote about the limitations of computer text 
analysis: 
[C]ontent analysts must look outside the physicality of texts – for example, to 
how people other than the analysis use these texts, what the texts tell them, 
the conceptions and actions the texts encourage. ... [C]omputer text analysis 
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cannot point to anything outside of what it processes. Computers have no 
environment of their own making: they operate in the contexts of their users‘ 
worlds without understanding those contexts. (Krippendorff 2013, p. 29) 
Seale (1999) sees indexing as a preceding stage to coding. He argues that 
indexing is an attempt to fix meaning on to the world, and that while this process 
excludes other viewpoints, this exclusivity is required in order to persuade audiences 
of the validity of the research. An issue remains, however, if coding fixes meanings 
too prematurely during the process of analysis thereby preventing the analyst from 
seeing beyond his or her initial ideas. Seale argues that indexing should be seen as an 
early stage within the process of coding and represents an initial signposting of data 
rather than representing final theories. 
The first stage of data analysis typically involves familiarisation with the data 
through a series of re-readings in order to obtain a general sense of their meaning. 
The familiarization (or data immersion) is usually carried out on a small section of 
the full data set such as one or two interview transcripts. At this point the analyst 
may be writing notes on the types of topics contained within the data. A thematic 
framework is then developed according to the key research objectives and emergent 
themes, with similar topics clustered together. Sections of data are then indexed 
according to the framework, with coding categories refined appropriately in response 
to the data. The aim at this stage is to generate sections of data with multiple codes 
and for the process to be as inclusive as possible, codes being added to reflect all 
kinds of nuances in the data rather than trying to fit the data into a few core codes. 
Categories 
Coding is looking for key words, phrases and ideas that arise directly from 
the data. You are looking for similarities and consistencies in what the 
participants say. You are also looking for differences and inconsistencies, 
contradictions. You are looking to develop categories and sub-categories. 
Ian Robertson (2008) 
Categories can be described as high-level codes – concepts that allow sub-
codes with common properties to be grouped. Category development can be done 
either inductively or deductively (Given 2008, p. 71). To generate categories 
inductively, the researcher approaches data analysis without a preset list of categories 
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and analyses the data to identify analytic units that conceptually match the 
phenomenon portrayed in the data set. When categories are generated deductively, 
they emerge not from the data but rather from prior studies, relevant literature, 
research questions, and the researcher‘s own experience with and knowledge of the 
phenomenon. A risk to using the deductive approach is that the categories generated 
from other sources will not be relevant or accurately reflect the qualitative data set at 
hand. Because data was generated from both interviews and background literature 
and reports, in making up categories, the synthesis of both sources was done. 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic content 
analysis. The steps consisted of: categorising the information from all the interviews 
and finally, theoretical coding in which open codes and categories were compared to 
generate an analytic schema and to interpret the findings. 
The coding process had two stages: 
1) Early coding stage. I did open coding using the participants‘ own words and 
phrases without preconceived notions or classification, and in the original 
languages of transcription (Russian, Ukrainian, English), following the coding 
process guidelines described by Ian Robertson (Robertson, 2008). The first 
matrix contained codes done in original During this stage of coding, I coded 
and marked all interviews, and browsed through the data to see what was 
there, and what patterns were emerging from the data. I recorded those with 
margin notes - using the high-lighter, marking the key words. Documents 
were formatted with a wide margin to enable writing. Sticky notes were used 
to mark the codes on the pages. Thoughts and ideas were recorded in a 
reflective journal. 
At this stage, some preliminary, ‗raw‘ initial categories - proto-codes –emerged, 
and they were incorporated into an initial, ―raw‖ matrix. This manually-drawn matrix 
was used to demonstrate how codes/emerging themes/categories can be represented 
visually. This first matrix accomplished the following:  
• generated an initial list of items from the data set that have a reoccurring 
pattern; 
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• assembled all emerging themes in one chart; 
• grouped them into broader categories; 
• established links between categories – without suggesting hierarchy or 
predominant meaning. 
2) Advanced coding stage. Before commencing the second stage -- refining, 
expanding and/or rejecting initial categories –the interval of two months was 
made. The goal of the interval was to ‗cool down‘ and abstract from initial 
categories, while translating the proto-codes into English. This proved a useful 
strategy as, on a fresher look, some categories appeared more ―saturated,‖ as 
defined by Merriam (2009), while others with no or limited  significance were 
eliminated.  
At this stage, descriptive proto-codes were beginning to transform into more 
abstract analytical categories as re-coding progressed. Relations between categories 
emerged, including sub-categories – belonging to the same semantic category but 
naming a less general phenomenon with similar properties to a wider category. 
Following this, a second matrix was constructed, with all themes translated 
into English and grouped into vertical columns by categories and sub-categories. The 
design and construction of the second matrix had clear data reduction implications 
that included, according to Saldana‘s (2009) ‗think display‘ principle, the following: 
• Looking for weaved-condensed meanings-codes; 
• Creating a visualisation of actual codes; 
• Establishing key emerging themes. 
Based on the themes that emerged during the advanced coding stage, several 
major themes were further analysed using content analysis. Computer analysis 
software was not used in this study. Since the objective of the research was not 
aimed to produce generalisable or universally applicable conclusions, the author was 
not looking for quantifiable (most frequently used) words, neither had she aimed to 
prioritise among most frequently and less frequently mentioned ideas or concepts. 
Instead, my analysis was aimed to capture as many as possible accounts within the 
chosen thematic categories since the ability of this study to produce broad accounts 
of various aspects of GF implementation was perceived as a most valuable 
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contribution. In constructing the meanings, following were taken into account: (a) the 
general thematic framework of the Interview Guide, and (b) emerging codes 
generated after the advanced coding stage. In doing this, it was assumed that the 
initial Interview Guide already provided for a certain level of saturation. Added by a 
purposely selected participants and their mature level of informedness, this was also 
supposed to add to the saturation of initial information at the point of collection. 
After the emerged themes were obtained from coding, the saturation of meanings 
further increased. Then a minimum threshold was set of the use of unit in context to 
be included into analysis: being the minimum of two uses of the sub-theme 
mentioned by two different participants.  
From the themes that emerged after the advanced coding stage, several major 
themes were further analysed using content analysis to develop the results described 
in the findings chapters, and synthesised with document and literature analysis. They 
included: 
 PRs‘ roles and relationships with other actors in GF programmes; 
 Linkage of GF-funded HIV services with state health care;  
 Focus of GF-funded HIV prevention services; 
 Target setting systems and practices for HIV prevention services; 
 Coverage of clients by HIV services; 
 Data collection systems used by PRs to demonstrate service delivery; 
 CCM perceived roles and effectiveness; 
 CCM decision making practices. 
The analysis done during the last –‗post-coding‘ stage- refined coding by doing 
‗coding-marking‘ that was about seeking instances of context use of the selected 
themes and sub-themes. At this stage, all the individual interview transcripts were re-
read again, and textual instances were marked as they appeared to be linked to the 
emerged themes. This was meant to generate textual evidence that is used widely in 
findings chapters as direct participants‘ quotes. This process was mostly manual -
bigger quotes were put in the computer, while smaller quotes were written in a 
matrix at specially allocated spaces.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE SPECIFICITY OF NGO DELIVERY IN UKRAINE‘S 
HEALTH CARE CONTEXT. TARGET SETTING PRACTICES FOR HIV 
PREVENTION. PR PERCEIVED ROLES 
There is a big contradiction that large funds are 
concentrated with NGO but government is responsible 
for healthcare. The risk is that money will not be spent 
for the purpose it needs to be spent, because GF 
priorities in funding [HIV] prevention may not coincide 
with state policy or even run counter to it.  
(Anonymous respondent, Ukraine) 
 
4.1 Challenges of NGO delivery in the health care context 
As argued in Chapter 2, NGO management of GF programmes posed 
challenges in Ukraine. First, there was never a programme of such scope 
implemented before. Second, following the transfer of the R1 grant to the Alliance, 
there was little willingness on the side of the government to see the GF-supported 
programme as part of the national HIV/AIDS response (Drew 2005a). Lack of 
national ownership with minimal government commitment and support carried a risk 
of the GF programme being seen as a ‗stand-alone‘ project (OIG2008). Other 
challenges included sustainability concerns over the perceived role of the GF as the 
largest external funder for HIV prevention in Ukraine. In the absence of government 
involvement and dwindling support from other development partners, should GF 
funding come to an end, no other funding source was available (OIG 2008).  
Yet, challenges of a different kind, associated with the nature of the 
programme delivery, appear relatively less studied. In line with ethnographic inquiry 
approach, Chapters 4 and 5 that follow are bringing forward the evidence that 
emerged from my analysis, concerning the specificity of NGO service delivery in 
GF-funded settings in Ukraine. The focus is on HIV prevention services as delivered 
by PRs, chosen as the focus area for this research. Here I argue that the way how the 
GF‘s own systems and principles, such as performance-based funding and country 
ownership, applied in Ukraine, as well as the GF‘s focus on NGOs to deliver 
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implement its programmes, had a fundamental impact on channelling of the GF 
funding, organisation of HIV services, target setting, and other practices at the 
country level and in oblasts. Material presented in the following chapters is a 
synthesis of the document and interview data analysis, with interview data as the 
primary evidence.  
4.1.1 The nature of health-care delivery in Ukraine: state as the only 
provider of health services 
When the R1 proposal was prepared, the major focus of the grant - 70% - was 
to provide treatment, care and support for HIV/AIDS patients (Brusati2003). The 
focus of care was the provision of ARV therapy (APMG 2009, p. 6) in which state 
health institutions and state-paid health-care workers were seen as the main providers 
of services, with NGOs assisting in referral services, as well as in care and support. 
The prevention component constituted a small part of the original R1 grant, while the 
World Bank project, also launched in 2004, had an HIV prevention component for 
high-risk groups. The Bank‘s project was not implemented, however. The delivery of 
services by NGOs was among the biggest risk factors for the Bank project, as noted 
in its closure report (Bank 2009). 
In contrast with the Bank, an anticipated outcome for the GF programme was 
robust and effective delivery of HIV services by NGOs. This expectation stemmed 
from the GF‘s perception of a special role of civil society organizations as linked to 
or representing the vulnerable communities and thus having better access to them. 
However, access alone was only part of a solution. With a key focus of the R1 
programme on the provision of ARV treatment, ARV procurement was not the only 
field in which the ―Alliance did not have experience‖ (Drew 2005a, p. 3). The 
delivery of other health services by an INGO presented a problem. 
Ukraine‘s AIDS health care being a vertical, separate health-care system, the 
public sector was the only one ―to provide services needed to the fullest extent‖ 
(UNAIDS 2007, p. 39). Under Ukrainian law, NGOs cannot directly engage in the 
provision of medical services, even less acceptable are international NGOs. The lack 
of a legal framework for NGOs was pressing, in particular, for such GF-funded 
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activities as HIV screening tests and needle exchange provided by NGOs, which fell 
under strict laws on medical waste utilisation, a legacy of Semashko SanEpid 
control
61
. Eight years after the start of GF programmes, a USAID-funded report 
noted that for NGOs to provide HIV counselling and testing services: ―licensing and 
accreditation system has not actually been developed or implemented‖ (Judice et al. 
2011, p. 44). The lack of legal framework carried the risk that many NGO-based 
health services would have to be provided ad hoc
62
 and, as such, may not be 
recognised by the state.  
The other issue was a famous GF ‗medicines without doctors‘ dilemma that 
did not allow its programmes to pay salaries to health workers (Ooms et al. 2007). 
According to this, no health-care institutions could be paid by GF to administer 
ARV, even if a country received them from the GF. Administering ARV drugs is a 
complex and time-consuming process that draws resources from the general health-
care system into narrower channels of operation — a problem which is not unique to 
Ukraine.   
In Ukraine, services of licensed health workers were needed in particular for: 
(1) blood screening for antibodies to HIV; (2) administration of ART; (3) 
administration of methadone. With the government as an implementer, the services 
were to be delivered by state health-care workers. With a transfer of GF money to an 
INGO, the perceived division of roles between state health care and NGOs ceased to 
exist. Having an NGO acting as implementer for what was designed as a typically 
health service–oriented programme, introduced role distortions into the provision of 
health care. The nature of the services to be delivered immediately put a PR in an 
awkward position. 
In general, participants viewed the state as the main provider of health 
services and perceived NGOs as being responsible for care and support: 
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Environmental protection of waste control legislation in Ukraine, while not adequately enforced, has 
remained in existence from the Soviet times, a responsibility split among SanEpid and state 
environmental protection services.  
62
 With a strict regulatory framework in existence, responsibility for syringe utilisation was passed on 
by PRs to sub-recipient NGOs. Regional NGOs were expected to work on the basis of ―notifying the 
regional authorities about the beginning of harm reduction programmes in their region‖ and 
―clarifying the conditions for collection, transportation, storage and utilization of syringes with 
regional SanEpid branch‖ (EHRN/WHO Europe/GTZ/AFEW 2008, p. 13).    
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The state has [the] potential to deal with HIV. (006: 11-112) 
We do not want to take over the roles that the state should fulfil. For example, 
treatment. Or prevention. But we can do care and support...Non-medical care. 
But we cannot substitute the state. (036: 158-180) 
In GF programmes, the role division between NGOs and state was largely 
perceived by participants as unclear and challenging: 
There is no clear division of roles…What is state doing? What are NGOs 
doing?... We need to define this division clearly... and then we won‘t interfere 
in their work and they won‘t interfere in ours. (020: 352-358) 
The NGOs‘ role as GF implementers was also viewed as contradictory and atypical: 
There is a discrepancy in that the government is responsible for prevention, 
but the actual implementation rests with NGOs. So this external funding is 
managed by an external NGO working in Ukraine – an organisation that does 
not have overall stewardship for this arguably a public health service... There 
is a contradiction here... given that the principal recipient of those funds is a 
non-government organisation, which then channels the money to non-
governmental organisations to do the work. (049: 60-68) 
The duality of service delivery and advocacy roles of NGOs 
 The dual role of NGOs as implementers of GF programmes and civil society 
advocates has been widely discussed. 
On the one side, Harmer et al. (2012) argue that an important outcome of the 
GF HIV/AIDS grants has been the increased professionalization of CSOs
63
 through 
adopting adequate project management, accounting, grant and financial management, 
and monitoring and evaluation practices, etc.; which has also been reported by 
Kapilashrami and O‘Brien (2012). This is believed to have led to an increase in 
government officials‘ respect for CSOs, helped to build trust, and challenged 
government stereotypes of CSO organisational capacity.  
Donor publications in Ukraine appear more concerned about the duality of 
NGOs roles as implementers and advocates, mentioning posed risks to NGOs 
becoming less independent, and to programmes not being sustainable. This was 
mentioned by UNAIDS in relation to Merezha becoming a GF co-PR in R6:  
                                                          
63
 As was mentioned before, the terms ‗civil society organisations‘ (CSOs) and ‗nongovernmental 
organisations‘ (NGOs) are used interchangeably in this thesis in relation to Ukraine 
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As organizations such as the Network focus on implementation of large 
programmes and services as the PR for Global Fund grants, they risk 
undermining their role as effective and independent advocates on behalf of 
civil society. The systematic lack of Government involvement and support for 
programmes ...implemented by NGOs also represents a serious risk to their 
long-term sustainability. (UNAIDS 2009, p. 31) 
 
Participants similarly noted the challenges that NGO implementation posed to 
sustainability: 
GF needs to interact more with government-funded programmes, not just 
NGOs. Because when the GF collaborates with the state and it leaves, the 
state feels responsible for the [GF] money and for the money it put in, and 
can pick up where the GF left off. When NGOs are receiving [GF money], 
only the NGO network grows. Because NGOs are on external funding, they 
are a high risk in terms of continuing activities if the funding ends. (027: 277-
286) 
The state is used to NGOs doing prevention. But if [GF] funding stops, the 
state is not ready to support this work. It is only loyal to NGOs because they 
receive grants. If the state has to fund this, it won‘t..It has different priorities. 
(036: 204-231) 
 Other perceived roles of PRs NGOs not directly related to health-care 
delivery are described later in this chapter. 
4.1.2 Channelling GF money: divide and rule  
Drew (2005a) outlined two ways by which the Alliance channelled GF funds 
for service delivery: 
1) By providing direct grants to NGOs and government departments, done by 
competitive tendering for new partners and direct granting to existing 
partners; and 
2) By indirect granting (sub-grants) to local NGOs through other national 
NGO recipients.   
In R1, Drew noticed that different granting procedures were applied to 
different NGO categories: while grants to new partners were issued through a 
competitive tendering process, existing partners and partners with ―unique 
capacities‖ were issued direct contracts. Among Drew‘s concerns regarding the 
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tendering process were inadequate time for responses and the perception that some 
tenders ―were tailored to specific organizations‖ (Drew 2005a, pp. 5-6). 
In the later stage of GF implementation, divisions and classifications between 
different Sub-Recipients (SRs) became even more pronounced, contributing to a 
growing rift among them. The Alliance staff manual on grant-making defines all SRs 
as ‗implementing partners‘ (IPs)64, and classifies them according to the amounts 
received (below 50,000 Euros; between 50,000 and 300,000 Euros; and above 
300,000 Euros); by scale of activities (local, national and intermediary IPs); and by 
status. The ‗status‘ classification reveals PRs‘ high degree of discretion. It falls into 
several categories, taking into account whether IPs are new or existing partners of 
the Alliance or whether they possess a unique capacity to implement HIV/AIDS 
programmatic activities in Ukraine. While the first two categories can receive money 
under an open call for proposals, IPs with a unique capacity follow a closed call for 
proposals procedure and receive money as the only participant of such a closed call. 
Among the criteria for being selected as a ‗unique IP‘ are: ―having exclusive capacity 
and experience in implementing the supported programmatic activity, which is not 
possessed by other organisations; ... being the only visible IP with an outstanding 
record in the specific area of programmatic activity; as a favoured implementer of 
the specific programmatic activities‖ (Alliance 2007, p. 6) The vagueness of the 
classifications suggests a high level of PR discretion in making decisions about 
awarding grants, while allowing some IPs to bypass the competition suggests the 
existence of double standards. Sadly, it also manifests that the perceived strength of 
NGOs PRs having close links with other NGOs in Ukraine did not appear in practice. 
Instead, being put in charge of GF funding allowed PRs to become arbiters in money 
matters over other NGOs, which strongly affected the nature of the relationships 
between them. As Drew noted, ―where financial relationships exist, interactions may 
be financially motivated or interpreted as such‖ (Drew 2005a, pp. 14-15). Another 
study on the GF in Ukraine noted in regard to the distribution of GF funding to SRs, 
that ―personal connections with Principal Recipient staff are believed to increase the 
chance of receiving a grant‖ (Semigina et al. 2008, p. 6). In the context of the nascent 
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 ―Implementing partners are the Non-Governmental or Governmental Non-Profit Organisations, 
which implement certain programmes or projects funded by Alliance Ukraine‖ (Alliance 2007, p.3). 
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civil society in Ukraine, the power and control that PR NGOs gained from being in 
charge of massive funding was a threat to the still fragile NGO partnerships. 
Participants found grant procedures difficult and dependent on personal 
connections:  
Alliance has established priorities, and pre-determined organisations that will 
get funding. The grant competitions are so difficult that without special 
training it‘s impossible to even fill in the application. As a result, only 
‗known‘ NGOs can win. (012:454) 
NGO heads began entering into closer relations with Alliance managers to 
achieve preferential treatment for their NGOs. (046: 192-194) 
PR discretion was also manifested in the way how they determined the length 
of NGO contracts. While for some NGOs, contracts ran for one year, eight months or 
nine months (Alliance. n.d.1.), others were just renewed. The renewal was at the 
discretion of the relevant PR staff, based on the past performance of the existing IP, 
rating, the availability of funds, and on whether the renewal was needed (Alliance 
2007). The short length of most NGO contracts was noted by a study on NEPs
65
 in 
Ukraine, which noted that ―lack of sustained funding‖ was one of the reasons the 
programmes did not reach high coverage in 12 months, which was the length of 
funding contracts (Burrows 2006, p. 875).  
The lack of a unified approach to funding and varied PR standards as applied 
to the SRs had important implications for access to services in oblasts, sustainability 
of services, as well as for relations between NGOs, and NGOs relations with the 
state.  
One especially problematic outcome of NGO-state relationships appeared as a 
direct consequence of PR sub-contracting systems. Its essence lay in the need to 
engage state health workers in service delivery. 
4.1.3 Problematic sub-contracting: hiring state health workers. „Quasi‟ NGOs 
With the government as a whole sidelined by the money transfer to an INGO 
in R1, the need to engage with state health institutions to deliver health services was 
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NEP – Needle Exchange Programme. 
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imminent. To implement what was designed as a health service-oriented programme, 
the PR needed to develop a working mechanism to engage with state healthcare 
system. The decision was for a PR to provide funding to local NGOs, which would 
then hire licensed health workers from state health institutions in their regions. A 
system was created that ―recruited doctors (infectious disease doctors, narcologists, 
dermato-venereologists
66
 and gynaecologists) and nurses to work in mobile clinics 
and in other settings fully or partly operated by NGOs‖ (APMG 2009, p. 16). Says a 
participant: 
As grant distributors, they [PRs] could maybe do a lot. But in health services, 
their capacity was not great because they had to hire the health-care staff in 
order to implement these [GF] grants. They paid for specific work, for a 
specific task. (023: 143-147) 
 The involvement of medical staff was perceived as more of a necessity, and 
as a temporary solution for NGOs to run HIV services outside of health facilities: 
The problem was that high-risk groups at that time did not want to go to 
government facilities…The eventual compromise was that doctors from 
AIDS centres would go to NGOs. This was not a bad solution. You were 
giving money to state officials to do their job – this is what was happening. 
(045: 505-510) 
We were told to organise the utilisation of syringes. It is hard work and 
should not be given to NGOs. There are many regulations. We were told to 
find a smart solution to this ourselves... So we signed a formal agreement 
with a local medical facility that they would supposedly take our syringes to 
use. For this, we employed their head doctor in our NGO. (046: 230-240) 
This decision was problematic because, in participants‘ view: 
The GF should not finance support for governmental institutions through 
NGOs. We have anti-corruption legislation. If there is budget line for an 
NGO to finance a state institution, and state employees receive something 
from this NGO, this knowingly cannot be done. Because state officials are not 
allowed to receive payments other than official salaries or scientific 
honoraria. [B]y recognising this expense, they [GF] expose implementers to 
the risk of being accused of corrupting state officials. (044: 430-436) 
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Dermatology and venereal diseases doctors operate as part of ‗STD – sexually transmitted diseases‘ 
dispensaries – that constitute a separate, vertical part of the healthcare (the outline of the Ukrainian 
health system is provided in Appendix C). 
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„Quasi‟ NGOs 
 Hiring state health-care workers through NGOs continued and proliferated 
and brought about an even more problematic development. Participants reported that 
NGOs were beginning to be created by doctors themselves, and in particular, by head 
doctors of regional AIDS centres and drug clinics: ―NGOs were created by people 
who worked [in AIDS centres] and they controlled these organisations. It was like, 
the head doctor of an AIDS centre or his deputy registers an NGO in his name or that 
of a family member, and this organisation then works as an NGO‖ (012:202-207) 
Among the motives for doctors opening their own NGOs was receiving additional 
pay for administering ART and other medical services, to serve the needs of GF 
programmes. As participants described: 
Payoffs to doctors were used to push through the policies necessary to 
implement GF programmes. (046: 353-355) 
One head of [name] AIDS centre in conference said openly: ‗We formed an 
NGO to get more money. That way we could get paid a supplement to our 
ordinary salaries.‘ (045: 505-514) 
Participants used the term ‗quasi NGOs‘ to describe ‗doctors‘ NGOs‘, suggesting 
that the way they functioned was artificial and not as a real NGO: 
Why do you need a quasi NGO? Because in this way you can show a quasi-
collaboration with the state and report on a partnership, without any hassle. 
(047: 393-395) 
Practically all decisions are agreed on by the head doctor. There is no 
independent NGO position. NGOs may also be run by these doctors‘ patients. 
(012: 205) 
 
Participants suggested that top-ups to state AIDS workers created tensions  
and benefited individual medics rather than the health system: 
The problem is quite difficult, because if you give salaries that are too high, 
it‘s also bad. Because other doctors in the same building are getting much less 
and are very angry about this…It creates tensions and it creates very 
complicated situations. (050: 281-290) 
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AIDS centres forming NGOs was talked about quite a lot. But this seemed to 
benefit individual medics the most. It really did not seem to be strengthening 
government institutions. (049: 238-240) 
These findings resonate with some recent publications on the GF in Ukraine. 
Spicer et al. (2011b, p.22) noted that ―government staff had established NGOs to 
apply for Global Fund and other donor grants, enabling individuals to supplement 
their salaries.‖  
 Regarding the areas in which doctors‘ NGOs proliferated, participants 
believed they were most common in ‗priority regions‘ because:  
PRs wanted to work with priority regions because they had established 
relations with AIDS centres‘ doctors. (015:133-38) 
 As to the number of ‗quasi‘ NGOs, participants believed that they represent 
from ―one third of all NGOs [funded by the GF]‖ (012: 467) to ―half of all NGOs‖ 
(014: 265), or as being opened in ―in almost every AIDS centre‖ (015: 329). 
Zhukova (2013) argues that international organisations use AIDS NGOs in 
Ukraine as “tools for opening pharmaceutical markets and accessing clientele 
groups,…increasingly pharmaceuticalizing the population, and blurring the lines 
between activism and patienthood‖ (Zhukova 2013, pp. 129-130)[emphasis added]. 
In this sense, ‗quasi‘ doctors‘ NGOs represent an ideal instrument for accessing 
Ukraine‘s markets and PLWHA, and explain why the involvement of medics in the 
organisations of their patients whom they were supposed to cure and protect, despite 
the gross ethical dilemma it entailed, was tolerated and supported by the GF.  
Participants viewed ‗quasi‘ NGOs as detrimental to Ukraine‘s ‗Third sector‘: 
Quasi NGOs may be necessary when the Third sector is not developed in a 
country. But we had a developed third sector, and there were strong 
organisations, almost none of which remained afloat, because they were 
pushed out by these AIDS centre-based organisations. These quasi NGO are 
harmful…A critical mass of fictitious NGOs was created, and when the 
critical mass of quasi NGO gets too big, the process is irreversible. It kills the 
real NGOs. Now there is no strong third sector any more. It does not exist. 
(047: 437-461)   
 Some participants reflected that, by paying doctors, NGOs were not doing 
advocacy, but buying loyalty from the state: 
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Paying doctors through NGOs… this can be seen as a sort of hand-out to the 
state…This system of handouts received wider recognition [in GF 
programmes]. Instead of lobbying the state to take on the functions that it 
would – and should – normally perform, we were financing local health 
administrations or doctors. This put the state in a ‗dependant‘ position. This 
was faulty in every instance, because when you go to a CCM meeting, and 
there are people who do not receive money from you, but they see how others 
get it almost for free and for doing nothing – i.e. for their regular work – they 
begin demanding the same thing from you. By giving such handouts we were 
buying loyalty from the state.(046: 240-257) [emphasis added] 
 
Overall, participants reported active and frequent involvement of state 
officials in receiving payments through GF-funded NGOs:  
NGOs pay off government bureaucrats. They won‘t survive if they 
don‘t.(043:90-92) 
[There is] active collaboration with the state. State officials get invited to 
meetings, to participate in projects as consultants. There is interest on the side 
of the state, and it is possibly also financial. (026: 200-203)  
 
4.1.4 The GF programme engagement with HIV care continuum: a „broken link‟  
Chapter 2 describes the HIV/AIDS health-care entitlements within the HIV 
care continuum in Ukraine. The GF-supported programmes ―contributed to the 
implementation of the majority of tasks included in the Ukrainian National 
HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Support Program‖ (OIG 2012, p. 3) and were 
thus expected to contribute to the health-care delivery. Studying the linkage between 
GF-funded interventions and state health care was of a particular interest to my 
research. This section presents results of document analysis and data emerging from 
interviews. 
In R1, the GF programme directly engaged in the provision of ARV therapy 
for treatment (APMG 2009). While Semigina noted that, in 2005,the Alliance 
―coordinated measures to provide services to vulnerable communities that aimed to 
link clients to respective services, and to meet their specific needs‖ (Semigina 2009, 
p. 45), the lack of patients presenting for ART was observed by Drew, who noted that 
attempts by the Alliance to advocate scaling up ART provision in R1had resulted in 
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medication being provided, but that the demand for treatment had not been ―as great 
or as rapid as expected‖ (Drew 2005, p. 13) [emphasis added]. 
 In R6, ―ensuring a level of access for communities to comprehensive needs-
based and high quality services sufficient to make an impact on the epidemic‖ (OIG 
2012, p. 3)was one of the two main strategic GF-funded directions. Among the tasks 
were the following:  
 1) Ensuring access of HIV-infected adults (particularly pregnant women), 
adolescents and children to ART as well as prophylaxis and treatment of 
opportunistic infections; and  
 2) Ensuring access of vulnerable population groups to targeted HIV/AIDS 
and sexually transmitted infection prevention measures and programmes(ibid., p. 3) 
The APMG report highlighted that ―successful referral from testing to 
treatment is key to controlling the epidemic,‖ but noted that ―the division between 
the sectors and lack of government resources means that many people who test 
positive do not get treatment‖ and that the linkages between all relevant NGOs and 
government services were ―highly variable‖ (APMG 2009, pp. 20-21). 
UNAIDS noted problematic delivery of HIV prevention services between 
governmental and non-governmental service providers, which remained ―poorly 
coordinated‖ and presented ―a risk to the sustainability of prevention programmes 
currently supported by the Global Fund grants and the viability of overall national 
prevention efforts‖ (UNAIDS 2009, p. 15). 
Spicer et al. (2011b), studying GF-funded HIV/AIDS services in Ukraine, 
observed that while clients of NGO services acknowledged being ―referred between 
NGO and government services,‖ in practice, client referrals were ―inconsistently 
applied and frequently consisted of informal signposting rather than formalised 
referral across government and NGO providers‖ (Spicer et al., 2011b, p.22). 
At the end of R6, the WHO-guided evaluation (2013) noted a broken link in 
the chain of services after the administration of rapid tests: 
HIV positive clients are referred to an AIDS Centre. However no 
accompaniment is offered and no follow up is conducted to determine who 
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accessed or did not access health care facilities; this indicates a broken link 
in the chain of services. The grant ends in 2013, which raises concerns about 
the sustainability of this service. (WHO 2013, p. 5)[emphasis added] 
 
The WHO evaluation also noted the problematic referral of patients to other 
branches of the health-care system and concluded that: 
PLHIV are lost to follow-up at every stage of HIV care: not all PLHIV 
register for HIV care; not all who register for HIV care once, come for 
regular checkups or are seen at least once a year; not all who access care 
regularly and are eligible for ART have access to ART; not all who start ART 
continue it. (WHO 2013, p. 11) 
Some particular aspects of linkage to health services in GF-funded settings 
that appeared in participants‘ responses are presented below.  
 
 4.1.4.1 Linkage to health services: referral practices 
Overall, there was no uniform view among participants of what constituted a 
successful referral. Some participants understood that to be successful, referral meant 
linking a patient to an official registration: 
There is a need to work continuously with a person who has received a 
positive result until he or she gets registered. (028: 223) 
 
In the oblasts that are many NGOs – one deals with IDUs, another with sex 
workers, a third with MSM. Doctors complain [about this].When an NGO 
tells a client – you need to go to an AIDS centre –what if the person does not 
understand? If he is an injector… or has other issues…he may not necessarily 
go. So you need to work with him, take him by the hand and bring him. There 
needs to be a system involving psychologists, social workers, etc. But nothing 
is established. (013: 240-246) 
 
 Others believed that only the retention of a patient in care constituted a full 
referral: 
Look, here they found an injecting drug user, took him to [get] 
methadone…They found him and provided him with information and 
counselling. But the final goal is not just finding a person, or even bringing 
him forward for treatment. It is retaining him there. (020: 441-443) 
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You not only need to count services…You need to take the patient to the 
logical end. (019: 100) 
 
 Among the factors influencing referral, respondents noted:  
 An absence of protocols: ―No referral protocols‖ (040: 330-337); ―There 
are many NGOs around the AIDS centre, but no referral protocol‖ (013: 
329-330). 
 Ineffective patient management: ―There is no client base. Clients may 
enter an ST programme several times‖ (019: 571-586); ―Client 
management is not well developed, there is lots of subjectivity‖ (018: 
125-127);―Even after receiving motivational packages, only 12% turn up 
at AIDS centres for confirmatory testing‖ (019: 20-22).  
 No case management: 
In 2012, the government doubled and the GF doubled the quantity of 
patients – to have twice as much more patients on ART... but suddenly 
they realised that they could not find the people. First we were worried 
that there were not enough drugs, now there were enough drugs, but they 
could not get the people. Even if the need is much bigger than this, you 
cannot get people to have this treatment. This means there are problems. 
(050: 35-44) 
 Internal divisions within HIV prevention programmes in the field 
provided by two different PR NGOs: 
Network and the Alliance are two PRs… so they are fighting over the 
money, which is a natural situation, if you divide something in two, and 
you give one part to one actor and the other part to the other actor… So it 
means that you have one NGO doing screening and the other one working 
on adherence and treatment, but nothing in the middle. (050: 302-310) 
 Lack of consensus over referral practices: 
They [PRs] report numbers… but how to get people to start going to the 
doctor to get tested, how to stop them from being afraid of doing this, and 
how to help those people who are found to have HIV become less afraid 
of getting treatment – these things are not discussed.(009: 92-95) 
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 Some respondents questioned the existence of referrals and suggested there 
were ‗no client referral services in Ukraine at all‘ (012: 377), (014:24).  
 4.1.4.2 Linkage to health services: HIV screening 
 As described in Chapter 2, HIV screening constitutes a necessary step 
towards official registration of HIV patients with state health care and enables them 
to enter the HIV continuum of care. In Ukraine, while PLWHA may get tested for 
HIV by ‗quick‘ tests, access to ART and other HIV care entitlements begin only 
when a patient presents with a positive HIV test result obtained from a confirmatory 
(pidtverdzhuvalny) testing at the AIDS centre.  
 In GF-funded services run by PR NGOs, there appeared to be a lack of focus 
on a confirmatory HIV screening stage, which is an important step to complete the 
linkage of PLWHA to state health care. Participants reported that instead, GF-funded 
activities appeared to be concentrated more on the early ‗field stage‘ of finding a 
client and giving basic outreach services such as rapid screening and counselling, and 
less on linking him or her to care:  
Look, here they found an injecting drug user, took him to [get] 
methadone…They found him and provided him with information and 
counselling…The lion‘s share of the money is being spent on finding 
clients… when instead, it should be spent on retaining [them]in health 
care…they [NGOs] are fixated on field work… spend so much money in the 
field… but their work ends there. Clients do not reach the treatment stage. 
There is a widespread awareness about this among doctors. (020: 442-446) 
 
 Analysis of documents identified similar concerns. The APMG report called 
attracting high-risk groups to an early, rapid HIV screening stage a ‗success‘, but 
noted lack of further guidance to reach the final stage of confirmatory HIV 
screening: 
Their [MARSs] experiences of testing in the mobile clinics were generally 
positive but many were unhappy at the experience of making a confirmatory 
test at the AIDS Centre. [A] substantial group of clients had failed to return to 
the AIDS Centre to receive their confirmatory test results. SRs mentioned that 
they provided incentives to clients to get confirmatory tests but no incentives 
to pick up the results of these tests. (APMG 2009, pp. 15-16) 
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The APMG report outlined such problematic practices in mobile clinics as no 
standards or protocols for screening and the over-testing of some MARPs
67
, with 
some clients being tested weekly for HIV [emphasis added]; a lack of standards for 
the frequency of HIV testing; no ability to track the users of mobile clinic services, 
other NGO services and/or government services, which led the authors of the report 
to question: ―Do referrals from mobile clinics lead to good clinical outcomes?‖ 
(APMG 2009, p. 22) Another report described regulatory gaps remaining, including 
the requirement that mobile clinics employ a doctor to inform the patient of the HIV 
screening results, and the inability of NGOs to provide official certification – 
spravka– of the test results (Judice et al. 2011). The Alliance‘s R6 final report 
mentions a MOH decree (nakaz) passing in 2011 that regulated work of mobile 
clinics (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012d, p. 24), but the fact that nakaz  
appeared in the last year of R6, confirms lack of service delivery standards before 
that. 
A GF-funded publication notes that, according to current legislation, HIV 
screening by rapid tests – despite having been delivered by NGOs for over ten years 
in Ukraine– can only be done by the medical staff of state medical institutions, who 
also have the exclusive right to communicate test results to the patients (Varban et al. 
2012). This publication describes GF-funded testing procedures as ―approximated to 
the field‖ (priblizhennyie k polyevym usloviam) (Varban et al. 2012, p.26). 
 From participants‘ responses, it appeared that the GF-funded rapid screening 
tests conducted by NGOs were not viewed as part of state health care, nor were they 
counted in state statistics:  
The MOH does not report express [quick] screening by NGOs. It only reports 
on the tests they have done. (029: 232-233) 
[During] referral to confirmatory tests, coverage sharply falls. You can pass a 
quick test a million times, but you are nobody for the [health] system. You 
only become a patient after a confirmatory screening. (040: 299) 
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A quick test is not confirmatory…People need to go to an AIDS centre to 
have the second test. I know that the numbers of people who go to an AIDS 
centre after a positive result on a quick test is quite low. The referral 
percentage is low. Much less than half [of the people who tested positive]. 
(028: 216-220) 
 
It cannot be concluded, based on participants‘ responses, that the GF-funded 
interventions were viewed as part of the state health-care services. 
 In mid-R6, responding to concerns about referral, the PR established a system 
of referring people who tested HIV-positive by rapid tests to AIDS centres by 
providing them with talon or koreshok – appointment coupons for confirmatory 
testing at an AIDS centre. This procedure was mentioned in published protocols for 
VCT
68
 (2012).  
 Respondents mentioned problems with the coupon system: the coupons were 
―scarce, hard to get‖ (019: 344-345) and the ―number of coupons was limited per 
day‖ (032: 342-343).  
 At the same time, the existing appointment system was overburdening AIDS 
centre staff:  
Our oblast AIDS centre is suffocating. Our NGO takes 7 out of 
20couponsthat are for an AIDS centre visit. The remaining 13 coupons go to 
other NGOs. It means that an AIDS centre can only receive 20 people per 
day, which means 100 people per week. They are suffocating... Staffing is a 
problem. (019:286-288) 
 
4.2 PR systems and practices of setting HIV prevention targets 
 4.2.1 Challenges of self-reporting by GF PRs  
 The GF uses a ‗performance-based funding‘ (PBF) system in which it verifies 
that its money is being spent to reach the defined targets. While the principles of 
GF performance measurement and concerns over PR self-reporting may have been 
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well-described
69
, a closer look into the practices of GF target setting at the country 
level is pending.  
As outlined in previous sections, one of the two main GF-funded directions in 
Ukraine was ―ensuring a level of access for communities to comprehensive needs-
based and high quality services sufficient to make an impact on the epidemic‖ (OIG 
2012, p. 3) [emphasis added] This section presents findings about the practices of 
PRs setting targets for comprehensive HIV prevention services in Ukraine as they 
emerged from the interview analysis. In the participants‘ view, GF-funded ‗expert 
groups‘, not objective data, determined national and regional targets, coverage and 
size of the vulnerable groups, and other key baseline values.  
In R1, following the PBF model, the PR (Alliance) established a system of 
coverage indicators of three levels (Drew 2005d).
70Among Drew‘s concerns about 
these indicators were: some of the targets being very low, some of the indicators 
being inappropriate process indicators, e.g. the number of information materials 
distributed, and the lack of adequate definition of some other indicators, such as 
whether ‗people reached‘ meant unique individuals or contacts. He noted in 
particular, the importance of estimating the size of populations needing services such 
as the number of sex workers and IDUs, as this was needed to determine whether or 
not the programmes for these groups were reaching effective coverage levels (Drew 
2005d). 
 UNAIDS observed a lack of national ownership in M&E data collection of 
HIV programmes and activities and noted that most data collection was ―driven by 
external reporting requirements from donors and for UNGASS reporting, rather than 
by the national and local information needs of service providers, programme 
managers and policy-makers‖ (UNAIDS 2009, p. 26). The OIG report for R6 
described the Alliance-Ukraine performance framework as consisting of a number of 
quantitative indicators and set-out targets to be reached by the end of a given period. 
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 A closer look at sources describing PBF is provided in Chapter 1. 
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 The agreed framework at the time was provided by WHO‘s M&E toolkit (2004) and presupposed 
tracking the level of services provided. Level 1 was the number of people trained, level 2 the number 
of service delivery points and level 3 the number of people reached with particular services. Level 3 
indicators are the most important to track (Drew 2005d, p. 9). 
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The report noted that ―the targets established were not always formulated adequately 
and supported with validated assumptions‖ and recommended to the Alliance to 
review ―whether appropriate targets have been set relative to universal access to 
prevention, paying special attention to the quality of prevention services‖ (OIG 2012, 
pp. 23-24).  
 4.2.2 The choice of targets for HIV prevention. Communist-style  „central 
planning‟: vypolnit i perevypolnit 
In Chapter 1, some features of the aid delivery were discussed, such as 
comparison by Easterly (2006) of aid programmes with ‗communist-style‘ central 
planning. Ironically, similar to a Soviet ‗Five-Year Plan‘, GF grants were also given 
for five years.  
Wedel wrote about legacies of communism that ―figured prominently in the 
aid story‖ (Wedel 2001, p.42). One of such legacies was a 100% fulfilment or even 
over-fulfilment of targets – vypolnit i perevypolnit. Similarly, in GF-funded settings, 
100% fulfilment of targets was a goal. In R1, the Alliance reported massive over-
fulfilling of targets: 
Figure 4.1 Achievements against service provision targets 
(Alliance 2009, p. 25) 
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Participants reported the ‗race for figures‘ and the need to constantly fulfil 
targets in SR contracts: 
There was a constant race for figures, to increase coverage, the distribution of 
syringes… (012: 161-62) 
Organisations are forced to fulfil the target numbers or else they won‘t get 
another project. (014: 172-73) 
It became clear to me in talks with some NGOs that, in some regions, the 
performance on meeting targets was reaching 100% – like in Soviet election 
reports – or even exceeding 100%, which was impossible. (046: 378-79) 
In the Interview Guide, several questions were dedicated to defining needs 
and targets for HIV prevention in GF programmes. Participants‘ responses revealed 
that practices similar to Soviet ‗central planning‘ were common in GF programmes, 
in particular, in setting targets. The following section summarises the main features 
of target setting in GF programmes in Ukraine as perceived by study participants. 
 4.2.2.1 No national research base to determine HIV prevention targets 
 Participants were asked if there was a system in Ukraine to determine targets 
for HIV prevention, and whether there was a national research base. Predominantly, 
participants noted the lack of a national, government-funded research base and said 
that research on target groups was conducted only with external funding: 
There was no state system to define targets. The state was forced to accept 
targets from PRs. (040:76-85) 
There was no research on risk groups... only for GF money. We don‘t do 
national studies. [We] became so spoiled by GF money, there‘s not even a 
thought that something can be done independently. (039: 611-614) 
 
 4.2.2.2 Paternalism of external approaches 
Wedel (2001) outlined specific perceptions held in the FSU region in regard 
to external consultants in donor aid programmes, among them: applied assumptions 
and experience gained from previous work in the Third World, not suitable in a post-
Soviet context; lack of sensitivity to the gravity of the decisions they influenced; 
arrogance and paternalism, ―like a parent giving to a child.‖  
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The dominant, paternalistic role of external approaches came up very strongly 
in participants‘ responses. The theme of ‗external‘ emerged in relation to: (a) the 
approaches and chosen methods, (b) organisations, and (c) individual experts: 
(a) The dominance of external approaches was reported to take the form of 
‗canons‘, ‗canvas‘, ‗calque‘, and ‗cement‘. Participants made the following 
references: 
In Ukraine, it is more like some external models are being implemented, 
rather than [our] own [models] are being created. And these external models 
carry a sort of… pre-defined canvas with them. (028: 52- 55) 
Absolutely uncritical calquing from abroad. (039: 112) 
 
(b) Among the dominating external organisations, participants named WHO, 
USAID and Soros being the most influential entities, as well as other donors, in 
choosing target groups in GF programmes: 
Donors such as UNAIDS and USAID were convincing the state that this is 
the best choice for how the money should be spent. And the state officials did 
not know much, besides, they were often changing. To people who were not 
aware of anything, they did not need any proof. (047: 363-364) 
...international organisations form this policy. If WHO says that IDUs are a 
risk group, then it would be listened to, there is no national opinion as such. 
(042: 104-106)  
Targets were set by manipulating the priorities…Stakeholder groups would 
get together and nominate priorities to include in [GF] proposals. The main 
writers were UNAIDS or the Principal Recipients, and the Soros Fund, and if 
the priorities were not formulated to their liking, they were removed. (047: 
39-41) 
 
(c) The priority role of external advisors was especially strong at the stage of 
preparing the GF submission:  
The external experts who come to Ukraine especially to write [GF] country 
proposals – their opinion is a priority. If a foreign expert comes to Ukraine 
and sees this and that, and studies the situation in Ukraine in some reports– 
and then gives recommendations – that this and that should be put into the 
proposal – our mentality is such, that the country needs to get money by all 
means, so it agrees. (025: 148-151) 
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The main thing is that, historically, it has always been that the international 
expert is some kind of god. Unfortunately. It is because this [AIDS] system is 
constantly dependant on Western money. (025: 205-208) 
 
 Some participants suggested that some NGOs linked to PRs acted 
opportunistically in target setting: 
Alliance defined target groups in conferences. Conferences were held with 
the NGOs that were already working in harm reduction…With the help of 
these organisations, the Alliance got support to define target groups and 
regions. The same NGOs served as a base to conduct regional assessments, 
and they determined the focus on IDUs. (012: 87-108) 
Regional targets were set by NGOs working in harm reduction. (014: 54-58) 
 
 4.2.2.3 Choosing the target groups to be covered by prevention 
Drew (2005c) argued that the Ukraine‘s original R1 proposal 
disproportionately focused on IEC interventions for the general population.  
 Participants noted that after a GF grant transfer, prevention became narrower 
as PRs and the GF had guided the choice of target groups: 
The Round 1 proposal included activities on primary HIV prevention for the 
general population. After the grant transfer, prevention activities were 
narrowed to secondary prevention, but money amounts remained the same. 
(027: 38-42) 
In Round 1, the focus on prevention was shifted from the general population 
to the narrower needs of narrower groups. (029: 262-263) 
 
 A USAID-funded 2010 evaluation similarly suggested that target populations 
and regions to be funded were already identified when PRs issued calls for proposals:  
After mapping MARPs and examining local information, the Alliance-
Ukraine issues a call for proposals that identify target populations and 
locations for prevention programming on a regional basis. By including 
examples of ―typical‖ projects in the call for proposals, the Alliance-Ukraine 
provides applicants with models ... that they can adopt and modify to their 
particular setting.(Cited in Bergmann and Stash 2010, p. 7)[emphasis added]. 
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Participants reported that project targets were pre-set and imposed by PRs, 
and that SRs had to accept these targets, with no possibility of reprogramming:  
The reprogramming [of indicators] was not possible. You had to report for 
the money given to you by these [given] indicators. (004: 150-151) 
The GF targets were not flexible. It was not easy to reach [these] when the 
drug scene changed. The country could not back off from these indicators. 
(042: 491-493) 
 In the Interview Guide, one of the closed questions was about the possibility 
of correcting the targets set by an NGO after the project began. The answers 
distributed as follows: 
 Figure 4.2 Possibility of correcting targets during GF project implementation 
 
*Only participants with relevant experience answered 
 Some participants suggested that GF targets were forced onto the national 
M&E systems and that the national M&E centre was simply an appendage of the PR: 
M&E centre was created, which was de facto accountable to the Alliance, 
because they funded salaries of its staff, but de jure, it was responsible for the 
formulation of state needs. This was a fictitious function, because these 
people were toothless, they served the PR [the Alliance] and were paid by it. 
They became anappendage – pridatok. (041: 98-106) 
The national M&E system that was supposed to be developed for GF money 
did not get launched for 10 years. Therefore, where do you get the [target] 
figures? My feeling was that these indicators were drawn from GF indicators. 
(014: 74-78) 
 Some participants suggested that the targets were linked to the amount of 
[GF] money available:  
1 15 0 15Number of respondents
Is target correction being conducted during 
the project implementation?*
Yes No, targets are pre-set Rarely Never
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Prevention targets were based on already determined amounts of money for 
each oblast. (009: 139-142) 
In our context, money determines the targets and results, not work…The 
financial process –money received, money spent, money accounted for – is 
primary to all other processes. (014: 130-134) 
 
 4.2.2.4 Determining the size of target groups  
Drew outlined the importance of estimating the size of populations needing 
services when he described systems used by the Alliance in R1 to track services 
delivered (Drew 2005d). Throughout R1 and R6 implementation, various GF-funded 
studies of the risk groups‘ size were conducted in Ukraine, with broad discrepancies 
appearing in data provided (see Appendix D). In 2012, previous estimates were 
overruled, and all subsequent estimates on the numbers of PLWHA and the size of 
other risk groups were to be legislated through the CCM (the NAC) resolution.  
 However, prior to 2012, in R1 and R6, as expressed in participants‘ 
responses, decisions about the size of the target groups were made by PR-run ‗expert 
groups‘. The choice of members in the group and control over its agenda lay entirely 
with the PR: 
The size [of target groups] was determined at the meetings of the work groups 
funded by the Alliance. The agenda of the meeting was imposed by the 
Alliance – who ordered sociological research. Even though they were grant 
implementers, in commissioning research they were bosses. (041: 90-99) 
Target groups ..were defined by the Alliance in conferences. (012: 87-88) 
 
 Some participants stressed that it was hard to verify assessments of the risk 
groups‘ size.  
Assessing the size of risk groups is done for GF money by PRs, who organise 
expert evaluations of the size of risk groups. It is based on data obtained in 
behavioural research [by PRs]... Ukraine has no national research that could 
verify this data; it has no money to do such research, so it [PR estimates] is 
just being accepted at face value. (029: 358-370) 
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 Interesting accounts came from participants when they were asked to describe 
the systems to estimate the size of the target groups in oblasts. In their view, these 
estimates used official data on HIV-registered patients and some multiplier 
‗coefficient‘ - koefitsient. Different participants reported different ‗coefficients‘ used 
to determine the number of people living with HIV, ranging from 2 to 10:  
The number of new people with HIV is multiplied by 2 or 3 – and that‘s how 
the demand is determined for secondary prevention for PLWHA. (007: 67-
69) 
The coefficient used to be 10 at first, then 7; now it is just determined locally 
somehow. (012: 386-394). 
One participant noted that final adjustment depends on the funding available for 
oblast: 
This data [on PLWHA] is taken from state registration, but it‘s clear that this 
figure is low in state statistics, so they take the number of registered PLWHA, 
accept some general figure, and then multiply it by some coefficient…Then 
they look at UNAIDS‘ estimates, and then finally they design a figure that 
will fit into the amounts that the GF is ready to give. (014: 177-183) 
At the oblast level, the way how the coefficients were determined, did not 
seem to follow any system and appeared as ad hoc: 
We took official statistical data, and research done by international donors, on 
vulnerable groups in Ukraine and looked at them. And we made a 
determination. There were many different studies using different methods... 
snowballing, RDS, others, and there was a lot of data that had many gaps… 
so we always agreed on some coefficient. We sat in the working groups and 
discussed: ‗Look, the tendency is this, so how much should we cover? 60%, 
okay, so which co-efficient should we choose?‘ And then we decided on the 
coefficient. In 2006 it was 10, from 2008, it was 8. (019: 55-58) 
 
 4.2.2.5 „Centrally planned‟ needs of target groups  
 Participants could not confirm whether any needs assessments were 
conducted in GF programmes and spoke of needs as ‗centrally planned‘ and 
‗determined‘ by PRs: 
In terms of determining the needs of risk groups, I was getting a strong sense 
that such sort of decision tended to be made centrally by the Alliance, and had 
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less to do with understanding these problems from the perspective of the 
grass roots service organisations that were the sub-grantees. (049: 127-129) 
The problem lay also in the fact that the services– which were supposed to be 
delivered and were supposedly needed by clients – were already defined. We 
[the NGO] were told that – probably - clients needed syringes, condoms, and 
information materials, and that these needed to be included into the 
distribution plan in NEPs and so forth. Then we were told to evaluate our 
needs as we saw them. But in fact, this did not mean assessing our needs for 
services, but rather choosing the number of services from the predetermined 
list. (046: 310-315) 
 
 4.2.3 Decision making practices  
After R1 transfer, Drew noted, ―the open-access nature of working groups 
allowed for maximal participation. The most successful working groups were 
characterized by effective facilitation, willingness to listen to all views, professional 
standards of behaviour and excellent administration/documentation‖ (Drew 2005d, p. 
1).Participants had a similar reflection, however, noted that this practice did not 
extend to the groups determining the size of target populations where final decisions 
on GF target groups were made by consensus of PR-run ‗expert‘ work groups: 
In Ukraine in general, all working groups are held democratically, with the 
state sector and NGOs actively participating, as well as international experts. 
However, regarding studies to estimate the people who are HIV-positive, I 
cannot say the same picture is true. There is more imposing, like saying that 
there is such and such number of PLWHA, and such and such number of 
IDUs and CSWs. These groups have a monopoly. (013:135-144) 
 Participants noted the closed character of ‗expert groups‘, frequent change of 
methods, and the uninterrupted chain of PRs control over the whole process. Some 
participants noted that PR already had control over target setting after the R1 
transfer: 
After this [GF transfer],… the PR had an opportunity to rewrite the whole 
project ‗for themselves‘ – and for their interests – to work with vulnerable 
groups, needle exchange, and methadone programmes – the directions in 
which they were competent. (015: 82-86) 
 A theme of PRs having full control over the entire cycle of reporting surfaced 
very strongly in participants‘ responses. The PR (the Alliance) appeared to have had 
total control over the process, from target setting to ‗monitoring itself‘:  
189 
 
PRs control the full cycle of data. (041: 336) 
Country targets [were] imposed by PRs. (041: 254) 
If a report says that 80 people received condoms, the CCM does not know 
how this information was received. All of the reporting systems are also 
developed by PRs. (026: 442-445) 
PRs did everything: conducted research on risk groups, ran programmes and 
evaluated their programmes. There was a potential for data manipulation and 
for presenting epidemiological data in the way they needed. (015: 20-24) 
 In cases where workgroup meetings could not generate a consensus, decisions 
were made by majority vote. Below is an account of an example of how this process 
was working: 
During a meeting of [GF-funded] work groups on M&E, it was announced 
that, in the result of a study, there appeared to be a ‗small‘ gap in estimated 
numbers of IDUs in Ukraine between 280,000 and 720,000. One participant 
asked: ‗Why was it necessary to spend so much money to generate a result 
with such a wide gap? I could have given this estimate off the top of my 
head.‘ With no response [from the organisers], half of the expert group stood 
up and left the meeting. At the end, the lower estimate was announced as the 
baseline and voted for by remaining part of the group – the ones that 
conducted the study. (013: 156-165) 
 
 Participants described failed attempts to influence decision making in the 
working groups: 
For five years, we tried to expand the risk groups. Why? Because we were 
observing how youth – from 14 to 24 years–was exhibiting behaviour that 
was risky [for contracting HIV]. But the workgroups expert commission of 
the PR only said ‗No, we will only have risk groups that were already 
chosen‘. (020:44-51)  
 
 Participants described M&E research as semi-independent and controlled by 
PRs: 
There are no minimum quality standards, no professional regulations. No 
normative base. Against what mark should the monitoring and evaluation be 
done? PRs conducted their own operational research…which they hired 
sociological research institutes to do... but… these institutions were guided by 
the GF, by PRs, who selected them and accepted their research reports... So 
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everything that was associated with the organisation of those studies was only 
semi-free, semi-independent. (029: 335-346)  
 Participants reported lack of a research protocol or standardised 
methodology: ―Research funded by the GF – useless. They change methodologies 
from year to year, change sampling strategies... we cannot determine any tendency… 
nothing‖ (041: 205-222). 
 Participants noted that one particular sociology group was winning PR 
tenders: 
Only particular sociology groups win GF research money. It is guided by the 
Alliance. (020: 93-94) 
The same company always conducted all the sociological research. (047: 403) 
There is a monopoly on conducting this research and new people are simply 
not allowed there. (013: 143-44) 
 
4.3 Three roles of NGOs: the main assumptions 
Ibrahim and Hulme (2010) in their analysis of civil society roles in poverty 
reduction distinguish three main roles perceived of NGOs, which in the context of 
HIV/AIDS NGOs would look like the following:   
1) Advocacy - defending the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, pushing for 
structural and system change, better access for people in risk groups to medical 
services; 
2) Policy change – lobbying changes in government laws and regulations related to 
access to medical services, anti-discrimination laws, etc.; and 
3) Service delivery – provision of basic services, including provision of HIV 
prevention interventions.  
Engberg-Pedersen (2008) argues that development NGOs in rich countries 
have been operating as donor agencies with respect to CSOs and even to state in poor 
countries: ―They have unilaterally decided where, with whom and regarding what 
they want to work‖, while ―the concern with raising money and the various 
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ideological commitments have pushed them towards service delivery‖ (Engberg-
Pedersen 2008, p.1). 
As noted in Chapter 2, the mere receipt of GF funds by the INGO in Ukraine 
did not make it (Alliance) in any way more accountable or better advocates, 
especially if knowing that the INGO received the funding directly from the GF, and 
not as a result of a wide local initiative or quest for civil society participation. In this 
sense, they were ‗GF-appointed advocates‘. Regarding policy change - another 
anticipated NGO role - PRs were not able to influence the whole of national policy 
on HIV and only influenced isolated segments of policy (Semigina et al. 2009). 
The third function – service delivery – was the key rationale behind the GF 
focus on NGOs as deliverers of health services. However, as discussed above, as a 
result of a GF programme transfer to INGO, the need to engage with state health 
sector distorted traditional NGO roles as well as brought in adverse outcomes on the 
way NGOs engaged with state actors (‗quasi‘ NGOs). No less interesting to this 
study was the enquiry into the relations of PR NGOs with other NGOs in Ukraine  
during the delivery of GF-funded services. This section presents findings on the 
perceived roles and relations that surfaced between PR NGOs and other NGOs on the 
ground. It synthesises both findings from document analysis and data emerging from 
interviews, with interview data as a key source. 
4.3.1 PRs NGOs and their perceived roles 
4.3.1.1 Size matters: „big‟ PRs  
The typical narrative of how PRs tend to present themselves has to do with 
their being the ‗biggest‘, ‗largest‘ NGOs in Ukraine. This narrative was used by both 
PR NGOs in relation to their role as GF implementers. 
 Beginning from 2004, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine 
continuously claimed to be ―the largest NGO in Ukraine‖ (International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance 2007, p. 35).  
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In 2008, after becoming a PR of a Round 6 grant, Merezha similarly 
described itself as ―the most powerful HIV service organization in the country‖ 
(Network 2008, p.11).   
 Participants recognised the role of PR NGOs in fighting HIV/AIDS: as ―big‖ 
(009: 76), ―quite significant‖ (008: 35), and ―key‖ (002: 264).  
 At the same time, participants thought that NGOs role was important because 
they were the only possible GF recipients:  
NGOs are the only possible recipients of GF [money]. (005: 236-238), 
NGOs play roles that the state cannot play. They deal with social 
mobilisation, advocacy. They reach out to vulnerable groups…This is an 
important role. (026: 405-411) 
 
 PRs were also viewed as NGO openers and creators: 
 They were NGO openers, [they] supported the creation of NGOs. (007: 164-
167) 
Considerable money was thrown [around] to develop the NGO potential. This 
enabled NGOs working in the HIV/AIDS sphere to assume leadership 
positions, from the point of view of their consolidation, development of 
national coalitions, NGO management development, public relations – all that 
you could call the high standards of NGO development. (045: 146-149) 
 
 4.3.1.2 PR roles: unclear community mandate  
 Issues of the PR NGOs perceived mandate and representation of communities 
were reflected strongly in interviews. 
The Alliance 
 Understanding the Alliance‘s mandate as the main GF implementer has 
important implications in regard to how it relates to the GF country ownership 
principle that all its programmes are ‗nationally owned‘. 
Participants were overall unclear as to whether the Alliance represented national 
constituencies: 
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When they [the Alliance] got the Round 1 money, it was not clear what their 
status was… They began saying in all the meetings that they represented the 
entire NGO community of Ukraine. And when somebody visited Ukraine, 
they did not invite anybody, they just met with those people themselves. It 
gave the impression that they were the only NGO in Ukraine. (047: 205-209) 
It is hard to say which community the Alliance represents in Ukraine. Hard to 
talk about representation. Historically, the Alliance was linked with a group 
of injecting drug users and harm reduction programmes funded by 
Vidrodzhennya [Soros]. (028: 397-401) 
 An issue in question in regard to the Alliance mandate was whether it was 
perceived as an affiliate of an international NGO or as a national organisation. In 
country documents, the Alliance calls itself the ‗Alliance-Ukraine‘ (AU) and claims 
to be an independent organisation. In other communications, the Alliance stresses the 
existing link with the home office: ―One important factor behind the Alliance‘s 
success in Ukraine has been that it has from the beginning been able to rely on the 
expertise of the Alliance Secretariat in the UK‖ (Alliance/GFATM 2008, p. 37). 
Different sources provide various dates relating to the Alliance‘s status: becoming 
‗separate legal entity‘ in 2003 (Drew 2005a), ‗initiating transition‘ in 2007 (Alliance 
and OIG), or ‗fully independent‘ in 2009 (OIG 2012).  
 Most participants did not consider the Alliance a Ukrainian organisation but a 
foreign entity, or a branch of a foreign entity:  
They have a head organisation in the UK (012: 248) 
The Alliance positions [itself as a] national organisation, but everybody 
understands they are international. (043: 174-175) 
The Alliance-Ukraine is a ‗daughter‘ organisation. (038: 288) 
The Alliance is an organisation where the older brother is the curator of a 
younger brother. [T]he position of the current Alliance in Ukraine is the 
position of the Alliance in Brighton. They are interlinked. De jure they are 
independent, but de facto they are linked... You cannot be not linked. (026: 
507-509) 
 
 Participants described how Alliance‘s role as a PR has changed between R1 
and R6, when it evolved from a more partner-like organisation collaborating with 
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regional NGOs, to being the sole manager, the boss. This change brought more 
bureaucratisation and stricter rules to SR NGOs: 
The Alliance evolved from an open organisation to [the one] dictating to 
other NGOs. (046: 155) 
The Alliance‘s role is changing, from NGO openers…to closers. (007: 164-
167) 
 One participant described a role of the Alliance as a ‗foreign body‘ in medical 
terms: 
The Alliance was disseminating many types of work here. But what they tried 
to disseminate, was very eclectic and isolated from reality here. So they were 
like a foreign body... (corpus alienum
71
) that is implanted into a master‘s 
body and the master‘s body is trying to reject it, but the foreign body is 
protected by a protective layer of money... (039: 517-528) 
 
 Some participants suggested that different ways how Alliance positioned 
itself were linked to reporting results:  
They did not always associate themselves with the parent organisation... They 
always said - it is because of us. So they used to be like this: ‗If something 
bad was there, it is them [the parent Alliance]; if something is good, this is 
because of us‘. When they became a Ukrainian organisation, their 
management became harsher, like pulling the screw tops tighter. They want 
to over-protect themselves. (035: 400-414) 
  
 In 2012, the published Report of the Trustees of the International HIV/AIDS 
Alliance (registered as a UK charity) reported $29.9 million from the GF as part of 
the charity‘s annual income in 2008 (Alliance 2012), while the money has been 
received as Ukraine‘s Round 6 grant.  
 
Merezha: from a clear mandate to „problematic‟ advocates 
                                                          
71
Corpus alienum – from Latin ‗foreign body‘ – an object 
or entity in the body that has been introduced from outside (The American Heritage Medical 
Dictionary 2007, at: http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Corpus+alienum). 
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 Of two NGO PRs, Merezha was historically perceived as an organisation 
with a strong advocacy focus. Merezha was described by participants as having a 
clear representation mandate and being better positioned to reach the target groups: 
Network is an organisation of people living with this disease. [T]hey have a 
more balanced approach to GF grants. (027: 230-232) 
Network feeds from... water springs at the bottom of the lake, it is linked to 
communities of people and as the epidemic grows, their links will grow too, 
and they will have more clients. It moves in the right direction. (044: 345-
349) 
 
 At the same time, because Merezha was more strongly perceived as 
advocates, the contradiction of its PR role with its advocacy role was more 
pronounced as noted by: 
 UNAIDS:  
With its decision to become co-Principal Recipient of the Global Fund grant, 
the Network risks over-reaching and spreading its resources too thin. The 
Network continues to grow rapidly within Ukraine... Redirecting scarce 
resources outside the country could limit its ability to support local groups in 
Ukraine, which is the cornerstone of its mandate to improve the lives of 
people living with HIV at home. (UNAIDS 2007, p41) 
 A number of publications suggesting that Ukrainian PR NGOs advocacy 
efforts appear ‗tokenistic‘ (Spicer et al. 2011a).  
 By participants.  
 Respondents noted a problematic character of combining advocacy and 
service delivery roles:  
It is impossible to combine service and advocacy. There are two types of 
organisations – watchdog and service. Combination of these two functions is 
impossible. You have to be a watchdog – criticise the government. Then if an 
NGO wants to be a service organisation, do field work, and to provide 
services, it cannot be effective advocate. (028: 409-418) 
 One participant described how Merezha‘s role as an advocate appeared  
compromised in interactions with the GF and the government of Ukraine: 
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The visits of the GF with high-level officials – the GF director [Kazachkine] 
came here several times – and high-level meetings were organised. If you 
take a meeting with [Prime Minister] Azarov, it was a problem. It was a warm 
thank you from the Network, which said in a government meeting that the 
year 2011 was a turning point and a wonderful year, when actually, it was a 
year full of stock-outs. It was a year when people died because they stopped 
receiving ART. So it was really a terrible year, and when such messages are 
brought during a meeting with the GF, it‘s difficult to understand … at such 
level of meeting, starting to lie and starting to say the opposite of what is 
happening, that is a big problem. I think these meetings were missed 
opportunities. (050: 415-425) 
 
There were concerns expressed by participants about whether the Merezha 
membership numbers were a reflection of a community mandate and representation. 
Document analysis reveals various reports stating that Merezha had between 300 
(UNAIDS 2007) and 500 members and 400 volunteers (OIG 2012).Respondents 
questioned whether the existing membership numbers allowed Merezha to be 
representative of the whole PLWHA community in Ukraine, which is in the hundreds 
of thousands. At the time of writing, its web-site reports having around 500 members 
(Merezha 2014). 
 Participants reported that in 2008, Merezha stopped adopting new members.  
The problem with the Network is that they are not accepting any more new 
members. So now it‘s not a membership organisation anymore. I think they 
said they have 300 members if I am not mistaken…But there is a certain 
amount of members, and now it‘s closed to new membership. This was 
supposed to be an organisation representing the people with HIV themselves. 
But how can you represent them when you have blocked membership...   
(050: 354-370) 
Network never represented communities. They only represented their 
members, who established them. They now have around 300 members. And 
they closed down membership several years ago…They have these 300, 
which they can always take out on the street to campaign... They refused to 
be defenders of rights, because now it conflicts with their role as a [GF] 
recipient. (047: 471-485) 
 
 ‟Advocates for themselves‟? 
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 Wedel (2001) noted that during communism and its ‗shortage economy‘, the 
command over resources guaranteed the development of ―informal patronage 
networks to allocate resources‖(p. 165), and described how personal connections and 
favouritism found its way into aid programmes. Chapter 2 discussed opportunism of 
the ‗project elites‘ in ‗aid for democracy‘ programmes in EECA and FSU. 
 Participants suggested opportunism in GF-funded advocacy activities, with 
the PRs advocacy being based on self-interest and benefitting individual 
organisations or even individual members: 
There are no new activists that have appeared among the newly infected HIV 
people. All activists have been there for a very long time. But the top 
managers will never change, they will never leave their position. They will 
never take a new person onto board of directors. These people are very 
strongly installed…  their salaries are higher... They all agree with each other. 
I have heard others say that these people all agree because they have a share 
in this money, so they are all happy. (050: 183-192, 256) 
I always smile when the executive director of the Alliance [name] and the 
executive director of Network [name] – principal advocates – say that they 
had an open-door policy with the MOH…For over a year,I don‘t believe there 
was a single individual added to the rolls of those on ART. So, what are they 
advocating for? A sceptic could say... they are advocating for ART, and 
[they‘ve] certainly got ART for themselves…They got fairly comfortable… 
They would advocate for a greater number of people on treatment, but I never 
felt the greater numbers ever materialised... I think they were a little bit more 
self-centred. (045: 296-311) 
They can beat themselves on the chest and say, ‗Here I am, an HIV-positive 
person,‘ despite the fact that he has been wearing expensive shoes for years 
and driving an expensive car and his living conditions are much different 
from those of other HIV-positive people in Ukraine. (047: 479-483) 
 
4.3.1.3 PRs as donors/money distributors/rule-setters 
 Participants reflected on the specific roles of PRs associated with GF money 
management. First was the role of grant administrators, redistributing GF money:  
[The PRs] are more like money distributors. (034: 132-133).  
The Global Fund gives money to the Alliance and Network. And they give 
grants to organisations that are within their purview, by announcing grant 
competitions. (036: 85-88)  
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The Alliance was perceived by participants as acting more strongly in this 
role:  
The Alliance are money distributors. (023: 153) 
The Alliance is simply a funds-receiving and redistributing organisation – no 
more and no less. (026: 517-518): 
The Alliance is more like a managerial structure; it does not have much 
expertise in HIV prevention. Their staffs are made up more of managers, 
programme coordinators, financial specialists, who take on the bulk of 
funding themselves, so they need to manage this stream of funding, but they 
are not implementers, not executors of this [HIV prevention]. They are a 
transmission mechanism for GF money to implementers in country who have 
expertise and who can conduct practical activities in the area of HIV. (001: 
390-400) 
 The second role, as seen by participants, was that of the donor. In this 
capacity, Alliance often presented itself as owner of the GF grant or as GF itself: 
The Alliance presented as the GF. (013: 249) 
In terms of publicity, you would often get the impression in the field that this 
was the Alliance grant…  and Alliance was giving grants to sub-grantees. The 
Alliance logo was always present everywhere. If somebody was receiving a 
GF grant, there would be an Alliance logo on the vehicle or on the building... 
If you were a drug user, you would often see the Alliance logo all over the 
place, and you would assume that the Alliance is some wonderful benefactor 
from the UK, and possibly Kyiv, who would give grants for all these 
wonderful things. This was the impression that the Alliance wanted to give, 
that it was more an Alliance thing. It really saw itself less as an organisation 
managing the grant and more as a main contractor, which was giving 
contracts as a donor. (049: 427-447) 
 Some participants noted a combination of several roles: ―The Alliance has 
two roles: the distribution of money and monitoring‖ (003: 132-133). Another 
participant saw it as business-oriented, not an NGO: 
The fact that they were so well-resourced and that they have lots of highly 
educated professional people working for them... doing various things that 
they do, gives them the impression of being less like a traditional NGO and 
less of – at least in management practices – but someone who is very sleek 
and very business-orientated, very good at PR. (049: 459-464) 
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 The other reported role for PRs was that of rule-setters for the [GF] 
programmes:  
The Alliance‘s role as a Principal Recipient…it was very much to set the 
rules. (049:320-321) 
Some participants suggested that by setting standards, PRs have a power to 
determine where the money will flow: 
[PRs] offered some standards and then, if the region accepted those standards 
and approved of their policies, the money would come to that region. (030: 
323-328) 
 
 4.3.1.4 PRs as policy enablers 
 Because PRs were setting rules and policies, they were also policy enablers as 
seen by participants. In this role, PRs appeared to be influencing state policy. This 
ability was perceived as negative by some participants and as positive by others, 
reflecting sector differences among participants: 
…Unfortunately, AIDS state policy in Ukraine is created not by the state, but 
by the GF recipients. (013:530) 
 
The same person acts as the Alliance representative in [...] region, and as 
head of the regional health department. It‘s a complete merger. (016: 156) 
 
NGOs funded by the GF played a key role. Even state programmes who 
worked with drug users were replicas from NGO activities. (014: 102-106) 
 
 4.4 Evolving relations of PR NGOs with other NGOs: a „culture of fear‟ 
 Articulated in many GF communications, described in Chapter 2, the 
perceived strength of PR NGOs as having established links with other NGOs in the 
country was one of the factors behind the GF grant transfer to an INGO in Ukraine. 
In R1, ‗partnership relationships‘ among the Alliance and other NGOs were 
perceived as key to the success of the GF programme (Drew 2005). Around the same 
time, a pattern ―to encourage competitive bidding between small Ukraine NGOs‖ 
was observed by DeBell and Carter (2006,p. 9) in DFID-funded projects.  
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 Despite the declared NGO ‗partnership‘, similar pattern of inequality, 
manifesting a shift of inter-organisational relations, began to appear after the GF R1 
grant transfer (Drew 2005c). In these relations, the Alliance was seen acting ‗as a 
donor‘ with the financial support going from the Alliance to the [other NGO] 
organisations. The possibility that organizations might receive funds from the 
Alliance affected ―the nature of the relationship between the organizations‖ (Drew 
2005c, pp. 14-15). 
 4.4.1 Growing vertical relations 
 The fact that one NGO acting on behalf of the GF provided funding to other 
NGOs to implement HIV services introduced vertical relations. The previous 
sections described PR systems to channel GF money to SRs and suggested that 
channelling of the GF funding created rifts between different organisations and led to 
increased competition among the NGOs. 
 Participants reflected on the changing nature of the relationships between PR 
NGOs and other NGOs in Ukraine as GF implementation progressed: 
Considerable money was thrown [around] to develop the NGO potential in 
HIV/AIDS [sector] to assume leadership position. And the Alliance‘s own 
leadership potential was quite high then. It assumed collegial relationships with 
other NGOs, at least declaratively. They were quite communicable, open, and 
relations were built on two-way communication. In future, it began to change. 
Somewhere around 2005 the changes started to occur. For us, local 
organisations, this lay in the dictatorship of the Alliance, i.e. in their asserting 
pressure on organisations. Next, their monitoring visits – initially meant to 
work out a collegiate decision through dialogue – began more to resemble 
inspections… with a seemingly accusatory tone… but because the Alliance did 
not officially announce its inspection policy in its relations with NGOs… this 
was unspoken policy… there appeared to be double standards in the Alliance‘s 
work. (045: 145-176) 
 In later GF Rounds, relations between PR NGOs and other NGOs became 
strictly vertical and contract-based. The language of SR agreements, PR manuals, 
and OIG reports changed to ‗SR management‘ and ‗stricter control‘ (OIG 2012, pp. 
9, 34).  As GF programmes proliferated, a growing dependency of local NGOs from 
PRs became more visible. Earlier, a UNAIDS report acknowledged ―a widening rift 
between the powerful national organisations and smaller regional NGOs‖ (Druce et 
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al. 2008, p. 10). Spicer et al. (2011a) observed ―a culture of fear derived from 
concerns for personal safety but also risk of losing donor largesse‖ identified among 
the representatives of CSOs in Ukraine (Spicer et al.2011, p.1751). [emphasis added] 
Participants described the evolution of relations between the PR NGOs and 
implementing NGOs in the regions. PRs were perceived as managers, exercising 
power and control, and SR NGOs as passive recipients, accepting submissive roles: 
The Principal Recipients were on the day-to-day managing regardless of what 
other actors said or thought. Once the proposal had been legitimised through 
the CCM, there was little input from other actors. The two NGO Principal 
recipients – they were enormously powerful – and they were more or less 
controlling and managing a vast sum of money. (049: 310-316) 
Civil society cannot influence them [PRs] anymore. They are way too 
powerful now to pay attention to the outbursts of public discontent on behalf 
of civil society organisations that are trying to challenge this or that decision 
or direction of the Global Fund‘s work. If somebody wants to say that a 
Principal recipient has done something wrong, this has to be said not by one 
organisation, and not even by a coalition of organisations, but by the 
thousands of patients of this organisation. But because all these patients are 
left dependant on the PR‘s, and their health and even life depend on whether 
PRs provide treatment to AIDS centres, or to methadone sites, they feel 
dependent in this situation and will never speak out. (044:309-320) 
 
4.4.2 PRs as „powerful‟ and „monopolies‟ 
In regard to the Alliance, participants reported that it: 
[was] too powerful. (016: 129) 
[held] all the main management levers (041: 415),  
is a monopoly and there is no alternative. (016: 145-146) 
PRs were also described as ‗bureaucratic machines‘: 
The Alliance and Network are by status charitable organisations, but de facto 
they are almost like corporations… that are indeed in charge of big money... 
and because these GF procedures and all that GF bureaucracy are so 
important, they cannot, even if they wanted, to be anything else but 
bureaucratic machines... (028: 380-385) 
Merezha was also seen as controlling: 
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In the early days, they were possibly considered rather inexperienced as a 
major grant manager, but lately, they have been getting much more 
experience. [I]t sounded like they were starting to act a little more like the 
Alliance in terms of having quite a lot of control over some aspects of the 
grants – and over which NGOs would receive the funding and what they 
would do... (049: 451-456) 
 4.4.3 A „culture of fear‟ – obedience and conformity in PR-SR relations 
 Participants described PR-SR relations using terms such as ‗obedient‘, 
‗conformist‘, and ‗servile‘ to describe SRs, while a term ‗not collaborative‘ described 
PRs: 
The final transformation – a switch towards total conformity from NGOs. By 
the second year [of R1], the GF already had potential and experience. We, the 
NGO community, were the key experts in the field; we had to participate in 
policy making, in research on HIV prevention, where our expertise lay. But in 
the heads of many NGOs that believed they were directly dependent on the 
Alliance – it turned into a director, not an implementer, as it originally was 
believed to be – equal to us partner. As a result, the Alliance became expert 
on everything – on prevention, on policy, while we NGOs became 
implementers. As a result, Ukraine and the NGO community lost a powerful 
collective capacity that was there before. The harm reduction philosophy 
development stopped; it turned into stone. We became reporting machines. 
Sooner or later, we would ask ourselves, ‗How did it happen that we grew a 
dragon among ourselves?‘We fell into an inferior position, and moved from 
being leaders of the Third sector to servile implementers. (046: 308-344) 
 Participants report that PR funding cycles had an effect on organisations 
becoming submissive: 
They [the Alliance] only have a one-year grant cycle. It is not convenient. 
Because there is no predictability. You never know if you are going to win a 
project next year or not. Theoretically, you suppose that because you worked 
well, you can receive another project. But you never know for sure… This 
always brings in strain. (021: 160-164) 
You cannot criticise the Alliance. It is hard to criticise the principal recipients 
and continue receiving money. (028: 429-432) 
 
 4.4.4 Increased competition between NGOs 
 Practices of PRs channelling GF funding, which were described in previous 
sections, affected the way NGOs viewed each other. Participants reported increasing 
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competition and a focus on winning the grant, not clients. There was no unified view 
on competition.  
 Few implementers thought of a grant competition as ‗positive‘: 
The way the [GF] money is distributed in the regions, is by organising grant 
competitions. If we talk about competitions, the best always wins. So in this 
sense, the competitive system is good, because it allows donors to ensure the 
necessary quality of work. At the same time, if an NGO understands that 
another NGO is breathing down its back, it will improve the quality of work. 
And therefore competition is necessary... It keeps NGOs ‗toned‘, and it gives 
donors the instruments needed to determine the quality of NGO work and 
remove the NGOs that do not conform to these criteria. (024: 119-134) 
 However, a large number of participants saw competition as negative because 
it impeded cooperation and made NGOs compete with each other instead of finding 
more clients.  
It was a policy imposed by PRs. But we should not compete among each 
other, but must work together. (017: 89-90) 
Regional needs need to be determined– how much the regions should give, 
how the regional budgets should be formed, and then the implementers will 
be looked for. Now it‘s just competitive. (026: 474-481) 
 
4.5. Regional power works. „Mega‟ NGOs: from „boutique programming‟ to largest 
regional recipients 
Drew argued that a ‗key factor‘ in the GF‘s choice of the Alliance as an 
implementer was in its ―pre-existing organizational capacity, largely developed 
through managing a USAID-funded program in 2000-2004‖ (Drew 2004, p. 4). 
Semigina (2008) noted that disbursement of GF R1 funding primarily in six regions – 
Kyiv and Kyiv oblast, Odesa, Mykolayiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and 
Crimea – happened because of the presence of USAID programmes in these regions, 
where infrastructure was relatively well-developed (Semigina et al. 2007).  
Chapter 2 suggested that the initial NGO networks in ‗high priority‘ regions – 
previously funded by other donors – became a base for rolling-out GF-funded 
activities with the Alliance as a PR in R1 (in 2004). These projects, initially located 
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mainly in large cities in several ‗high priority‘ regions, as the APMG report 
described, moved ‗beyond boutique programming‘ in 2009. The report, however, 
noted that GF territorial expansion was still insufficient and described NGO work in 
small towns and rural areas as a ‗challenge‘:  
One AU
72
 manager said: ―While assessments indicate a lot of IDUs in these 
areas, they are very hard to reach. Everyone knows each other: IDUs fear 
their status will be disclosed, they don‘t congregate, don‘t come to 
community centres. Also, because of the lower numbers and greater distances 
between them, economic efficiency is low. There are some NGOs trying to 
reach IDUs in rural areas, driving hundreds of kilometres, but it‘s very 
expensive for each IDU reached. (APMG 2009, p.20) 
 
 The OIG report noted: ―[P]revention services ...were being provided by sub-
recipients in many regions of Ukraine, with programs focused on regions of higher 
prevalence rates and in larger cities. Coverage of injecting drug users remained 
limited outside the larger regions.‖ (OIG 2012, p. 22) 
In earlier sections of this chapter it was noted how a number of regional 
NGOs in ‗high priority‘ regions were able to exert much influence on the whole GF 
proliferation in R1, including target setting in regions.  
Participants reported several large NGOs in high priority regions as receiving 
most of GF funding: 
To organisations that were in ‗high priority‘ regions – there went all stream of 
funding, not only GF. At once money was directed there by all other donors – 
Soros, UNDP, UNICEF, USAID, EC, and GTZ – all rushed to work in these 
eight regions. And when the same organisations – which had not quite 
developed their capacity – began attracting additional amounts of funding, 
other regions remained uncovered…When everything was going to the same 
regions, they [NGOs] could not simply use this money effectively. When one 
and the same organisation receives grants from ten donors, it is hard to 
implement them. (012:147-157)  
[PR] organisations that were put in a crisis situation would revert to what they 
were most comfortable with. So at that time, the Alliance was working in 
eight or ten oblasts on their USAID programme in prevention, so it was 
comfortable to them to just slip into those with GF money. (044: 452-455) 
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Participants reflected on a variety of reasons explaining why the GF chose to 
work in high priority regions: 
 These regions also had higher government spending: 
[It‘s] hard to say how the GF chose the regions. I would suggest that they 
looked at regions where enough local government money was spent on 
purchasing HIV testing systems, and where more tests were conducted, and 
where there were higher HIV rates… so where local resources were sufficient 
to screen wider population groups,  that is also where the GF focused. (030: 
116-123) 
 Based on epidemiological data: 
On the basis of epid[emiological] data the regions with high HIV rates were 
determined, and priority regions were defined. So Mykolayivska, Odesska 
oblasts were such examples, where NGOs received much, much money. Even 
before the GF they received funding. And the GF also directed [money] there. 
(042: 128-134) 
 Because of previous donor funding experience (of USAID and other 
donors): 
The Alliance already worked with USAID in priority regions. (045: 454).  
USAID ‗high priority regions‘ policy… had an important influence on the 
distribution of [GF] funds in Ukraine in Round 1…A very high proportion 
was directed at those regions. And very little outside of them. The reason was 
that there were HIV programmes that were set up or promoted through that 
[USAID] programme – so it would be quicker and easier to set up additional 
programmes if there was some infrastructure down already – so the 
programme could be rolled out much more quickly. (049: 152-166) 
In 2005, Drew identified the need for the Alliance to have specific partners in 
GF delivery, initially including Merezha, the Ukrainian AIDS Centre, and PATH, 
and argued that the need for such ‗unique capacity‘ partners was determined by an 
urgent character of grant delivery and a lack of time to develop capacity when time 
was at stake. As was noted above, the classification of SRs into ‗unique capacity‘ 
and others by PRs was maintained as a typical approach to granting in subsequent 
GF programmes. Participants described how PRs ‗classified‘ NGOs in Round 1:  
In 2005-2006, I heard, the Alliance adopted a system of putting SR NGOs 
into three classes – 1) the ones that work for a long time and are trusted; 2) 
the ones that work for a long time and are less trusted; and 3) the ones that 
have not worked before and are the least trusted. (046: 178-185) 
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 The document and interview analysis suggests that the nature of GF funding 
distribution by PRs, urgent character of GF delivery and pre-existing NGO networks 
affected the regional proliferation of HIV prevention services. Despite the overall 
numbers of 130, or 150 of local NGOs funded through the GF, according to various 
PR reports in different years, the large part of funding was channelled to just around 
a dozen of well-established NGOs who were prolific before the launch of the GF 
programme. The rationale for PRs engaging with such NGOs non-competitively was 
noted by Drew (2005a, p.10), when he described how Alliance, while in general 
announcing competitive tendering, was ―flexible in adapting this to specific 
circumstances, e.g. when ARVs were needed urgently, to bring in an experienced 
agency to manage the non-ARV medical procurement when some NGOs had been 
through a previous competitive process‖ (ibid.,p.10), which meant engaging some 
NGOs non-competitively. This exemption from a general rule facilitated the 
emergence and proliferation of large regional NGOs – influential power blocs that 
received continuous GF funding because they had been through ―a previous 
competitive process‖ and because deliveries were needed ―urgently‖. These large, 
multiple-funded regional NGOs are referred as ‗mega‘ NGOs in this research. The 
term was first used by Merezha in Round 6 communications
73
 and referred to NGOs 
with 300,000 Euros and higher grant amounts. The term ‗mega‘ NGOs was also used 
by participants.  
‗Mega‘ NGOs were in a better position to receive GF funding than others, as 
noted by participants:  
Mega NGOs in ‗priority regions‘ are a step ahead of us. (010: 34-37) 
The same NGOs keep getting the money. They‘ve got the experience of grant 
writing and that‘s why they win. (012: 278) 
Participants thought that ‗mega‘ NGOs were concentrating on too many 
directions of work, that this created a ―geographic misbalance between regions‖ 
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 The Merezha web-site informed about a meeting held on 17-18 February, 2010 at the Kyiv office 
with organizations – mega-recipients on issues of R6 implementation in 2010 – 2012 (Merezha 2011). 
In this information, organizations receiving GF grants over 500,000 Hryvnas, were referred to as 
‗mega-recipients‘ 
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(012: 163), and that it was ―better [to have] ten small NGOs than one large ‗mega-
NGO‘(005: 394-98). 
 Needed to deliver the ARV and other supplies, some ‗mega‘ NGOs were 
reported to be established directly at AIDS centres –and thus were ‗quasi‘ NGOs:  
All streams of funding went to 8 priority regions where there were AIDS 
centres. (012: 152-157) 
 Participants also thought that because ‗mega‘ NGOs held multiple contracts, 
their clients‘ pool was overlapping and results duplicated: 
Same organisations get the money of all donors. Programmes are made the 
same way, and there is overlap of activities and coverage grows – three-fold, 
four-fold. But there are same clients coming to all programmes. (012: 273-
280) 
 Participants noted that, while there was a division of labour between two PRs 
at the national level, at the oblast level ―they shared spheres [of influence]...If one 
organisation worked, it received part of money from the Alliance, and part from 
Merezha‖ (029: 495-497). This approach to allow ‗mega‘ NGOs to receive GF 
money through both PRs led to creating inequalities at the regional level, blocked 
access to funding to new or smaller NGOs, and monopolised services in hands of one 
or two regional NGOs.  
 Some respondents reported that while PRs attempted to support the 
establishment of new NGOs, attempts ended by the end of R6: 
The Alliance began rolling out new organisations, but it was done in regions 
that were completely empty, so there was nothing there. But now they‘ve 
abandoned it. So practically the same NGOs remain there as before. (017: 
497-499) 
 Meanwhile, in oblasts with several ‗mega‘ NGOs, a fierce competition 
between them was perceived by participants as equally problematic: 
There were oblasts where there were several large NGOs, and they fought 
like in a dog fight to get grants. (015: 151-152) 
 
 The OIG 2012 audit report failed to see through the need to diversify and 
increase the number of NGOs in the regions when instead, it recommended 
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―rationalization of the number of sub-recipients‖ as a means to ―reduce 
administrative workload and improve the efficiency and quality of services‖ (OIG 
2012, p. 9). In existing power inequalities, a ‗rationalisation‘ could only further 
empower and solidify ‗mega‘ NGOs while the need to scale-up HIV services 
coverage in other oblasts was unmet. In October 2013, the GF Portfolio Manager, 
speaking in Kyiv, stressed that, to maximise treatment and prevention in vulnerable 
groups, GF funding should be spent in ‗hot epidemiological points‘ and that the 
greatest impact on the epidemic can be made in regions with higher HIV rates
74
.  
Conclusion 
 NGO-based outreach and ‗rapid‘ test screening constituted a core of GF-
funded HIV prevention services in R1 and R6, but appeared not linked with HIV care 
continuum, with referral protocols absent in most settings, and not recognised as part 
of state health care. The GF focus on NGO delivery of health services not only 
compromised NGOs‘ perceived advocacy role, but also rendered the ones that were 
originally grassroots, community-type NGOs to be penetrated or eroded by ‗quasi‘, 
hybrid NGOs created by government officials and AIDS centres‘ head doctors. 
 Target setting was heavily influenced by PR-run expert groups, targets were 
pre-set centrally and passed on to regional SRs to implement. This made NGOs 
tuned more into reporting targets to PRs, rather than responding to needs on the 
ground. 
  Distribution of the GF funding by PR NGOs has introduced competition and 
verticality into their relations with SR NGOs, while a number of well-established 
‗mega‘ NGOs in priority regions were reported to enjoy multiple and extended 
contracts. The regional proliferation of GF-funded services followed a previously 
existing ‗high priority regions‘ policy, and as such, manifested a surrender of the GF 
PRs earlier pledges to scale-up coverage by HIV services in all Ukraine‘s regions.  
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 Online webcast from the 2
nd
 national HIV conference, from the web-site of State Services, 24 
October, 2013. 
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CHAPTER 5. DELIVERY OF HIV PREVENTION SERVICES IN GF-FUNDED 
SETTINGS. DATA REPORTING SYSTEMS AND PRACTICES. 
 
5.1 Challenges of identifying the GF-attributable services. 
A number of sources analysing the GF-funded HIV prevention services in 
Ukraine were reviewed in the literature section in Chapter 3. Some of them are 
briefly summarised below. Reports identify series of gaps in service delivery areas 
that were important signposts to guide the field data collection. 
Drew‘s reports on Trips 6 and 7 were particularly useful in writing this 
chapter - the former focusing on the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices in 
GF programmes – Drew called accurate tracking of the level of services provided 
―the heart of program M&E‖ (Drew 2005d, p. 6) – and the latter focusing on the 
analysis of service delivery systems by Alliance in R1. Trip 7 report also includes a 
list of services available under the R1 programme.  
Analysis of HIV services administered by Alliance as a GF PR is contained in 
the APMG 2009 report, which notes that ―a web of services … started to develop 
among all types of government and SR agencies working with MARPs
75in Ukraine‖ 
(APMG 2009, p. 3), describes the service delivery practices, and recommends to 
―refine practices to maximize the efficient use of these assets for epidemic control … 
by increasingly getting the right services to the right people at the right times‖ 
(APMG 2009, p.14).[emphasis added] 
A UNAIDS report, analyzing the delivery of HIV prevention services, stated 
that: 
The geographic scope of programmes has been uneven and the coverage of 
specific MARPs remains imbalanced. The scope, scale, quality and intensity 
of these prevention programmes remain inadequate to halt the spread of HIV 
among these groups and to limit the potential spread of HIV to the general 
population. (UNAIDS 2009, p. 14) 
 
This report also noted that the delivery of HIV prevention services between 
governmental and NGO service providers was ―poorly coordinated‖ and presented ―a 
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MARPs – Most-at-Risk-Populations. 
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serious risk to the sustainability of prevention programmes currently supported by 
the GF grants and the viability of overall national prevention efforts‖ (UNAIDS 
2009, p. 15). 
The OIG 2012 draft report described prevention programmes run by Alliance 
in Ukraine under the GF grants as ―targeted at specific groups‖ and ―focused on 
regions of higher prevalence rates and in larger cities‖ (OIG 2012a, p. 22). 
A document entitled ‗Ukraine‘s Impact Profile HIV‘ that was presented at the 
CCM meeting on July 25, 2013, noted: 
Coverage by prevention programmes, based on estimated numbers of 
PWID
76
, CSWs, MSM and prisoners, remains low. Coverage by majority of 
main prevention services (providing a condom during last 12 months, and 
information about HIV screening site) of such groups as CSWs and MSM, is 
low, and much lower the level needed to produce impact. Despite the fact that 
most basic components of HIV prevention services and care are available to 
some people in some regions, there are wide variations in regional coverage, 
and fully accessible package of services in a broad sense does not exist(State 
Service 2013). [emphasis added] 
 
Identifying HIV services to be studied in GF-funded settings presented a 
challenge. Based on the literature, there appeared a discrepancy in understanding 
what constitutes the list of prevention services, delivery of which was funded by GF.  
The discrepancy appears primarily in the PR and GF own implementation 
reports that typically tend to list all services – including available services in state 
health care (not funded by GF) – as provided by GF programmes – even if only 
referral to them was presumably funded by the GF. Because the GF also had input 
into procurement of some commodities such as ARV drugs, test systems, 
needles/syringes, condoms, baby milk formulas, lab equipment etc. (Semigina 2009, 
p. 18), PRs tend to position its programmes as part of state service delivery. For the 
GF, such positioning is important to demonstrate that its programmes are a part of a 
wider, more comprehensive system of national health services. Below, is one 
example of such presentation, provided in a Round 6 GF report: 
Figure 5.1 Health services for Most-at-Risk Populations (International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012d, p.22) 
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 PWID – People Who Inject Drugs, a more recent term that replaces IDUs – Injecting Drug Users. 
Both terms are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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This colourful scheme shows the multitude of services for IDUs in Ukraine. 
Aimed to represent the GF-funded results in Round 6, the scheme, however, does not 
specify which of these interventions were actually supported by GF, who delivered 
the services, and thus obscures the ‗GF zone of responsibility‘. In Chapter 1, 
problems of distinguishing between interventions attributable to the GF, and others, 
funded by countries governments and/or other donors, were noted in a discussion 
over the ―GF implementation pyramid‖. Such a distinction is especially difficult at 
the country level, and the OIG noted that any program achievements ―cannot be 
attributed to Global Fund alone but are the result of funding from a number of co-
operating partners under the leadership of the government‖ (OIG 2012b, p. 4). 
Identification of GF-attributable services represents a problem also because PRs 
themselves are a ―prime source‖ of reporting data as ―much of the underlying data 
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comes from PRs themselves‖(Glassman et al. 2013, p. 44). The practices of the PRs 
target setting as part of data management cycle were described in Chapter 4. Self-
reporting also has serious implications in reporting the delivery of services, and is 
discussed in more detail below. 
For this study analysis, the need to isolate the services that were provided and 
specifically relate to GF funding was pending. Lack of a clearly established set of 
services represented one of the limitations for my analysis.   
Drew identified provision of an ‗elementary package of services‘ as ―a core 
prevention approach used by GF in Ukraine in R1‖ (Drew 2005e, p.1). Alliance R6 
Report presents the evolution of HIV prevention ‗basic services‘ for PWIDs: 
Figure 5.2 HIV Prevention for People Who Use Drugs  
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(From International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2012d, p. 6) 
 
The list of ‗basic package of services‘ is misleading. It puts both the services and 
activities to provide them in the same list – e.g., ‗delivering a basic package of 
services‘ is included, and then ‗outreach activities‘, of which it is a part. Further on, 
‗training volunteers using peer education approach‘ is included that is not a 
prevention service but is on the list, while ‗distribution of behaviour change 
communication materials‘ is mentioned two times – first as a separate service, and 
second time - as ‗basic package as ‗awareness-raising materials‘. ‗Voluntary 
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counselling and testing for HIV using rapid tests‘ is included in the 2007 section as a 
part of ‗basic package‘, and then it appears again under innovation in 2008 as ‗VCT‘, 
which is its abbreviation. 
The APMG report describes ―the range of services provided by the regular 
prevention project, relevant to all populations‖ that includes: 
- Provision of condoms, syringes (to IDUs only), antiseptics, and other 
expendable commodities (may vary from project to project); 
- Provision of printed health promotion materials on safe behavior (leaflets, 
etc); 
- Provision of voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) (with rapid tests), rapid 
STI screening and consultations, STI treatment (available to all except people 
in prisons); 
- Provision of various consultation services (social workers as the primary 
consultation, medical doctors, and other narrow specialists, which vary 
extensively from project to project), referrals to other services and agencies, 
and social support, including basic mentoring. (APMG 2009, pp. 64-65). 
However, the APMG report then notes that ―getting the right services to the right 
people at the right times” was a dilemma (ibid., p.65). 
Identification of HIV prevention services at the beginning of R6 is contained 
in the OIG report and includes: ―educational information, counseling by a social 
worker, and distribution of syringes, condoms and other preventative materials‖(OIG 
2012b, p. 29). This list represents a core minimalny paket poslug in Ukraine – 
translated in different English language sources as ‗elementary package of services‘, 
‗minimum package of services‘ or ‗basic package of services‘.  
For the purpose of this study, the OIG description of services was accepted 
because it was assumed that OIG methods to distinguish GF-attributable services 
were the most reliable. Further clarifications on HIV prevention services package 
were then sought from the participants. The Interview Guide included questions 
about identifying HIV prevention interventions in GF-funded settings, about the 
standards of services, information on how services were documented, as well as on 
the focus in GF-funded services. The findings as perceived by study participants are 
presented below, in synthesis with the document analysis. 
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5.2 A focus of GF-funded HIV prevention in Ukraine 
The Global HIV Prevention Working Group that surveys HIV prevention 
efforts globally, in its 2010 report noted that most international donors did not define 
―the criteria used to select the prevention strategies they support or the mechanisms 
for targeting prevention services‖ (Global HIV Prevention 2010, p.13). 
As shown in Chapters 2 and 4, in the result of GF R1 transfer to an INGO, the 
HIV prevention approach in the GF programme was narrowed. From the original 
country programme that included HIV prevention in general population, which 
―disproportionally and inappropriately focused on IEC77‖ (Drew 2005e, p. 2) as well 
as on high-risk groups, it shifted to prevention only in high-risk groups. Drew (ibid.) 
argued that shifting the prevention focus from general population to a more narrow 
prevention was needed due to the nature of HIV epidemic and in order to spend GF 
resources effectively. This shift represented a view on Ukraine‘s HIV epidemic, held 
by most international donors, as concentrated among groups of high-risk, according 
to which the dominant mode of HIV transmission was by injecting drug use.  
The PR R1 decisions to re-programme GF funding to support a more focused 
HIV prevention – reported by participants in the previous chapter – remained largely 
unchallenged in Ukraine. Initially, the decision to re-programme by Alliance faced 
lack of legitimacy as it did not have a country mandate to do so, and ―the only way 
the required re-programming‖ was to happen was if the GF insisted on it (Drew 
2005e, p. 34). The GF has endorsed Alliance with a broad funding mandate and this 
prevention focus was retained in all subsequent GF grants. Called ‗targeted 
prevention‘, HIV prevention services for IDUs were a key focus of GF spending in 
EECA region that received 50% of all GF global harm reduction (HR) funding 
(Wilson and Fraser 2013), while Bridge et al. (2012) suggest around 95 % of the GF 
budgeted and projected investments (US$ 408 million) was given on HR for EECA 
in Rounds 1 to 9.  
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In R6, the funding received by Alliance to implement the HR programme in 
Ukraine was ―of global significance – 69 million USD versus 89 million disbursed 
elsewhere‖(International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2012c). The GF representative 
reiterated the GF funding focus on ―facilitating access to HIV prevention services – 
mainly harm reduction – for PWIDs‖ during a national HIV conference.78 
5.2.1 The focus on drug users 
Harm Reduction campaign and OST were implemented and lobbied under 
umbrella of HIV/AIDS prevention in Ukraine, and were largely justified 
through the appeal to IDUs as potential HIV-carriers. The figure of IDU was 
so politicised ... and often overshadowed a figure of the HIV/AIDS sufferer. 
(Zhukova 2013, p. 159) 
Questions in the Interview Guide asked about the focus of HIV prevention in 
GF-funded programmes. Majority of participants reported that GF funding was 
mostly aimed at injecting drug users: ―prevention done by GF in ‗classical‘ risk 
groups, according to best world practices‖ (001: 288-292), ―IDUs were and remain 
main risk group despite changes in transmission‖ (020: 136), ―GF is not flexible, it 
only gives money on drug users‖ (036: 314-315), ―very little attention on the general 
population from these grants, they were primarily focused on one risk-group - people 
known to be IDUs‖ (049: 113-114).  
However, there was no uniform view on how the IDUs were defined as a 
group in GF-funded settings. Some participants suggested that the GF programmes 
had a ―focus on groups and sub-cultures of drug users‖ (019: 117-118), and were 
―geared at classical opiate users‖ (046: 387). Participants suggested the view of 
injectors as a risk group was rooted in the past: 
Understanding risky behavior in drug users goes to its roots in the past, when 
from one glass syringe – with one needle - 15 or 20 people could be injected. 
Now they are going away from that. And now there are disposable syringes, 
and they are widely available – go to drug store and buy as many as you 
want. But there is still a strong prejudice of syringe drug users. Because of 
this historical fear, more attention is paid to this group. (018: 141-147) 
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 A statement was made by Nicolas Cantau, the GF Portfolio Manager, in a conference presentation 
in Kyiv on October 24, 2013, the transcript of the presentation is on file with the author. 
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Other participants were not certain that the programmes were oriented at drug 
users, or specifically, at injectors: ―programmes are neither oriented on drug-users, 
nor on specific types of drug-users‖ (001: 131-133), ―when the epidemic began, it 
[GF programme] was mainly for injecting drugs users..now, injecting or not 
injecting... just drug users... it‘s not clarified... GF established its specific indicators 
and continues to work only on these indicators‖ (020: 46-49). 
A number of participants thought that the choice of approach was determined 
by the nature of commodities to be delivered: 
It is easier to organize a programme this way because: you buy syringes, you 
count them, you distribute them – one to each – then count again, report, and 
that‘s all. Doing a more complex intervention is more difficult (015: 218-21), 
or suggested that this focus was chosen because it allowed the PRs to spend the 
money quickly: 
… the interest to conduct prevention in this group was financial. Not the most 
effective interventions were chosen. But they were most costly and it was a 
good way for them [PRs] to spend a lot of money. (047: 47-59)  
Some participants suggested opportunism of particular organizations in 
choosing HIV prevention interventions: 
[F]or prevention, the most difficult groups were chosen that are hard to reach 
– such as drug users – and then it was said that prevention needed to be 
conducted confidentially. It is very hard to prove whether prevention was 
really happening in these groups. Group interests of particular organizations 
played a role in this. (047: 39-42)  
Some participants reported that the original IDU population targeted by GF 
has shrunk, but prevention focus did not change: 
[T]he group of IDUs … is shrinking also for natural reasons. First, because of 
mortality. Secondly, young drug users reject syringes. It is related to changes 
in the drug scene … On the market, synthetic drugs dominate. Drug user 
changed. The supply of drugs changed. If earlier shirka dominated on the 
market, now it is all changed… injecting drugs users are like dinosaurs – they 
are becoming extinct. (001:121-28) 
… there is no such population anymore that was originally defined. Half of 
these drug users have died, and another half disappeared in unknown 
direction. (047: 455-458) 
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A number of participants thought that a narrow focus on prevention among 
risk groups, promoted by GF, lowered HIV risk awareness in general population and 
led to risky behaviour: 
... because of these [GF] programmes, the population of Ukraine was made to 
believe  that HIV is mainly a problem of marginalised groups, and this creates 
a big problem. Because HIV is presented as concentrated in drug users and 
prostitutes – аnd nobody wants to think about themselves like this in Ukraine 
– that‘s why risky sexual behaviours are thriving. (012: 510-515) 
 
5.2.2 Harm reduction: Ukraine an „experiment zone‟? 
As noted above, R1 and especially R6 programmes in Ukraine were the 
largest-funded programmes to do HR in the EECA, and possibly, in the whole world. 
Negative perceptions on HR reduction as an external, ‗Western concept‘ that was at 
odds with the culture and norms in Russia and other FSU were noted (Tkatchenko-
Schmidt et al., 2007). With a prevailing focus of many publications on legal and 
political barriers to HR in Ukraine, noted in Chapter 2, fewer studies analyse services 
themselves. In R1, the HR activities conducted by Alliance were reviewed by Drew 
who stressed that it was difficult ―to determine whether or not the programme as 
implemented has stayed in line with the originally-proposed harm reduction 
strategies because it is far from clear what those were‖ (Drew 2005e, p. 30).  
‗Harm reduction‘ was one of sub-categories identified by participants as a key 
focus of GF-funded prevention interventions in R1-R6. Similarly to a wide range of 
definitions of IDUs noted above, there was no uniform view on what constituted HR 
in GF-funded settings, how they were perceived, or how they were practiced. Some 
inferences of participants‘ statements on HR services are presented below.  
Participants thought that the way the programmes were run by PRs, were 
based on external approaches and not adapted to existing drug use practices: 
In Ukraine it is attempted to introduce some international standard 
recommendations, despite that the existing drug use culture is characterized 
by several factors. In comparison to Europe, where drug use is mainly 
individual, in Ukraine drugs are being used ‗in a circle‘ – old Slavic habit – 
we sit in a circle and pass over the syringe. Second difference – in Ukraine 
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drugs that are common in Europe, a-la hashish, marijuana - are not common. 
We have locally made opiates that produce strong dependence..Third 
difference – drugs are often sold already pre-filled in syringes. What quality 
is of that syringe, who bought the needle, who handled it – nobody knows. 
This is never studied. Often people have to give up these clean syringes at the 
point of sale in return for the pre-filled one… as part of payment… for [drug] 
(029: 546-560) 
Harm reduction philosophy – in the form that it came to Ukraine – was not 
adapted. The main accent and philosophy should have been for us to penetrate 
the communities, and try to find other mechanisms..to move away from 
syringe exchange that is purely technical in its nature. But all [GF] coverage 
indicators were geared at the number of syringes distributed. It was the main 
accent of work. Why was it bad? It was bad in long-term sense. Because the 
people with little understanding of harm reduction philosophy were misled 
that by such technical means we can solve this problem. (046:259-270) 
 
In participants view, promotion of external approaches by PRs has turned 
Ukraine into an ‗experiment zone‘, a ‗guinea-pig country‘ for HR: 
We were a working base for applying maybe all the philosophy that lies 
behind that approach.. All different approaches were tried on our drug 
users… as large numbers of drug-users were involved, with different [drug] 
use types, different in social status etc. (025: 160-167) 
Some participants believed that implementing HR before changing the legal 
environment for it compromised the approach and was detrimental on its 
perspectives: 
[T]hese programmes were absolutely perpendicular to Ukrainian legislation. 
Without changing the legal environment you cannot implement them. 
Anybody who is implementing them – be it AIDS center, narcology doctor, 
NGO - becomes a hostage of drug law. The implementers were put in trouble 
by this. People took risks. If a narcologist said yes to implementing this 
programme, he knew the procurator general may be coming... or maybe not. 
So it was on this fragile anticipation that maybe it will pass. But if doctors 
knew they could be subject to prison terms, and some were already arrested, 
they would refuse this money at once. The programmes were presented as 
though they could be done. Methodology and drugs were brought. But 
possible criminal liability was not outlined. So the dangers were not clear. 
Doctors who did it were suicidal. Such programmes can be implemented with 
consensus between MOH and Interior Ministry. There was none then, and 
there is none now. Reach consensus first and then show that you can do 
programmes. But they [PRs]…took the money and started implementing what 
they declared. Even if they already knew there would be resistance. They 
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were misleading the Global Fund about the risks that existed in country. (039: 
418-439) 
Some thought that because HR programmes linked to the MOH as a state 
partner, they bypassed other important state agencies: 
[T]his is a drug-abuse problem, this is a law and order problem, there is a 
medical side to it – let‘s work  – you at the Ministry for Interior work out 
your side, and the Ministry of Health will have and a special coordinating 
officer ... next to your office and help you solve this problem. This was not 
going to happen...  As soon as the Ministry of Health had it – this was a kiss 
of death. (045:296-301)   
Using an approach that was not sufficiently approbated in country and viewed 
as external also meant that harm reduction services would not be supported by the 
state and not be sustainable: ―if not for foreign money, they [state] would never have 
allowed such things as harm reduction...‖ (021: 296-299), ―there is no guarantee that 
these programmes would be sustained beyond the life of the grant‖ (049: 499-500). 
Some participants also felt that the way harm reduction was offered, was not 
perceived as fair in society: 
You may say that harm reduction is needed. But how can you explain it to an 
old lady who comes to a drugstore to buy a syringe that costs 40 copecks or 1 
hryvna
79
 from her tiny pension because she needs diabetes shots, and here 
comes an injecting drug user who gets syringes for free. She would not be 
happy about it. (016: 31-33) 
..there were naïve assumptions that because of AIDS, the drug policy will be 
relaxed…It is not so here in Ukraine. Instead it brought an irritation in poor 
society. Why should drug users receive this for free? So the drug policy did 
not relax, there is no consensus on this… we have different public attitudes 
here. (039: 477-489) 
A number of participants suggested that the scale of programmes was not sufficient 
to have an impact on the epidemic
80
: 
The overall need that you need to fill in terms of harm reduction services was 
so vast – it was really going to be very difficult to do much good with what 
were relatively small programmes and relatively small numbers of people 
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About 0.07 pound sterling. 
80
 As of January 2012, 6,632 people were reached with OST programmes in Ukraine (International 
HIV/AIDS Alliance. 2012a, p. 10). With the number of PWID estimated at 290,000 (Nieburg and 
Carty 2012, p.4), the former figure represented 2.3% of the projected PWID population.  
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receiving harm reduction services ... that was simply not going to do very 
much in terms of overall epidemic on the population level. (049: 492-98) 
 
Needle and syringe exchange programmes (NSPs) were a significant part of GF 
funding. NSPs came up as a sub-theme in interviews linked to ‗harm reduction‘. 
Participants noted the following aspects of needle exchange services:  
 Lack of ―uniform approach to instrumentarium (paraphernalia) disposal‖ 
(002: 393); 
 Only isolated parts of harm reduction were being implemented, not linked 
with other services and not achieving a desired effect: ―needle exchange 
makes sense if it is not done separately, but tied to other services‖ (003: 375-
376); 
 Needles need to be of good quality to attract drug users but were not always 
available in GF programmes. ―Needles alone were not a motivator: [quality] 
directly influences attendance. If quality is bad, person won‘t come again‖ 
(002: 543-545), ―A clean syringe in itself cannot be a motivator. Syringes are 
sold without prescription in drug stores. Syringes are cheap. In many 
developed countries where NEPs ran, syringes were by prescription only, and 
in limited numbers (015: 294-298). 
 
 Risky legal environment for NGOs: ―needle exchange is too serious a 
problem to give it to NGOs. Social workers are not protected from injuries, 
utilization is not legally defined for NGOs to do it‖ (046: 227-239): 
[N]eedle exchange – headache for NGOs. Nobody thinks what they will do in 
relations with law enforcement. Name me at least one NGO who has a license 
for this practice and can conduct it independently. None. There is a loose 
legal basis for NGOs in harm reduction. NGOs did not have license to deliver 
needle exchange services.(005: 220-232) 
Some participants reported that after 2010, the needle exchange has stopped 
completely in GF programmes and only needle handouts remained: ―now there is no 
needle exchange, only distribution‖ (017: 369-370), ―after 2010, no needle exchange, 
only distribution‖ (019: 395). 
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5.3. Documenting HIV prevention services: challenges of data reporting 
It is usually impossible to foresee all possible issues which might arise after 
reporting and registration systems are designed. Moreover, even those 
projects working in the same sphere might be quite different in terms of 
services provided, activities implemented and approaches taken. Thus it is 
very important for funding agencies to find a proper balance between 
necessary standardization and flexibility when developing the system of 
programme monitoring.  (International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2008, p.67) 
 
Chapter 4 described significant PRs discretion in choosing targets and the full 
PR control over the data reporting cycle. This section focuses more closely on the 
process how the data on delivering HIV services was obtained and documented in 
GF-funded settings.  
The 2011 MEASURE report of Alliance-provided HIV prevention services 
identified key features of the service delivery process and how it was documented: 
• HIV preventive interventions for MARPs are largely provided by the 
NGOs‘ social workers (SWs).  
• The interventions consist of a large variety of activities that are 
offered, most of which are similar across organizations within the 
same MARP sub-groups. At their enrollment in an NGO‘s program, a 
client has an intake interview with a SW during which a complete 
baseline assessment takes place. The client is also assigned a personal 
ID code. At the time of the audit, the coding system was transitioning 
to an Alliance-wide eight-digit code based on a number of initials, 
birth date, and gender of the client. During the audited period, the old 
coding system based on shorter codes was still in use. 
• During the visits, SWs document the services they provide on a daily 
report form in which the client is identified by her or his ID code only. 
The format for the daily report form is provided by Alliance, but can 
be adapted by individual NGOs according to their needs. A number of 
variations on the format were found at different NGOs. The form 
contains information on which services were received: used needles 
returned, needles dispensed, used syringes returned, syringes 
dispensed by size, condoms, disinfectant swabs, lubricant, information 
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leaflets, type of consultation (information provided: SW, VCT/HIV, 
VCT/STD), sent for confirmation HIV test and other services. (food 
support, hairdresser services etc.)[emphasis added] Most daily report 
forms have a heading ‗Other‘ that can include a variety of services 
depending on the NGO; mostly it includes services such as pregnancy 
testing, female condom distribution, hairdresser services, etc. The 
SWs hand over the daily report forms to the documentator on a daily 
or weekly basis, depending on the NGO. The documentator enters the 
data from the daily report forms in the SyrEx database. (MEASURE 
Evaluation 2011, pp. 9-10) 
 
As emerging from interviews and document data, specific aspects of services 
documentation were described: 
 - coverage by services; 
 - identifying a ‗minimum package of services‘ 
- identifying ‗clients‘ or services, ‗new‘ and ‗old‘ (continuing) clients; 
- client coding systems; 
 - computer database used by PRs to document data. 
The sections below present findings on these topics. 
5.3.1 Lack of standards of HIV prevention services  
A key challenge in assessing the prevention services in Ukraine lies in the 
absence of defined standards of services. Existingstate standards are applied in 
treatment of PLWHA at the state health institutions, as noted by OIG. To identify 
and assess other services, including HIV prevention, is challenging because of 
―absence of national service quality standards for prevention, care and support‖ (OIG 
2012b, p. 25).  
Uniformly, participants reported the absence of standards in NGO service 
delivery settings: ―There are no minimal standards of quality. There are no 
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professional regulations. No norms. So – by which benchmark you conduct 
monitoring and evaluation? And how do you report?‖ (029: 257-261), ―Regarding 
standard package of services, there may be different services in different visits‖ (003: 
349-350).  
A new legislation passed in 2012 on ‗social contract‘ services was supposed 
to streamline general standards for social services, however, it was not in place 
during R1-R6 grants. Some participants reported knowing about state introducing 
such standards: ―there are now moves by state in direction of quality standards of 
social services‖ (002: 564-66), ―there were protocols, norms beginning to be 
developed, and now a law on social contract is passed‖ (017: 130-132).  
Participants thought that if NGOs were able to receive state funding, it would 
bring more standardisation of services. However, some participants were concerned 
that state-funded services might have different priorities from donor programmes: 
―There is no experience of social contract. No money was given on this before. So if 
donor funding ends - all our regional NGOs – with their computers, capacity, target 
groups - will not be funded. And they [state] will certainly put money to their 
priorities‖ (036: 191-95). 
Others thought that standardisation of services was not always beneficial and 
it was clear that not all NGOs wanted such standardisation: 
We need time to transfer on state funding. But it should be gradual. 
Standartisation is on one side good, but is also problematic. Here you need 
one thing, and there you need another.Here one thing will be effective, and 
there another. Donor programmes allow for flexible services. (017: 317-322) 
It would be good to standardize [HIV] services. However, this is a double-
edged sword… it all depends of how we define the quality of a service… 
(sighs)… so if we define standard, we need to cost it… and then you can 
cover less people for same money… so you need to approach this sensibly… 
(024:365-68). 
 
5.3.2 Handling the data: problematic historic traditions   
Ukraine has a rich historical association with data distortion that long 
precedes the Soviet period, as part of the Russian Empire, where practices of 
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manipulating information were wide-spread. The term ‗Potemkin Village‘ –―used, 
typically in politics and economics, to describe any construction (literal or figurative) 
built solely to deceive others into thinking that some situation is better than it really 
is‖ 81 – originates from Ukraine. The novel Dead Souls, a Russian literature 
masterpiece written by Ukrainian-born Nicolai Gogol, satirizes corrupt tsarist Russia. 
The main character, Chichikov, travels across Russia buying non-existent serfs from 
landowners – dead souls– to build an estate on paper that does not exist in reality. 
The serfs are accounted for on landowners' census and other records, but they have 
died. The Chichikov‘s hopes of amassing enough dead souls to gain influence and 
power do not gain him anything in the end. 
Manipulating information was a typical feature of the Soviet system. Stalin‘s 
cynical saying – ―it is utterly unimportant who voted and how, but what is important 
is who will count the votes‖ (cited in Bazhanov 1992) – was widely used in all 
spheres of the Soviet life. In the planned economy, reporting 100% of targets 
fulfilled or over-fulfilled - „vypolnit i perevypolnit‟ - was typical in official statistics. 
The real figures were available to a select few senior party members. A typical case 
of concealment involving the Chernobyl nuclear plant catastrophe was described in 
Chapter 2. 
In Collision and Collusion, Janine Wedel described pre-existing ―legacies of 
communism that would figure prominently in the aid story‖ (Wedel 2001, p. 73). She 
described an “entire language developed under communism to describe the practice 
of creating fictions to please authorities‖ when referring to a Soviet practice of 
ochkovtiratelstvo – ―literally, to kick dust into someone‘s eyes, meaning to pull the 
wool over someone‘s eyes or to fool the observer, boss or do-gooder‖. She argued 
that such practices were reinforced in donor aid programmes in the FSU: 
Just as they [managers] had engaged in certain ―fictions‘, ranging from subtle 
readjusting of figures to outright falsification, to meet pre-specified targets 
under central planning, so they employed the same kinds of fictions in the aid 
process to please the donor community... Just as there were obvious reasons 
for the original development of ochkovtiratelstvo, so there were reasons for 
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 The definition is from Wikipedia. The term derives from Count Potemkin, a Governor of Southern 
Russia, and a favourite of Catherine the Great, who allegedly built fake settlements along the banks of 
the Dnieper River to impress the Empress during her travel to Crimea in 1787.  
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its use in the post-communist era. By unwittingly encouraging the habit of 
ochkovtiratelstvo, aid served to reinforce some of the old communist ways. 
(Wedel 2001, pp. 74-75) 
Because donors were unaware about such pre-existing practices, aid 
programmes in the FSU were often ―following in Communism‘s footsteps‖ (ibid., p. 
165).  
Among others well known Soviet practices were blat (the use of personal 
networks in order to obtain goods and services in short supply or to influence 
decision-making), and pripiski (false reporting) (Ledeneva 2000, p. 7). Bridger and 
Pine (1998, p. xiii) note that in the context of post-socialist transformations, ―the 
effect of many foreign interventions is to accentuate previous hierarchies‖. Sampson 
(1997) spoke about ‗project elites‘ who accumulate donor resources and re-distribute 
them among closed circles, as was mentioned in Chapter 2. 
The GF reporting systems as a part of the PBF model, rely heavily on self-
reporting by PRs, and may present a high risk for data manipulation in the post-
Soviet context, and possibly in all contexts incentivized not to report under-
performance. Some features of data reporting systems and practices in GF-funded 
settings in Ukraine are described below. 
 
5.3.3 Data reporting systems used by PRs: different databases, the same owner  
Data on provision of services, including how it is documented and reported, 
represents an important part of the GF PBF system.  However, as a CGD Report 
notes, ―given that much of the underlying data comes from PRs themselves – it is not 
surprising that ―data quality‖ is a recurrent concern addressed in GF policies‖ 
(Glassman et al. 2013, p. 79). 
 Drew called accurate tracking of the level of services provided ―the heart of 
program M&E‖ (Drew 2005d, p. 8), and acknowledged a ―strong and clear focus on 
tracking the numbers of people reached with essential services‖ in R1. He cautioned, 
however, that ―reported information on key indicators needs to be carefully verified 
and supplemented by data on quality of services and their effects‖ (ibid., p. 1). 
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In GF programmes in Ukraine, data obtained from provision of HIV services, 
numbers of clients covered, etc. is aggregated by a special automated database called 
SyrEx
82
.  
The Alliance manual describes SyrEx as ―an automated records management 
system, developed by International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine with financial 
support from the Global Fund‖ for monitoring and recording HIV prevention 
programs among all vulnerable groups, having the following key functions: 
- registering clients; 
- recording commodities and services provided; 
- recording trainings and other group events; 
- generating reports by different criteria; and, 
- aggregating and transmitting data from multiple sources. 
(International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine, 2008). 
A recent report by the International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Ukraine refers to  
―a state-of-the-art monitoring, evaluation and reporting system‖ that ―is now used as 
the official monitoring and evaluation framework for the national HIV 
response‖.(International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2014, p.25) 
Earlier, Drew noted confusion over the use of M&E software in Ukraine: ―[I]t 
was not completely clear what system was being used or how compatible these 
various systems were with each other‖ (Drew 2005d, p. 5). The OIG reported that 
PRs routinely collected data on services provided by sub-recipients and analyzed 
progress against targets (OIG 2012b, p. 24).  
Four M&E management software systems are mentioned in documents related to 
GF-funded programmes in Ukraine: SyrEx, SyrEx2, Case, and Case Plus. The two 
SyrEx systems were used by all NGOs that report to Alliance (MEASURE 
Evaluation 2011, p. 8), both under its USAID SUNRISE project and in GF-funded 
programmes. The two Case systems are used by Merezha to document care and 
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The name SyrEx originates from the ‗syringe exchange‘ - information management system used by 
Alliance sub-grantees working in the sphere of HIV prevention (International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 
2008, p. 7). The full name of the software is Automated Records Management System In Harm 
Reduction Programs – SyrEx. 
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support services for PLWHA. PRs use data generated from the Syrex and Case 
systems to report on ‗performance-based‘ indicators to GF.  
The MEASURE Evaluation (2011) provided a detailed description of how data 
on services is gathered through SyrEx in projects (p.8). The APMG evaluation 
considered SyrEx an ―important addition‖ to the M&E mechanisms operating in 
Ukraine, and ―an invaluable tool‖ to document and measure the progress of 
programme, but noted the need to connect each service administered to the client 
served using the unique client identification codes, so that ―confidence in statistics 
derived from SyrEx can be substantially increased‖ (APMG 2009, p. 17). 
Review of available documentation shows that all four systems are variations 
of the same SyrEx system, created locally in Ukraine by a private IT software 
company (Borschev). A number of key managers of Alliance Ukraine are among the 
individuals holding ownership rights to the SyrEx software, which the GF paid for.
83
 
Participants reported that the PRs required SRs to use their data collection 
systems, offered no choice between different data documentation systems or 
discussion of whether those chosen were suitable for users. ―The reporting database 
systems are being imposed. The SRs cannot choose anything else‖ (028: 151); ―It is 
not possible to choose a different system‖ (003:199). 
Participants had the following opinions of the SyrEx software:  
1) SyrEx is owned and therefore controlled by Alliance: ―this system was invented 
by Alliance itself‖ (048:140); ―SyrEx gives Alliance ―a monopoly on data‖ (041: 
279);―because Alliance owned SyrEx, they could correct it at any time‖ (042: 247); 
‗SyrEx- a monopolist programme‖ (041: 229): 
SyrEx is Alliance owned [software] programme, and they can do whatever they 
want with it. All kinds of changes can be put in or put out. The one who orders, 
controls the results. (047: 540-548) 
2) This database is not possible to be verified or controlled externally: 
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 The names and affiliations are on file with the author. 
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NGOs are accountable only financially in Ukraine. Programmatically, they only 
report to Alliance. CCM has no relation to this reporting. These reports are just 
presented to CCM, nobody knows how to verify them, and if report says that 80 
people received condoms, the CCM does not know how this information was 
received. All reporting systems are developed by PRs. (026: 436-445) 
SyrEx validity is questionable. Because clients are not required to come in 
person, but only to be registered. (014: 312-314) 
3) Difficult to work with: ―silly system‖ (003:294), ―not reliable‖ (012: 334), 
―paradoxical‖ (042:320), ―there was not one quarter when there was not a problem 
with using SyrEx‖ (006: 433). 
4) SyrEx data is only used to report for GF money: ―SyrEx is used to monitor 
internally the GF projects‖ (025: 117), ―data from SyrEx used to submit money 
requests to GF‖ (043: 368). 
5) Data reported is not used for state or regional HIV programming and cannot be 
used for state statistical purposes in Ukraine: ―SyrEx is not a programme to prepare 
state reports, we kept parallel calculations‖ (003: 188-193). ―SyrEx data is not used 
in national planning‖ (025: 116); ―This data is ..only used for GF and Price 
Waterhouse [LFA], because it cannot be operational in Ukraine‖ (012: 411-416). 
6) SyrEx aggregates one-year project data, and is then re-set at the beginning of the 
next project year: ―database closes at the end of project year‖ (021: 390); ―Clients are 
counted during one project cycle which is one year. The next year, the database is 
annulled, and if clients come, they are counted as new [clients]‖ (028: 192-93). 
7) PRs conduct expensive conferences and trainings on how to use SyrEx databases: 
―expensive training about methodologies for collecting data. It is not needed by 
NGOs. They are not linked to methodology, they only provide services. Much money 
is spent on SyrEx training‖ (041: 548-553);  ―trainings are held in the most expensive 
conference halls, or in resorts – and it is a Feast in the time of Plague – you cannot 
call it otherwise. This wastes a lot of money‖ (040: 206-209). 
8) SyrEx is not certified in Ukraine: 
Why didn‘t they [PRs] adopt a system that was legally normalized? Because 
they would need to certify their system in ministries that regulate coding and 
certification in Ukraine. But they were probably afraid that their database 
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would not pass through these systems – on how they ensure data protection, 
etc. But most important, they did not have an obligation that this programme 
should be adopted by the state. They simply needed a reporting system to 
demonstrate to GF – electronic system to show to GF how they conduct the 
work with GF money. (048: 248-256). 
 
5.4 Data reporting practices as reported by research participants  
5.4.1 Coverage and its importance. Evolving language of „coverage‟  
The definition of ―coverage‖ in the provision of HIV services deserves a 
closer look. Drew defines coverage as ―a measure of how much a service is used‖ 
(Drew 2005e, p. 8) and notes that coverage of clients by HIV services as the least 
well-defined but most disputable indicator. Having analysed coverage by services for 
IDUs in Round 1, he noted that the levels remained ―significantly short of the 
target‖(Drew 2005e, p. 11). The UNAIDS External Evaluation identified coverage as 
one of the critical barriers to the national AIDS response and noted ―limited capacity 
of NGOs to further scale up services to meet ambitious targets for coverage, 
especially among population groups and in cities and towns with limited or no 
coverage‖ (UNAIDS 2009, p. 33). 
The Alliance M&E Manual embarks on a lengthy description of how to 
define coverage: ―Different terms are used in international literature to reflect the 
number of people reached with a specific package of services during a certain time 
period. It is often referred to as either coverage or uptake. Sometimes the term 
coverage is used to define which geographical areas have prevention or care and 
support projects, thus showing a potential possibility for vulnerable groups to ... 
receive services, while the term uptake is used to define the actual contact of client 
and service provider. In this manual, we use the term coverage to describe actual 
numbers of people reached‖ (International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2008, p. 45). Further 
on in the manual, coverage is defined as not actual numbers of people reached, but as 
“the number of people who receive a service expressed as a percentage of those who 
need the service. Thus, for coverage calculations, the number of people receiving the 
service is the numerator and the number needing the service is the denominator‖ 
(ibid., p. 46). 
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Analysis of PR reports suggests that both the numbers and percentage figures 
were used to account for coverage. There is wide variation in coverage figures in 
different reports in relation to GF-funded prevention. For example, the Round 6 
Summary Report published by Alliance (2012, p. 5) cites: ―the cumulative coverage 
(in 2007 – 2012) with prevention services was 429,778 people who inject drugs, 
74,908 sex workers, 52,469 men who have sex with men, and 146,535 prisoners‖. 
Further on, the same report on page 8, citing another GF publication on Ukraine, 
mentions ―more than 160,000 people who inject drugs covered with prevention 
services‖ within the period from 2005 to 2011 (Alliance 2012, pp. 5-8). A Factfile 
map on the International HIV/AIDS Alliance web-site presents the coverage figures 
for Eastern Europe (where Ukraine is the only country having their Linking 
Organisation) as: 464,854 people in 2011, and 262,131 people in 2012, reached 
through HIV prevention services there (International HIV/AIDS Alliance n.d. 3).  
The evolving language of ‗coverage‘ used by PRs was another feature in GF-
funded programmes. The language used to describe coverage changed over time, 
from ‗covering high risk groups with 60% services‘ in (Drew 2005; and Smyrnov 
2009), to ‗reaching‘ most-at-risk-populations with prevention services (Alliance 
2012). A GF-funded brochure in 2013 spoke of IDUs who ‗had access to prevention 
services‘ (Alliance 2013). The OIG final report does not use the term ‗coverage‘ at 
all, but rather uses two terms – ‗clients reached‘ with prevention services and ‗clients 
served‘ (OIG 2012b, p. 30). [emphasis added] 
There was a discrepancy in how different terms came to be used: ‗reached by 
services‘ meant ‗reached once‘ while ‗covered‘ meant reached by regular services. 
The APMG report noted when observing the data collected by PRs, that ―ever 
reached‖ and ―annual reach‖ figures were generally referred to as ―coverage‖ 
(APMG 2009, p. 17). 
In Round 6, the Merezha, responsible for the care and support component of 
the GF grant, used the CasePlus documentation system that is a technical variation of 
SyrEx. The following definition was used for a ‗covered‘ person living with HIV as:  
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Person Living with HIV (adult, child affected by the epidemic) – who has 
received a minimum package of (two) services during the reported period 
(Salabai 2011, p. 16). 
Coverage by services in GF-funded programmes and its definition was one of 
the thematic areas of the Interview Guide. Participants‘ answers were spread, without 
a common approach and with a wide variability in understanding of what was meant 
by coverage. In some accounts, it was ―a very variable indicator‖ (002: 243-244), 
while in others, ―coverage figures were fixed‖ (046: 420). 
Among other features of coverage noted by participants were the following: 
a) Cumulative counting of clients of HIV services was reported in R1:  
.. at the beginning there was a different counting system. It was 
cumulative… for several years. Some people could come several times 
during this time. Within a year, we could say more realistically how many 
people came. (019: 70-74) 
[Participant 017]: First we had all cumulative data. Horrible – there were 
tens of thousands there – cumulatively - and we understood that really we 
don‘t have so many… so we started to deduct some figure ourselves… as 
a kind of mean arithmetic. 
[Researcher]: how did you calculate that? 
[017]: Don‘t know. Alliance deducted. So this year we covered.... 
[number], but one third of them are ‗dead souls‘ – they will never come 
again. I do not know how this was calculated. They conducted surveys or 
something. Alliance said – here is what we counted. They impose their 
counts on us. (017: 393-400)  
b) Coverage data had a high variability – it could mean different things in 
different places, or not providing the whole package of services, but only 
some of them: 
Coverage can be one thing, and can be the other thing… there may be a 
coverage, but with low quality services. (002: 234-235) 
Coverage also meant distribution of brochures. If a volunteer distributed 
100 brochures, it was considered 100 clients were covered. (003:112-114) 
 c) Coverage figures are not important because clients are not linked to care: 
―coverage… NGOs show 60% - but of what? It is not linked to care‖ (020: 567-570). 
5.4.2 A „minimum‟ (basic) package of HIV prevention services and its 
evolution 
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A core prevention approach used by GF in Ukraine is based on provision of 
an ‗elementary package of services‘ (Drew 2005e). Data obtained from provision of 
HIV services, numbers of clients covered etc. is aggregated through the SyrEx 
database.  
Questions in the Interview Guide asked participants to define a minimum 
package of services. Participants gave the following descriptions: ―Syringes. 
Counseling by social worker. Information material. Condom. Spirit wipes – a set of 
supplies‖ (017: 510-511); ―minimum package of services for MSM is: condom, 
lubricant, information material, consultation. Regarding HIV screening, not sure it is 
part of a minimum package‖ (028: 209-212). 
While some participants suggested that minimum package existed in both R1 
and R6 programmes: 
When we only started to work, the minimal service included handing out 
paraphernalia and informing. Later, counselling was added, and then work of 
psychologist. Evolution was going from the point of view of developing 
quality, the quality of service itself, and increasing the range of services 
(diversification). (024: 291-295) 
But others thought that reporting on the minimum package began only in Round 6, in 
2009 and was not done in R1. 
Receiving the minimum package of services was linked to the frequency of a 
client‘s visit. Participants were asked how often a client needed to receive HIV 
services to count as covered. The answers suggest two variants of reporting options:  
 One time: ―In SyrEx–  once in a lifetime – and already covered‖ (025: 582-
83): 
 
―[017] Once. That‘s all. He came, received, and already was counted as a 
programme participant, and as covered.  
Researcher: And if he did not come again? 
[017]: Well… if he did not come… he did not come… (017: 385-390) 
 More than once – including ‗once a month‘ to ‗two or three times per 
quarter‘. 
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Regarding the number of services received, there was no uniform perception of 
what qualified. Some suggested ―covered by [minimum] service was based on two 
services received‖ (024: 282-284). Others suggested that clients were not receiving 
minimal package of services in each visit: ―standard package of services - there may 
be different services in different visits‖ (003: 349-350). 
A large number of participants reported that the nomenclature of prevention 
services and the number of people to be covered were already pre-determined by PRs 
(Alliance), and that SR NGOs could neither define the needs for prevention services, 
nor choose services themselves: 
The range of services to be offered that presumably were needed by clients, 
was already determined. First of all, clients required syringes, condoms and 
information materials, so work should be around handing these supplies to 
them at NEPs and other points. So when NGOs were asked to write what 
services were needed, this meant in reality to choose from the services 
already given. By imposing pre-set services, Alliance acted as a restrictor, 
and a grave-digger of service provision (046: 310-20). 
 
5.4.3 Defining clients of HIV services: „old‟ clients and „new‟ clients. Coding 
clients 
Alliance M&E Manual outlines ―a single electronic management information 
system (MIS) of clients of various HIV prevention projects for IDUs, CSWs and 
MSM, which makes it possible to identify former and present regular clients‖ 
(Alliance 2008, p. 33). However, the MEASURE evaluation (2011, p. 23) noted that 
in Alliance M&E data management, two aspects of service provision were ―not fully 
understood: the ‗definition of client‘, as well as what makes a client eligible to be 
counted as having received HIV preventive services‖. 
The APMG report described problems with client recruitment, lack of 
incentive for NGOs to retain clients, as well as lack of attraction in clients to services 
offered:  
In at least two sites, a successful PDI
84
 process led to a large number of new 
clients being attracted (by the financial incentives of the PDI) but few of these 
                                                          
84
 Peer-Driven-Intervention (PDI) – a method that relies on respondent educating and recruiting peers 
for services (Matiyash 2012). The method involves recruiting ‗seed‘ workers who get paid for 
bringing in more people to service. In GF-funded settings, the PDI system allowed for clients to 
receive services for other clients by presenting their cards. 
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were converted into regular clients. In one case at least, the SR seemed to 
have a deliberate policy of not wanting PDI clients to become regular users 
of their services as this would lead to budget problems and staff being 
overwhelmed with work. In the other case, it seemed that the services offered 
were not sufficiently attractive to the new clients to keep them coming back. 
(APMG 2009, pp. 18-19) [emphasis added] 
 
 The Interview Guide asked to define a ‗client of HIV prevention services‘, 
how to distinguish between a ‗new client‘ and an ‗old client,‘ and how or whether the 
old clients are retained in the database. The definition of what constituted a ‗service‘ 
was also sought.  
Participants suggested that the definition of ‗client‘ and what constituted a 
‗service‘ were linked to reporting by the SyrEx database. Participants‘ responses 
suggest two qualifiers that were important to person being registered as a client: 
frequency of visits, and how many services were received by a client in one visit. In 
regard to both, there was no uniform view of what counted as a ‗service‘ and who 
counted as a ‗client‘. Speaking about the frequency of visits, the minimum number of 
times a person needed to come to count as a ‗client‘ of HIV services, was one – i.e. 
the person needed to only come once: ―Came once – and got into database. If he was 
entered into database, so he remains there. Even if he does not come again‖ (035: 
139-141), ―once in a lifetime and already covered‖ (025: 582-83), ―To be considered 
covered – once in a lifetime of a project‖ (014: 215). 
Other suggestions varied from person needing to come twice: ―New – the one 
who came for the second time‖ (048: 195-197), ‗once a month‘ to ‗two or three times 
per quarter‘: ―permanent client - came once a month - covered once a month and 
already permanent‖ (012: 347), ―Two or three times per quarter… but some come 
less [frequently] and are still counted‖ (028: 190-192). 
Participants noted that the duration of NGO projects was important in 
defining clients. As mentioned in Chapter 4, most NGO grant contracts lasted only 
for one year. Participants referred to this practice as ‗historical‘, introduced by 
Alliance: ―there are certain requirements of Alliance. Their grant cycle is one year, 
and they only give money for one year. It has been historically like this‖ (021: 160-
62). Participants reported that at the end of each project (year) the client database 
236 
 
was annulled: ―we begin a new year by annulling database‖ (024: 269). If an NGO 
had won another grant, they would begin a new database in which every client would 
be input as ‗new‘. Participants suggested a confusion of viewing clients as ‗old‘ or 
‗new‘ was linked to using the SyrEx database: ―new project period – means a new 
client base. Everything gets counted anew. There is a [database] key to close the 
period‖ (003: 304-309). 
There is a nuance about these databases. The clients are counted during one 
project cycle which is one year. The next year, the database is annulled, and if 
clients come, they are counted as new [clients]. (028: 191-193) 
Participants noted that when NGOs receive a new grant, they would be 
typically visited by both groups of clients – those who knew the NGO before and 
new ones who just came. Because the database was annulled each year, most clients 
from the old group were re-counted as new:―The projects are for one year. When the 
project ends, and new one starts, these people are already new clients. So in reality… 
we know them, we know their faces, but programme-wise they are counted as new 
[clients]‖ (032: 259-263). 
Some participants did not see a distinction between the regular and new 
clients because the way clients were defined, was based on clients‘ own words. There 
was no way to check the information clients provided about themselves: 
Some part of those will be new people, some would come from previous 
project. Again. If they say they have not attended before and they are new, 
who can check this? (017: 364-366) 
There was no incentive to retain clients in services: 
There are problems with ―old‖ clients. [NGOs] do not want to serve them. 
There is a tendency now to look for new clients… there are such projects that 
get paid to find new ones. But old clients also come. So they are re-coded as 
new clients. They give him a new code – and he passes as new. You cannot 
throw the person out. (012: 345-356) 
Some participants tried to define ‗old‘ or ‗permanent‘ client (postoyannyi client): 
―Permanent client – the one who is visiting twice a month. As a minimum‖ (048: 
200-202). 
237 
 
Others suggested there was no such thing as ‗old clients‘: ―There is no such 
thing as clients from previous years‖ (003: 265), ―old clients don‘t exist‖ (012: 358). 
A number of participants reported confusion between counting the number of 
clients and the number of services, and that higher number of clients reported would 
increase chances of NGOs to continue receiving funds:  
[Researcher]: How are services counted in NGOs? Who is classified as a 
client? 
[020]: Counted, but all wrong. Why? Because in all our NGOs one and the 
same client is counted. Why is this needed?  
Researcher: May be, he simply wants to get maximum of services in different 
organisations? 
[020]: it‘s his problem. Such is our mentality. We want to grab here and 
there, and there. At the same time we say we work in a tandem. By services – 
we count that we delivered 100,000 but it means in reality that 10.000 people 
went through services– ten times less. … NGOs blow up statistics in order to 
participate in project, to receive more money. But there are no norms. NGOs 
act on their own. So we have few people covered, but with so many services, 
and money is plenty, so why there is plenty of money, because they are linked 
to the number of services and not to the client. (020: 114-139) 
 
Coding clients 
  
Coding of clients was done during most part of R1 through the SyrEx system. 
The OIG 2012 report described the basis for assigning the client codes in GF 
programmes and suggested there was a high variability of coding systems, as a result 
of which, double counting of clients was possible: 
Client codes are based on personal information in order to be restored easily 
in case of loss of client card records. [T]he current client coding system used 
by the Network does not address the risk of double counting by Sub-
recipients delivering the same services. Coding systems currently vary from 
one organization to another. (OIG 2012b, p. 37) 
 
In 2011, the Unified Coding System (UCS) of counting clients was piloted by 
Alliance, as a measure to avoid data duplication (OIG 2012b) (see Figure 5.4): 
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 Figure 5.3 Launching a Unified System of Client Registration (Alliance 2012, 
p. 37) 
 
Alliance R6 final report underlined that the implementation of the new 
Unified Codes reduced the probability of clients‘ double counting and increased data 
accuracy. However, the Summary Report on 2011 results, released by Alliance a few 
months earlier, noted that “a client will have an opportunity to get services in several 
NGOs simultaneously‖,[emphasis added] while ―the client‘s code will be the same in 
every NGO‖ (Alliance 2012a, p.4). It remained unclear whether, by documenting 
multiple use of services by same clients, the new coding system would help to 
overcome the existing confusion between the number of clients and the number of 
services, reported above, or contribute to it. 
The interviews for this study were conducted at a time when the new coding 
system was being introduced and this topic generated considerable response. 
Participants described the old coding system as based on self-reporting from 
clients. The staff person then assigned a code to the client based on the information 
given by client: 
Alliance recommends that organizations create codes themselves. They use 
family name, patronymic etc. Capital letters. But a smart person would know 
how to use this system. This should not be coded by a staff person. Coding 
needs to be assigned automatically. By an automated system. (048: 237-242) 
Regarding the new Unified coding, participants suggested that the new 
system could be open to manipulation because it was also based on information 
provided from clients‘ own words. Besides, it did not require clients to show up but 
only to be registered and have cards: 
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A Unique Code system is based on cards. But we detest it..Because 
information is taken from client‘s own words.If client said a Unique name – 
for example – mother‘s name, date of birth etc – and has been assigned a 
Unique code, he understood that. Then he went to a different point of delivery 
– with a slightly changed mother‘s name – and there he gets a new Unique 
code. So he takes his new card and leaves. We have clients – drug-store based 
– who come having ten cards. (017: 367-376) 
Drug users brought registration cards of other drug users. It is convenient for 
organization to distribute materials to many people to one person at once. It is 
beneficial to drug users who get multiple supplies at once. But another 
question – who is behind those cards? (014: 221-224) 
Participants also noted the new system did not have a mechanism to capture 
overlapping clients: 
After the Global Fund requirement – in 2011 – they began introducing a new 
unified code – to avoid duplication. For example, there is one city in Ukraine 
that had 14 NGOs that were funded by one PR. So clients were walking 
around town visiting all these organizations. (028: 196-206) 
The person needs to receive multiple services. Nobody is controlling him – 
not me not another organization. There is no such mechanism as to control his 
movements. (006: 230-232) 
 
5.4.4 Some features of reporting culture as perceived by participants  
Drew in Trip 6 report underlined a need to build an ―M&E culture which is 
focused on collecting essential, high-quality data that is needed to mount an effective 
response to the epidemic‖. He outlined a few barriers to this culture: over-reliance on 
passive case reporting, the norm that meeting targets is more important than 
reporting accurate data, the view that ―measuring more indicators and conducting 
more surveys is better than doing a few good surveys and measuring a few key 
indicators well‖ (Drew 2005d, pp. 5-6).  
‗A good M&E system‘, Drew implied, should include rigorous systems for 
ensuring that data is true, particularly in settings where pressures to present ‗on-
target‘ data were high – and under such pressure settings were ―all settings where 
performance-based funding applies and also in cultures where targets were expected 
to be met or there would be fear of punishment‖ (Drew 2005d, p. 11). Spicer et al. 
observed ―a culture of fear derived from concerns for personal safety but also risk of 
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losing donor largesse‖ that their study identified among the CSO representatives in 
Ukraine (Spicer et al. 2011, p.1754).  
The AMPG report (2009) reviewed monitoring processes in SR NGOs and 
noted two parallel processes for data gathering –―Official Process‖ by which social 
workers first entered the information into their journals, then transferred this 
information onto the standardized paper forms, and then put it into SyrEx database; 
and the ―Actual Process‖ by which staff made informal Field Notes for their own 
use, and then transferred information to official monitoring forms and database 
(APMG 2009, pp. 23-24). Observations of outreach and other activities found 
examples of social workers not filling in monitoring forms or spending so much time 
on the forms he had no time to talk to clients, as well as clients showing up with two 
or three registration cards and with up to seven PDI cards
85
. The report concluded 
that ―client registration mechanism and existing forms did not prevent double 
counting of clients‖ (ibid., p. 24). 
Participants noted the internal character of monitoring as a feature of PR data 
collection: ―a lot of Monitoring and Evaluation data published by GF Principal 
Recipients in Ukraine was generated internally. [T]here was no system in place to 
check the veracity or validity of those data.‖ (049: 368-371)  
Chapter 4 described reaching GF targets as a ‗race for figures‘. Instances of 
pripiski (add-ons, or double counting) of data on providing services provision were 
reported by participants as widely spread in GF-funded settings.  
In particular, a specific case of pripiski was described in R1 in regard to a 
state Sub-recipient. In this case, coverage data in state services run parallel with the 
NGO data providing services, while sharing the same clients: 
When harm reduction programmes began, the state services for youth created 
Trust centres, but the state did not execute these programmes, it could not 
execute them. They were done by NGOs whose statistics were simply used 
by state programmes. The same clients were shown twice – in GF programme 
statistics, and in state statistics on youth services(014: 66-72). 
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 PDI – Peer-driven Intervention, see a footnote on p.266. 
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Participants described how the process of pripiski worked in other GF-settings.  
Pripiski were done at both stages of SR projects: 
 At submission: writing a proposal with a ‗desired‘ number of clients – even if 
organization knew it may not be able to cover them: 
 The sum of a grant project depends on the number of clients that project 
serves. If organization submitted a project to cover 500 clients, but in reality 
it only has 100 clients – it makes them write in these 400 clients anyway. 
(028: 174-177) 
 
 At the reporting stage – when reporting the number of services delivered – 
because under-reporting was discouraged: 
At last, under pressure of facts, it became obvious that there are obvious 
pripiski, which were on the surface denied but … indirectly you see this... the 
drug scene is closing down, but coverage is growing, funding is reduced – 
and logically, the coverage of every new client should be more expensive – 
but it looks cheaper… so when in some projects coverage approached 104% - 
like in Soviet elections, (smiles) and calculations were even made to show 
that it was impossible for such a number of clients to pass through a NEP
86
 in 
one day – that was equal the number of people in May Day parade‖  (046: 
276-285). 
 
If you cannot influence the indicator, you can influence how it is counted… 
organization puts effort so that indicator becomes like it needs to be. (041: 
287-290) 
[P]ostavit galochku – means to fill the number of clients planned in target 
indicators. (041: 492-93) 
 
 
Participants noted that in order to satisfy the overall PR targets, pro forma 
reporting was taking place. One of reported practices was occurring during supplies 
disruptions. On such occasions, PR (Alliance) would tell SRs to reduce handing out 
needles/syringes etc. until the supplies were restored, but show regular hand-outs in 
reporting: ―there were periods when supplies are disrupted. Alliance says – reduce 
hand-outs to clients. When supplies are restored, more instrumentarium 
(paraphernalia) should be handed out so that in the overall result it all looks even – as 
much as was planned, was distributed‖ (012: 308-315); ―Organisations always hold 
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 Needle and Syringe Exchange Point (NEP) 
242 
 
on to some amount of dirty syringes in case of inspection from donor, or in case  if 
monitoring comes‖ (014: 486-492). 
Participants spoke about ―mass data falsification by NGOs in Round 6‖ (042: 
351), because PR reporting systems allowed for ―multiple comebacks‖ (019: 601). 
Participants also reported that a part of the reporting culture in GF-funded 
services was a tendency not to include information about unreached targets: 
[Efficiency studies] are conducted, but how they are conducted? We are used 
to this practice – you always need to report that everything is good. Bad? -
nobody would say this about his organisation. Bad – means everybody 
worked badly. It is deeply rooted. This is a practice [common] in all 
programmes and projects now. (043: 148-153) 
 Some participants reported inflation of data on syringe exchange: ―reported 
data is inflated. There are targets that must be met. Funding determines the number 
of clients to be covered‖ (014: 159-160); ―Majority of syringes were never collected‖ 
(012: 492). 
A number of participants suggested that ‗pretty‘ prevention targets were set 
high by PR to GF, and then passed on to local SRs to implement: 
NGOs were scared to do re-programming, even if they saw targets could not 
be reached, because it cast a cloud on the organisation. Nobody wanted to 
stick out, and everybody wanted to show pretty indicators, but how to achieve 
them? If [SR] NGOs would start massively to re-programme their targets and 
draw them to real figures, then Alliance would have to do the same at the 
national scale. And they did not want to because they already blew 
themselves off to GF. (046: 420-428) 
 
Participants also suggested that double counting was resulting from other 
donors funding the same organisations
87
:  
There is a paradox, but all programmes are the same: GF, UN, SUNRISE. 
Often there are overlapping activities – this project is handing out syringes, 
and that project is handing out syringes, these ones attract clients and those 
attract clients. Often the same clients come. From year to year, the same 
organizations win grants. So it‘s not only duplication, but triplication, 
quadruplication. (012: 273-279) 
                                                          
87In Chapter 4, the process of channeling the funding to ‗mega‘ NGOs in high-priority regions was 
described. 
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Regarding how wide-spread data inflation practices were, participants 
suggested that ―fictitious reports are compiled by 70% to 80% of all NGOs‖ (014: 
172-173). Others suggested that no information coming from NGO could be verified: 
―Regarding the third sector, assessment was given to NGOs. In fact, I could give any 
figure – from the ceiling – and it would pass‖ (046: 341-345). 
5.5 Other issues of access to HIV services 
A number of other issues related to accessing HIV prevention services came 
up in document analysis and in interviews. Semigina (2009) evaluated the overall 
accessibility of HIV services in Ukraine. In the study, data obtained from service 
providers and clients suggested different perspectives between providers and clients 
– ―the vast majority of service providers rated their organisation as highly accessible; 
clients were far more critical about levels of service access, with a high proportion 
rating a service highly or fairly inaccessible‖ (Semigina et al. 2008, p. 8). The study 
noted the interviewees having been recruited through GF-funded organisations, 
therefore the survey was not able ―to elicit the perspectives of individuals not using 
HIV/AIDS services‖(ibid., p. 14), which can be seen as affecting the study‘s 
conclusions. 
As noted above, access to services in regions had wide variations as diffusion 
of GF programmes into all geographical locations in Ukraine was not even. 
Semigina(2009) reported that in R1, most GF funding was disbursed in the six major 
regions: Kyiv and Kyiv oblast, Odesa, Mykolayiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts 
and Crimea, she also noted that GF-funded programmes tended to be established in 
areas where USAID programmes already worked. The APMG evaluation noted that 
―expansion into agrarian regions by SRs has been difficult because of logistical and 
ideological difficulties and the need for intensive infrastructure investment to reach 
relatively few clients‖ (APMG 2009, p. 20).  
Participants thought that GF funding was directed mostly into the high 
priority regions – and in them, mostly into oblast centers and large cities- because 
USAID already funded work there, and infrastructure was relatively well developed: 
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―USAID policy had important influence over distribution of services in regions‖ 
(049: 152-166). 
An outcome was, as suggested by participants, that the GF-funded services 
were not reaching beyond urban areas: 
The problem is that services do not reach to the district level, or level of small 
towns. (002: 305-315) 
..rural populations are not covered. (010: 140-147) 
 
Regional gaps in the diffusion of HIV services were mapped in several 
reports. In 2009, Alliance-Ukraine report outlined ‗highly affected regions‘ where 
most of the Alliance [GF] investment focused (see Figure 6.1): 
Figure 5.4 Map of Ukraine with services and coverage (Smyrnov 2009) 
 
The map shows that most GF investment focused in the following oblasts: 
Kyiv, Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Odesa, Mykolayiv, Kherson and Crimea. 
It is clearly seen that the numbers of people covered (shown in blue and red inside 
white boxes) were the highest in these oblasts. In line with findings presented above 
about the coverage and duplication of services, it is easy to imagine how these large 
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numbers were generated by regional ‗Mega NGOs‘ located only in a handful of 
Ukraine‘s regions, and were then passed on to construct the national coverage data. 
Because the coverage data reported for Ukraine by PRs to GF was cumulative, in 
reality coverage was only occurring in a fraction of regions, leaving other regions 
under-covered or covered irregularly. 
A 2010 report had similarly shown an uneven concentration of GF-funded projects in 
the regions:  
Figure 5.5 Projects on HIV/STI prevention among target groups (GFATM, 2010, p. 
10) 
 
As seen from the map, multiple projects for all populations targeted by GF 
were concentrated in Donetsk, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, 
while Chernihiv, Zhitomir, Chernivtsi, Uzhgorod, and Lutsk oblasts had few 
projects, and those only reached one group - drug users.  
Lack of research on whether access to GF-funded services was gender-
sensitive should be noted. Available documents express concerns regarding whether 
the GF-funded services were gender-specific. OIG has noted general lack of 
understanding of the meaning of gender specific client needs (OIG 2012b), while 
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APMG evaluation noted ―systemic lack of understanding around women-specific 
barriers to services‖ (APMG 2009, p. 20): 
[T]here was little evidence that gender-specific services were being offered 
beyond the female sex worker programs, or that staff had basic knowledge 
around the unique needs of women who use drugs, men who have sex with 
men or transgendered clients. In most focus groups with staff it was asked if 
they had any special programming for women or unique services tailored to 
women and consultants were consistently told that women were treated 
equally and had the same access to services as men. When asked if women 
had unique barriers to services, staff seemed confused.  
 
The gender dimension of HIV services was not covered by Interview Guide 
questions, mainly because it represented a wider scope of analysis that this study 
objectives were not meant to cover.  
Participants spoke about knowing about women-centred initiatives in GF-
funded settings, but reported those were not seen as active, opened by PRs: 
You have a network of women with HIV/AIDS… but it‘s quite inactive 
because it‘s just a kind of branch of All-Ukrainian Network (of PLWH). 
There is probably a gap here... (050: 365-367). 
Similarly, there was no documented evidence found that GF-funded services 
were income-specific. One participant suggested that GF-funded programmes did not 
distinguish among different drug users and targeting of IDUs was not means-tested: 
It was not known if drug user was rich or poor. Economic criteria were not 
considered – behaviour was the same, but economic factors not counted. It is 
important, because drug users differ in how much money they have. Drug 
user with money has no problem buying syringe [in drugstore], they need to 
be aware that they should buy it. But for drug user without money – you need 
to do something… but how to distinguish? It was not done. Only behaviour 
characteristics were important. (039: 98-105). 
Reports mentioned issues of access to services for disabled people. The APMG 
report noted that: 
A number of community centres and some other services were on the third, 
fourth or even fifth floor of high-ceilinged buildings so that people who may 
be ill with HIV disease or have mobility problems would be unlikely to 
access them easily. Also, though most clients seemed resigned to having to 
travel long distances to access NSP
88
, especially at fixed sites, and 
community centres, SRs were concerned that they could no longer provide 
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NSP – Needle and Syringe Programmes. 
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transportation assistance to clients and that this would lead to fewer clients 
accessing NSP and other services.  (APMG 2009, p. 21) 
 
Conclusion 
It can be summarized that the practices of data inflation, regardless of their 
scope, can be a litmus test of serious gaps in data processing and cast doubt over the 
whole coverage data reported by PRs. Lack of unified standards of services and wide 
deviations in understanding ‗clients‘ of services contribute to this uncertainty, as well 
as ownership of the data software by one of the PRs. Independent research into this 
area needs to be continued that would engage a wide range of respondents.  
Studies into whether the GF-funded services in Ukraine were gender-
sensitive, as well as income-based and disability-sensitive, deserve a special look and 
represent interesting venues of further research on GF. Lack of understanding of the 
needs of sub-populations, and ‗blindness‘ to cross-cutting issues such as age, gender 
and income, may be explained by mostly behavioristic and narrow view on injecting 
drug users as a homogenous group. Existence of such a view was possible due to 
externally imposed approaches to HIV prevention that appeared not to be adapted to 
realities in Ukraine. 
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CHAPTER 6. CCM IN UKRAINE:  A FALLACY OF COUNTRY 
COORDINATION OR A WORKING GF GOVERNANCE MODEL?  
6.1. Country coordination in GF programmes in Ukraine: why study CCM?  
 As described in Chapter 1, according to the country ownership principle, 
GFATM does not have in-country presence or representation and relies on a model in 
which Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs) develop proposals and oversee 
programmes, PRs receive funding and implement programmes, and a LFA provides 
in-country monitoring. The CCM is viewed mainly as a model of multi-sectoral 
coordination, in which different sectors are assumed to play different roles: ―While 
government lends political legitimacy to this partnership, NGOs incorporate the 
aspirations of the poor and marginalized, and private sector actors contribute a 
results-oriented work ethic. Development partners bring technical support and 
financial resources from the international community‖ (GFATM 2008, p. 9). 
The CCM-related governance in GF programmes has only recently began to be 
researched (Spicer et al 2010). There is evidence suggesting that the CCM 
membership may be skewed towards organisations implementing GF programmes. 
The GF High-Level Panel reviewed CCMs that submitted successful applications to 
the GF from 2002 to 2011. Of the 132 CCMs, 95 percent contained members that 
were also PRs, SRs or sub-SRs (SSRs) (High-Level Panel 2011). Drew (2004) 
questioned the general validity of the CCM principle in the FSU states, relating it to 
the fact that the previous decision-making practice in the region had been (and often 
remains) much more centralised. 
Because of a special importance assigned to CCM to be an embodiment of the 
country ownership principle, studying how this model manifested itself in Ukraine 
was an interesting part of this study. By bringing together multiple actors in 
HIV/AIDS at the country level, CCMs represent a unique venue to observe and 
understand their roles in decision making, relations between them, as well as 
decision making mechanisms, policies and practices that are revealed through the 
CCM functioning in a particular country.  
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The country coordination needs to be discussed bearing in mind that the 
‗classical‘ CCM model, in the way it was introduced by GF as a multi-sectoral 
mechanism, is typically viewed in context of government-led GF programmes that 
constitute the majority of the recipients globally(see below):  
Figure 6.1 GF Portfolio by Implementing Entity for all Grants in 2005-2010
 
In such context, the ‗classical‘ CCM is viewed as a platform and a mechanism 
to mitigate and outbalance the implementing government and ensure that the voices 
of civil society and communities of people living with the diseases are represented.  
In many FSU countries, the GF principal recipients are indeed government 
institutions (GFATM 2013f). When governments administer the GF grants, under 
such a configuration, the CCM and recipient government are largely perceived as the 
same entity, with the level of awareness and knowledge, and mandate sufficient to 
make decisions over the programme implementation.  
Much less has been studied about how CCM model is realised in countries 
such as Russia, where applications could be made externally on a non-CCM basis 
(Garmaise, 2012), with PRs being one or several NGOs or, as in the case of Ukraine, 
an INGO and its Linking Organisation, with unclear mechanisms to ensure the PR 
accountability to national stakeholders and government. As the monitoring report on 
Ukraine‘s adherence to Paris Declaration noted, the NGOs in Ukraine are ―not 
subject to the same controls routinely imposed on the public administration 
bodies‖(OECD 2008, p. 51). The issue in question is what happens when NGOs are 
(GFATM 2011d, p.1) 
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in charge of GF funding and government is not, and how the CCM model would 
work in such a case. 
The specificity of Ukraine‘s governance context in GF grants was noted by a 
GF Portfolio Manager during a Stakeholders meeting on 23 September, 2009 in Kyiv 
who noted that the GF usually signed agreements with state entities in recipient 
countries that were ministries or government agencies. He described Ukraine‘s 
situation as a ‗grey field‘, where grant agreements were signed by GF with two 
NGOs, and underlined the importance of oversight of the GF programmes that 
should be within a framework of Ukraine‘s national law (Stakeholders Meeting 
2009).Semigina (2009) argued that Ukraine‘s HIV/AIDS response was primarily led 
by two PR NGOs who were unable to influence the larger HIV/AIDS policy but only 
influenced isolated segments of policy.  
Another specific feature of the GF-related governance in Ukraine lay in the 
way how the PRs positioned themselves on ownership over the GF funding. As noted 
earlier by Drew, in comparison with the GF globally perceived [PR] role ―not as an 
implementer of programs but rather as a funder of national response‖, there was a 
qualitative difference between this perception and how the Alliance as a Principal 
Recipient was selected to play this role (Drew 2005c, p. 14). Because of the way 
Alliance was selected by the GF as a Principal Recipient in R1, described in Chapter 
2, and the fact that they were conducting R1 programme ―in the absence of an agreed 
national program oversight mechanism‖ (ibid., p.14), the pattern was established 
when the PRs could function as distinct entities from government to run the GF 
programmes in country. Chapter 4 has shown how the PRs positioned themselves 
and were perceived as donors, funders, rather than implementers of a country-owned 
programme. This ‗donor‘ role that the PRs have taken on themselves to a large extent 
determined the way the country coordination mechanisms were to function.  
Among other factors affecting governance and country coordination were the 
‗urgency‘, ‗emergency‘, and ‗short-termism‘ of GF programmes –an approach that 
originated from the GF decision to transfer a R1 grant to a grant steward, as argued 
in Chapter 2. The pressing need to deliver massive GF programmes in a fast-paced 
environment often precluded the need for a democratic decision making and the need 
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to agree the decisions with a broader stakeholder community. Instead, as Chapters 4 
and 5 have shown, in many aspects of their decision making, the PRs acted 
opportunistically and practiced unilateral discretion: in target setting for HIV 
prevention services, in channeling GF funds, in service organization in the regions, 
and in data reporting practices.  
The section below presents a synthesis of document and interview analysis of 
how the CCM functioned during different stages of R1-R6 grants (2003-2012) in 
Ukraine, with a closer look into decision-making mechanisms, oversight function of 
GF programmes, and  challenges to HIV governance manifested in the CCM work. 
This is done with the aim of establishing whether, after the GF Round 1 grant 
transfer, the CCM in Ukraine has been an effective mechanism of country 
ownership. In particular, we looked into the following: 
 Whether the CCM worked as a national policy making body; 
 How it was working – whom it represented, what were the 
mechanisms of decision making, membership, voting, etc.; 
 How the CCM was affecting the relations between various actors 
involved in GF programmes; 
 How the CCM was perceived by various actors; and 
 Whether the CCM was an effective coordination structure. 
 
The OIG reports of 2008, 2009 and 2012, the GF High-Level Review (2011), 
a 2003report on CCM in Ukraine conducted by Prof. Luca Brusati, Roger Drew 
reports of 2004-2005, various country reports, Ukraine government and the GF 
documents served as document sources. Memos and notes taken by the author from 
observing the CCM meetings in Ukraine between 2009 and 2012 and prior to that, 
were also informing this chapter, in addition to Interview Guide questions through 
which the main amount of data was generated. The roles and functions of CCM are 
presented as perceived by study participants based on the interview analysis.  
6.2 Evolution of CCM in Ukraine 
In Ukraine, a number of national governance mechanisms on HIV/AIDS 
issues functioned at different times, outlined in Chapter 2. With the first country 
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submission in 2002and the beginning of the GF activities in Ukraine, a new type of 
governing body - CCM – emerged that became to be known as Natsionalna Rada or 
Natsrada - the National Council on the Issues of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other 
socially dangerous diseases. First established in 2002 to comply with the GF 
submission guidelines, at different times Natsrada had assumed different 
organizational forms, was sometimes dysfunctional or disbanded. Throughout its 
existence, Natsrada reflected more the country‘s compliance with international 
obligations and treaties, rather than emerged from previously existing governance 
mechanisms in HIV/AIDS policy. With terms of reference defining it as a 
recommendatory, consultative body, whose decisions needed to be further 
legitimized by different - and upper organs of power – such as President, Cabinet of 
Ministers, or MOH – it cannot be viewed as a fully governing body.  
In general, the CCM history in Ukraine falls into three main periods: 
1) A „proto‟ CCM. Beginning of Round 1: application and suspension - from 2002 to 
January 2004. 
A large, 45-member ‗Government Commission on Fighting HIV/AIDS‘ – 
Uryadova Komisiya - had multiple government ministries and few NGOs represented 
and was headed by the Deputy Prime-Minister of Ukraine (at the time, Vitaly 
Seminozhenko). It had a strong mandate as its decisions could be implemented 
directly and did not require additional government decree. This body has been 
largely perceived and referred to as the CCM in GF documents and later reports by 
OIG, UNAIDS, and other donors, based on the fact that it was responsible for 
consolidation and submission of a country R1 proposal. It needs to be remembered, 
however, that at the beginning of Round 1 grants – not only in Ukraine – the GF was 
just beginning to define the very concept of the Country Coordination Mechanism 
(Brusati 2003), and Ukraine‘s R1 submission happened before clear CCM guidelines 
had been developed (Drew, 2004). Brusati (2003) reported that when the R1 was 
already running and the GF issued CCM Guidelines in June 2003, none of the CCM 
stakeholders interviewed for his study knew about them as they were not provided by 
the GF Secretariat. He argued the CCM was proving to be ―an important testing 
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ground for Ukraine‖ (ibid., p. 24). [emphasis added] While the composition and 
capacity of this ‗proto-CCM‘ could be at odds with the GF implementation 
processes, and were criticised by a number of NGOs, from the point of view of 
Ukraine‘s government decision making, it was a central point and had a high 
representation of key national decision makers. After the GF 2004 decision to 
suspend the R1 grant, the Government Commission was disbanded (OIG 2008) and a 
period of massive government walk-out of AIDS structures ensued. DeBell and 
Carter (2011)suggest that by putting NGOs in charge of massive grants, the actions 
of GF have allowed the country to abdicate its national responsibility to develop an 
operating structure that can co-ordinate the fight against infection transmission. All 
the subsequent country coordinating mechanisms have functioned with a heavy 
donor presence. 
2) From May 2005 to July 2007. The second CCM – National Coordinating Council 
to Fight HIV/AIDS – Natsionalna Rada, or Natsrada - a „donor-dominated CCM‟. 
Its emergence deserves a special look. The second CCM emerged at the end 
of Phase 1 of R1 and had some of its activities and structures fully or partially funded 
by donors. Its establishment is linked to the ‗Stakeholders meetings‘- a de facto 
decision-making mechanism that functioned in Ukraine after the suspension of R1 
and Year 1 of Alliance GF Stewardship agreement that ran until 30 September 2005. 
Drew (2004) called ‗Stakeholders Meetings‘ by default the major HIV/AIDS 
coordination mechanism in Ukraine (emphasis added) and noted ‗reluctance‘ on the 
side of Alliance during the first stage of R1 to re-establish a CCM: 
 [T]here is little appetite for seeking to resurrect a body with the name of 
CCM in Ukraine. On the contrary, there is a strong feeling that the program is 
progressing well in the absence of a formal CCM (Drew 2004, p. 8)[emphasis 
added] 
 
As the Stewardship agreement was going closer to the end, no consensus 
existed between donors and the government on how to build government capacity to 
resume management of the programme in the future, as envisaged by the stewardship 
agreement. Drew noted the GF‘s reluctance to lead, or wait until the change of 
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government
89
, suggesting that a ―leadership gap‖ was created by the GF (Drew 
2005c, p. 11). Country governance structures around the GF programme continued to 
remain non-existent after the appointment of a new government of Julia Tymoshenko 
in February 2004, while donor-controlled ‗Stakeholders Meetings‘ performed a 
quasi-governance role. The need for this structure was explained by the fragility of 
the moment and the need for a ―diplomatic approach‖ with the new government 
(Drew 2005c, p. 11).  
Meanwhile, without settled governance structures, and despite the existence 
of the new government, on March 21, 2005, the GF sent an invitation letter to submit 
a request for continued R1 funding to Alliance, the Network of PLWHA, and the 
Ministry of Health, that had no decision making authority over international matters 
(Herbert 2005, cited by (Drew and Malkin 2005b, p. 28)). Previously, the GF had 
communicated on such matters, including the grant suspension, at the level of 
Deputy Prime Minister. The letter has said: ―Due to historical circumstances which 
have been transparently disclosed by the Global Fund to stakeholders on an ongoing 
basis, the earlier approved Ukraine proposal is now being implemented under the 
management of the International HIV/AIDS Alliance as a grant steward.‖90 The letter 
continued that ―given the absence of a functioning CCM in Ukraine, the recent 
election of a new government in Ukraine, … the Global Fund recognizes the need for 
flexibility in its grant management and renewal process‖.[emphasis added] The 
application to GF was to be submitted by the ‗Consolidation group‘(Drew and 
Malkin 2005b, p.22).The submission process was to be organised around the 
following timelines: 
                                                          
89
 The ‗Orange Revolution‘ in December 2004 has brought to power allegedly pro-Western President 
Viktor Yushchenko. More details on Ukraine‘s political history are provided in Chapter 1. 
90
 The GF letter of March 21, 2005 is on file with the author. 
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(text reproduced from the letter cited). 
The 21 March letter and the timeline show that the GF began to engage 
directly with its implementers on all matters, including governance issues. The 
pattern of engaging solely with non-state entities as PRs remained in future GF 
rounds in Ukraine
91
. 
After the GF 21 March letter stipulating a submission process by a non-CCM 
entity (Stakeholder supported ‗Consolidation group‘), events in Ukraine continued to 
unroll. On May 17, 2005, just on the eve of the GF submission deadline, the 
formation of the new National Council on AIDS was announced (Government Portal, 
2005), and on the same day the new CCM meeting endorsed the country submission 
to the GF. The new Grant Agreement acknowledged that ―the Alliance was 
nominated by a group of stakeholder representatives” and was ―endorsed‖ by the 
National Council (GFATM 2005, p.1) [emphasis added]. The OIG noted the decision 
to nominate Alliance as PR for the new grant was made without a review of its 
performance, stipulated by the 2004 stewardship agreement (OIG 2008, p. 18). 
The new Natsrada included Western government representatives as well as 
some INGOs. It had several sub-committees, whose role was to prepare draft 
documents and identify issues to be included into the CCM agenda and planning. Its 
activities, meetings, web-site were supported through the USAID-funded POLICY 
project which also paid salaries to the Secretariat of Natsrada. Notably, the 
                                                          
91
 In R9, Rinat Akhmetov‘s ‗Fund for Development of Ukraine‘ (FDU), a private foundation 
established by Ukraine‘s richest man, billionaire Rinat Akhmetov, from Donetsk, was nominated as a 
PR for Tuberculosis grant that Ukraine won after an appealing over the GF TRP decision. In Phase 1 
of Round 9, the FDU discontinued its PR obligations by a letter to the CCM. On September 15, 2013, 
GF entered into a R9 extension agreement with the state-run Ukrainian Center for Disease Control.  
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composition of the CCM showed a diminishing role of the UN family: apart from 
UNAIDS, all other UN family organisations were only represented by one entity.  
This was in contrast to previous formats such as UN Theme Group on AIDS and 
other multi-sectoral bodies that existed in Ukraine earlier. Some of the participants 
interviewed for this study suggested that the loss of UN leading role in governance 
structures was associated with the suspension of R1 grant where UNDP was one of 
the PRs. Earlier, Drew noted that the UNDP suspension made it difficult for other 
UN agencies to step forward and reported a person from a UN agency as saying, ―it 
is very difficult to act ‗if one of your brothers or sisters has been ―killed‖‘(Drew 
2005c, p. 4), he also noted that GF did not involve UN agencies in the decision to 
appoint the Alliance as a grant Steward. The pushing off of UNDP was atypical – in 
many global settings where the GF operates, in situations that could be viewed as 
similar to Ukraine‘s, UNDP manages GF programmes.92 
At the same time, the 2005-2007 Natsrada and its committees had an 
increased representation of the US government-funded organisations – it included 
several USAID-funded INGOs, and even an USAID official. For this and other 
reasons, it had frictions with some government agencies. In 2006, it was challenged 
by a group of parliamentary deputies who requested the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to 
examine the regulations (polozhennya) of Natsrada.MoJ legal expertise department 
issued a determination that defined a recommendatory and non-obligatory character 
of Natsrada‟s resolutions,further confirmed its recommendatory status, and noted 
that inclusion of foreign government representatives contradicted the legal nature of 
the National Council as a national governance body (Ministry of Justice, 2006).
93
 
Harmer et al (2012) described the status of Ukraine‘s CCM as advisory rather than 
decision-making body. With another change of government, this Natsrada was 
disbanded and a new one re-instated. 
3) July 2007- to present – „MOH-centred‟ – This CCM (National Council on 
TB, HIV, and other Social Diseases) functioned during GF Round 6 and onwards. In 
2007, Prime Minister Yanukovych disbanded the 2005 Natsrada. The new Natsrada 
was expanded to include issues of TB and other Social Diseases. It has lost most of 
                                                          
92
 In neighboring Belarus, UNDP acts as a GF implementer.  
93
 The MoJ legal note is on file with the author. 
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its sub-committees and USAID funding stopped
94
.  The mandate of the Natsrada 
remained strictly recommendatory, with a separate decree needed to issue a policy 
document. One of the key indicators for assessing the CCM effectiveness was the 
number of meetings held per year (four meetings) (Yechchenko 2013). Had these 
meetings been conducted, this would indicate the successful functioning of the 
Natsrada. By a separate decree, a Committee on TB, HIV-infection/AIDS and other 
social diseases was re-created at MOH
95
 that came to perform functions of CCM 
Secretariat. After a brief déjà vu appearance in 2010 of the Deputy Prime Minister 
Vitaly Seminozhenko
96
, CCM functions gradually shifted to MOH. CCM meetings 
began to be chaired by Ministers of Health (Z.Mytnyk, A.Anischenko), and deputy 
Ministers of Health (V.Bidnyi, V.Tolstanov).From February to December 2012, the 
posts of Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Health of Ukrainewere held by Raisa 
Bohatyriova, later to be replaced by Kostiantyn Hryschenko as a Vice Prime Minister 
of Ukraine and a Chair of the Natsrada.  
Shifting of the CCM in the direction of the MOH had implications for broader 
national governance. With MOH as a focal coordination point for GF funding, it 
signalled the understanding of HIV narrowly as a medical problem. At the same 
time, MOH as a health care executive agency, did not have political weight to 
influence other and more powerful government agencies (Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Interior) over decisions that were important for the GF programmes to be 
implemented. Lack of understanding of how political systems work in post-Soviet 
states may explain the persistence with which many aid organisations continuously 
engage with MOHs. 
Apart from the CCM, other structures prominent in decision-making 
processes during Round 1 and Round 6 grants need to be mentioned:  
                                                          
94
 Following the end of funding, the Natsrada web-site with most 2005-2007 documents became 
inactive. Paper versions of the documents and downloads made earlier, were used for this study. 
95
 The previous National HIV/AIDS Committee, briefly re-instated by Yushchenko in 2005 and 
headed by Valery Ivasyuk, did not gain influence before he was dismissed. More information is 
provided in Chapter 2.  
96
Seminozhenko headed the first ‗proto-CCM‘ in 2003. In 2010, he was appointed a Deputy Prime 
Minister and a new Head of the National Council.  At a CCM meeting on April 20, 2010, he pledged 
to scale-up government leadership in HIV/AIDS. The post of the Deputy Prime Minister was 
abolished in 2011. 
258 
 
1) HIV Stakeholders meetings – were held as parallel forums to government-centred 
decision making bodies and included mostly NGOs, INGOs, and donor 
organisations, including UNAIDS. Drew suggested that early rivalries and group 
interests were already present among donors in relation to GF programmes, however, 
he also noted that coordination with other programmes was ―not an explicit and 
central part of [Alliance‘s] terms of reference‖ (Drew 2005c, p. 8), suggesting the 
high level of PR discretion in decision making regardless of other donors. Apart from 
2004-2005 period when they were ‗by default‘ a decision-making mechanism in 
Ukraine, in other time ‗Stakeholders Meetings‘ continued to be dominated by PRs 
and were an important venue for influencing the way the GF programmes were run. 
A typical feature of ‗Stakeholders Meetings‘ was holding them on the week, or 
several days preceding the date of the Natsrada, and then announcing a stakeholder 
resolution/recommendation on the day when Natsrada was to consider its own 
agenda agreed weeks in advance. Because recommendations coming from 
stakeholders meetings were often linked to donor funding, such practices were 
essentially ‗setting the stage‘ for the CCM.  
2) Stakeholder-supported „Consolidation Group‟ (soglasitelnaya gruppa)– was 
established during R1 transfer to mitigate various conflict of interests around GF 
programme, and to draft decisions for the National Council, or for Stakeholders 
Meetings. Membership included: two PRs representatives, one Ukrainian NGO 
representative, a UNAIDS representative, a USAID representative. Drew noted, in 
relation to ‗Consolidation group‘ in R1, ―the added problem of lacking in-country 
legitimacy since NCC [CCM] was established‖, as well as having ―no jurisdiction 
over funds provided through other programmes (Drew 2005e, p. 34). During R6, the 
tradition of having a ‗Conciliatory Group‘ continued, and it was reviewing PRs grant 
performance reports. OIG called it as ―a forum for the resolution of disputes between 
the PRs and sub-recipients‖, questioned the Group‘s legitimacy as having ―no 
provision for such a group‖ in the GF grant architecture and described the 
‗Conciliatory Group‘s functions as ―typical functions of the CCM‖. OIG also 
recommended to CCM ―to adopt a more proactive role in overseeing grant 
implementation‖ (OIG 2012b, p. 52). 
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3) Oversight Commission (Komisiya z naglyadu). Throughout all R1, and for 
the most time during R6, Ukrainian CCM did not have a functioning oversight 
mechanism. Finally established by CCM on 17 August, 2010, this body was aimed to 
become a CCM tool for overseeing the GF programmes implementation. Its 
composition largely included people who were already members of the CCM. OIG 
has analysed country oversight mechanisms of GF programmes in several countries, 
including Ukraine, and found the level of oversight to be weak as characterised by 
failure by the CCM to identify and rectify key issues that affected GF programmes. 
OIG report characterized oversight by CCMs ―at best by PRs reporting to the CCMs‖ 
and noted that CCMs did not have mechanisms to verify and monitor the 
performance/results reported by PRs (OIG 2009, pp. 26).  
Oversight Commission acquired prominence in March-April 2012, after the 
release of the first draft of OIG audit, when it led the work to prepare a consolidated 
country response on OIG audit recommendations but faced challenges from the PRs 
who demanded that it should verify the accuracy of OIG findings many of which 
were critical
97
. Members of the Oversight Commission periodically conduct 
monitoring visits to different GF-funded venues, but, apart from those, similar to 
CCM, the Commission does not have other mechanisms or instruments to verify 
and/or monitor the PRs performance/results. Besides, its members work on an unpaid 
basis and there are no state funds provided to support its work. There is a provision 
in the Commission‘s Polozhennya (Terms of reference) that the organizational, 
methodology, technical, information and logistic support of the Oversight 
Commission is the responsibility of the National Council Secretariat with assistance 
from international and donor organizations (National Council, 2010) that allows it to 
receive funding, for conducting meetings, travel expenses and modest honoraria. 
Because the money comes in external grants, this puts the Commission in dependent 
position from donors and too close to CCM Secretariat, which compromises its 
                                                          
97
 CCM meeting on March 29, 2012, attended by the author, discussed a draft OIG report of PR 
performance (Natsionalna Rada 2012). The report contained over 50 ‗High Priority‘ criticisms of both 
PRs systems and performance. PRs were challenging the report findings as inaccurate and OIG for 
publicizing the draft, while the head of Oversight Commission stressed the absence of monitoring 
instruments to verify the audit findings. The official version of OIG report, released in August 2012,  
signed by the GF Manager General Jaramillo, said that most findings have already been addressed by 
PRs. 
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impartiality role as an independent mechanism of overseeing that GF programmes 
are implemented in accordance with national ownership principles. There is no 
provision to rectify situations when members of the Commission may have different 
opinions over PR performance or results. Decisions are taken by a majority vote, 
and thus, according to Polozhennya, the number of Commission members cannot 
exceed seven people (National Council, 2010). Another provision stipulates the 
Commission to conduct its oversight activities at the CCM request, which means 
that in absence of such request, or when CCM is not meeting, Commission becomes 
inactive.  
6.3 Participants‟ perceptions of the Country Coordinating Mechanism 
6.3.1 CCM functions and roles as perceived by participants   
The questions in the Interview Guide were asking participants about the 
effectiveness of the National Council. ‗CCM‘ and ‗CCM effectiveness‘ emerged as 
the themes from the interview analysis. The main sub-themes in relation to CCM as 
perceived by participants, were ‗formalism‘, ‗lack of effective coordination‘, ‗geared 
to GF‘, ‗artificial structure‘, ‗PR tokenism‘, ‗PR instrument‘, as well as other 
features that are presented below. 
How CCM worked – membership, representation, mechanisms of decision making 
Uniformly, participants noted that CCM was created at the impetus from 
external donors: ―CCM creation was under significant influence of international 
donor community‖ (002: 609-610). As such, it functioned as a mechanism ―to attract 
external funding‖ (001: 381-85). 
Participants noted a formalistic, pro forma function as a common feature of 
Ukraine‘s CCM: 
CCM is an absolutely formal structure. It is such a room for voting. Because 
the assumption is that people who come there already made decisions, so they 
come there and unanimously vote... all decisions that need to be taken by 
CCM are taken by different mechanisms and in other places. (028: 355-365) 
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Many participants linked this formalistic role to the fact that CCM was a GF 
requirement, it was―more of the performance of compliance with the Fund, rather 
than particularly meaningful‖ (046: 308-310); ―… a requirement of the Fund. It was 
very much set up by GF grants and securing the grant in mind. But beyond that, not 
an active structure. Its oversight function seemed to be much weaker than its purpose 
to put together a GF proposal‖ (049:279-286). 
According to participants, CCM mandate over GF funding was weak because 
it did not have any formal agreement with GF: ―CCM does not have power over GF 
money because grant agreement is signed between the GF and PR‖ (026: 303-304); 
―Natsrada cannot much influence GF programmes. They have no control over 
money, nobody respects them, and they really badly orientated in what needs to be 
done‖ (012: 370-373) 
 [I]t is a recommendatory-consultative body. If Natsrada does not agree on 
some issues between themselves, its members cannot influence PR reports to 
GF. Yes, they can express emotions, advise something, but in terms of 
decision making, no, they cannot influence anything by saying we won‘t sign 
or something. They don‘t have such mandate. (038: 300-312) 
Some participants suggested that CCM was not a ―typical body of state governance‖ 
(036: 270) and could not influence state policy: ―this CСМ is really toothless… they 
were taking some decisions there regarding GF money – but they could not influence 
state policy, policy of MOH‖ (015: 347-350); ―a quasi-executive body – not enough 
mandate, not a full body of power‖ (044: 224-25). 
CCM only heard what was reported, did not make real decisions and did not 
have real power: ―After R1 grant transfer, CCM did not have any legal power to 
influence national AIDS policy‖ (015:343-345), ―CCM decisions are not mandatory‖ 
(044:217), ―no influence on PRs‖ (044: 259-260) 
Being a weak structure, CCM ―... cannot execute decisions, and is harmful to 
GF interests in the long term‖ (041: 262-63) 
Some participants thought that CCM was more biased towards AIDS issues 
than other infectious diseases under its scope.  
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Participants gave accounts about how CCM meetings were conducted:  
On the day of the CCM meeting, small PR reports are handed out. Then PR 
directors come out and read their reports. Some members of CCM, deputies 
ask – how can we accept your report after a five minute talk and a small 
handout when it requires analysing the targets, the means spent on reaching 
them, and who participated? – all this requires a thorough preparation. There 
were times when some deputies walked out of the meeting, calling it a 
‗shambolic business‘ (sharazhkina kontora). After that they were accused [by 
PRs] that it‘s is none of their business as PRs signed an agreement with GF, 
and state has no right to determine what they report and how they spend the 
money. Then a state official asked: ‖If you don‘t need our input, and decide 
everything, why do you need to come here and report to us?‖ (013: 382-392) 
It‘s so Sovietique. If you go there, it‘s in Ministry of Health, and there is this 
table (presidium) set above the rest of the room. And just how it is 
happening... It‘s not effective, it is not taking the right decisions because the 
situation is not changing. (050: 257-262) 
Participants described the voting systems. In particular, they spoke that the typical 
voting pattern at CCM was based on a majority vote and that consensual decisions 
were not sought: 
Decisions are never made by consensus. Only by majority of votes present. 
Even when there are some people against continuation of funding, the 
decision is made in favour, because those in favour are in majority. But there 
is no consensus and it is not sought. (026: 279-282) 
It was also possible for CCM members to vote by proxy. This practice, according to 
participants was common. Participants reported a case when one member represented 
eight other CCM members by a proxy vote. Other cases included, e.g. when ―the 
decision was already made, and CCM members were not present, the [secretariat] 
were travelling to them to collect their signatures‖ (025:190-94). 
Some participants also suggested that that practice for CCM was not to be a place to 
hold a debate and that all decisions should have been agreed in advance: 
Ukraine had different heads of CCM, regardless whether they were more or 
less authoritarian, they all wanted the debates to settle before the [CCM] 
meeting... because it [CCM] was not a ‗Shuster-Life‘ show 98 . So all 
                                                          
98
A popular political TV talk-show that invited politicians, experts and journalists to discuss current 
issues. 
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stakeholders were to meet separately and reach agreement, argue 
somewhere... so when the meeting took place, the draft decision was already 
prepared. You could add something minor, like technical issue here or there, 
but the core of the question would not change... PRs influenced the 
preparation of draft decision, worked with [CCM] Secretariat closely. (025: 
336-356) 
 
6.3.2 CCM - a venue manifesting the relations between various actors in GF 
programmes 
Participants strongly reflected on the CCM being ‗a PR instrument‘, oriented at, 
or controlled by from PRs: 
National Council, especially on early stages of GF, acted as an attachment of 
PRs. It was only needed for GF to continue funding its projects. It was de jure 
state body, but it did not function as a state body. They met once in three 
months, or once in 6 months. Some intervals were up to one year. And they 
only met to vote a new funding request by PRs. (026: 227-239) 
CCM is a convenient instrument – for PRs. It meets when they need it, passes 
the decisions they need. And does not do much beyond that.(013: 246-252) 
Within CCM, there is mostly representation of vested interests of 
organisations linked to PRs: ―PRs and international organisations  that work closely 
with PRs– have leadership in CCM and .. manipulate the decisions it is taking. (014: 
254-55) 
Meanwhile, CCM members do not have a full understanding of GF 
programmes: ―CCM do not have time or the will to learn how GF programmes are 
going in Ukraine‖ (045: 522-24): 
Government did not articulate its position often. Government officials did not 
understand these [GF] programmes... there is often change of government..a 
new team gets in, there is simply human capacity lacking. One person was 
trained, but then he leaves, and a new guy comes in, train again. (025: 202-
207) 
PRs were not accountable to CCM: ―none of PRs is accountable to CCM, but only 
to the GF‖ (044: 243-45). 
Some participants called multi-sectoral collaboration as ‗state consumerism‘:  
―consumerism by state organs of free-of-charge aid – this is what multi-sector 
collaboration is like‖ (044: 209-213). State officials viewed GF money ―as additional 
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resources that need to be attracted. They are interested in money, but they cannot 
determine policy‖ (012: 134-137). 
 
6.3.3 Perceptions of the CCM by participants 
Participants described CCM as:  
- a place for hearing PR reports: ― It was a venue for PRs to read their reports‖ 
(013:292). 
 
- as ‗organ of zero coordination‘ 
 
- as Soviet-style, ‗quazi‘ democratic mechanism of decision making, ―window 
dressing structure‖ (044: 238); ‗masquerade‘-like structure to mock 
democratic mechanisms: 
I think it‘s not effective. It‘s a kind of masquerade – and the people who are 
there ... they already agreed on everything...[O]ther people who can comeare 
either under influence of these people or too shy to speak. There are few 
people who participate and can say openly what they think. I don‘t see any 
strength about this CCM. It‘s so Soviet. (050: 253-257) 
- as a structure with no country ownership: 
There were quite a lot of Coordinating and decision-making structures in 
place. Main comment was on the balance between the need to do something 
very quickly to tackle on important health issue and in doing that, 
compromising the means - so that NGOs controversially deliver or manage 
services that are seen as eroding country ownership – and possibly, not 
strengthening, or even weakening country health systems in different ways. 
(049: 472-78) 
 
Participants suggested that government only ―tolerated CCM because of 
image-making concerns. Ukraine wants to look good to foreign donors. Often 
decisions are made out of thinking about the country image abroad. It‘s an image 
thing... for a government official it is important‖ (025: 358-364). 
In participants view, Natsrada functioned as a ‗mock‘ governance body. 
Heavily dominated by donor organisations and PRs and their partnered stakeholders, 
it was not functioning in a way that typical governance structures function in 
Ukraine. 
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Natsrada had no effective oversight mechanisms to review GF grants 
performance. The Oversight Commission was only established following GF 
recommendations, and late into R6 implementation. During R1, there was no 
national oversight of GF programmes. Natsrada had few or none performance 
evaluation mechanisms of its own work. The terms of reference provided to hold a 
certain number of CCM meetings per year as an indicator of its effectiveness.  
Notably, many of the Global Fund own decisions were made in absence of Natsrada 
or without being endorsed by it, among them: 
1) The decision to suspend the Round 1 grant and transfer the funding to INGO.  
2) Re-programming of R1 programme from treatment-oriented into prevention-
oriented. 
Conclusion 
CCM model of country ownership in Ukraine has enabled a functionally 
impaired governance structure without a genuine decision making power over the GF 
funding. As reported by study participants, during R1 and R6, the Natsrada (National 
Council to Fight HIV/AIDS and TB) functioned mainly as a pro forma structure to 
fulfil the GF eligibility criteria during the country submission and as a venue for 
formal endorsement of periodical GF grant disbursement requests. Natsrada 
decisions were not mandatory, and it could not alter or re-programme GF funding. 
Voting and attendance could be by proxy, consensus was not sought, and a majority 
vote was taken as a decision making mechanism.  
It can be concluded based on the material reviewed and interview analysis 
that Ukraine‘s CCM functioned not as a genuine country ownership mechanism but 
as a ‗mock‘, ‗quasi‘ governance body, whose agenda and decision making were 
influenced by PRs and a narrow group of stakeholders, and it did not execute 
effective country-based programming and oversight of GF programmes. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION  
This thesis presents findings of the critical ethnographic enquiry that 
examined the Global Fund‘s aid delivery model in the context of Ukraine. Delivery 
of HIV prevention services during the GF R1 and R6 grants (2003-2012) was used to 
analyze how effectively NGO Principal Recipients in Ukraine promoted and 
implemented the GF core principles, service delivery and governance models, the 
systems and practices they created, and the adequacy of GF oversight systems over 
the GF funding.  
Chapter 1 provides a thematic background to the concept of aid effectiveness. 
Its overview of the evolving concepts of aid delivery during the 20
th
 century 
established the ramifications of the subsequent strongly critical debate about 
traditional aid institutions and models of aid delivery, which developed after WWII 
(articulated by Bauer 1975, Easterly 2003, Friedman 1995, Knack 2001, Moyo 2009, 
Prokopijevic 2006, Svensson 2000, and Williamson 2009). The vigorous debate led 
to efforts to articulate aid effectiveness and harmonization principles, reflected in the 
GF delivery model and embedded in the Paris 2005 Declaration. Both the GF and 
Paris Declaration were a response to aid critics and were intended to resolve the 
worst problems of multiple donors and externally driven agendas. The GF, in 
particular, emerged as a response and a reflection of its backers‘ belief that a new 
approach was needed, one that could operate more effectively than existing bilateral 
and multilateral aid mechanisms (Wigell 2008). The research data presented in this 
thesis supports the critical perspectives within the aid effectiveness debate and 
demonstrate their continuing relevance in the context of GF-aided delivery of HIV 
services in post-communist Ukraine.   
The G8 Genoa Summit Communiqué (G8 Genoa 2001) that confirmed the 
establishment of the GF, specifically outlined how the new Fund would work 
differently to meet the criticisms leveled at traditional donor programming models in 
the aid effectiveness debate. The pledges made at the GF establishment were 
developed into research objectives for this study.   
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In particular, this study has closely examined the following GF founding 
principles that were intended to address criticism of traditional aid delivery, as they 
were expressed in the G8 Genoa Summit Communiqué:  
  ―approach emphasising prevention in a continuum of treatment and care‖; 
 ―light governance ― and ―ensuring ownership‖; 
  ―a strong focus on outcomes‖;  
 ―local partners, including NGOs, will be instrumental‖ (G8 Genoa 2001).  
In this thesis I have argued that, drawing on the available evidence, the GF core 
models, delivery systems and governance mechanisms were used opportunistically 
by Principal Recipients in delivering the GF programmes in Ukraine. It can be 
argued that, in channelling the aid in Ukraine, the GF alongside with other donors in 
FSU, has struggled to overcome the legacies of communism, when, in aid delivery, 
following the traditional aid programmes, they encountered complex systems of 
patronage and social relations (Bruno 1998; Wedel 2001). The GF choice of an 
INGO to implement its programmes demonstrated a continuing preference for 
external organizations and approaches. In doing this, the GF appeared to follow 
traditional aid institutions‘ ‗external project‘ method as a predominant form of aid 
delivery in FSU (Carothers 1999b), that tended to restrict funding to fairly narrow 
groups in capital cities (Hann 1998). The observed results in Ukraine are consistent 
with the critiques of Sampson (2003), and Hrycak (2007) that ‗external projects‘ 
sideline bona fide grass roots organisations and implant ‗transnational advocates‘ – 
INGOs with pre-set external agendas. 
While the GF programmes‘ value was acknowledged by interviewees, 
perceptions varied of the adequacy of linkages between GF-funded HIV prevention 
services and state health care, questioned in Chapter 4, as well as GF programmes‘ 
effectiveness in the regions as noted in Chapter 5. The outcomes described below in 
this chapter suggest that GF programmes in Ukraine in fact are subject to the same 
aid effectiveness critiques that the GF institutional model was intended to avoid.  
Ethnographic enquiry, as detailed in chapter 3, was selected as the method for 
this research because of its ability to enable a ‗critical space‘ and a critical lens to 
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look into the GF aid delivery model. The ethnographic enquiry undertaken in this 
thesis incorporated the views of a wide spectrum of the study participants, many of 
whom participated in service delivery, and integrated other evidence leading to the 
findings set out in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 above. The robust evidence emerging from the 
data analysis raises the following issues:   
 Based on external approaches to HIV prevention, promoted as ‗international 
best practices‘, as reported by participants and reflected in the literature, the 
PR NGOs-run programmes appeared not to have been integrated with the 
state health care system, but were run in a ‗standalone‘, isolationist manner, 
with unclear and badly defined referral protocols into the HIV continuum of 
treatment and care services. This ran contrary to donor pledges outlined in the 
Paris Declaration that stressed the importance for donors of ―using a 
country‘s own institutions and systems‖ (OECD 2005, p. 4). 
 It is argued that a Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) has been used 
narrowly and opportunistically by PR NGOs to promote their own interests 
and goals linked to the GF programme implementation. Available evidence 
suggests that CCM was dominated by PR NGOs, with oversight mechanisms 
non-existent for most of the period of R1-R6 grants. GF aid programmes 
were implemented through a network of Sub-Recipient NGOs, whose 
systems, policies, and practices were not aligned with state health care 
systems and practices. This had an adverse impact on national ownership of 
HIV prevention programmes in Ukraine that the CCM was supposed to 
ensure. This unfavourable outcome of GF-funded programmes has strong 
associations with criticisms like those of Radelet (2004) that traditional aid 
programmes relied on a non-adapted, one-size-fits-all approach for all 
recipients, regardless of the quality of their governance, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. The reliance on a one-size-fits-all approach in aid delivery in post-
communist countries, noted by Carothers (1999b), was manifested in the 
‗external project method‘ as a predominant form of aid delivery in the FSU, 
with little attention paid to local contexts. This research shows how lack of 
effective oversight and governance through a strong, inclusive CCM resulted 
in GF-funded PRs implementing HIV prevention programmes that bypassed 
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the national health systems. As the result, HIV prevention is not owned by 
Ukraine, and GF-funded programmes are, in their present state, 
unsustainable.  
 In particular, PR opportunism appears to be strongly manifested in the 
monitoring systems they built to respond to the GF ‗performance-based 
funding‘ model (GFATM 2009). Document analysis identified concerns 
about ―a lack of national ownership in M&E data collection of HIV 
programmes and activities‖ (UNAIDS 2009, p. 26) and data collection 
―driven by external reporting requirements..., rather than by the national and 
local information needs of service providers, programme managers and 
policy-makers‖ (ibid., p.26). These concerns were further confirmed by 
analysis of the interviews. As discussed in Chapter 5, participants described 
the PR monitoring systems as being under ‗full PR control‘. The target setting 
and monitoring systems, and the way they were run by PRs, established a 
cycle through which PRs exercised a high degree of discretion in determining 
targets, implementing HIV services, and monitoring themselves.  
 Based on the available evidence, another unanticipated outcome of the GF 
programme transfer to an INGO and its linking organisations was to impair 
the advocacy potential of Ukraine‘s ‗Third sector‘. In Chapter 4, 
conceptualisations in the literature of rich-country NGOs operating as 
‗donors‘ with respect to local NGOs and even to states in poor countries 
(Engberg-Pedersen 2008, p.1), were applied to analyze the impact of the GF 
decision on ―using well-established international NGOs rather than local 
organizations‖ (UNAIDS ASAP 2009, p. 44) to implement its programme. 
This GF decision, as predicted in the UNAIDS paper, ―hindered opportunities 
to strengthen the [local organizations] capacity‖ (ibid.). Analysis of 
interviews confirmed weakening of the NGO sector in Ukraine after the GF 
programme was transferred to an INGO, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Participants reported that local NGOs were forced to compete with each other 
and turned into passive recipients of GF sub-grants, with a limited ability to 
advocate for issues beyond the scope of GF programmes. A particularly 
disturbing outcome was the hybridisation of the ‗Third sector‘, manifested in 
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the appearance of ‗quasi‘ NGOs run by AIDS center doctors and state 
officials to apply for GF and other donor grants, reported in the literature 
(Spicer et al. 2011b) and interviews. 
The following sections of this chapter present more detailed support for each of 
these issues.  
7.1 „Standalone‟ NGO-run services, not linked to state health care  
As noted in Chapter 1, the Paris Declaration stressed the importance for 
donors of ―using a country‘s own institutions and systems‖ (OECD 2005, p. 4). 
The GF in its founding principles committed to ―pursue an integrated and 
balanced approach covering prevention, treatment, and care and support‖ (GFATM 
2001, p. 1). In Ukraine, the GF-supported programmes were to ―contribute to the 
implementation of the majority of tasks included in the Ukrainian National 
HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment and Support Program‖ (OIG 2012, p. 3) and were 
thus expected to contribute to national health care delivery. 
Analysis began with a review of the process and the outcomes of the GF 2004 
decision to suspend funding for a government-run programme and transfer it to an 
international NGO, the International HIV/AIDS Alliance, described in Chapter 2. An 
anticipated outcome of the GF decision to transfer implementation to an INGO was 
robust and effective delivery of HIV services. This expectation was rooted in GF‘s 
perception of civil society organizations as ―essential, successful and high-
performing implementers of Global Fund grants and that direct financing to civil 
society PRs can improve the speed of finance and add additional capacity‖ (GFATM, 
2007). Within this prism, the central role for civil society organisations was viewed 
as providing services in the place of weak, scattered, or even non-existent state health 
care services, typical in many world settings where HIV epidemics ravage societies. 
In Ukraine, juxtaposition of NGOs to the state, frequently articulated by GF and its 
PR NGOs, promoted ―the image of an international goodness in saving lives in a 
post-Soviet region as opposed to the image of the impotent post-Soviet state which 
put those lives at risk, not being able to protect them in the face of the epidemic‖ 
(Zhukova 2013, p. 249). 
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In the FSU health care context, this role did not make sense for several 
reasons. First, there was already in place a well-established state health care system 
that included specialized tertiary AIDS health care, described in Chapter 2. Second, 
NGOs were not perceived as service providers, but primarily as public advocates in 
post-Soviet states where the public sector was the only one ―to provide services 
needed to the fullest extent‖ (UNAIDS 2007, p. 39). Finally, there was no legal 
framework to provide for any external agency other than state-licensed medical 
professionals to act as health care providers. In the HIV/AIDS sector in particular, 
health services delivery is an exclusive prerogative and a legal obligation of the state 
health care system. Thus, Ukraine‘s original GF country programme, designed to 
interface with the state health care system, faced serious challenges, when it was 
transferred to an INGO. This study did not find any evidence that the GF considered 
the risks posed to programme effectiveness by transferring implementation 
responsibilities to an INGO.  
This study confirms that the original country programme was significantly 
altered after the GF pulled Round 1 funding from the government implementers and 
transferred it to an INGO known to promote more narrow HIV prevention 
approaches, and with pre-existing links to elements of Ukraine‘s health sector and a 
group of NGOs, with a harm reduction focus. Adoption of harm reduction 
programmes (HR) as a condition for receiving all subsequent GF funding began to be 
strongly articulated during R6. This was an externally imposed requirement that was 
not present in original R1 country-driven negotiations over the GF programme in 
Ukraine, which included prevention services to the general population, as well as to 
groups most-at-risk.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, R1 and especially R6 programmes in Ukraine 
became the largest GF-funded HR programmes in EECA, and among the largest in 
the world. The programmes were developed on the background of negative 
perceptions of HR in FSU countries as an external, ‗Western concept‘ (Tkatchenko-
Schmidt et al., 2007) and were subject to legal and political barriers to HR in FSU, 
noted in the literature (Rhodes et al. 2006; Rhodes et al. 2010; Strathdee 2010 et al.). 
Drew (2005e, p. 30) noted with respect to Ukraine that it was difficult ―to determine 
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whether or not the [GF-funded] programme as implemented has stayed in line with 
the originally-proposed harm reduction strategies because it is far from clear what 
those were‖. 
Analysis of interviews revealed similar perceptions of GF-funded HIV 
prevention programmes as based on external concepts and not based on clear 
standards. The majority of the study participants reported re-programming of HIV 
prevention by PRs to a more narrow HR focus in R1 and noted that it turned Ukraine 
into an ‗experimentation base‘ for politically-sensitive external approaches.  
At the same time, participants noted that despite a declared PR focus on harm 
reduction, their GF-funded ‗basic services package‘ did not provide a holistic HR 
approach, but consumed large amounts of money on syringe exchange, condom 
distribution, and some other outreach activities. Needle exchange was constantly 
hampered by legal issues that were not resolved during R1-R6. Some participants 
reported that needle exchange mostly halted in 2010 in all regions.   
The definition of a ‗basic services package‘ remained fluid throughout the 
whole duration of R1-R6 grants, with no benchmark level set at any time. Analysis 
of the documentary evidence and interviews suggests that the HIV prevention service 
package was ad hoc, not based on a consistent standard, and often meant different 
things at different times. Variations in the HIV services packages provided were 
reported by participants between regions, between NGOs, and between services 
provided for different populations. There was no ‗mean‘ or ‗average‘ package of 
services. Even the definition of ‗client‘ was vague, and both old and new client 
coding systems had reported drawbacks allowing for misreporting of services 
delivered. 
NGO delivery distorted health care system roles. Participants‘ responses 
indicate that the GF-funded interventions were not integrated with state health care 
services. A ―broken link in the chain of services‖ (WHO 2013, p. 5) between GF-
funded NGO outreach activities and entry into the HIV state care system was noted 
in documents and reported in interviews. Monitoring of GF-funded services focused 
on simplistic indicators of polevye (field-based, outreach) activities, primarily 
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deliveries of commodities such as syringes, condoms and information brochures, as 
well as preliminary, rapid HIV screening tests.  
Participants reported NGO referral systems varied in NGO settings and were 
mostly ad hoc with no referral protocol or coordination to track who provided what 
services to mutual clients. Service providers had limited understanding of what 
constituted an effective referral, reflected in their responses to interview questions. 
The result was inadequate referral practices between NGOs and state, with no 
traceable follow-up for a confirmatory screening with state AIDS centers and 
registration into ART and other services. Lack of effective referral meant fewer 
patients could enter the HIV care continuum, receive ART and other health 
entitlements for which they were eligible.  
Although in some regions, the numbers of PLWHA were reported as passing 
from outreach programmes to state health institutions, this appeared to be the result 
of a particular NGO and individual provider‘s initiative, and not the result of a 
formal, institutionalized referral system. In other reported instances, the number of 
HIV-positive individuals identified through rapid tests screening by NGOs was 
greater than the local state AIDS centre could receive (‗over-referral‘). When that 
happened, access to HIV confirmatory screening was rationed with coupons.  
GF funding allocations distributed competitively through PR grants to regional 
Sub-Recipient NGOs, lacked predictability. Numbers of clients that SR NGOs could 
serve were not aligned with the local AIDS centers capacity or regional budgets. It 
impeded the ability of the state sector to plan its capacity to receive more NGO-
diagnosed PLWHAs, and to link people with known HIV status to state-guaranteed 
care entitlements.  
Both ‗under-referral‘ and ‗over-referral‘ are detrimental to efforts to reduce HIV 
transmission. Members of high-risk, stigmatised populations, who may have 
‗surfaced‘ once with a positive HIV diagnosis by an NGO, but not linked to state 
care because of lack of capacity, were at risk of being lost to care.  
The urgent need to balance the numbers of PLWHAs identified by NGOs 
with the ability of AIDS centres to link them to care requires an effective strategy of 
NGO-to-state referral, and a greater role for regional governments in programming 
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GF funding based on local capacity. There is no evidence these issues were 
adequately addressed by PRs in R1-R6. NGOs swollen with massive grants and state 
clinics nursing small and often shrinking state funds were left to resolve referral 
issues on their own. 
Outcomes: 
 The role distortion between state health care providers and NGOs in 
provision of health services resulted in an accountability gap. The NGOs 
receiving massive GF funding were not legally obligated to bring clients into 
care, while government providers had an obligation to provide care but did 
not have the funding, as reported by participants. As a result, the state health 
care delivery system, with its focus on AIDS centres, was compromised by 
unclear referral between GF-funded NGOs and state services. The result was 
many gaps in the process of finding, linking and retaining PLWHA in the 
state-centred HIV care continuum. Lack of effective NGO-to-state referral 
and imbalance of funding allocations in the regions contradict the pledges 
made by GF in its founding principles that in delivering aid, the GF 
programmes will ―pursue an integrated and balanced approach covering 
prevention, treatment, and care and support‖ (GFATM 2001, p. 1). 
 By promoting perceptions of the HIV epidemic as concentrated only in some 
populations, and narrowly focusing HIV prevention programs on high-risk 
populations, PR NGOs contributed to HIV being seen mostly as a problem of 
‗risk groups‘ by society and distorted perception of the risks of HIV in the 
general population.  
 
7.2 „Soviet style‟,‟mock‟ governance structures 
As discussed in Chapter 1, ‗country ownership‘ is a GF founding principle 
(GFATM. 2001). The Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) is at the core of the 
GF model of governance to ensure that principle in practice. GF guidelines 
encourage CCMs ―to be broadly representative of all national stakeholders‖ 
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(GFATM 2005, p. 3) by creating a forum that includes national and international 
private actors such as local and international NGOs in addition to government 
(Walker 2011). The GF has itself acknowledged absence of a ―shared perception – 
inside or outside the Global Fund‖ – about what the ‗country ownership‘ means in 
practice (High-Level Panel 2011, p.9). 
The available documentary evidence as well as analysis of interviews indicate 
that the GF R1 transfer, re-programming of the original R1 programme, and the 
delivery of HIV programmes by PR NGOs for most time of the R1-R6 GF grants all 
took place in the absence of an effective CCM. Stakeholder Meetings, dominated by 
PRs and external donors, functioned as a de facto country coordination mechanism, 
as documented in more detail in Chapters 2 and 6.  
It can be argued, following suggestions in some studies, that transfer of the 
GF R1 grant an INGO changed the perception of the PR in Ukraine, as compared 
with the how GF PRs are perceived globally. Instead of being seen as an 
implementer of GF programs, the PR [Alliance] began to be perceived ―rather as a 
funder of national response‖ (Drew 2005c, p. 14). This ‗funder‘, donor-like role was 
confirmed in participants‘ interviews, where the PRs were described variously as 
‗money distributors‘, ‗grant administrators‘, ‗business structures‘ and ‗monopolies‘. 
One of the outcomes of the R1 transfer was a complete government withdrawal from 
CCM, which subsequently disbanded, signalling a possible loss of national 
ownership over the GF programmes. The lack of transparency or a public mandate 
over decisions about GF funding remained a characteristic feature of Ukraine‘s CCM 
after it re-emerged in later GF rounds. It was characterized by participants as a weak 
and tokenistic ‗Soviet-style‟ discussion forum with wide-spread use of proxy voting. 
Unable to influence or re-programme GF funding, the CCM was a passive recipient 
of PR reports, incapable of implementing effective oversight structures and 
monitoring instruments over GF programmes. 
Chapter 1 discussed GF challenges to conform to its own governance model 
and documented suggestions of serious accountability gaps at its Geneva 
headquarters. GF board members were quoted as saying ‘the Global Fund is 
accountable only to donor states‘, with donors perceived as having ‘an effective veto 
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power‘.(Brown, G. 2007) The GF governance challenges were passed on at the 
country level and created a governance deficit in Ukraine. A lack of transparency and 
highly discretionary decision making at the GF Secretariat were reported in the 
literature discussed in Chapter 1. The GF did not substantively address issues raised 
by its own OIG, including in his reports on Ukraine (OIG 2008, OIG 2012) about 
how GF funds were being spent. Rather, GF engaged in conflict with its own OIG, 
which prompted an infamous crisis in 2011, after which, the GF redefined and 
narrowed the mandate and role of the OIG in overseeing programme implementation 
issues. 
Lack of transparency at the GF board level and its unwillingness to address 
the issues raised by its OIG, aided by pre-existing Soviet legacies and local 
democratic deficits, outlined by Bruno (1998), Wedel (2001), and Carothers (1999b) 
discussed in Chapter 1, enabled PRs on the ground in Ukraine to implement highly 
discretionary, top-down programmes. The high discretion and top-down approach 
were manifested in PR control over target setting, in channelling funding to Sub-
Recipients, and in control over monitoring and reporting systems. The result was to 
allow PRs to set their own performance benchmarks and declare them as results with 
no oversight. 
The CCM model turned out to be a ―testing ground for Ukraine‖ (Brusati 2003, 
p. 24), rather than became a governance mechanism: 
 CCM functioned not as genuine country-owned governance body, but as a 
‗quasi‘ governance structure established to support GF country application 
and funding processes, with no real oversight or mandate to re-programme 
GF funding. It passively adopted PR-imposed targets, monitoring, and 
reports. The CCM, members of which were unpaid, did not exercise decision-
making authority.  
 For prolonged periods during Rounds 1 and 6, there was no functioning 
CCM, and stakeholder meetings were the de facto governance mechanism for 
GF programmes. Stakeholder meetings were called and run by PRs, with 
agendas and participants influenced by PRs.  
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 During the period studied, when it functioned, the CCM appeared to be 
dominated by a narrow segment of PR representatives, donors, and 
organizations linked to PRs.   
 Government‘s role in GF programmes was limited. From a period of 
complete government withdrawal after the R1 suspension, it transitioned into 
PRs engaging selectively with officials at MOH and AIDS Services in CCM. 
Because of the nature of GF programmes and the specificity of the targeted 
populations (drug users, etc.), successful implementation required a broader 
policy consensus, including on drug policy, and necessitated a more inclusive 
CCM membership. The MOH, the government focal point for PRs, did not 
have the political weight to influence other and more powerful government 
agencies (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior) over policy issues 
important for GF programme implementation. Lack of understanding of how 
political systems work in post-Soviet states may explain the persistence with 
which aid organisations continue to engage almost exclusively with MOHs. 
Outcomes: The GF Country Coordination Mechanism was used narrowly and 
opportunistically by PR NGOs to promote their own interests and goals in relation to 
the GF programme implementation. CCM oversight mechanisms were non-existent 
for most of the time of R1-R6 grants. Due to weak governance, the national 
ownership of GF-funded HIV prevention programmes in Ukraine was not exercised, 
which ran contrary to the GF pledges that it ―will base its work on programs that 
reflect national ownership and respect country-led formulation and implementation 
processes‖ (GFATM 2001, p. 1). The PRs were able to implement their own 
preferred approach through a network of Sub-Recipient NGOs, with little linkage to 
state health care systems and practices, and with the inconsistent involvement of 
important government stakeholders. The result is that the GF-funded HIV prevention 
programme is not owned by Ukraine and in its present state is unsustainable. 
 
7.3 „Potemkin villages‟ of service coverage and monitoring 
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As noted in Chapter 1, Paris Declaration donors committed to ―managing and 
implementing aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses information to 
improve decision-making‖ (OECD 2005, p.7). That included, among other measures, 
―to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries‘ ... reporting and monitoring 
frameworks‖, ―link country programming and resources to results and align them 
with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks‖, and ―harmonise 
their monitoring and reporting requirements .. with partner countries to the maximum 
extent possible‖ (ibid., p.7).Thus, the centrality of country-owned reporting systems 
was clearly articulated. 
 Even before the Paris Declaration outlined the pillars to make aid more 
effective, the GF formulated its founding principle — to provide funding to countries 
on the basis of performance (GFATM 2009). Performance-based funding (PBF) is a 
central pillar in the GF grant management where data on GF-funded services is 
routinely reported by recipients in countries. A number of sources have expressed 
concerns about GF‘s PBF model. One criticism is that it allows recipient countries to 
choose ―their own performance indicators and target goals‖ to evaluate the 
performance of their GF grants (Glassman et al 2013, p. 46). Another criticizes a 
―superficiality of numbers that the Global Fund proudly announces as its ‗results‘‖ 
(Decosas 2012). In regard to GF in Ukraine, document sources reveal concerns that 
―the targets established were not always formulated adequately and supported with 
validated assumptions‖ (OIG 2012, p. 23). Drew (2005d, p.31) warns that that 
agreeing targets between PR and GF, without local involvement, could result in a 
―must achieve 100% mini project‖, a ―negotiated agreement of what is needed and 
feasible within the time available‖. The outcome, Drew said, may be that the PRs 
―that understand how the process works will find it in their interest to set low targets 
to ensure they achieve higher scores in their grant performance report‖ (ibid., p.31). 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, GF programme implementation occurred in the 
context of pre-existing relationships and legacies, many of which were deeply-rooted 
in the Soviet system, which was a common feature to Western aid programmes in 
FSU (Wedel 2001). Analysis of primary data reveals how some of these legacies, 
rooted in particular in Soviet work practices and data reporting, were re-animated in 
GF-funded environments.  
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 Participants reported PRs had full control over the whole data production 
cycle, including setting HIV prevention targets generated by PR-controlled ‗expert 
working groups‘. The persistent GF focus on performance-based funding was passed 
through to the PR INGO and on to Sub-recipients (SRs). Shortcomings in PR-
practiced approaches to performance monitoring and SR management resulted in 
pressures on SRs to report 100% fulfilment of targets and a constant ‗race for 
figures.‘ As discussed in Chapter 6, no real oversight systems were in place to 
monitor performance for most of the time of R1-R6 grants. Analysis of primary data 
aligns with document sources indicating lack of coordination and ownership over PR 
data monitoring systems. PR (Alliance‘s) focus on delivering results and meeting 
targets left ―little time for considering …issues like coordination and building a 
national response‖ (OIG 2008, p. 19). As an outcome of weak governance, the PR 
had  practically unfettered discretion to institute approaches and systems that allowed 
the PR itself to set and monitor its own service delivery targets, and to control, in 
fact, to assert ownership right in the data reporting systems paid for by GF with 
funds originally intended to support the country monitoring systems.  
 Among the issues identified by participants were the following: 
 GF publicly stated that continued funding would be based on 
performance. The model failed to put in place independent oversight 
systems to allow countries to track PR-reported results. Instead, it 
allowed the PR to implement its own data collection systems and 
procedures that study participants describe as encouraging inflated 
reporting and data manipulation. 
 Full control by the PR (Alliance) over the data reporting cycle 
allowed it to set targets for service delivery, shape reporting of results 
by its SRs, and then to control what was reported to GF. A key tool 
for the PR‘s control of results was a monitoring and evaluation 
database, funded by GF. This database recorded and aggregated data 
obtained from provision of HIV services. Some participants expressed 
concerns that because PR owned the database, it could access, alter, 
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and modify the data they had entered. The database was not certified 
by Ukraine‘s authorities.  
 The focus on delivering 100% or more of results created a 
disincentive for innovation, experimentation, or truthful reporting. 
Ironically, those in charge of Ukrainian NGOs were practiced in the 
culture of over-reporting from their Soviet past, when bad results were 
discouraged, even if it meant data manipulation. SR organisations 
were forced to fulfil the target numbers with no possibility of re-
programming, or otherwise they would not get another project. 
 PR data reporting systems appear to have encouraged and at least 
permitted practices that amounted to double counting of data on HIV 
prevention services. Participants reported the PR reporting systems 
did not produce a fair reflection of actual performance, but 
encouraged pripiski (false reporting). Pripiski were done at both 
submission and implementation stages of SR projects. At the 
submission stage, NGOs were incentivized to write proposals with a 
‗pre-set‘ number of clients – even when the organization knew that 
the numbers promised either did not exist within its coverage area or 
could not be served with the funding requested.  At the reporting 
stage, NGOs were also incentivized to exaggerate the number of 
services delivered – because under-reporting was discouraged and no 
systems were in place to detect exaggeration. Participants report the 
issue was widely known.  
 Data collected by NGOs on HIV prevention services, was cumulative 
for most of R1-R6. Because NGO contracts were short-term, typically 
for one year, it meant that many clients who received services in the 
same NGO would be re-counted as new in new contracts and would 
show in growing cumulative figures each year, while the actual 
number of people reached would grow insignificantly or not grow at 
all. The coding systems that were meant to remedy this were also 
reported as open to manipulation by clients and staff of NGOs. As a 
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consequence, participants reported, double counting of clients was 
wide-spread. 
 The implications of the ‗centrally planned‘ target setting by PRs on the 
example of Ukraine are far-reaching to understand how PBF model manifests itself 
on the ground. Drew (2005d) talked about ‗pressure settings‘ where pressures to 
present ‗on-target‘ data were high. He identified them as ―all settings where 
performance-based funding applies and also in cultures where targets were expected 
to be met or there would be fear of punishment” (Drew 2005d, p. 11). [Emphasis 
added.] Analysis of interview data confirms that PR‘s monitoring systems in R1-R6 
in Ukraine directly fit the ‗pressure settings‘ definition:  firstly, because PRs used 
performance indicators (as part of PBF), secondly, because they controlled the target 
setting – and the whole cycle of the data reporting, and lastly, because through their 
requirement of a 100% target fulfilment by SRs (targets to be met) in order to receive 
new grants (fear of punishment), they could influence that SRs report the right 
results. 
Outcomes: 
 It is argued that the data gathered by PRs are unreliable. The practices of data 
inflation, regardless of their scope, that were reported by participants, are a 
litmus test of serious gaps in data processing, and cast doubt over the 
accuracy of coverage data reported by PRs. The need to reach targets quickly 
in order to process massive funding from GF may explain why these practices 
exist. The ‗performance-based funding‘ model of GF aid delivery that 
envisioned "... a level of substantive accountability – meaning results – that's 
unheard of in international development assistance" (Bush administration 
official, cited in Schoofs and Phillips 2002) did not appear to be realised on 
the ground in Ukraine. Lack of unified standards of services, wide gaps in 
understanding basic definitions, including ‗clients‘, ‗coverage‘ and ‗services‘, 
as well as practices of multiple NGO contracts, overlapping clients and 
NGOs reporting cumulative coverage, contribute to the uncertainty about PRs 
performance results.  
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 The PR ownership of data and reporting systems, not certified by national 
authorities in Ukraine, is dubious. Its use by GF-funded PRs does not 
correspond to what donors and GF pledged in the Paris Declaration: ―to rely, 
as far as possible, on partner countries‘ ... reporting and monitoring 
frameworks‖ (OECD 2005, p.7). How a GF-funded data reporting system 
could end up to be owned by several of the PR‘s managers is inexplicable, 
underscores serious oversight problems of GF programmes, and appears to 
bear a conflict of interest.  
 
 7.4. Servile NGO sector: implementers, not advocates 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision to transfer funding from a state-
centred programme to an INGO was GF‘s own decision (Drew 2005, OIG 2008). 
The perceived strength of the PR INGO as having established links with other NGOs 
in the country and ‗partnership relationships‘ among the Alliance and other NGOs 
were considered as key to the success of the GF programme (Drew 2005). 
The starting point for the analysis of NGO relations during the GF 
implementation was determined on the basis of literature sources on the roles of 
NGOs in development. Chapter 4 discussed the implications for Ukraine of two 
issues raised in the literature: 
- Following Ibrahim and Hulme (2010), NGOs typically exercise three primary 
roles, namely: advocacy, policy change and service delivery. 
- Rich-country NGOs operate as donors with respect to NGOs and even to the 
state in poor countries when they ―unilaterally decided where, with whom 
and regarding what they want to work‖ (Engberg-Pedersen 2008, p.1).  
 In many other Eastern European countries, for HIV NGOs, the need to secure 
funding occurred ―on the landscape of political and moral messages regarding HIV 
and the need to serve their clients‖ (Owczarzak 2009, p.422). Ukraine‘s NGO 
context was profoundly altered by the GF entry. Not only was there little domestic 
discussion about the political and moral messages important to HIV prevention, the 
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fact that funding was given directly to the INGO by the GF demonstrated that this 
NGO did not emerge or develop from within civil society in Ukraine. Nor was its 
recipient status a result of a wide national initiative; rather it was a GF-appointed 
advocate.  
 The ‗donor-like‘ role of PRs manifested in the context of CCM governance, 
as discussed above. It also led to ―a shift of inter-organisational relations‖ after the 
GF R1 grant transfer (Drew 2005c). In these relations, Alliance was seen acting ‗as a 
donor‘, and the possibility that organizations might receive funds from Alliance 
―affected the nature of the relationship between the organizations‖ (Drew 2005c, pp. 
14-15). In R6, dependency of local NGOs on PRs deepened. One report 
acknowledged ―a widening rift between the powerful national organisations and 
smaller regional NGOs‖ (Druce et al. 2008, p. 10).  
The concept of PR NGOs acting as donors to other NGOs was further applied in 
analysis of country documents and interviews. 
 The decision to transfer a government-focused grant to an INGO, and later to 
its local subsidiary, disadvantaged the emerging national civil society in Ukraine. To 
implement its programmes, GF demonstrated a preference for externally-linked 
NGOs. Drawing from the participants responses, a cluster of regionally established 
NGOs with a harm reduction focus and previous international donor funding appears 
to have assisted in the transfer of the GF grant from the government. To those not 
involved in engineering the transfer, the narrow HIV prevention agenda with its 
focus on injecting drug users did not allow room for a broader stakeholder 
involvement.  
As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, Ukrainian civil society sector was co-opted 
through competitive and PR-controlled channelling of funds, producing a servile 
NGO community with weak advocacy capacity. PR NGOs, acting as donors in 
channelling GF funding, ran highly discretionary policies of Sub-Recipient funding, 
by which they classified SR NGOs as possessing ‗a unique capacity‟ or „exclusive 
capacity and experience‟, as ‗favoured implementers‟ and so on (Alliance 2007, p. 
6). Local NGOs, instead of looking out to better serve their constituencies, had to 
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endure a permanent competition among themselves for ―donor largesse‖ (Spicer et 
al.2011, p.1751), and succumb to vertical, contract-based relations established 
between NGO-grantors and NGO-grantees, with a wide-spread ―culture of fear‖ 
(ibid.,p.1751). With GF the largest HIV funder in most oblasts, the only alternative 
for NGOs was ‗get a GF grant or perish‘. This contradicts the initial GF assumption 
that PR NGOs would be capitalizing on the existing NGO networks. Instead, local 
grass roots NGOs lost the voice to articulate where the real needs lay, and turned to 
trumpeting the 100 percent success of PR-defined approaches and targets. In the 
words of one participant, local NGOs ―moved from being leaders of the third sector 
to servile implementers‖. Advocating for broader policy issues or for re-
programming GF funding to meet the actual needs in their oblasts would have 
threatened their own funding.  Lack of broader civil society engagement with 
government compromised its capacity to advocate scaling up future domestic 
funding in case of donor exit.  
The distribution of Sub-Recipient NGOs was uneven within the eight of 24 
regions. GF-funded services were purportedly targeted and delivered at ‗high 
priority‘ regions and ―focused on regions of higher prevalence rates and in larger 
cities‖ (OIG 2012a, p. 22), which followed prior patterns of donor aid in Ukraine. 
Even at the time of peak GF funding, when R1 and R6 programmes overlapped, the 
‗scaling-up‘ of HIV prevention services did not spread beyond the ―high-priority‖ 
regions. This was also confirmed by interviews.  
 Significant amounts of GF funding went to about a dozen well-established, 
well-connected NGOs in ―high-priority‖ regions – ‗mega NGOs‘ that were already 
well-funded before the launch of the GF programme. The rationale for PRs to engage 
with some SR NGOs non-competitively was rooted in their discretionary grant 
making and was explained by the need for PRs to be ―flexible in adapting ... to 
specific circumstances‖ and thus bringing in ―some NGOs [that] had been through a 
previous competitive process‖ (Drew 2005a, p.10). The use of ‗established‘ NGOs 
appeared to be consistent with the need to spend money quickly. It enabled the 
proliferation of larger regional NGOs – influential power blocs that were funded 
continuously – because they had been through ―a previous competitive process‖. 
Chances of new NGOs without a prior SR experience to be funded were low. 
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Due to the practices of double counting in data monitoring, ‗Mega‘ NGOs 
were able to generate large coverage numbers from one oblast that were passed on 
into national coverage statistics and to the GF. Massive overlap of NGO-provided 
services within the same city allowed for a duplication of services when clients were 
able to walk from NGO to NGO in the same city and receive multiple services. This 
practice appears to have been well-known. 
A problematic element of GF funding was reported as associated with hiring 
of licensed medical professionals by HIV-service NGOs. This practice allowed 
NGOs to deliver specific medical services, as well as allowed them to deliver, 
without resistance from local officials, harm reduction interventions that were 
viewed as politically or morally controversial. GF-funded NGO service delivery that 
required formal local government approval often led to NGOs being co-opted by 
state health officials and AIDS centre head doctors. This resulted in creation of 
hybrid, ‗quasi‘ NGOs in the regions, run by health officials or AIDS centre doctors. 
The ambiguous nature of NGO involvement with government officials at both 
national and regional levels was also reported. The engagement by NGOs of state 
officials as GF-funded consultants was a common feature in an environment where 
GF-funded interventions were seen as politically controversial, and often not fully 
legal, such as syringe exchange. It represented, in the words of one participant, 
―buying loyalty from the state‖.  The ease with which such NGOs appeared should 
be viewed not as a sign of a deregulated, ‘free‘ sector, but of a weak civil society, 
trapped between dependence on external funding and the need to survive under the 
pressures of state bureaucrats that viewed NGOs as a lucrative ground for 
themselves. The NGOs seeking approval from local government in order to get GF 
funding could not be effective advocates, and local advocacy potential was seriously 
impaired or lost altogether. Involvement of AIDS centre doctors in organisations of 
patients whom they were supposed to cure and protect, getting funding on their 
behalf, constituted a conflict of interest and a gross violation of ethics in ‗doctor-
patient‘ relations. 
Outcomes: 
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 GF selected an international NGO and its subsidiary, without a competition 
and for many years, as PR to run its programmes. Ukraine‘s own NGOs, 
however, were co-opted competitively through PR-controlled grant contracts 
and were used opportunistically to deliver services and generate coverage 
data. This resulted in a servile NGO community with a weak capacity to 
advocate for issues outside the GF programmes‘ scope.  
 Because its cookie-cutter programmes imported from elsewhere were not 
designed for the Ukrainian legal, political, and cultural context, PR had to 
engage state health care workers in GF-funded NGO settings. This facilitated 
NGO hybridization, and the appearance of ‗quasi‘ NGOs run by officials or 
AIDS centre doctors. In an environment where GF-funded interventions were 
seen as politically controversial, the engagement of state officials in GF-
funded NGOs represented, in one participant‘s words, ―buying loyalty from 
the state‖. 
 Due to their privileged status, explained in detail in Chapter 4, ‗mega‘ NGOs 
in ‗high priority‘ regions were influential in the GF-funded proliferation of 
activities during R1, including target setting and monitoring of service 
delivery data. ‗Mega‘ NGOs, based in large cities in ‗priority regions‘, 
generated high-digit coverage data. This data was then passed on to the PR 
national coverage data reported to GF under the Performance-Based-Funding 
(PBF) model. In reality, this data was inconsistent and cumulative, concocted 
from imprecise and conflicting definitions of ―client‖ and ―service package‖, 
with numbers generated from counting the same clients as new again for 
multiple contracts, counting multiple visits of the same clients, using absent 
clients‘ cards, etc. The PR-owned data reporting systems enabled these 
practices. 
Conclusion 
The implementation of GF-funded HIV prevention programmes in Ukraine 
provides specific examples of general weaknesses in the GF model that others have 
critiqued in regard to the traditional aid programmes, as noted in Chapter 1, including 
the CCM governance structure, weak monitoring and evaluation systems, and the 
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performance-based funding model. The outcomes described above also suggest that, 
as implemented, some of the same flaws assigned to earlier, traditional donor 
programmes by aid effectiveness critics, were manifested in GF programmes in 
Ukraine: 
 Williams (2009) complained that donor programs too often solicited 
negligible feedback from beneficiaries and their impacts were difficult to 
observe. 
 Prokopijevich (2006, p. 19) criticized the pattern of ―mass deception 
through reporting and evaluation.‖ 
 Easterly (2003, p. 34) described donor programs that function ―as a cartel 
of good intentions, suppressing critical feedback and learning from the 
past, suppressing competitive pressure to deliver results, and suppressing 
identification of the best channel of resources for different objectives.‖ 
It was precisely such flaws that the GF as a new aid delivery model, 
compliant with the principles of the Paris Declaration, was intended to avoid. In this 
light, the Conclusion to this thesis that follows will address whether and to what 
extent GF programmes can be sustainable in the event of the GF exit from Ukraine. 
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Conclusion. The exit of the Global Fund and the future of HIV prevention in 
Ukraine 
The perceptions of aid by donors and recipients are very different. Citizens of 
donor countries might expect their foreign aid money to be received with gratitude 
and without expectations for how it should be used, trusting that Western political 
systems, democratic values and good intentions will produce effective programming 
that improves lives in recipient countries. For those of us ‗on the ground‘, or rather, 
deep inside the aid delivery quagmire, such attitudes appear naïve. We lack trust in 
good intentions, because, based on decades of experience, we understand the 
catastrophic harm that ignorance and arrogance can unleash, as discussed in Chapter 
1. Faith in Western democratic institutions has little relevance in the context of our 
own countries where aid is being delivered. We have even less faith in our own post-
Soviet ‗democracies‘ and their ability to manage the incoming aid on our behalf. 
This mostly skeptical perspective was expressed at the beginning of this enquiry and 
provided for a ‗critical space‘ in order to examine the effects of aid and how it is 
perceived ‗on the ground‘ in Ukraine.  
At the same time, the existence of multiple modern approaches to HIV 
prevention and care, increased access to new and more effective diagnostics and 
ARV drugs, as well as the existence of strong global health advocacy networks 
supported the belief that new elements from outside could be incorporated into the 
existing health care systems in Ukraine. We believed that the state health sector, 
although affected by transition, was capable of moving forward with ART provision 
and other health services. Ukraine, among many other FSU states, also had powerful 
and growing civil society, and expectations were high of its ‗Third sector‘ capacity in 
HIV/AIDS advocacy and service delivery. With this understanding and these hopes, 
a comprehensive, nationwide, HIV prevention and treatment programme, developed 
with a strong government support, centred on government health system, and with 
participation of civil society, was approved for GF funding. This thesis has described 
how that programme was taken away and another, more narrowly focused program, 
centred on NGOs to deliver services, substituted in Ukraine. This research has 
examined the effects of the Global Fund programme transfer to the INGO it selected, 
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implemented by non-governmental entities, on the HIV health sector and policy 
relationships and services in Ukraine.  
Aid divides. The aid programme, even before it arrives, already divides the 
country‘s government, parliamentarians, business and expert communities, NGOs, 
ethnic, faith, gender and age groups, and population at large into stakeholders, 
beneficiaries, and the rest. Most aid programmes in the way they are run are divisive 
in principle – aid is being given only to a particular cause, for a particular group and 
for a particular time. Those who are presumed beneficiaries – the end recipients of 
aid - are so divided in their opinions that special methods are needed to examine 
them. In some cases, beneficiaries, if asked, do not want to receive what donors want 
to give. The donor side of the aid narrative has been clear-cut: the givers know better 
than takers where and for what the money should go.  
All that was meant to change with the Global Fund. Established to over-ride 
the fallacies of previous aid delivery models, its programmes were meant to be run 
based on the principle of country ownership. Countries themselves, in a broadly 
inclusive process, would determine where their needs lay, and how to tackle them. 
Once the GF was satisfied with country-developed programmes, it would provide the 
funding that supported implementation. Indeed, GF documents explicitly incorporate 
the principles of the Paris and Accra Accords: 
As a signatory to the Paris and Accra Accords, the Global Fund will abide by 
the guiding principles of alignment and harmonization. At the country level, 
the Global Fund will emphasize the alignment of its grant cycle with country 
planning and budgeting cycles, and harmonization of salary support and 
compensation.  
 
The Global Fund will encourage CCMs to be more in line with other national 
coordinating bodies. (GFATM 2010a) 
 
The innovative GF model of aid delivery was supposed to create systems to 
deliver balanced programming. Stakeholders in each country would develop 
interventions to meet their own specific needs. CCMs would assure broad 
representation in program development and oversight, with members drawn from the 
public sector, NGOs, and those living with the targeted diseases and their 
communities. GF procedures and oversight would prevent kleptocrats – usually 
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government officials – from stealing the money. And the communities of people with 
the diseases targeted would have influence over funding decisions.  
In some respects, the model succeeded. Ukraine‘s government did not divert 
the funds, though some health sector officials and their quasi NGOs did well. GF 
grant recipients were non-governmental organisations, including the one representing 
the community of people with the disease.  
Yet, drawing on the available evidence, this thesis asserts that despite its 
guiding principles and contrary to its own ongoing narratives about its much-touted 
best practice approaches, GF-funded aid model as implemented in Ukraine, does not 
appear, as noted by its former IG, to have delivered value. In fact, its programmes 
may have adverse impacts and distorted state health sector capacity for prevention 
and treatment and, more importantly, have made HIV prevention unsustainable. 
The delivery of GF aid programmes brought in and institutionalised multiple 
divisions that had adverse effects on the country‘s ownership of HIV prevention 
efforts, on relations of civil society with the state, and on national governance. In the 
context of democracy, the grant seeking and grant-eating practices that were enabled 
by massive GF funding had a detrimental effect and corrupted Ukraine‘s nascent 
HIV/AIDS civil society. The ability of NGOs to advocate for issues broader than GF 
programme delivery was severely impaired. Some civil society actors engaged in 
opportunism in their promotion of narrow GF-funded prevention ideologies.  
The ‗stand-alone‘, isolationist manner, in which HIV prevention programmes 
were run by PRs, undermined national ownership. The state health sector was largely 
bypassed by NGO-centred programmes, systems, and practices. Instead of generating 
a broader policy dialogue and making HIV a public concern for all, the PR NGOs 
and GF continued to articulate a more narrow ‗prioritisation of those most-at-risk‘ 
which was not perceived as fair by society and medical community, ravaged by 
multiple diseases and collapsing health care. In reaching those ‗at-risk‘ though, the 
PRs did not appear to have consistent service standards or to reach out to most parts 
of the country. Only eight of 24 regions appeared to have been covered by most of 
GF-funded services. The narrow programmes run by GF-funded PRs and their SRs, 
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some of which were inconsistent with Ukraine‘s legal framework, lacked a broad 
national constituency. Nor does it appear that they could be implemented 
independently of the current PRs, who own the data monitoring systems and other 
programming materials, etc., developed over the years. Thus, attempting to prolong 
GF-programmes in the absence of GF funding would require extra funding to replace 
systems and procedures that GF has already paid for.  
The important question therefore is what the implications will be for HIV 
prevention services if Global Fund exits from Ukraine. The most recent GF 
communications suggest it is leaving countries like Ukraine that have achieved 
middle-income status, and will be focusing on disease ‗hot spots‘ and target high-risk 
populations. In Ukraine, PRs and their NGO grantees, supported by the GF, assert 
that GF-funded HIV prevention has been effective, and the government should now 
provide replacement funding to continue the programming. Others argue that GF has 
to stay and continue funding the existing approaches.  
A GF exit from Ukraine would come at the worst possible time. The country 
is in dire economic straits and racked by civil war. Funding for HIV prevention and 
treatment initiatives would compete with modernizing the military and maintaining 
public electricity and heating systems. It may be that to curry Western favour, upon 
which its survival may depend, the current government accepts the GF exit 
conditions and takes over funding of badly regulated, controversial, non-standardised 
HIV prevention services run by NGOs. The Ministry of Health has given assurances 
about continuing engagement with GF after its exit. It is unclear how the current 
political and economic crisis will affect Ukraine‘s relations with the GF, and whether 
it will expedite its exit scenario. (Most of this thesis was written before the crisis in 
Ukraine commenced in February of 2014.) 
Transfer of HIV prevention to domestic funding faces several challenges.  
The PR NGOs‘ advocacy for this approach may be viewed as defending their own 
self-interests. The current narrowly-focused HIV prevention programmes will be 
subject to challenge by other country stakeholders who have not been engaged in 
past planning and delivery of interventions. The government may co-opt a number of 
NGOs to implement its own HIV prevention approaches as it sees them. Some of 
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these NGOs are already in existence as an aftermath of NGO hybridisation in GF-
funded settings, described as ‗quasi NGOs‘ in this thesis. Other NGOs may be 
opened to enable utilisation of ‗social contract‘ budget allocations, when those 
become available.  
Similar developments can already be observed in Russia, where the 
government moved to fund its own version of HIV prevention, and significantly 
overhauled the direction of programming. Most of the previous GF-funded service 
providers were replaced with different organisations that focused on healthy life 
style, drug treatment and rehabilitation services, and re-integration of drug users 
introduced as the key policy directions of state services. The GF is only marginally 
present in Russia, funding a segment of NGO-based regional harm reduction projects 
that are often in conflict with government policies.  
If GF exits from Ukraine, the government will have to take responsibility for 
HIV prevention and treatment. As was the case in Russia, government may well 
replace GF-funded programs with an entirely different approach, especially given 
Ukraine‘s current financial crisis. The way to deal with the transition from GF to 
government funding may be to move the HIV prevention services from being 
focused on ‗outreach‘, field services, to a ‗closer-to-care‘ approach that would 
shorten and improve linkages to the state HIV care continuum, and institute stronger 
referral protocols for entry into care, currently missing. For this, effective, 
permanent, and legally defined standards need to be developed and nationally 
adopted for HIV prevention service delivery. Clear definitions of ‗coverage‘, ‗client‘, 
and ‗service‘ need to be adopted and costed in a manner consistent with relevant 
legislation. A well-functioning, predicable and sustainable system of NGO-run 
services needs to be established and nationally funded. The scope and level of NGO 
services should not be competition-based, but regional needs-based. An NGO-run 
system that can effectively demonstrate and reliably document coverage and service 
delivery would raise the status of NGOs in dialogue with the state and local 
governments, and move NGO services closer to integration into state health care.  
All the existing HIV prevention capacities, including those created with GF 
funding, need to be mapped in order to be effectively coordinated by country-run, 
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nationally-owned systems. Overall, a full and independent audit of all available HIV 
prevention services that are currently delivered is much needed in Ukraine, without 
which attempts to integrate prevention and care are doomed. The language of 
concentrating prevention in some groups in some regions needs to give way to a 
broader and more holistic approach to HIV prevention that would benefit the whole 
population of Ukraine and generate a broader policy response to the threat of 
Europe‘s fastest growing epidemic.  
However, given most of the recent statements by GF leadership, it does not 
seem to support holistic prevention. Its leadership uses phrases like seeking ‗the 
biggest bang for the buck‘ and focusing on ‗hot epidemiological spots‘. Whether and 
how well GF will continue to engage with countries that adopt different HIV 
prevention and treatment models remains to be seen. But under the new approach as 
articulated, country ownership may mean the country is abandoned if its choices do 
not conform to GF‘s requirements.  
 Sadly, it appears from the evidence and document analysis reported in this 
thesis that, as experienced in Ukraine, the high expectations for GF aid delivery have 
not been met. In many respects, the country ownership model was never allowed a 
chance to succeed. Government was pushed out of the process early on and control 
passed on to an international NGO. The original country-owned programme that 
envisioned a nationwide, comprehensive programme covering the entire population 
was replaced, without national debate, by a narrowly targeted focus on some, but not 
all, high-risk target groups in a limited number of high-priority regions. A vibrant 
NGO community was undermined, converted into grant-eaters that collaborated in 
churning out unreliable data to justify continued funding. How could this approach 
be sustained? More importantly, even if resources were available, why should it be 
sustained? Despite the high hopes and great expectations, GF‘s legacy is likely to be 
an all too familiar phenomenon – a donor programme that disappears when funding 
dries up, leaving behind shrivelling NGOs that no longer have the means or 
resources to carry on a programme, and weakened in front of their governments. And 
in the background of wasted opportunity, the key issue still remains, how Ukraine, 
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Europe, and the world will continue to respond to the world‘s fastest growing HIV 
epidemic.   
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: Global Fund Recommended “Top Ten” Key  
Performance Indicators  
 
 
(CGD 2013b, p. 44). 
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APPENDIX B. Sex work, prostitution and sexuality in Ukraine and 
Russia: a historic overview 
In tsarist Russia, prostitution was regulated and confined to brothels (publichnye 
doma) where prostitutes lived and worked, subject to medical examination. This 
system was well-described in the Russian 19
th
 century literature (Tolstoy, Bunin, 
Dostoyevsky, and others). Prostitution in Halychyna was illegal at the times of the 
Austrian Empire while some individual prostitution was allowed at home. Often with 
direct involvement of the Austrian authorities, Ukrainian women were trafficked into 
brothels as far as in Istanbul, Bombay, Buenos-Aires, Rio in the 19
th
 century. In 
1920s-1930s when Halychyna was Polish territory, prostitution was confined to 
special streets, similar to ‗red light‘ districts in European capitals. During Nazi 
occupation of Ukraine in 1941, many local women were drawn into prostitution 
despite Himmler‘s ban on sexual relations with ―inferior‖ people (Gertjejanssen 
2004).  
 
In Soviet Union, prostitution was de-criminalised. It was an administrative offence 
with minimal fines. Soviet view on prostitution was based on perception of 
prostitution as existing mainly in the capitalist society where women were forced 
into sex work by joblessness and lack of education. Prominent Bolshevik feminist 
leader Alexandra Kollontai - Commissar for Public Welfare in 1917-18 – was an 
advocate of ‗free love‘ and proclaimed that family „is ceasing to be necessary either 
to its members or to the nation as a whole‟ (Kollontai, 1977). Kollontai advocated 
strongly against prostitution:  
 
 And what, after all, is the professional prostitute? She is a person whose 
 energy is not used for the collective; a person who lives off others, by taking  
from the rations of others…from the point of view of the national economy  
the professional prostitute is a labour deserter. For this reason we must  
ruthlessly oppose prostitution. In the interests of the economy we must start  
an immediate fight to reduce the number of prostitutes and eliminate  
prostitution in all its forms.  (Kollontai 1977, p.266)  
 
Early attempts of Bolshevik sexual emancipation did not survive and, with the 
emergence of Stalin in the 1920ies, abortion was outlawed (until 1955) and 
puritanical attitudes predominated, when sexuality became a taboo subject in mass 
media, scientific investigation, and education and the only legitimate function of 
sexuality was reproduction (Hovorun and Vornyk 2004).    
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APPENDIX C. Health care organisation in the USSR: the „Semashko‟ 
system 
Outpatient care was provided by the uchastkovyi vrach (catchment area therapist or 
paediatrician) to the assigned adult/child population in their catchment area 
(uchastok in Russian) or at district (rayon) polyclinics. The inpatient care was 
organized into three levels: the first (lower) level of rural hospitals provided basic 
inpatient facilities; the second (middle) level - secondary inpatient care – was 
provided in central district and oblast multi-profile hospitals, specialized clinics 
(dispensaries), and specialized hospitals; and the third (higher) level of regional and 
supra-regional specialization - tertiary care - for more chronic and complicated 
conditions - provided by republican hospitals, research centres and specialized clinics 
in large cities.  
Tertiary care services were also vertical, organised by disease-centredspecialties, 
each with its own system of institutions – TB dispensaries, drug dispensaries, 
infectious hospitals etc. Large industry employers (railroads, defense, police etc.) as 
well as the prison system, all had separate health care systems. Vertical health care 
remains characteristic of the Ukrainian health care system (Lekhan et al, 2004).  
Soviet healthcare was based heavily on prevention and made significant advances in 
preventing infectious and other diseases through compulsory vaccination and annual 
―dispensarization‖ (health check-ups) for all citizens (Rowland and Telyukov 1991). 
An important element of the Semashko model was the extensive system of 
epidemiological monitoring networks - SanEpid (Tragakes 2003).  
A vertical, command-based system with no world analogues, SanEpid (Sanitary-
Epidemiological) Service, or SES was established by Semashko in 1918-20 to 
respond to a devastating typhus epidemic that took millions of lives, when Lenin is 
reported to have uttered a famous phrase, "if socialism cannot conquer lice, then lice 
will conquer socialism" (cited in Muller et al, 1972). A massive and zealous public 
delousing campaign was carried out that succeeded in stopping typhus in Soviet 
Russia (Garrett, 2000). Later, thousands of SanEpid stations monitored mass 
obligatory vaccinations, sanitary protection of water supplies, vector control of 
malaria, disinfection, pest eradication, hygienic disposal of waste and sewage, milk 
pasteurization, etc. (Glass, 1976) In late Soviet times, the focus of SanEpid shifted to 
occupational health and environment, and it was responsible for setting and 
maintaining numerous standards and norms. Overall, SanEpid was able to bring 
under control most existing epidemics of the time, and can be viewed as a model of 
preventive medicine that was effective in the Soviet context.  
Beginning in the 1970s, more emphasis was placed on the hospital as a provider of 
care (Rowland and Telyukov 1991). The budgeting approach was based on the 
notorious ‗bed-unit‘ (koyko-mesto) system, under which the service capacity of a 
health care institution was measured by the number of hospital beds and of health 
personnel (Lekhan et al, 2010). Socialist planning was oriented towards the goal of 
ever-increasing this capacity. In 1990, just before the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine 
and other Soviet republics had among the world‘s highest numbers of hospital beds 
and physicians per capita (World Bank, 1995).  
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APPENDIX D Variability of HIV/AIDS estimates in donor-funded 
research in Ukraine 
 
Between 2005 and 2011, three comprehensive studies have were being 
conducted to estimate the size of populations most-at-risk for HIV infection 
(Berleva et al, 2012) as well as national estimates for the number of PLWHA, 
fully or partially funded out of GF grants. A wide and diverse combination of 
various research methods was practiced in these studies.  
However, in 2012 UNAIDS acknowledged that data on HIV/AIDS made in 
previous years was incorrect ―due to differences in calculation methods and 
differing versions of the software used for estimates generation‖ (UNAIDS 
2012b, p.2). The developers of the new estimates urged not to use the 
estimates from previous years and ―encouraged all users to accurately and 
consistently cite and use the data, as figures which have been approved by the 
National Council on TB/HIV/AIDS on March 29, 2012‖ (ibid., p.1). 
[emphasis added] A CCM approval thus constituted a decision making 
mechanism, with similar regional targets endorsed by Regional CCMs in 
oblasts. Only in 2012 – almost ten years after the GF began work in Ukraine – 
research protocols on the estimation of the size of most-at-risk populations 
began to be endorsed by the State Service of Ukraine on HIV/AIDS and Other 
Socially Dangerous Diseases. (Berleva et al. 2012, p. 8) 
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APPENDIX E. HIV testing in Ukraine: four stages 
1) At the first stage, the previous Soviet model of mass HIV testing worked: 
from 1987 to 1994, 39,226,986 tests were carried out (Barnett et al, 2000). In 
1993 alone, some 7.3 million persons were tested for HIV. Vast numbers of 
tests were carried out to identify very few infected persons as the epidemic 
was low. 
2) The second stage, from 1994 until March of 1998, saw a major decrease in 
the number of tests as a result of changes in financing of test-systems and 
their distribution, as the previous centralized purchases by the national 
government were replaced by requiring local budgets to cover these costs. 
During this period, only few oblast AIDS centres had their own laboratories, 
and blood samples from all other oblasts had to be transported to Kyiv.  
3) During the third stage, from March of 1998 until 2002, screening numbers 
fell further, following adoption of the Law "On Prevention of AIDS 
Incidence and Social Protection of People", which made HIV testing 
voluntary. Some sources note that, while conforming to international 
standards and aiming to protect the human rights of PLWHA, the 
introduction of the new system made the collation of data obtained prior to 
and after 1998 complicated (British Council 2011). This period is also 
associated with the dissolution of the AIDS Committee in May 1998 and 
scandals over testing systems. Thereafter, the state budget only funded the 
purchase and distribution of test systems for donor blood screening. Testing 
for other purposes devolved to local budgets.  
4) The fourth stage – from 2002 to present – has been characterised by changes 
in the state framework for PMTCT
99
within the National Program. 
Procurement of HIV-antibody tests for pregnant women began to be fully 
funded by the state.   
 
 
 
                                                          
99
Preventing Mother-To-child HIV transmission 
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APPENDIX F. The GF funds harm reduction in Ukraine: a success story.  
 
(International HIV/AIDS Alliance, 2012b, p.10) 
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APPENDIX G. Research information sheet. 
 
 
 
Information Sheet 
 
My name is Svetlana McGill and below is information about a research project that I 
am conducting at the Institute for International Health and Development at Queen 
Margaret University in Edinburgh. The title of my project is ‘Impact of the Global 
Fund Grants on HIV Prevention Policy and Services in Ukraine’.  The research will 
be conducted in several regions of Ukraine, one of which is your region.  
As you may know, the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(GFATM) is the largest international donor in public health. Ukraine has been 
receiving grants since 2002 and is at present the largest single GF recipient in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia region.  
The purpose of my research is to find out how the prevention policies and 
interventions that were developed during the implementation of GFATM grants, 
influenced national HIV prevention policies and HIV services in Ukraine.  
There have been many publications about HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine, including 
a number which mention the work of the Global Fund in Ukraine. According to some 
estimates, Ukraine has developed the most severe HIV epidemic in the whole of 
Europe and Eurasia, with adult HIV prevalence estimated at 1.6% in 2008 – the 
highest in Europe100. The severe character of Ukraine’s epidemic remediates the 
need to look at the effectiveness of HIV prevention interventions and policies, as 
most of them were funded through the GF programmes. 
In Ukraine, there is little state support to nationally-based social policy research, 
including research on HIV prevention policy and services, and most studies are 
conducted at the initiative of donor organisations. In this context, the nature of policy 
making in Ukraine and justification for adopting this or other policy often remains 
obscured or viewed as an outcome of donor recommendations. The NGO context in 
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which GF programmes are run presents a particularly interesting case for analysis. 
While much of existing research on GF in Ukraine has focused at the national level, 
the regional perspective was often limited. 
It is the author’s belief that most of HIV prevention and treatment work happens at 
the regional or city/district level, where patients turn for health care and social 
services, and where they are referred to other health services by locally functioning 
NGOs. In this connection, your opinion, as an expert on HIV policy and services, 
health provider and organiser, is invaluable for the goals of this research. You are 
invited to participate in the research project.   
There are some criteria, however, for you to take part. You need to be involved in 
the implementation or planning of HIV/AIDS programmes in Ukraine, either 
nationally, regionally, or internationally, and you need to have work experience or 
extended knowledge about the programmes supported by the Global Fund. Other 
than that, there are no special requirements and everybody is welcome.  
Some of the questions will relate to practical aspects of HIV prevention work, and 
about HIV prevention approach that was chosen in GF-funded settings in Ukraine. 
You only need to provide your opinion about this. No data or figures will be required 
from you. You may be asked to comment on the existing systems of data collection 
about HIV services in Ukraine. We will not interview clients of HIV services. You will 
be free to withdraw from the study at any stage and you would not have to give a 
reason.  
This is not an operational research. The research is conducted independently by the 
researcher, and is not funded by the Global Fund. Your name or other personal 
information will not be collected. The responses that you choose to provide, will be 
in disposal of the researcher only and will not be shared with any institution or 
organisation in Ukraine, or anywhere else. There will be no payment for taking part 
in the research. Results of the research may be used in preparing a doctoral 
dissertation at QMU, published in national and international journals, and presented 
at conferences. 
I would be very glad if you would be able to dedicate your time to take part in the 
interview and answer some of the questions. I would be grateful for your 
collaboration.  
Contact data of the researcher:  
Name:   Svetlana McGill 
PhD Research Student 
Address:   Institute for International Health and Development,  
Queen Margaret University,  
   Edinburgh EH21 6UU 
 
Email / Telephone: SMcGill@qmu.ac.uk  +44-131- 474 0000 
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APPENDIX H. INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Questions to determine respondent‘s status, duration of experience and level of 
knowledge of the GF programmes 
 
1. Do you have any knowledge about/experience with the programmes 
supported by Global Fund in Ukraine? If yes, for how long?  
 
- less than two years; 
- from two to five years; 
- five or more years;  
2. With which Rounds of GF grants on HIV in Ukraine do you have 
knowledge/experience of having worked with? 
 
- Round 1 (2004-2009); 
- Round 6 (2007-2012) 
- Both rounds. 
 
3. How would you best identify yourself in relation to GF programmes in 
Ukraine? 
- state medical care sector (Ministry of Health); 
- state non-medical sector (employee or official of State Penitentiary Department, 
State Social Services, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Interior, etc.); 
- national NGO of Ukraine; 
- regional NGO (oblast, rayon, town); 
- independent expert, specialist; 
- international intergovernmental organisation (UNDP, UNAIDS, WHO); 
- international governmental organization (USAID, GIZ, CIDA, DFID etc.); 
- international NGO; 
- other (please describe which one). 
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4. What type of activities were you involved in/worked that is related in GF 
programmes? 
- prevention (including among groups of high risk to HIV transmission); 
- Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) services on HIV 
- treatment/administering ARV-therapy; 
- referral of patients 
- care and support, palliative care. 
- reporting, preparing assessments 
- several of the above. 
 
MAIN BLOC OF QUESTIONS – TO BE ASKED TO EVERYBODY 
 
For state and NGO sector:  
 
1. What, in your opinion, is the character of HIV epidemic in Ukraine?  
 
2. Does the understanding of the character of HIV epidemic influence the policy 
formation on HIV prevention? Why?  
 
3. Which structures in Ukraine are responsible for HIV prevention?  
 
4. What structures in Ukraine are conducting HIV prevention programmes? 
Please name as many as you know. 
 
5. Please name, in your opinion, the main components for HIV prevention in 
Ukraine.  
 
6. Are all of these included into the programmes of prevention that were 
conducted in Ukraine funded by GF? If not, which are included? Which are 
not included? Why? 
 
7. What was the main focus of HIV prevention programmes funded by GF?  
 
8. Do you know how priorities were determined for HIV prevention during the 
time of submission of Round 1 country proposal to GF? (year 2003). 
 
If the answer ‗yes‘, then ask the following question: 
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 8a. What were the HIV prevention priorities after the transfer of Round 1 grant from 
government to HIV/AIDS Alliance? 
 
BLOC OF QUESTIONS ON HIV PREVENTION NEEDS AND COVERAGE 
 
9. Does Ukraine have a system to determine the needs for HIV prevention 
programmes? 
 
If a respondent has answered ‗yes‘ on this question, then two follow-up questions are 
being asked.  
 
9a. Please provide a short description of this system, and nominate the HIV 
prevention needs from more important to less important (at least three needs).  
9b. Please explain how it is determined that these needs are the most important.  
 
If a respondent has answered ‗no‘ on question 9, then ask about how the decision is 
made to scale-up existing measures of HIV prevention. 
 
10. In GF-funded programmes, describe, how the needs are determined of the 
region for coverage with HIV services (whether assessments are conducted, 
regions consulted, how planning of prevention taking place) 
 
11. How the groups targeted for HIV prevention are determined at the 
national/regional levels? How are they estimated? 
12. Do you know, which populations were the focus for HIV prevention in 
programmes funded by GF? 
13. How were the prevention needs determined for each of sub-populations?  
14. Do estimated needs of the projects funded by GF get corrected/amended 
during the project implementation? 
-yes; 
- no; 
- rarely; 
- never. 
15. In which cases the estimated needs are being corrected/amended? 
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- when a surplus appears of distributed paraphernalia 
(supplies)
101
/informational materials, etc.; 
- when a deficit appears of distributed supplies/informational materials, etc.; 
-other cases (describe which). 
16. In your oblast/rayon/town, how did the prevention programmes funded by GF, 
influence the HIV morbidity levels? – in risk groups and in general population 
Reduced in risk groups Reduced in general population 
Slightly reduced in risk groups Slightly reduced in general population 
Did not influence in risk groups Did not influence in general population 
Increased in risk groups 
Cannot determine 
Increased in general population 
Cannot determine 
  
17. Which of the following may have reduced the effectiveness of HIV prevention 
programmes funded by GF? 
- insufficient coverage of risk groups; 
- weak attendance by clients of SEP (syringe exchange programmes); 
- not enough instrumentarium/materials being distributed; 
- breaks in supplies of instrumentarium/materials; 
- delays in funds transfer  
- uneasy access of patients to SEP sites; 
- uneasy travel of social workers to SEP sites; 
- safety/difficulties of programme staff in implementing prevention activities;  
- other (explain what).  
 
18. How was prevention conducted after the onset of GF programmes in 
populations not targeted by GF-funding? 
 
BLOC OF QUESTIONS ON MULTI-SECTORAL COOPERATION 
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19. How effective do you think, is collaboration between state institutions and 
HIV-service NGOs? 
20. How effective was the work of the CCM - National Council on HIV/AIDS-TB 
in 1 and 6 Rounds? Or Regional CCM? Why do you think so?  
21. Can the CCM - National Council – or Regional CMM - influence the 
implementation of programmes funded by GF? Why do you think so? 
 
BLOC OF QUESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF NGO 
 
22. What role do PR NGOs play in HIV prevention in Ukraine? 
 
23. To whom are the NGOs accountable for HIV prevention activities? 
 
24. Do HIV prevention activities conducted by NGO get monitored? Who is 
conducting the monitoring of HIV prevention activities?  
 
25. How do you evaluate the role of International HIV/AIDS Alliance as a 
Principal Recipient of grants in Rounds 1 and 6 of GF? How was it 
established? Who established it? Does it function as a typically national 
NGO? 
 
26. The same – of the Network of PLWA? Is it a typical national NGO? 
 
27. How the work of NGOs – as Principal Recipients – is monitored at the country 
level? What forms does such monitoring take? 
 
 
BLOC OF QUESTIONS ON EVALUATING THE WORK OF GF AND 
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
28. Which portion of GF funding was targeted at HIV prevention? In Round 1? In 
Round 6? 
- The largest 
- The small part 
- Half 
- Not sure 
 
28a. In what degree the funding given by GF, corresponded to the country‘s 
needs in HIV prevention? Why do you think so? 
 
29. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of resources given by GF to prevention 
programmes (on a 5-degree scale)?  
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1 – extremely non-efficient 
2  – not very efficiently 
3 – average efficiency 
4 – efficiently 
5 -  very efficiently 
30.  Are the programmes funded by GF different from programmes funded by 
other donors in HIV/AIDS?  How? 
 
31. What are the perspectives of the development of HIV epidemic in Ukraine in 
future? 
32. What are the perspectives of Ukraine receiving new grants from GF? Why do 
you think so? 
 
QUESTIONS ON GLOBAL FUND ACHIEVEMENTS IN UKRAINE 
33. What, to your knowledge, was the main goal of GF programmes in Ukraine?  
34. Did the HIV prevention programmes supported by GF achieve the intended 
goal in Ukraine? Why do you think so? 
35. How did the programmes funded by GF, influence the national response to 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Ukraine? 
 
BLOC OF QUESTIONS ON DOCUMENTATION OF HIV-PREVENTION 
SERVICES 
 
1. Which documentation methods are you using to determine the coverage by 
HIV services? 
- Supplied by Principal Recipients (SyrEx, SyrEx Plus, etc.) 
- Other 
- Own (explain which ones). 
 
2. Do you know other systems of documenting HIV services? Did your 
organisation have an opportunity to choose among several documentation 
systems? 
 
3. Is the target correction being conducted during the course of implementing 
the project? 
- Yes 
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- No 
- Rarely 
- Never. 
3a. How can coverage figures be corrected if the project has started and it is clear 
that so many clients won‘t come? 
4. In which cases the estimates of coverage are being corrected? 
– when a surplus appears of instruments/informational materials etc.  
- When the shortage of instruments/informational materials etc. appears, 
 
- Other (explain what). 
5. How the unused instrumentarium/supplies is being disposed of? 
- utilised; 
- thrown into garbage; 
- transferred to state medical institutions. 
- distributed in advance; 
- distributed to one person for more persons; 
- other(describe what). 
6. Which services do you offer? 
- Counseling (including peer to peer), by project staff 
- Harm reduction (needle exchange etc.) 
- Client support during ARV-therapy, ST. 
- Information dissemination (trainings for clients, for staff of projects) 
- other 
7. How often does the client need to visit the programme to be documented as 
covered by HIV prevention services? 
- No less than once a month 
- Once a month 
- Twice a month 
- Once a week 
- Daily 
- Give your variant of answer. 
 
8. When entering data into SyrEx, which client is considered ―new‖ and which – 
―permanent‖? How are the permanent clients being documented in database? 
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9. How does the data system reflect the frequency of how often the client 
received services? 
 
10. How it is counted how many services did the client receive during one visit? 
 
11. What lies at the base of calculating the coverage indicators? 
- The quantity of given paraphernalia (supplies) 
- The quantity of distributed information materials 
- The number of people who received supplies and informational materials 
- The number of times that the person visited the site/community center 
- The combination of several or all of the above 
- Hard to answer 
- Other.  
 
12. Which data about the size of the target population is used to determine the 
needs of your project? 
- Estimates on the region covered by the project (write which ones) 
- Own estimates of the organization 
- Information supplied by Principal Recipient 
- All of the above 
- Other. 
 
13. What should, in your opinion, be included into the service that client is 
receiving during one visit? (not necessarily included now) 
 
14. Is the data collected through SyrEx influencing the possibility of receiving 
the future funding from GF? How? 
 
15. What is the purpose of using the data on coverage with services and 
distribution of materials, that are collected by Syrex? 
- To prepare PR reports to GF 
- To plan further prevention 
- To account for money received by sub-recipients 
- Other 
- Not sure. 
 
16. Is the data collected through SyrEx, reflecting: 
- Capacity of NGOs in HIV-service 
- Regional/local needs of HIV services 
- Real numbers of clients who are permanently covered. 
17. Your opinion on using SyrEx. 
